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WOi 1397 


Treaty History Series 















A History 
amLCFE* 




)f the On-Site 


eaty Imple 


rnmnoTi, i w iawfe rr. 




Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publishing Data 
Harahan, Joseph P. 

Kuhn, John C. Ill 

On-Site Inspections Under the CFE Treaty, A History of the On-Site 
Inspection Agency and CFE Treaty Implementation, 1990-1996 
Treaty History Series 
Includes Bibliographical References 


1. Treaties, Arms Control — United States — History. 

2. United States — CFE Treaty — On-Site Inspections — 
History. 3. Europe — End of Cold War — History. 

4. Russia — post-Cold War — History. 5. United States 
Government — History, Government. 

I. United States. Treaties. CFE Treaty. II. Title 



For the past decade Europe has been in transformation. For more than four decades the Euro¬ 
pean continent had been divided into two heavily armed military alliances. That sharp division soft¬ 
ened after 1986, as old forms of government were cast off and new nations emerged. Within a few 
years, across the length and breadth of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, nations assumed new 
responsibilities and rights under a series of new treaties, agreements, and international accords. The 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty played a pivotal role in this transformation. This 
history details the implementation of the CFE Treaty. In doing so, it contributes to our understanding 
of contemporary Europe. 

In the American constitutional system, the government is accountable to its people. This his¬ 
tory, the second in a series by agency historians, tells the American people about a significant treaty 
mission undertaken by their national government. It is based on extensive research in government 
documents, treaty records, inspector and escort interviews, and statistical reports. The result is an 
interesting history, one that will be used in treaty courses and disseminated widely to the public and 
national agencies throughout Europe and the United States. We hope that you will enjoy reading and 
learning how the United States conducted “On-Site Inspections Under the CFE Treaty.” 


Thomas E. Kuenning, Jr. 
Brigadier General, U.S. Air Force 
Director 


v 



Joseph P. Harahan is the senior historian at the On-Site Inspection Agency. Prior to joining the 
Agency, he was a historian in the Office of Air Force History and a faculty member at the University 
of Richmond and Michigan State University. He received a B.A. from the University of Virginia, an 
M.A. from the University of Richmond, and a Ph.D. from Michigan State University. He is the author 
of On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty (1993) and the co-editor of a multivolume Air Force 
history series, Warrior Studies (12 volumes). While completing this history he lectured at colleges, 
universities, and military academies in the United States and abroad. 

John C. Kuhn, III, joined the On-Site Inspection Agency in 1992. As an Air Force historian, he 
authored organizational histories at the 2nd Bombardment Wing and contributed to the annual histo¬ 
ries at the 8th and 15th Air Forces in the Strategic Air Command. At the On-Site Inspection Agency 
he assisted in the final stages of production of the Agency’s first history, On-Site Inspections Under 
the INF Treaty (1993) before turning to researching and writing this book. 


vi 



When the Cold War ended suddenly in 1989-90, the signposts were clearly visible. Communist 
governments collapsed in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Ro¬ 
mania, and Bulgaria. The Berlin Wall fell in November 1989. Germany was unified in October 1990. 
In the same period, the Soviet Union announced that it would withdraw, within four years, all of its 
680,000 stationed troops from Eastern Europe. The United States countered by declaring major 
withdrawals of its forces from Western Europe. Against this background of political revolution, 
unification, and massive military force withdrawals, the leaders of Europe, Canada, the United States, 
and the Soviet Union signed the Peace of Paris in November 1990. Two multinational agreements 
constituted the heart of that peace: the Accords for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. 

Following national ratification, the CFE Treaty entered into force in July 1992. By then the 
Soviet Union had collapsed as an empire and eight new republics had emerged to become treaty 
signatory states. In all, 30 Atlantic-Eurasian states implemented the CFE Treaty. On-site inspection 
played a critical role in monitoring treaty compliance. Every treaty state established new, or ex¬ 
panded existing, verification agencies and staffs to conduct and host on-site inspections. This history 
narrates the efforts by the United States and other nations to plan, staff, train, equip, and conduct 
on-site inspections under the CFE Treaty. 

The book begins with the CFE Treaty’s signature in November 1990, and it concludes with the 
signing of the Final Document at the First Review Conference in May 1996. Between those years, the 
treaty nations collectively reduced more than 50,000 conventional weapons—tanks, artillery, ar¬ 
mored combat vehicles, fighters, and helicopters. Hundreds, if not thousands, of on-site inspectors 
monitored these reductions in accordance with the protocols of the treaty. Inspection standards were 
established and sustained across national borders. A rule of law was replacing the rule of force. 

Many of the inspectors had been soldiers of the Cold War; now they were monitoring force reduc¬ 
tions under a complex peace treaty. Quietly, professionally, effectively these inspectors and their 
respective governments ensured that the new rule of “law,” as detailed in the CFE Treaty, was being 
enforced. 

Agency support for the research and writing of this history was directly attributable to the sup¬ 
port of Brigadier General Thomas E. Kuenning, Jr., USAF, OSIA Director (1995- ), and Brigadier 
General Gregory G. Govan, USA, OSIA Director (1993-1995). Dr. Joerg H. Menzel, OSIA’s Principal 
Deputy Director, took a personal interest and shepherded the project from the sharp knives of those 
hostile to major long-term efforts. Colonel Paul H. Nelson, USA, OSIA’s Chief of Staff, read the 
manuscript and encouraged the authors at every step along the way in the final two years. Colonel 
Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC, OSIA European Operations Command, read every word, wrote incisive 
comments, and then discussed each comment with us personally. His intellect and professionalism 
strengthened the final book in numerous ways. Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, Commander of the 
OSIA’s European Operations Command, contributed his support to the project in its final year. 

We would like to acknowledge the assistance and helpful suggestions of all of the people of 
OSIA’s European Operations Command. We interviewed many of the team chiefs, inspectors, plan¬ 
ners, logisticians, and commanders; their opinions and insights helped straighten out the often con¬ 
fusing references to treaty protocols, tables, paragraphs, and subparagraphs. In particular the follow¬ 
in' 




ing NCOs and officers shared their time and experiences: Stephen Barneby, Mark Bumala, David 
Carter, William Chesney, Joe Drach, Tom Dudley, Ed Gallagher, Les Garrison, David Gessert, Jan 
Karcz, Gary Karstens, Michael Lukes, Jack Monahan, Keith Oatman, Richard O’Shea, George Par¬ 
tridge, Ken Periman, Tom Regan, Larry Schultz, Mike Slifka, Bill Smith, and Ron Tait. In the review 
process, senior officials in the JCS, OSD (Policy), and OSD(Acquisition) read and critiqued the manu¬ 
script for policy and operations considerations. In that process, Mary Margaret Evans, OSD, Acquisi¬ 
tion, was especially helpful. 

When it came time for assembling the final book in all of its parts—the tables, charts, appendi¬ 
ces, bibliography, and fact checking—we are indebted to David Willford of the History Office. His 
diligence and intelligence made it a better history. Stephen Jimenez contributed to the chronology and 
appendices. Rolen Maddox helped cross-check every name, place, figure, and bibliographic reference. 
Bob Coleman and Tom Pearlman developed the cover art and maps, and assisted with other photo¬ 
graphs throughout the book. At EEI, Judy Cleary and Gayle Dahlman guided the book through 
production, Baiba Seefer edited the manuscript, and Jennifer Whittington created the design and 
layout, with the assistance of Lynn Whiteley. Rey Ovalle steered the finished design through the 
government bureaucracies to final publishing. Everyone knows that publishing a textbook of this 
nature is both an individual and a collective work. Individually, the authors researched and wrote the 
book, and they are credited on its cover and title pages. Collectively, the contributions of the others 
are mentioned only here. This fact obscures the appreciation we hold for their work and contribu¬ 
tions. We simply could not have completed this history without them. 


Joseph P. Harahan 
John C. Kuhn, III 
July 24, 1996 


viii 


Contents 



The Treaty and the Mission 



Initial Preparations 





Ratification Delayed 


1 


45 


73 




Standing Up the Unit 




Final Preparations 




CFE Treaty Baseline 




Reduction Years 


97 


133 


155 


199 



The CFE Treaty: A Durable Structure 225 



IX 





















APPENDICES 


A. CFE Treaty (Text) 265 

B. The CFE Treaty: Statements and Agreements (Text) 323 

A. 

C. The CFE1A Concluding Act (Text) 325 

D. CFE Review Conference: Final Document (Text) 331 

E. CFE Treaty: National Verification Organizations 341 

F. OSIA European Operations Command: Personnel Strength 1990-1992 343 

G. Chronology: CFE Treaty Negotiations and Implementation, 1972-1996 345 

CHARTS 

NATO Nations 8 

Warsaw Pact Nations 8 

NATO Reduction Liability 24 

WTO Reduction Liability 25 

CFE Inspection Deconfliction Matrix 62 

Inspection Team Composition 108 

U.S. CFE Treaty Team Leaders 165 

TABLES 

1-1. CFE Treaty Ceilings 19 

1-2. NATO Declared Holdings and Liabilities 20 

1-3. WTO Holdings and Liabilities 21 

3-1. Declared National CFE Holdings in November 1990 76 

3-2. Soviet Union’s ATTU Holdings and Transfers, 1988-1990 79 

3-3. The Tashkent Agreement: Allocation of Soviet TLE 89 

3-4. CFE Treaty Original State Parties 92 

7-1. National Holdings by Alliance 200 

7-2. NATO Equipment Transfers 205 

7-3. Residual Levels—NATO States (November 17, 1995) 221 

7- 4. Residual Levels—Eastern States (November 17, 1995) 222 

8- 1. CFE Treaty-Limited Equipment in the WTO Flank Zones 247 

8-2. Comparison of CFE Treaty Reductions by Group of States 257 


x 


8-3. Comparison of Selected National Holdings of CFE Treaty TLE 

8-4. Comparison of CFE 1A Military Manpower Figures for Selected Nations 

8-5. U.S. On-Site Inspections Under the CFE Treaty 


259 

260 
261 


MAPS 


Treaty-Limited Equipment for Each Group of States 22-23 

The Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 81 

Tashkent, Uzbekistan 89 

1st U.S./Eastern Mock Inspections 110 

U.S. CFE Liaison Team Deployments 124 

CFE Treaty Flank Regions 248 

Bibliography 353 

Glossary 361 

Index 363 


xi 





President Bush and the leaders of 21 nations sign the CFE Treaty in Paris, France, on November 19, 1990. 


O n November 19, 1990, the leaders of Western Europe, the 
United States, Canada, the Soviet Union, and Central 
Europe gathered in Paris to sign the Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe Treaty. 1 The CFE Treaty came amidst profound 
historical changes that were sweeping across the European conti¬ 
nent at the end of the Cold War. 2 During this time of transition, 
the treaty served as an international structural bridge. The CFE 
Treaty was both an arms reduction treaty, which mandated the 
signatory states to collectively reduce more than 38,500 military 
weapons, and a conflict prevention treaty. To prevent (or, more 
accurately, reduce the probability of) conflict in Central Europe, 
the CFE Treaty required the signatory nations to permanently 
reduce their stationed military forces in designated geographical 
zones in Central and Western Europe and on the flanks of the 
Soviet Union. Under the CFE Treaty, verification measures were 
the most extensive, intrusive, and complex of any modern arms 
control agreement. The heart of verification was and remains on¬ 
site inspections under the CFE Treaty. 


Chapter 1 

The Treaty and the Mission 













2 


On-Site Inspection Agency 



Moscow streets during August 1991 coup attempt; the 
Soviet Union collapsed on December 25, 1991. 


By the fall of 1990, European stability, char¬ 
acterized by the post-World War II division of 
Eastern and Western Europe and the ‘ German 
Question,” had changed decisively. 4 For more 
than four decades, ever since the Berlin Blockade of 1948, the threat 
of a continental European war had been present. In 1989-90 that 
threat was ending. For the new Europe, the CFE Treaty represented 
a practical measure, especially with its extensive, intrusive verifica¬ 
tion process, for establishing a new international process that would 
both reduce and establish lower levels of offensive military forces 
and their deployment for the 1990s and beyond. 


The process of implementing this cross- 
European treaty, stretching from the Atlantic 
Ocean to the Ural Mountains, began with the 
signatory nations’ exchanging thousands of pages 
of military force data, establishing verification 
agencies to conduct thousands of on-site inspec¬ 
tions, developing new data systems for monitor¬ 
ing the presence of tens of thousands of military 
weapons, and traversing millions of miles of 
territory to inspect declared sites, objects of 
verification, and specified areas. While the lead¬ 
ers of 22 nations had signed the CFE Treaty in 
November 1990, there were 29 nations that 
provisionally implemented the treaty at entry 
into force in July 1992. The increase in signatory 
nations was the direct consequence of larger 
historical forces reshaping the European conti¬ 
nent: Eastern Europe’s political revolutions, 
Germany’s unification, and the Soviet Union’s 
collapse. As a result, seven new nations, all 
drawn from the former Soviet Union, became 
signatory states. In 1993, the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia as a nation resulted in two new 
nations, the Czech and Slovak Republics, becom¬ 
ing signatory states. Thus, 30 nations imple¬ 
mented the CFE Treaty. 3 


In retrospect, it seemed so straightforward. The Cold War era 
had ended and the post-Cold War era had begun. Events of his¬ 
toric proportions came so rapidly in 1989-92 that all of Europe 
seemed, for a few years, to move in one, and only one, direction— 
toward democratic revolution. But as people swept up in contem¬ 
porary events know, change is straightforward only in history 
books. The present rarely is so clear. This realization was particu¬ 
larly true for the men and women entrusted with implementing 
and monitoring the CFE Treaty “on the ground.” As military 
professionals, they had to build new treaty verification agencies 
and staffs. As on-site inspectors monitoring a multinational treaty, 







3 


The Treaty and the Mission 


they had to cross bridges that stretched across Europe’s older, 
west-to-east national boundaries. These new bridges crossed to 
places, peoples, and military sites not visited, much less inspected, 
for more than 45 years. Consequently, there were days, even 
months, when the footing secured by the treaty seemed unsure. At 
times, the treaty’s very foundation—its legal authority sanctioned 
by national ratification—seemed certain to collapse. At other 
times, the treaty appeared to be carrying more of Europe’s security 
structure than it was designed to carry. Uncertainty was the rule 
for months and months. It is this uncertainty that makes this his¬ 
tory interesting. A rule of law was replacing a rule of force. No 
one was certain if the historical circumstances that created the 
political and military consensus for the signing of the CFE Treaty 
would continue throughout its implementation. 

The CFE Treaty signing in Paris in November 1990 came at 
the midpoint of a series of political and military changes occurring 
in Europe, the Soviet Union, and to a far lesser degree, the United 
States. Arms control treaties and agreements in the late 1980s had 
legitimized many of these changes and, in a few instances, they set 
the stage for more revolutionary developments. The Stockholm 
Agreement of 1986 was the first step. Then, in December 1987, 
President Ronald W. Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail S. 
Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) 
Treaty in Washington, D.C. That treaty was a diplomatic and 
military watershed; its elimination provisions and implementation 
measures set precedents for all subsequent modern arms control 
treaties. In the next five years, the United States, the Soviet Union, 
and their allies negotiated and signed two bilateral and five multi¬ 
lateral treaties: Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1990), Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (1990), Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty (1991), Vienna Document Agreements (1990, 1992, and 
1994), Open Skies Treaty (1992), Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
II (1993), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993).’ 

All these treaties incorporated on-site inspection as an impor¬ 
tant element in monitoring compliance. The first treaty, the INF 
Treaty, stipulated extensive on-site inspection rights. These rights 
were so extensive that President Reagan authorized the establish¬ 
ment of a new agency to conduct U.S. inspections of Soviet facili¬ 
ties and to escort Soviet inspection teams at U.S. military facilities. 
That new agency, established in the U.S. Department of Defense 
on January 26, 1988, was the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA). 
While the small but growing cadre of OSIA men and women orga¬ 
nized, trained, and conducted inspections in the initial phases of 
the INF Treaty, negotiations continued in Vienna and Geneva on 
other, more extensive, arms control treaties. One of these, the 
Treaty Between the Twenty-Two Sovereign Nations on the Reduc¬ 
tion of Their Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, became 
known as the CFE Treaty. 6 









4 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Early Negotiation to Signature 


c 

s 

c 

e 


Security 
Human Rights 

Technology/Science/Environment 


The Helsinki Process, officially called the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), provided the plat¬ 
form for CFE Treaty negotiations. The Cold War had divided 
Europe politically, economically, and militarily. On July 3, 1973, 
more than 25 years into the Cold War, delegates from 35 nations, 
including neutral and nonaligned European nations, the United 
States, Canada, and the Soviet Union, met in Helsinki, Finland, to 
bridge those divisions. This meeting was the first in a continuing 
series of CSCE conferences and meetings held in national capitals 
across Europe. At these meetings, delegates from the CSCE nations 
attempted to define and agree upon a set of legal principles that 
would apply to all European states and peoples. The first signifi¬ 
cant phase of this process culminated in August 1975 with the 
signing of the Helsinki Final Act. 

Through the Helsinki Final Act, the CSCE nations declared 
that issues concerning the future of Europe should be discussed in 
terms of three areas, or “baskets.” Basket one dealt with security 
in Europe, including issues such as national self-determination, 
territorial integrity, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Basket 
two covered progress in science, technology, and the environment. 
Basket three contained human rights and other issues. To enhance 
military security, the 35 CSCE states agreed to the concept of 
negotiating “confidence-building measures (CBMs).” The objec¬ 
tive of these measures, which were initially quite limited in scope 
because of the rigidity of the east-west European divisions in the 
Cold War, was to make each nation’s military capabilities and 
intentions more transparent. The theory was that if nations knew 
of their neighbors’ military capability and intentions, then these 
nations might develop confidence in their international relations 
and possibly reallocate their security resources to other national 
concerns. Collectively, the European continent was the most 
heavily armed of any continent in the world. National armies and 
air forces were large, well equipped, and modern. Both the United 
States and the Soviet Union had stationed large, combat-ready 
armies and air forces in Central Europe. The first confidence¬ 
building measure, signed in 1975, required all 35 CSCE nations to 
provide every other nation a 21-day advance notice of any military 
exercises involving more than 21,000 troops. Other provisions 
stipulated the voluntary notification of smaller exercises as well as 
large-scale troop movements on an annual calendar. 


In contrast to the successful negotiation and institution of 
these CSCE confidence-building measures, another set of cross- 
European diplomatic-military negotiations, the Mutual and Bal¬ 
anced Force Reductions (MBFRs), did not fare well. These nego¬ 
tiations were between the representatives of two alliances: the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw 










_The Treaty and the Mission 


5 


Treaty Organization (WTO). Initiated in 1973, the negotiations 
lasted intermittently for 17 years. They were never able to get past 
several stumbling blocks. NATO sought reductions in military 
personnel stationed in Europe, whereas WTO proposed equal 
reductions in both military personnel and weapons. The objective, 
NATO argued, would be to achieve, after several phased with¬ 
drawals, end-strength parity in the forces of both alliances. The 
Warsaw Pact, as the WTO was commonly known, countered that 
both alliances should be reducing the same number of personnel 
and weapons, leaving the end strength unbalanced. Neither alli¬ 
ance would agree during the lengthy negotiations whether to make 
the cuts in equal slices or through gradual reductions leading to 
parity. Nor could they agree on whether the cuts should be made 
on an alliance-to-alliance or a nation-by-nation basis. In addition, 
a major U.S. concern was that there was no satisfactory method to 
verify personnel cuts. In lieu of any agreement in these protracted 
and frustrating MBFR negotiations, both NATO and WTO mod¬ 
ernized their conventional weapons and maintained their focus on 
combat readiness. Huge, modern, massed armies and air forces 
continued to face each other across a line running through a di¬ 
vided Germany. 8 


Military Forces in Europe 
1986 

NATO—3,670,000 
WTO—5,343,000 


Throughout these years, the 35 CSCE nations continued 
meeting in a series of lengthy conferences in Madrid, Stockholm, 
and Vienna. The Madrid meetings began in November 1980 and 



A U.S. team observes a Russian exercise—a CSCE-negotiated confidence-building measure. 





6 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


led to the delegates agreeing on a September 1983 CSCE Mandate. 
This mandate called for all delegates to negotiate agreements 
implementing not only confidence-building measures among the 
states of Europe, but alsomew treaties leading to the gradual disar¬ 
mament of Europe. At the Madrid meeting, the CSCE nations 
accepted a broader definition of Europe as envisioned first by 
French President Charles de Gaulle, then by President Valery 
Giscard d’Estaing, and finally strongly articulated and argued by 
the United States. It defined Europe as stretching from the Atlantic 
Ocean to the Ural Mountains. 9 This meant that any future agree¬ 
ment or treaty would include military forces and equipment sta¬ 
tioned across the length and breadth of Europe, including the 
interior of the Soviet Union. This definition had significant impli¬ 
cations for the CFE Treaty. 

Three years later in Stockholm, in September 1986, CSCE 
delegates agreed to new confidence and security building measures 
(CSBMs). These measures required notification of military exer¬ 
cises involving more than 13,000 troops and provided for on-site 
inspection of field activities involving 17,000 or more ground 
forces or 5,000 or more airborne troops, with no right of refusal 
by the inspected nation. Known as the Stockholm Document of 
1986, this was the first multinational agreement that the Soviet 
Union signed permitting on-site inspections on its own territory to 
verify an arms control accord. 1 " 

In agreeing to the Stockholm Document, Gorbachev signaled 
his intent to accelerate negotiations for reducing military arma¬ 
ments across Europe. Throughout 1986-87, Gorbachev gave a 
series of dramatic speeches, calling upon European and American 
leaders to consider phased reductions in conventional and nuclear 
forces based on the European continent. He changed the course of 
all previous negotiations by conceding that since the Soviet Union 
had numerically superior conventional forces in Europe, the 
NATO nations might reasonably conclude that these forces were a 
threat. He further stated that under any negotiated all-European 
arms control treaty, the side with the greater number of forces 
ought to take a larger share of the reductions, provided there was 
adequate verification through on-site inspections. Under the Soviet 
Union’s leadership, the seven-nation Warsaw Treaty Organization 
met in Budapest and endorsed Gorbachev’s proposals. 11 

Responding to these significant new Soviet and Warsaw Pact 
initiatives, the foreign ministers of NATO created a High Level 
Task Force (HLTF) in May 1986 to develop a coordinated alliance 
proposal for a conventional arms reduction treaty. Following long 
and difficult internal discussions within the 16-nation alliance, this 
NATO task force produced a negotiating position in December 
1986. The NATO foreign ministers in their December meeting 




7 


he Treaty and the Mission 



NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. 


proposed a two-track negotiating strategy. One would consist of 
the 35 CSCE nations’ pursuing broader and more transparent 
confidence-building measures. The other would have the NATO 
nations and the WTO nations negotiate phased reductions and 
stability provisions for their conventional forces in Europe. This 
two-track strategy was adopted. 12 

Just five weeks later, negotiators from 23 states (16 NATO, 

7 WTO) met in Vienna on February 17, 1987, to discuss treaty 
negotiating guidelines. Nearly two years of detailed, often techni¬ 
cal discussions, both among the allied nations and between the 
alliances, produced on January 14, 1989, the Mandate for Nego¬ 
tiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. This mandate 
established the fundamental negotiating principles for the CFE 
Treaty. Specifically, the treaty would include provisions to reduce 
or prevent the capability of any nation, or group of nations, to 
mass military forces on the European continent in order to launch 
a surprise attack across national borders. The treaty would seek to 
significantly reduce offensive military hardware; these reductions 
would be asymmetric, with the objective of an end-strength parity 
between alliances. In addition, the treaty would contain provisions 
for a robust and intrusive verification regime. 1 ' 














































8 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


NATO 

Nations 

Belgium 

Luxembourg 

Canada 

Netherlands 

Denmark 

Norway 

France 

Portugal 

Germany 

Spain 

Greece 

Turkey 

Iceland United Kingdom 

Italy 

United States 


Twenty-three states began negotiations under the Cold War 
structure of Europe. The NATO alliance, 16 nations including the 
United States, formed one side; the Warsaw Pact, 7 nations domi¬ 
nated by the Soviet Union, constituted the other. Although these 
nations shared negotiating goals and strategies as members within 
their alliances, they were independent, sovereign nations. Under 
the treaty being negotiated, the individual signatory states would 
hold all rights and obligations. Recognizing this fact, French nego¬ 
tiators successfully argued for not identifying in the formal treaty 
language either the NATO or the Warsaw Pact alliance. Instead, 
the French persuaded the other nations to use the term “group of 
state parties” to refer to the two alliances. 14 This became a critical 
treaty term since it allowed negotiators to incorporate the existing 
bloc-versus-bloc structure as an integral element of the treaty 
while holding the individual states responsible for treaty imple¬ 
mentation. This dualism remained in the treaty despite revolution¬ 
ary changes that transpired in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet 
Union in 1990-92. 


Warsaw Pact 
Nations 

Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
German Democratic Republic 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Soviet Union 


In late 1989, the East Germans revolted; the Berlin Wall fell, 
and the German Democratic Republic’s communist government 
collapsed. German unification became a serious possibility. Ger¬ 
man Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail S. 
Gorbachev, British Prime Minister Margaret H. Thatcher, French 
President Francois Mitterrand, and American President George 
Bush participated in a series of dramatic meetings in 1990. These 
negotiations culminated in a series of international agreements 
that recognized Germany as a single, unified nation, effective 
October 3, 1990. While these events unfolded, the Warsaw Pact 
collapsed. This collapse was a direct consequence of the “velvet” 
revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1988-89 as the peoples of 
Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria rejected 
their communist governments. Equally important was the fact that 
Gorbachev and the leaders of the Soviet Union allowed the revolu¬ 
tions to proceed. Previous attempts by Warsaw Pact nations to 
depart from communism had resulted in forceful Soviet military 
intervention. In 1989-90, by contrast, Soviet troops were with¬ 
drawing from Eastern Europe. 15 

All these events influenced the CFE Treaty. The issue of 
German unification posed several concerns for treaty negotiators. 
A united Germany would possess a large, modern armed force. 

It would have the largest national army and air force in Central 
Europe. Twice in the 20th century, Germany had sought to domi¬ 
nate continental Europe. Acknowledging this legacy, German 
Chancellor Kohl pledged that his government would reduce the 
size of the new nation’s military forces. Germany submitted a 
special declaration to be included in the CFE Treaty. The “Decla¬ 
ration by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on 
the Personnel Strength of German Armed Forces” stated that 







9 


The Treaty and the Mission 


Germany would cut its troop strength to 370,000 three to four 
years from the day the CFE Treaty entered into force. 16 This decla¬ 
ration persuaded other nations to declare their willingness to 
negotiate u to limit the personnel strengths of their conventional 
armed forces.” Although negotiators did not reach agreement on 
this issue in time for the signing of the CFE Treaty in Paris in 
November 1990, they continued negotiations throughout 1991 
and 1992. By July 1992, the time of the treaty’s entry into force, 
national personnel limits were contained in a separate document, 
entitled the CFE 1A Concluding Act. 

Another event, also larger than the treaty and influencing it, 
was General Secretary Gorbachev’s unilateral declaration at the 
United Nations in December 1988 to withdraw six tank divisions 
(50,000 men) from the nations of Central Europe. 17 This unprec¬ 
edented, massive Soviet military withdrawal, coupled with the 
Eastern European nations discarding communist governments for 
democratic rule, resulted in a weakened, impotent military alliance 
among the Warsaw Pact nations. Just five months before the CFE 
Treaty’s signature, the Hungarian National Assembly on June 26, 
1990, voted 232-0 to initiate negotiations for Hungary to leave the 
Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact. 18 Since the framework of the CFE 
Treaty rested on a group of states as the basic unit for all reduc¬ 
tions and end-strength parity, a breakup of the WTO presented the 
possibility that those nations would no longer act as a group. This 
did not happen. The Eastern European states did not want the 
possible dissolution of the alliance to prevent the CFE Treaty from 
entering into force. 



The CFE Treaty was negotiated under a NATO/WTO scenario. 








10 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Ambassador Grinevsky on Soviet Negotiations 



A professional diplomat, Oleg Grinevsky led the De¬ 
partment of Mid-Eastern Affairs, USSR Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, from 1978 through 1983. During the 
next two years, he served as the Soviet Ambassador to 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Eu¬ 
rope. Then, in 1985, he became the Chief Arms Con¬ 
trol Negotiator for the USSR for the CFE Treaty. For 
the next five years, he worked directly with President 
Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister 
Shevardnadze to negotiate the treaty. 


On Soviet leaders and the concept of on-site 
inspections: “In December 1985, Gorbachev had 
a one-on-one with each of his arms control nego¬ 
tiators. He wanted to start ‘real negotiations’ 
with ‘real reductions’ in armaments to make 
Europe and the world less militarized and less 
dangerous. During the time of [Conference on 
Disarmament in Europe] negotiations in 
Stockholm, I suggested that we accept one or two 
on-site inspections every year of Soviet forces 
because it would convince the West of our good 
intentions and [it] would not harm our military 
position in any way.” 

On resistance within the Soviet Politburo: “In the 
meetings on arms control, the sides were gener¬ 
ally Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, Yakolev, and 
Grinevsky against Marshal Akhromeyev, 
the KGB Chief, the Director of the Central 
Committee’s International Department, and the 
Military Departments. Marshal Akhromeyev was 
the key member of the Politburo who opposed 
the CDE measures. As the head military officer, 
his ideas were important and persuasive. But he 
was very ‘explosive,’ and would speak out force¬ 
fully on his views. 

“The Politboro met on weekends. I would 
return from Stockholm and present the results of 
that week’s negotiations. The arguments were 
heated. Usually, they took the form of my intro¬ 
ducing a proposal and, if it was unacceptable, 
Akhromeyev would ‘explode,’ explaining that the 
proposal endangered the military security of the 


state. Gorbachev would then step in and ‘medi¬ 
ate’ the dispute, making sure at the end that 
everyone on the Politburo agreed. This happened 
on the discussions on the on-site inspection mea¬ 
sures, and that is how it was resolved.” 

On Gorbachev and Soviet participation in the 
more radical arms control treaty negotiations: 
“First of all, there was the economic situation in 
the country. The USSR needed time and resources 
to improve its economic situation.... Second, to 
do this we had to improve relations with the West 
to reduce tensions, to make economic relations 
easier by getting rid of the West’s biggest fear, the 
size and power of the Soviet military forces in 
Europe. We wanted to change our military profile 
in Europe and reduce our dominance over East¬ 
ern Europe. 

“We actually succeeded, especially after 
the CFE Treaty, which, by the way, only 
Shevardnadze really supported. Shevardnadze 
realized that only after this treaty would the 
USSR be safe from a Western attack. The country 
would be able to save resources from the conven¬ 
tional force reductions to use elsewhere. 

“Conventional forces are very expensive, and 
the money saved would be considerable. But 
virtually all of the others opposed the CFE Treaty 
because the USSR would be giving up its ‘over¬ 
whelming military advantage’ in Europe. They 
could not visualize a Soviet Union that did not 
have a huge and powerful military, even if it 
meant better living conditions for the people.” 


Source: Interview, Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, U.S. Army, March 14, 1994. 






The Treaty and the Mission 11 


Ambassador Hansen on U.S. Negotiations 


Lynn M. Hansen was the U.S. Ambassador to the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
1992-93. In 1989-90, he served on the U.S. delega¬ 
tion negotiating the CFE Treaty. Educated at Utah 
State University, Hansen was a Fulbright Scholar to 
the Free University of Berlin. The recipient of an 
M.A. and a Ph.D., he is fluent in German, Dutch, 
Swedish, and Russian. Currently, Ambassador 
Hansen is Vice Chairman for Evaluation, National 
Intelligence Council. 

On the Bush administration’s decision to pursue the 
CEE Treaty: “The United States made the decision 
to push the treaty sometime in 1989. It began in 
March 1989, but there was a little bit of time before 
they really made the decision that, by golly, we are 
going to get this agreement. They brought in Jim 
Woolsey [as Chief Negotiator], and I came with 
him. That was in November 1989. It was precisely 
the time when the Berlin Wall came down.” 

The INF Treaty as a precedent: “The INF experi¬ 
ence was both a positive and negative model for us. 

It was positive insofar as we and the Soviet Union 
had an experience which we shared, and we knew 
what had to be done. But this very fact was resented 
by some, particularly the French, who took some 
pains to make sure that we did not use INF termi¬ 
nology very much. But since it was the only experi¬ 
ence anyone had, we still used it. So it was very, 
very important to us in terms of methodologies and 
procedures.... 

“Clearly, there were two things that influenced 
us. One was, of course, the INF Treaty. The second 
was the shared experience everybody had with the 
Stockholm Agreement. That was a European-domi¬ 
nated experience, and it was very, very important. I 
think it was every bit as important to the Europeans 
and to the negotiation of the CFE Treaty as was the 
INF Treaty. Thirty-five nations had shared in that 
experience, but only 23 were in the CFE negotia¬ 
tions—and all of them had been involved in the 
Stockholm Agreement, every one.” 

Negotiating the final CFE Treaty verification issues: 
“As we proceeded through negotiations we were 
able to resolve most of the issues up until October 
1990. We were within a month of treaty signing and 

Source: Interview, Joseph P. Harahan, OSIA, December 14, 1993. 



didn’t have the basic question of a site versus an 
object of verification resolved. It was the basis for 
calculating the number of inspections, and what we 
were to inspect. In October 1990, the Russians paid 
a visit to Washington. A small team of us took 
Soviet Ambassador Grinevsky into a room in the 
State Department and we talked about the CFE 
Treaty, specifically verification. 

“The [U.S.] interagency community, or more 
accurately, decisionmakers at a high level, had 
decided that they would accept the Soviets’ object 
of verification concept, provided the Soviets would 
agree to the way it would be implemented. We put 
this proposition to Ambassador Grinevsky. He 
indicated that he wanted the appropriate people 
involved. We requested that he send his verification 
negotiator to the U.S. He called him over. His name 
was Gennadiy Yefstaviyev. We met in New York. 

The idea was that while the UN First Committee 
was in session, we would attempt to resolve the 
final parts of the CFE Treaty. 

“I arranged my room in the Waldorf Astoria to 
be a little negotiating room. As it turns out, only I 
and Yefstaviyev used it. One on one, we wrote out 
the final parts of the verification protocol, which 
included the concept of object of verification and 
access to the declared sites. We also developed the 
definition of a declared site and other definitions 
which have stood the test of time rather well. 

“Basically, we did it this way. My negotiating 
style was to write everything down. Then, these 
texts were given to Mr. Shevardnadze and Secretary 
Baker. They would meet, discuss, and bless them. By 
the time that New York meeting was over, we had, 
for all intents and purposes, an agreement on the 
verification protocol.” 





12 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Consequently, throughout 1990, the Central European War¬ 
saw Pact nations, specifically Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, 
Romania, and Bulgaria, continued to negotiate as a “group of 
state parties,” although most believed that the Warsaw Pact would 
dissolve by the end of 1991. In the negotiating sessions, these 
nations took positions that reflected their independent national 
status, but in the final treaty text and implementing protocols, 
they agreed to retain the terminology of bloc-to-bloc limits and 
zones. Since Soviet military forces were still withdrawing from 
Eastern Europe, no nation wanted to impede this withdrawal. This 
deliberate political act allowed the basic framework of the treaty 
to remain in place while the East European nations strengthened 
their new independent governments. 19 

By October 1990, most major treaty provisions, protocols, 
and statements had been agreed to; however, the basis for calcu¬ 
lating the number of inspections had not been determined. The 
United States argued that the location of treaty-limited equipment 
(TLE) and military units, known as a “declared site,” should be 
the basis for calculating the number of inspections. The declared 
site was what an inspection team would inspect. The Soviets 
countered that the number of inspections should be based on the 
“objects of verification” (OOVs). The OOV was a declared mili¬ 
tary organization that held equipment limited by 
the treaty. An OOV could also be a designated 
permanent storage site that held TLE not associ¬ 
ated with a specific unit, or any location, where 
TLE would be found routinely. The Soviet posi¬ 
tion was that a team would inspect the OOV— 
the organization, storage depot, or location and 
its TLE, not the entire site where they were 
located. For many, this distinction was difficult 
to understand; yet, it was important to the Soviet 
High Command because they colocated many 
military organizations at a single location. The 
Soviet Army often had several OOVs on a single 
declared site. Here was a major disagreement, 
declared site versus OOV, and neither the NATO 
nations nor the Warsaw Pact nations were will¬ 
ing to compromise. 

In an eleventh-hour effort, American CFE 
Treaty negotiator Lynn M. Hansen and Soviet 
CFE Treaty negotiator Gennadiy Yefstaviyev 
held a series of meetings in the weeks and days 
before the treaty was signed. 20 There was little 
time for extended deliberations. President Bush 
had stated that he would not attend the Paris 
CSCE Conference, scheduled for mid-November 
1990, if a CFE Treaty was not ready for signa- 


Declared Site 


OOV 1 
53rd Tank Brigade 


OOV 2 

52nd Tank Brigade 



Declared Site 

OOV 1 Declared for Inspection 































































13 


The Treaty and the Mission 


ture. Time was running out; in late October Ambassador Hansen 
met with Ambassador Grinevsky and others at the U.S. State De¬ 
partment to resolve the impasse. Their solution recognized the 
OOV as the item for inspection, but also granted inspectors access 
to the entire site except for areas belonging exclusively to another 
OOV. Declared site areas that were not part of an OOV, were 
colloquially referred to as common areas. This ambiguous solution 
resolved a treaty negotiating impasse, but it created problems later 
during treaty implementation. 

Long before this issue would surface during actual on-site 
inspections, the treaty text and protocols had to be finalized, 
signed, and ratified. To complete the treaty, Soviet CFE negotiator 
Yefstaviyev went to New York, where he and the American nego¬ 
tiator Hansen developed the final segments of the inspection pro¬ 
tocol. They in turn persuaded members of their respective blocs in 
Budapest and Brussels to accept the negotiated provisions. How¬ 
ever, this U.S.-USSR agreement came at a cost. These end game 
negotiations brought to a head a belief held by many of the other 
signatory states: the two superpowers, the United States and the 
USSR, were resolving too many issues bilaterally. From this point 
forward, the CFE Treaty negotiators from the European states 
began meeting among themselves. A stronger “European” perspec¬ 
tive on the CFE Treaty and its implementation began to emerge. 
Despite this development, the march toward final agreement con¬ 
tinued. After delegates agreed to all of the final provisions, the 
CFE Treaty was ready for signature. 


CFE Treaty Signature 

In mid-November 1990, the three-day meeting of the Confer¬ 
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe convened in Paris. 

The leaders of 22 nations, including Bush, Gorbachev, Kohl, 
Mitterrand, and Thatcher, signed the CFE Treaty on November 
19, 1990. At that point, the signatory states included Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nor¬ 
way, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, Soviet Union, 
United Kingdom, and the United States. Amidst all the historic 
changes sweeping across the European continent, the CFE Treaty 
constituted a new legal and diplomatic framework for reducing 
military forces and limiting national aggression in post-Cold War 
Europe. 21 

The CSCE Conference’s political and diplomatic dimensions 
were revealed the next day as the leaders of 34 states signed the 
Charter of Paris for a New Europe. 22 This charter codified state¬ 
ments on human rights, democratic values, and the rule of law for 
all European states and peoples. At the same session, leaders of the 



14 


On-Site Inspection Agency 








Leaders of CSCE nations at the November 1990 Paris Summit. 


16 NATO nations, 6 WTO nations, and 12 neutral and non- 
aligned European nations pledged to seek a nonconfrontational 
security structure for all of Europe. That structure began, of 
course, with their endorsement of the objectives of the CFE Treaty. 
Next, they agreed to establish and strengthen CSCE institutions. 23 
A new, small CSCE Secretariat would be established in Prague; a 
CSCE Conflict Resolution Center would be set up in Vienna, and 
a new CSCE Election Monitoring Office would be located in War¬ 
saw. At the same time, the 35 national leaders affirmed their com¬ 
mitment to follow the provisions of the Vienna Document 1990, 
an important new cross-European confidence and security building 
measure that expanded the provisions of the earlier Stockholm 
Document of 1986. 24 The new Vienna Document 1990 stipulated 
annual exchanges of military force data, regular military-to-mili- 
tary contacts, and on-site inspections as confidence and security 
building measures. When the three-day CSCE Conference con¬ 
cluded, it was seen as another significant step in the transition to 
post-Cold War Europe. 

President Bush, in his remarks to the 69 assembled presidents, 
prime ministers, and foreign ministers, cited the Helsinki Final Act 
of 1975 and the courage of the European peoples who worked to 


















15 


The Treaty and the Mission 


implement the CSCE objectives. He noted that three of the Euro¬ 
pean leaders present, the presidents of Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
and Bulgaria, had been jailed or persecuted for exercising their 
rights under the Helsinki Act. President Bush asserted that the 
treaty was the military dimension of the CSCE process and that it 
was “the most far-reaching arms agreement” ever negotiated. 25 In 
his remarks, President Gorbachev praised the CFE Treaty and 
called for action on the other arms control treaties then under 
negotiation, especially in the areas of strategic nuclear weapons. 26 
When they spoke, both Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand 
took a longer, European view. In the last 200 years, Kohl said, 
“Europe, and my country in particular, became the epicenter of 
worldwide catastrophes.” Now, he declared it was time for Euro¬ 
pean peace. Mitterrand observed that for the first time in Euro¬ 
pean history the massive changes occurring across the continent 
were “not the outcome of war or bloody revolution.” 27 

Between the hyperbole and the history lay the signed CFE 
Treaty. But before it could enter into force, it had to be ratified. 
That process would take nearly two years; in the interim, the 
treaty became the subject of intense scrutiny by those responsible 
for implementation. 


Anatomy of the CFE Treaty 


Text and Declarations 

The CFE Treaty contained 23 articles that spelled out 
treaty definitions and requirements in terms of equipment, 
quantities, locations, and time periods. The treaty outlined 
requirements for exchanges of information, reductions 
(elimination or conversion of TLE), and on-site inspec¬ 
tions. It also authorized the formation of a Joint Consulta¬ 
tive Group (JCG) of all signatory nations to resolve issues 
that might arise during the life of the treaty. Eight proto¬ 
cols provided detailed procedural guidance on the require¬ 
ments outlined in the 23 articles. Finally, three important 
declarations were included in the treaty. 28 

The first declaration defined and limited the number 
of land-based naval aircraft and attack helicopters. This 
declaration was but one element of a larger problem that 
treaty negotiators faced. Combat aircraft had been a par¬ 
ticularly difficult issue during treaty negotiations. The 
Eastern group of states held an advantage of more than 
2,000 land-based combat aircraft over the NATO nations’ 
air forces. The Soviet Union wanted the CFE Treaty limits 
to codify that advantage. If the NATO nations wanted an 
equal number of combat aircraft, the Soviet negotiators 
argued, they would have to build up to the Eastern group 



TREATY BETWEEN THE 

TWENTY TWO SOVEREIGN NATIONS 
ON THE 


REDUCTION OF THEIR 
CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES 
IN EUROPE 


19 NOVEMBER 90 


23 ARTICLES 



8 PROTOCOLS 



3 DECLARATIONS 














16 On-Site Inspection Agency 



Several issues concerning combat aircraft, like the MiG-29, were contentious in negotiations. 


of states’ treaty-authorized totals. NATO representatives coun¬ 
tered that the goal should be to achieve a treaty-authorized end- 
strength figure that would put the two groups of states on an 
equal footing in regard to the final number of combat aircraft. 
NATO’s proposal would require the Soviets to eliminate thousands 
of combat-ready aircraft. This was unacceptable to the Soviet 
High Command. 29 

Another aspect of the same problem was how to define a 
combat aircraft. The NATO states offered a definition that 
focused on the capability of the aircraft. If an aircraft could fly 
and deliver munitions, they argued, it was a combat aircraft and 
should be limited by the treaty. The Eastern group of states, how¬ 
ever, preferred a definition that categorized military aircraft by 
mission. Using this definition, they recommended excluding air¬ 
craft such as defensive fighter interceptors and combat aircraft 
used as trainers. These aircraft, they asserted, did not have offen¬ 
sive missions—they did not support ground forces—therefore they 
should not be limited by the treaty. In addition, the Soviets had 
reassigned 500 land-based aircraft from ground to naval units, 
and they wanted to exclude them from consideration arguing that 
the treaty did not apply to naval forces. These aircraft were impor¬ 
tant to the Soviet High Command because they constituted a 
counterbalance to NATO’s carrier-based aircraft, which were not 
limited by the treaty. The NATO states were concerned that any 
treaty exclusion of combat aircraft based on mission would sanc¬ 
tion a legal hiding place. Further, they were troubled by the Sovi¬ 
ets’ reassigning ground-based combat aircraft to naval forces. 

What would limit the Soviet military from simply assigning an 
increasing number of aircraft to naval forces? Painting a fighter’s 
tail and wings with naval unit insignia, NATO negotiators argued, 









17 


The Treaty and the Mission 


offered little evidence that the fighter would not be used for offen¬ 
sive operations within the treaty area. 30 

The issue became so contentious that as late as September 
1990, Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, commented in a news 
interview that combat aircraft might not be an element of the 
treaty. He suggested that these aircraft might become a consider¬ 
ation for subsequent CFE negotiations. Secretary Baker and For¬ 
eign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze met in New York City in late 
September to consider the final items of the treaty. By early Octo¬ 
ber, they had worked out a compromise agreement on 5,150 as the 
total number of combat aircraft a single country could possess in 
the treaty area. This ceiling reflected the Soviet High Command’s 
minimum needs. Concurrently with the Baker and Shevardnadze 
discussions in New York City, NATO’s High Level Task Force 
continued to review the issue in Brussels. Once Baker and 
Shevardnadze had reached an agreement, they presented it to each 
group of states. In Vienna, after treaty negotiators approved the 
single-nation limit, they moved forward on October 15, 1990, to 
agree on a ceiling of 6,800 combat aircraft per group of state 
parties. 31 

This 6,800 combat aircraft limit left the Eastern group of 
states with a 900 aircraft advantage. However, the new limits 
meant that the Soviet Armed Forces would have to eliminate 1,295 
aircraft, and the remaining members of its group of states, 277 
aircraft. The treaty limits included interceptor aircraft and Soviet 
Backfire bombers. Mission was not the basis for inclusion. Treaty 
limits excluded primary flight training aircraft, whereas combat 
aircraft trainers were included because of their offensive capabili¬ 
ties. The inclusion of combat aircraft trainers affected the Eastern 
group of states’ totals, primarily the Soviet Union’s. The NATO 
states, however, were not affected because their holdings were 
approximately 900 aircraft below the treaty ceiling. To compen¬ 
sate the Eastern group for agreeing to the lower combat aircraft 
ceiling, the NATO negotiators acceded to a treaty provision that 
allowed the reclassification of up to 550 unarmed training aircraft. 
Seven models of combat training aircraft could be reclassified. Key 
systems could be removed to render the aircraft useless for offen¬ 
sive operations. Reclassification of the MiG-25U fighters was 
limited to 130 aircraft. Once modified and certified by on-site 
inspectors, these reclassified aircraft would not count against the 
6,800 aircraft ceiling. 

In the final negotiations, the Soviet delegates were adamant 
on the issue of excluding their land-based naval aircraft from 
consideration. Ultimately, negotiators could not resolve the prob¬ 
lem within the structure of the legally binding treaty. Instead, they 
inserted into the treaty a political declaration that allowed each 
group of states, although in reality it applied only to the Soviet 



U.S. Secretary of State 
James A. Baker, III. 



Soviet Foreign Minister 
Eduard Shevardnadze. 


Soviet delegates were 
adamant on the issue of 
excluding their land-based 
naval aircraft. 







18 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


...the 22 nations declared an 
aggregated total of 201,005 
pieces of treaty-limited 
equipment. 


Union, to possess a certain number of land-based naval aircraft 
that did not count against the 6,800 ceiling for combat aircraft. 

The CFE Treaty did contain some limits, however. The total 
number of land-based naval aircraft was limited to 430 per group 
of states, with no nation allowed more than 400. This declaration 
recognized the initial Soviet advantage in combat aircraft going into 
treaty negotiations, but it limited the number of Soviet land-based 
naval aircraft to 400, and, most important, it sealed for the future 
the issue of combat aircraft being assigned to naval forces and being 
outside the treaty. Naval combat aircraft did not present the only 
unresolved issue as the time for treaty signature approached. The 
complex issue of setting and verifying limits on national military 
personnel could not be solved in the weeks leading up to treaty 
signature, and produced another treaty declaration. 

By inserting this second declaration into the CFE Treaty, 
negotiators stated that limits on national military personnel were 
an aspect of the CFE Treaty, but that such limits required further 
negotiations to reach agreement on specific figures and verification 
protocols. 32 Verification was the major stumbling point. U.S. nego¬ 
tiators believed that while counting CFE military equipment would 
be challenging, counting military personnel could become impos¬ 
sible, particularly during periods of extensive military reorganiza¬ 
tions, massive force reductions, and especially during rapid mili¬ 
tary expansions. There were other difficult issues associated with 
tracking military manpower. Just who would be counted: military 
reserves? naval infantry? military transients? In the end, negotia¬ 
tors agreed to continue manpower negotiations with a goal of 
reaching agreement by the Conference on Security and Coopera¬ 
tion in Europe to be held in Helsinki in July 1992. 33 Consequently, 
they included in this second CFE Treaty declaration a statement 
that all signatory states would not increase their current levels of 
peacetime personnel. Germany was the only state that made a 
treaty declaration to limit its military forces. Its pledge to limit its 
military forces to not more than 370,000 constituted the third 
declaration of the CFE Treaty. 34 

Scope 

The scope of the treaty in terms of nations, military equip¬ 
ment, and geography was enormous. In November 1990, 22 na¬ 
tions with military forces stationed over 2.3 million square miles 
had committed themselves to the CFE Treaty. The TLE fell into 
five major categories: tanks, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, 
armored combat vehicles, and artillery. Further, in each of those 
categories there were many types of equipment: 24 types of tanks, 
55 types of combat aircraft, 17 types of attack helicopters, and 
more than 50 types of armored combat vehicles (ACVs). Armored 
combat vehicles, a term coined for the treaty, grouped armored 





19 


The Treaty and the Mission 


personnel carriers (APCs), armored infantry fighting vehicles 
(AIFVs), and heavy armament combat vehicles into a single cat¬ 
egory. Heavy armament combat vehicles included vehicles that 
were not tanks, APCs, or AIFVs but had an integral gun of at least 
75 millimeter (mm) caliber and weighed at least 6 tons. Artillery 
included guns, howitzers, mortars, multiple launch rocket systems, 
and artillery pieces that combined the characteristics of guns and 
howitzers. There were more than 100 types of artillery and all 
were of at least 100mm caliber. The five categories of TLE con¬ 
tained more than 240 different types of equipment. The combined 
holdings of TLE for both groups of states surpassed 200,000 
pieces. 

The treaty also had provisions for reporting conventional 
armaments and equipment that were inventoried but not limited 
by the treaty. The Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional 
Armaments and Equipment listed all conventional armaments and 
equipment subject to the treaty. Known by its acronym, CAEST, 
this equipment included the five categories of TLE, plus combat 
support helicopters, unarmed transport helicopters, and Mi-24R 
and Mi-24K helicopters; primary trainer aircraft; armored-vehicle- 


launched bridges; and armored personnel carrier and armored 
infantry fighting vehicle “look-alikes.” Armored look-alikes were 
vehicles built on ACV chassis that were similar in appearance to 
an APC or an AIFV, except that they could not transport a combat 
infantry squad. They also did not have guns or cannons of 20 
millimeter (mm) or greater caliber. There were 21 types of look- 

Table 1-1. CFE Treaty Ceilings 


TLE 

In ATTU* 

In Each 

Alliance 

Sufficiency Rule 

In One Percent 

Country in ATTU 

'H 

Tanks 

40,000 

20,000 

13,300 

33% 

mr 

Artillery 

40,000 

20,000 

13,700 

34% 


ACVs 

60,000 

30,000 

20,000 

33% 


Aircraft 

13,600 

6,800 

5,150 

38% 


Helicopters 

4,000 

2,000 

1,500 

38% 


*Atlantic to the Urals. 

Source: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, November 1990, Articles IV, V, VI. 










20 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Table 1-2. NATO Declared Holdings and Liabilities 


TLE 

CFE Limit 

Declared 

Liability* 

Percentage 
of Holdings 

Tanks 

20,000 

25,091 

5,949 

24% 

Artillery 

20,000 

20,620 

2,334 

11% 

ACVs 

30,000 

34,453 

4,631 

13% 

Aircraft 

6,800 

5,939 

0 

0% 

Helicopters 

2,000 

1,736 

0 

0% 


‘Collectively, NATO nations set their CFE limits below the treaty limits. All figures as of 
November 19, 1990, the CFE Treaty initial data exchange. 

Source: CFE Treaty Declarations and Residual Ceilings, United Kingdom, Ministry of 
Defense, November 1990. 

alikes for the M-113 APC chassis alone, and these were not lim¬ 
ited by the treaty. In deference to the Geneva Convention of 1949, 
armored ambulances were not considered ACVs or look-alikes 
under the CFE Treaty. Thus, they were not reportable. 

Armored vehicle launched bridges were also subject to the 
CFE Treaty. Although they were not considered TLE, limits were 
placed on them. The treaty allowed each group of states to have 
740 armored bridges in use with their active forces. Any bridges in 
excess of this limit had to remain in storage. The treaty contained 
specific guidelines both for storing them and for removing them 
during an emergency. 

In the first official treaty information exchange, held in 
Vienna on November 18, 1990, the 22 nations declared an aggre¬ 
gated total of 201,005 pieces of TLE. By category, there were 
58,282 tanks, 77,402 ACVs, 47,573 artillery, 14,311 aircraft, and 
3,437 helicopters within the treaty area, from the Atlantic to the 
Urals.'' By November 1995, the total number of TLE within the 
area had to be below the treaty ceiling of 157,600 pieces. This 
final figure is the total of the five categories of offensive weapons: 
40,000 battle tanks, 60,000 armored combat vehicles, 40,000 
pieces of artillery, 13,600 combat aircraft, and 4,000 attack heli¬ 
copters (see table 1-1). These totals included a subtotal designating 
the maximum amount of equipment that active units could hold 
collectively, with the remainder stored in designated permanent 
storage sites. These maximum equipment figures, again one-half 
for each group of states, permitted active units to hold 33,000 
tanks, 54,600 ACVs, and 34,000 pieces of artillery. 

To lessen the possibility of any one nation’s becoming too 
dominant or unilaterally launching a massive surprise attack, the 
treaty stipulated limits on the amount of equipment that any one 
nation could have within the treaty area. Known as the “suffi- 






21 


The Treaty and the Mission 


Table 1-3. WTO Holdings and Liabilities* 


TLE 

CFE Limit 

Declared 

Liability 

Percentage 
of Holdings 

Tanks 

20,000 

33,191 

13,191 

40% 

Artillery 

20,000 

26,953 

6,953 

26% 

ACVs 

30,000 

42,949 

12,949 

30% 

Aircraft 

6,800 

8,372 

1,572 

19% 

Helicopters 

2,000 

1,701 

0 

0% 


*AII figures as of November 19, 1990, the CFE Treaty initial data exchange. 
Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1991, World Armaments and Disarmament, p. 426. 


ciency rule,” this provision allowed a nation sufficient forces to 
defend itself, but limited its forces and offensive equipment to 
approximately one-third of the total amount permitted for its 
group of states. As the Warsaw Pact disintegrated, this provision, 
which was originally a NATO proposal, took on an additional 
importance as the Central European nations sought to minimize 
the strength of the neighboring Soviet Union. 

Area 

The treaty’s area of application encompassed the territory of 
the European signatory nations stretching from the Atlantic Ocean 
to the Ural Mountains. Known as the ATTU (Atlantic to the 
Urals), the area consisted of four zones, three of which were con¬ 
centric rings centered on Germany, and one that defined the flanks 
of a European theater (see map). These four zones defined the 
areas in which the signatories agreed to limit the number of TLE 
for stationed ground forces. Because of their mobility and range, 
combat aircraft and attack helicopters were not subject to zone 
restrictions. The smallest zone encircled Central Europe, a focal 
point of the Cold War. It encompassed Germany, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, 
and designated European island territories. Military forces in this 
zone could not exceed 15,000 battle tanks, 22,500 ACVs, and 
10,000 pieces of artillery. 

The next, larger concentric zone extended beyond Central 
Europe and included additional nations. At treaty signature, the 
second zone included Denmark and the Faroe Islands, France, 

Italy, United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, and Soviet territory 
encompassing the Byelorussian, Carpathian, Kiev, and Baltic Mili¬ 
tary Districts. By the time of treaty ratification and entry into force 
in July 1992, the Soviet Union had dissolved and these military 







22 


On-Site Inspection Agency 



Sweden 


Norway 


North 

Sea 


reland 


Baltic 
Sea l 


Czechoslovakia 


France 


Switz 


ustria 


Hungary 


osma 


Morocco 


Tunisia 


North 

Atlantic 

Ocean 


Gree 


Port 


Poland 


BeiY Germany 

Lux^M 


Norwegian 

Sea 


Mediterranean Sea 














23 


The Treaty and the Mission 





























24 


On-Sitk Inspection Agency 


districts were located in the independent states of Ukraine, Russia, 
Belarus, and the Baltic nations. Equipment allowed in this zone 
totaled 20,600 battle tanks, 38,520 ACVs, and 18,200 pieces of 
artillery. Put another way, this larger zone, which included the 
smaller zone, could hold the equipment authorized in the smaller 
zone plus an additional 5,600 battle tanks, 16,020 ACVs, and 
8,200 pieces of artillery. 

The largest of the three zones at treaty signature encompassed 
the two smaller zones plus Portugal with the Azores and Madeira 
Islands, Spain and the Canary Islands, and the Soviet territories 
west of the Ural mountains encompassing the Moscow and Volga- 
Ural Military Districts. When the treaty entered into force, this 
expanded area, which stretched literally from the Atlantic to the 
Urals, included the independent states of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, 
and portions of Kazakstan. This zone allowed for 10,000 more 
battle tanks, 9,680 more ACVs, and 9,800 pieces of artillery for a 
total of 30,600, 48,200, and 28,000 pieces of equipment in their 
respective categories. The remaining pieces of TLE were autho¬ 
rized in the flank areas. 

The original treaty defined the flank areas as Bulgaria, 

Greece, Iceland, Norway, Romania, Turkey west of the Urals, and 
the Soviet territory encompassing the Leningrad, Odessa, North¬ 
ern Caucasus, and Transcaucasus Military Districts. By July 1992, 
when the treaty entered into force, portions of these former Soviet 
military districts were located in the new nations of Moldova, 
Russia, Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan. Other por¬ 
tions encompassed the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and 




NATO REDUCTION LIABILITY 

6,000 

5,949 






5,000 - 


2,379 




4,631 

| November 95 
[Tj November 94 
| November 93 

4,000 ~ 






1,852 

3,000 - 









2,082 


2,334 




2,000 - 




933 


1,621 

0 0 









1,000 - 


1,488 


817 


1,158 






584 


0 0 

0 

TANKS 

ARTILLERY 

ACVs 

AIRCRAFT HELICOPTERS 


























25 


The Treaty and the Mission 


Lithuania, nations that chose not to be CFE Treaty participants. 
Although the Baltic states were not subject to inspection, the Rus¬ 
sian forces stationed there were, and Russia’s reduction liability 
included the equipment not yet removed from the Baltic states. 

The total military equipment allowed under the treaty for the 
flank areas was 9,400 battle tanks, 11,800 ACVs, and 12,000 
pieces of artillery. 

Reductions 

Two of the CFE Treaty’s main objectives were to reduce the 
possibility of a surprise attack and to lower the probability of 
confrontation by reducing the total number of tanks, artillery, 
ACVs, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft the respective group 
of states could hold. To achieve these reductions, the treaty set 
specific schedules for reaching the final limits. As implementation 
unfolded, inspection teams monitored the pace and level of reduc¬ 
tion efforts. Inspections became important benchmarks for mea¬ 
suring treaty compliance. 

During the initial reduction phase, known by the term “first 
reduction year,” each nation had to reduce 25 percent of its hold¬ 
ings that exceeded treaty limits at entry into force (EIF). The initial 
reduction phase began at the provisional EIF on July 17, 1992, 
and lasted for 16 months. It encompassed the 120-day baseline 
inspection period followed by the first reduction year. A second 
reduction year followed, during which an additional 35 percent 
of the excess equipment had to be reduced. Treaty states would 


WTO REDUCTION LIABILITY 

































26 


On-Site Inspection Agency 




The treaty authorized converting tanks and ACVs to nonmilitary equipment. 


reduce the remaining 40 percent of their excess equipment during 
a third and final reduction year. This schedule gave each group of 
states 40 months to reduce all their weapons in excess of the final 
treaty limits. 

Article VIII of the CFE Treaty specified the methods allowed 
to reduce TLE. Reduction methods varied by equipment category, 
although destruction and placement on static display were options 
common to all categories of TLE. Nations could also convert 
tanks and ACVs for nonmilitary purposes or use them as training 
targets. A reduction option for the Soviet MT-LB armored person¬ 
nel carrier was modification that rendered the MT-LB incapable of 
transporting a squad of combat infantrymen. The only additional 
option authorized was to use the carriers as ground targets. Com¬ 
bat aircraft could also be modified for ground instructional use, 
and seven specific models of aircraft could be modified and reclas¬ 
sified as unarmed training aircraft. Helicopters, attack or multi¬ 
purpose attack, could be modified for ground instruction pur¬ 
poses, and the multipurpose helicopters could also be modified 
and recategorized as support helicopters. 

The Protocol on Reduction provided specific guidance on 
implementing the various methods of reduction listed in Article 
VIII. Authorized methods for destroying TLE included cutting, 
exploding, deforming, and smashing. The protocol also dictated 
the specific components to be destroyed for each category of 
equipment as well as the damage required to render a piece of TLE 
permanently ineffective as a military weapon. The protocol dic¬ 
tated the results, not the particular technology used to achieve 
them. How to accomplish a cut of a specific length in a specific 
location, for example, was an option of the state reducing the 
equipment. It was not necessary to destroy the entire weapon to 
achieve reduction. Unless specified in the reduction protocol as a 
component to be destroyed, some equipment, such as communica¬ 
tion systems, could be salvaged and the debris scrapped. 


■1 












27 


The Treaty and the Mission 


For aircraft, the fuselage was the critical component for a 
successful reduction by destruction; any other component could be 
salvaged. The first of the two authorized destruction methods to 
reduce an aircraft on the ground was severing, which required 
technicians to cut the nose and tail sections off the fuselage. The 
other option, deformation, required technicians to compress the 
fuselage to reduce its height, length, or width by at least 30 per¬ 
cent. In either case inspectors would have specific criteria and 
tangible evidence of an aircraft reduction. Using aircraft as target 
drones was an additional authorized destruction procedure for 
aircraft. Authorized methods of helicopter destruction were sever¬ 
ing, explosive demolition, and deformation. The fuselage and the 
transmission mounting area were the key components for a suc¬ 
cessful reduction, and specific damage criteria were outlined for 
each destruction method. 

Destruction methods for tanks and armored combat vehicles 
included severing, demolition, and smashing. Also allowed were 
procedures to reduce tanks by deformation, including welding or 
severing components of gun systems in addition to deformation of 
the hull and turret. The critical components to be damaged were 
gun tubes, breech systems, trunnions and their mounts, hulls, 
turrets, and integral main armament. 

Reducing artillery by destruction included severing, demoli¬ 
tion, smashing, and deformation. Specific criteria of damage were 
stipulated for components critical to making the piece of equip¬ 
ment a weapon. Those components were the tube, breech system, 
cradle with trunnion and mounts, and rails; launcher tubes or rails 
and their bases; mortar tubes and base plates; and vehicle hull and 
turret for self-propelled artillery pieces. 



The fuselage was the key 
component for an aircraft 
reduction, either by deformation 
or by severing, as shown on this 
MiG-21 “Fishbed.” 








28 


On-Site Inspection Agency 



Severing was the primary reduction 
method for all treaty-limited 
equipment (TLE). 


While destruction was the most common option selected for 
reduction, the treaty permitted other means as well. States owning 
the equipment were allowed to put it to use as something other 
than a weapon. Certain tanks and ACVs could be converted to 
nonmilitary equipment such as bulldozers, fire fighting equipment, 
and rescue vehicles. Any item could be reduced for static displays 
or placed in military museums. Tanks, ACVs, and artillery could 
be reduced for ground targets, and aircraft and attack helicopters 
could be reduced for ground instruction purposes. The key con¬ 
cept in these reductions was that specific components required 
disabling damage before certification for use for other purposes. 
However, the number of items that could be reduced using these 
treaty options was limited. 

Recategorization presented another reduction option, such as 
in the case of multipurpose attack helicopters. By treaty definition, 
these helicopters performed multiple military functions and em¬ 
ployed guided weapons. By removing their weapon systems, 
mounting points, fire control systems, and wiring, the owning 
state could recategorize these helicopters as combat support heli¬ 
copters not limited by the treaty. Well before any nations began 
these reductions, however, they collected and exchanged specific 
treaty data concerning their own forces and equipment. 

Data Exchange 

The initial, massive CFE Treaty data exchange occurred on 
November 18, 1990, the day before treaty signature. Freely pro¬ 
vided, this data exchange listed the order of battle for every signa¬ 
tory nation’s conventional forces stationed on the European conti¬ 
nent. Experts scrutinized these data immediately, and they became 
one of the primary sources for preparing and planning treaty 
implementation. Previously, a small army of intelligence officers 
would have been necessary to gather this information; now signa¬ 
tory nations were exchanging these data as part of their initial 
treaty obligation. Article XIII, the Protocol on Notification and 
Exchange of Information, and its Annex on the Format for the 
Exchange of Information required each signatory party to provide 
all other parties specific information on the status of its forces. 

The information was provided in six charts. 


Chart I provided the command structure for each nation’s 
conventional ground and air forces stationed in the ATTU. This 
chart identified each unit and assigned it a designator used in 
subsequent charts. Chart I also indicated the next two higher 
echelons in the unit’s chain of command. Charts IIA and IIB listed 
each nation’s total holdings of TLE. Chart IIA identified a state’s 
total holdings in treaty-limited tanks, ACVs, and artillery. It also 
revealed the quantity of TLE in each treaty area by category, sub¬ 
category, and type. Chart IIA also showed TLE in designated 





29 


The Treaty and the Mission 



On November 18, 1990, all CFE nations exchanged detailed information on their military forces. 


permanent storage sites (DPSSs). Chart IIB provided the same 
information for treaty-limited aircraft and helicopters, with two 
exceptions. There was no reporting by treaty zones for aircraft and 
helicopters nor did DPSSs apply. In Charts IIIA and IIIB, states 
reported all of their conventional armaments and equipment sub¬ 
ject to the treaty (CAEST). They reported not only those units 
holding TLE, as required in Chart I, but also those holding equip¬ 
ment not limited but nonetheless subject to the treaty, including 
naval units. In addition, the states reported all DPPSs, reduction 
sites, and locations where CAEST were routinely present, such as 
repair facilities or training establishments. Chart IIIA dealt with 
ground forces, and Chart IIIB covered air units. Any TLE located 
in the ATTU, but not in service with a state’s conventional armed 
forces, was reported in Chart IV. Also, internal security military 
organizations and their equipment that were not trained for com¬ 
bat against another military force were reported on Chart IV. 
Equipment being refurbished or held for export—for example, 
tanks and ACVs that had been reduced or were awaiting conver¬ 
sion—and equipment that had been decommissioned and was 
awaiting disposal were reported on Chart IV. 

On Chart V, states reported their objects of verification 
(OOVs). An OOV was any unit at the brigade/regiment, wing/air 
regiment, independent battalion/artillery battalion level, indepen¬ 
dent squadron, or equivalent unit holding TLE. Designated perma¬ 
nent storage sites, maintenance units, military training establish¬ 
ments, and airfields where TLE was permanently or frequently 
present were also OOVs. Reduction sites were OOVs as well, 
because of the excess TLE positioned on these sites. States also 
reported their declared sites on Chart V. 

While a nation’s total number of OOVs dictated the number 
of inspections it was liable to receive during the various phases 
of the treaty, the definition of a declared site dictated what was 
inspectable. A declared site was a precisely delineated geographic 
location containing one or more OOVs. Examples of declared sites 
were specific air bases, army posts, and storage depots on which 











30 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Chart IIIB: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS 
AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION III OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE 
OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (Date) 


Line 

Number 

Formation 
or Unit 
Record 
Number 

Designation 
of Formation 
or Unit 

Peacetime 

Location 

NOT 

USED 

Combat 

Aircraft 

Reclassified 

CCT 

Aircraft 

Primary 

Trainer 

Aircraft 

Attack 

Helicopters 

Combat 

Support 

Helicopters 

Unarmed 

Transport 

Helicopters 

Other 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

(f) 

(g) 

(H) 

(i) 

(j) 

(k) 

(1) 














The Protocol on Notification and 
Exchange of Information provided 
specific formats for presenting 
treaty-required exchange data. 



the OOVs were located. A declared site included all territory 
within its natural or man-made boundaries. A declared site also 
encompassed areas associated with the operations of the unit that 
might not be colocated, such as a railhead or a training area, but 
where CAEST and TLE were routinely present. For example, the 
36th Fighter Wing, a U.S. OOV, operated from a declared site, the 
Bitburg Air Base in Bitburg, Germany. This ratio of one OOV to 
one declared site was typical of most U.S. air unit OOVs, but 
ground units frequently colocated OOVs on a single declared site. 
For instance, three OOVs—the 3rd Battalion, 1st Field Artillery; 
82nd Engineering Battalion, 3rd Engineering Brigade; and 2nd 
Battalion, 14th Field Artillery—operated from one declared site: 
Warner Barracks in Bamberg, Germany. A declared site containing 
multiple OOVs was typical for the national militaries of the East¬ 
ern group of states. Declared sites and OOVs were critical for 
treaty implementation. 

Chart V listed the points of entry (POEs) associated with each 
declared site. Inspection teams entered and exited the inspected 
nation through the specific POEs designated for each declared site. 
Chart VI provided a listing of all designated POEs, categorized by 
the means of transportation used to reach them. In November 
1990, Greece, for example, reported two POEs on Chart VI, one 
at Athens International Airport for air arrivals and the other at the 
Port of Piraeus for arrivals by sea. The Greek government desig¬ 
nated both POEs as acceptable for 47 of their declared sites, while 
designating only one POE for the remaining declared sites. 

Treaty Periods 

Negotiators developed the treaty so that implementation took 
place in four different periods. The initial 120-day baseline valida¬ 
tion period, referred to as the CFE Treaty baseline, was expected 


CEE Treaty Periods 


































31 


The Treaty and the Mission 


to be an extremely busy period for inspection teams. During 
baseline each state party was prepared to receive inspections at a 
portion of its declared sites. During treaty negotiations, a consen¬ 
sus developed that there were too many declared sites to inspect 
each one during the brief baseline period. Consequently, negotia¬ 
tors agreed that it was not necessary to inspect each site to deter¬ 
mine if a nation had been accurate in its data exchange. They 
agreed that each nation would be liable for inspections based on 
20 percent of the total number of the OOVs declared in the initial 
exchange of data. These baseline inspections would occur when 
the amount of TLE and the number of OOVs would probably be 
at their highest and before nations could complete any significant 
TLE reductions. On-site inspections during baseline allowed states 
to take a significant sample of the data exchanged to determine its 
accuracy and to establish a base for planning future treaty activities. 

The second period, the reduction phase, occurred after base¬ 
line, when the pace of the declared site inspections slowed to a rate 
of 10 percent of the total declared OOVs per year. This rate re¬ 
mained in effect during the three reduction years. During those 
years, inspectors would be no less busy because of the requirement 
to conduct reduction inspections. After these initial baseline and 
reduction periods, the third phase would consist of a 120-day 
residual level validation period. During this phase, states would 
inspect at a 20 percent rate to confirm the amount of equipment 
remaining following the reductions. On completion of the residual 
validation period, the declared site inspections would be con¬ 
ducted at a rate of 15 percent of each state’s OOVs per year for 
the duration of the treaty, known as the residual period. 


On-Site Inspections 

Article XIV of the CFE Treaty allowed each state to verify 
compliance with all provisions of the treaty by giving each the 
right to conduct inspections. The same article obligated the treaty 
states to accept on-site inspections. Linder the CFE Treaty there 
were four types of on-site inspections: declared site inspections, 
challenge inspections, reduction inspections, and certification 
inspections. One purpose of these inspections was to ascertain if 
each state was observing the numerical limitations on TLE located 
in the treaty zones and the flanks. These inspections also moni¬ 
tored the reduction of TLE, the certification of recategorized 
attack helicopters, and the reclassification of combat-capable 
training aircraft. Each served a specific purpose, and the Protocol 
on Inspections outlined procedures for conducting each type of 
inspection. 

The declared site inspection was a critical tool for confirming 
the accuracy of exchanged treaty data. In theory and in fact, on¬ 
site inspections contributed to national security across Europe. 


Types of Inspections: 

• Declared Site 

• Challenge 

• Reduction 

• Certification 




32 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


The status of each state’s forces and equipment became transpar¬ 
ent to other states through inspection team reports and observa¬ 
tions. An inspected state could not refuse a declared site inspec¬ 
tion. It was a legal obligation under the treaty. Over the life of the 
treaty, the hundreds, indeed thousands, of on-site inspections 
allowed each state to conclude that other states were fulfilling 
their legal obligations and complying with the treaty’s require¬ 
ments. This important conclusion could, when combined with 
other information, lead to a new level of trust and confidence 
across national borders. Allowing treaty inspectors on-site was one 
key to developing and maintaining successful relationships among 
the signatory nations. 


Negotiators recognized that nations could not rely solely on 
the declared site inspections to monitor compliance with treaty 
procedures. Article XV addressed their right to use national tech¬ 
nical means such as satellites or reconnaissance aircraft to monitor 
treaty compliance. That article also prohibited the concealment of 
equipment to circumvent reconnaissance efforts. Negotiators also 
realized that to maintain a spirit of openness and cooperation, 
nations would have to open all of their territory to inspections, 
not just the sites where they had declared conventional military 
equipment. 



Challenge inspections allowed 
teams to inspect for the presence 
of TLE in areas other than 
declared sites. 


Challenge inspections gave participating nations the right to 
inspect a specific and limited area other than declared sites in any 
signatory nation within the ATTU. This inspection right increased 
the likelihood of detecting weapons at sites not de¬ 
clared in the exchanged data. As in declared site inspec¬ 
tions, quotas were applied to challenge inspections. 
Starting the day the treaty entered into force and con¬ 
tinuing through the residual level validation period, 
challenge inspections operated within a quota. It was 
not more than 15 percent of a state’s declared site 
inspection obligations. That quota increased to 23 
percent over the subsequent life of the treaty. The pro¬ 
cedures for challenge inspections were similar to those 
in declared site inspections, but there were differences. 


In a challenge inspection, the inspection team 
provided a geographic description of the specified area, 
delineating the boundaries of the area it wanted to 
inspect. By comparison, in a declared site inspection, 
the inspected party declared its site and the treaty de¬ 
fined the site. A challenge inspection team, however, 
could request any location within a country, excluding 
declared sites. There was a limit to the size of the in¬ 
spection area, namely, 65 square kilometers and no 
more than 16 kilometers between any two points 
within the area. 




33 


The Treaty and the Mission 


The major difference in a challenge inspection, however, was 
not area size, but the fact that the inspecting state could only 
request an inspection. The inspected state could refuse or accept 
the inspection within two hours after the inspection challenge was 
issued for a specified area. This was a critical right for any state 
in that it protected each state from inspection by another whose 
intent might not be associated with the CFE Treaty. An inspected 
state could refuse a challenge inspection request for reasons of 
safety or security. If the inspected state refused a challenge inspec¬ 
tion request, however, it was obliged to assure the requesting state 
that there was no TLE in the specified area, a difficult task if 
reconnaissance photography indicated TLE present at that site. If 
the inspected state held TLE assigned to peacetime internal secu¬ 
rity forces within the specified area, it had to allow visual confir¬ 
mation of the TLE present. Following a refusal, the inspection 
team could designate another challenge or declared site inspection. 
A refusal of the inspection did not reduce inspection quotas. 

Surprise was a key element for both the declared site and 
challenge inspections. Treaty provisions dictated specific timelines 
for different actions during each inspection. As a consequence, an 
inspected state had very little time to move or reposition TLE. The 
treaty’s Protocol on Inspection stipulated that an inspecting state 
had to provide only 36 hours’ notice prior to an inspection team’s 
arrival at the point of entry. After their arrival, the inspection team 



Inspection teams moved quickly—within nine hours after declaring the site to be inspected. 








34 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Safety briefings were particularly 
important at sites with rough 
terrain, harsh climate, and aging 
facilities. 



had from 1 to 16 hours to announce which declared site or speci¬ 
fied area it intended to inspect. Following that announcement, the 
treaty required the inspected state to expeditiously transport the 
inspection team to the declared site. Nine hours was normally the 
maximum time to transport the inspection team to the site. In 
mountains or difficult terrain, the treaty permitted a 15-hour 
travel time to the site, but only 9 of those hours counted against 
the inspection team’s time in country. Regardless of whether the 
permitted travel time was 9 or 15 hours, the treaty allowed the 
inspected state 6 hours to prepare the site for inspection. 

Upon arrival at a declared site, the inspected state’s escort 
team ushered the inspection team to a briefing facility, where 
escorts presented a site diagram to the inspection team. The site 
diagram showed the perimeter of the declared site, the boundaries 
of all OOVs on the site, major buildings and roadways, entrances 
to the declared site, and the location of an administrative area 
designated for the inspection team’s use. Within 30 minutes of 
receiving the site diagram, the inspection team had to declare the 
OOV they would be inspecting. 

Once the team chief announced the OOV for inspection, the 
inspected party gave a preinspection site briefing that “should” 
not last more than one hour. This briefing was important because 
it could, and often did, set the tone for the entire inspection. In¬ 
cluded in this briefing was information on local safety and admin¬ 
istrative procedures, communications and transportation systems, 
and holdings and locations of all CAEST on the site, including 
CAEST in any common areas. A common area was any area on 
the site that was not a part of an OOV, such as a parade ground, 
administrative facilities, equipment parking areas, and training 
areas. If the amount of TLE briefed varied from the most recent 
notification given by the inspected state, the inspected party was to 






he Treaty and the Mission 


35 


provide explanations for the differences. Explanations would 
include information on where the additional equipment came 
from, when it arrived, how long it would be there, and the loca¬ 
tion of any temporarily absent equipment. The time from notifica¬ 
tion to the beginning of the actual inspection could be as short as 
44 hours: 36 hours’ notification, 1 hour at the POE prior to the 
site declaration, 6 hours’ minimum time to prepare the site, and 
the 1-hour preinspection briefing. For challenge inspections the 
timeline was similar, except that the inspected nation had two 
hours to decide if it would accept the inspection. In theory and in 
fact, these treaty-mandated timelines left very little time to move 
or conceal large quantities of military forces or equipment. 

While the declared site and challenge inspections confirmed 
the presence or absence of TLE, the reduction inspection allowed 
states to monitor the reduction of TLE excess to the treaty limits. 
There were no quotas for reduction inspections because all reduc¬ 
tions were open to inspection. There was no right of refusal. Each 
state scheduled and conducted its reductions in periods that lasted 
for at least 30 days, but no longer than 90 days. These announced 
calendar reporting periods were not accountable schedules; in¬ 
stead, they reflected the reduction goals of a state for that period. 
The notification of a calendar reporting period, given not less than 



Russian team inspects severed main guns of American M-47 tanks at Buccino, Italy. 



36 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


15 days before reductions began, included the 
reduction site, the equipment to be reduced, the 
OOVs that had possessed the hardware, the 
reduction methods to be employed, the point of 
entry for the inspection team, and the last day for 
viewing the equipment before the actual reduc¬ 
tion started. 

During a CFE reduction, inspectors had the 
right to remain on-site and watch the entire 
process throughout the announced reduction 
period, and three days beyond that if necessary. If 
two announced reduction periods were less than 
four days apart, inspectors could remain on-site 
through the following period also. While inspec- 
A site logbook recorded reduction tors had a right to remain on-site for the duration, it was an im- 

activity during a calendar practical and unnecessary expense. Typically, an inspection team 

reporting period. arrived at the site at the beginning of the reduction period and 

exercised the treaty right to record serial numbers or to place 
markings on the equipment announced for reduction. The team 
also checked equipment serial numbers against the numbers re¬ 
corded in a site logbook maintained by the reducing state. The 
inspection team might then view reductions of one or two pieces 
of equipment. An inspector’s interest, however, was in the final 
results. The technology or techniques employed to achieve those 
results were more concerns for Joint Consultative Group (JCG) 
delegates or negotiators. Usually, the inspection team departed the 
site, and at the end of the reduction period, that team or a different 
team returned to confirm that the reductions met treaty require¬ 
ments. At that time, they compared equipment serial numbers, or 
the inspector-applied markings, on the reduced components against 
their own lists or against the site’s reduction log. 

The final inspection type, certification, was similar to 
reduction inspections in several ways. The certification inspection 
allowed nations to certify that multipurpose attack helicopters and 
combat-capable aircraft had been reconfigured into support heli¬ 
copters and trainer aircraft. Inspectors had access to cockpits and 
could demand the removal of panels to confirm that certain treaty- 
designated offensive weapons systems were no longer present. This 
inspection protocol required at least a 15-day notification prior to 
the date that the reconfigured helicopters would be available for 
certification by the inspection teams. There was no right of refusal 
nor quotas for these certification inspections. 

Liaison Officer Requirement 

As a consequence of the Cold War, nations of the NATO and 
WTO alliances had stationed hundreds of thousands of their mili¬ 
tary personnel, weapons, and facilities on military sites throughout 















































37 


The Treaty and the Mission 


Europe. The United States, for instance, had nearly 325,000 U.S. 
Army, Air Force, and Navy personnel deployed throughout Europe 
in 1990. The Soviet Union had 17 army divisions and 363,700 
military personnel stationed in East Germany and another 
337,000 stationed on military bases in the other Central European 
countries. Under the CFE Treaty, nations that stationed conven¬ 
tional forces and equipment outside their own state, but within the 
ATTU, were considered “stationing states.” Stationing state forces 
were subject to the provisions of the CFE Treaty and to inspection. 
The treaty recognized the sovereignty of a stationing state, autho¬ 
rizing it to escort CFE inspectors during an inspection of its forces. 
The treaty specifically required an inspecting state to notify the 
stationing state as well as the “host state” of an impending inspec¬ 
tion. This notification gave the stationing state sufficient time to 
assemble and dispatch an escort team to the site, as a host state 
would if an inspection team had selected one of its declared sites 
for inspection. Under the CFE Treaty, the United States initially 
had 169 OOVs that were subject to declared site inspections. 

A significant problem for the United States was that U.S. 
European forces, equipment, and facilities were located at more 
than 1,500 sites throughout Europe. Some of these sites contained 
sensitive or classified programs. Most of these programs were 
located on U.S. military sites, but a number had been placed on 
military bases or sites owned by the host state. Under early drafts 
of the treaty’s inspection protocol, all U.S. stationed forces and 
facilities were subject to inspection. Here was a serious issue for 
the United States. In treaty negotiations, the United States sup¬ 
ported the inclusion of a comprehensive, intrusive, on-site inspec- 



Sergeant First Class Gilbert Sierra, Jr., and David Carter document the 
reduction of ACVs. 






38 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


tion regime for monitoring the treaty, but at the same time it rec¬ 
ognized that it had to protect classified programs and facilities 
critical to combat readiness and military operations of the U.S. 
forces in Europe. To resolve this dilemma, the Office of the Secre¬ 
tary of Defense directed a thorough review in early 1990. Out of 
that intensive evaluation, key American officials concluded that 
the existing, tabled inspection protocol had to be modified. 36 

In early March 1990, the United States introduced a new 
NATO-endorsed inspection protocol. It provided procedures to 
deal with sensitive points, authorized the shrouding of non-TLE 
items, and inserted a two-meter access rule. This rule preserved the 
treaty right of the inspection team to observe, count, and record 
the CFE Treaty’s TLE—tanks, artillery, APCs, fighters, and attack 
helicopters—without entering and inspecting every building, bar¬ 
racks, container, and shrouded object. Doors to buildings could be 
opened for visual inspection, but inspectors could enter only when 
the doors exceeded two meters. The two-meter rule also came into 
play when dealing with shrouded sensitive items or containers. If 
none of the width, length, height, or diameter measurements of a 
shrouded item or container exceeded two meters, the inspectors 
had no right to access because there was no TLE that measured 
less than two meters. These changes were discussed and approved 
by the treaty negotiators in the spring and summer months of 
1990. They were incorporated into the final CFE Treaty’s inspec¬ 
tion protocol. 37 



Lt. Colonel Edward G. Gallagher, II, and Major Henry T. Storey discuss the inspection with 
Russian escorts under a canopy of tank barrels in Maykop, Russia. 






39 


The Treaty and the Mission 


Another critical concept, the right of the inspected party to 
declare a “sensitive point,” was part of the final treaty. Under this 
concept an inspected state could declare equipment, locations, or 
structures sensitive to its security. This declaration allowed the 
inspected state to delay, limit, or deny inspectors access to or 
overflight of the sensitive point. An inspected state could also 
shroud a sensitive piece of equipment while still providing an 
inspection team access to a facility. Although a state could declare 
a sensitive point, it also had to declare whether the sensitive point 
contained any TLE. If TLE was present, the escort team had to 
either display the equipment or take steps to satisfy the inspection 
team that only the declared amount and type of TLE was 
present. 38 

A third, significant concept developed in the final stages of 
negotiations. As explained previously, the United States had mili¬ 
tary units and equipment that were not subject to the treaty but 
were located on host states’ military bases and facilities. The 
United States wanted its trained, treaty-knowledgeable escort 
officers to be present at inspections in host states to protect Ameri¬ 
can rights and interests. In addition, the United States had other 
forces and facilities that were not on a declared site of any state 
but that were still vulnerable to being inspected during challenge 



The CFE Treaty required nations to reduce their massive holdings of TLE across Europe. 




40 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


inspections of a host state area. Protecting U.S. rights in these 
situations was a major concern for the U.S. government. In the last 
few weeks of treaty negotiations, U.S. representatives developed a 
new provision that allowed for a liaison officer. 

This concept required the stationing state party, prior to an 
inspection, to designate a liaison officer to serve on the host state’s 
escort team. Liaison officers were to be available to represent their 
government during an inspection in case the inspection team came 
upon any of the stationing state’s forces or facilities. Because the 
treaty protocols provided little guidance on how to carry out this 
liaison function, the United States negotiated bilateral agreements 
with the host states, outlining procedures for U.S. liaison and host 
escort officers during CFE Treaty inspections. These bilateral 
agreements varied from nation to nation, ranging from extensive 
interaction in Germany to minimal contact in other states. To 
reinforce the liaison officer provision, the treaty stipulated that a 
representative of a stationing state must be present for an inspec¬ 
tion of any of its forces or facilities. 


Notes 

1. For the CFE Treaty, see “Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
(CFE),” Appendix A. For an account of the treaty negotiations and 
ratifications, see Jane M.O. Sharp, “Conventional Arms Control in 
Europe,” in SIPRI Yearbook 1990, World Armaments and Disarmament 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 459-505; P. Terrence 
Hopmann, “From MBFR to CFE, Negotiating Conventional Arms Control 
in Europe,” in Richard Dean Burns, ed., Encyclopedia of Arms Control 
and Disarmament , Vol. II (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), pp. 
967-989; and Jane M.O. Sharp, “Conventional Arms Control in Europe,” 
in SIPRI Yearbook 1991, World Armaments and Disarmament (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 407-451. 

2. For the European context, especially Germany, see Timothy Garton Ash, In 
Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (New York: Random 
House, 1993) and Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified 
and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1995). For the American view, consult Michael 
R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of 
the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1993). For 
the state of the Soviet Union, see John B. Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and 
the Fall of the Soviet Empire (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1993). 

3. These numbers reflect the extraordinary creation of 17 new nations on the 
European continent between 1990 and 1992. Following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, eight new signatory nations entered the CFE treaty: Russia, 
Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakstan. 

4. Ash, In Europe’s Name, pp. 357-410; and Zelikow and Rice, Germany 
Unified and Europe Transformed. 



41 


The Treaty and the Mission 


5. For the text and a brief overview of the Stockholm Agreement of 1986, see 
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agreements (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1990), pp. 319-335. For the INF Treaty, see Joseph P. Harahan, 
On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1993) and George L. Rueckert, Global 
Double Zero: The INF Treaty From Its Origins to Implementation 
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993). For other treaties, see SIPRI 
Yearbooks, World Armaments and Disarmament, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 
and 1995 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991-1995). 

6. For a history of the agency’s origins and the INF Treaty implementation, 
see Harahan, On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty. For a report- 
length version, read David M. Willford, “A Brief History of the On-Site 
Inspection Agency,” OSIA Reference Report No. 1 (Washington, D.C.: On- 
Site Inspection Agency, 1996). 

7. James Macintosh, “Confidence-Building Measures in Europe, 1975 to the 
Present,” in Richard D. Burns, ed., Encyclopedia of Arms Control arid 
Disarmament, Vol. II, pp. 929-945; Rolf Berg and Adam-Daniel Rotfeld, 
Building Security in Europe: Confidence-Building Measures and the CSCE 
(New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1986). 

8. Hopmann, “From MBFR to CFE,” pp. 978-979; Jonathan Dean, 
Watershed in Europe: Dismantling the East-West Military Confrontation 
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987). 

9. Macintosh, “Confidence-Building Measures in Europe” pp. 933-935; John 
Borawski, From the Atlantic to the Urals: Negotiating Arms Control at the 
Stockholm Conference (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey International 
Defense Publishers, 1988), pp. 8-11. 

10. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agreements , pp. 319-335. For background, see Borawski, 
From the Atlantic to the Urals, pp. 102-115. 

11. Jonathan Dean, Meeting Gorbachev’s Challenge: How to Build Down the 
NATO-Warsaw Pact Confrontation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989); 
Borawski, From the Atlantic to the Urals, pp. 88-89. For a discussion of 
the Soviet Union’s changing foreign relations and military strategy toward 
Western Europe, consult Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to 
Freedom (New York: The Free Press, 1991); and Don Oberdorfer, The 
Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era—The United States and the Soviet 
Union, 1983-1990 (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991). 

12. Hopmann, “From MBFR to CFE,” pp. 977-978; Ivo H. Daalder, The CFE 
Treaty: An Overview and an Assessment (Washington, D.C.: The Johns 
Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1991). 

13. Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 
January 14, 1989. 

14. Hopmann, “From MBFR to CFE,” pp. 978-983. 

15. David Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire (New 
York: Random House, 1993), pp. 240-243; Zelikow and Rice, Germany 
Unified and Europe Transformed. 

16. Declaration by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the 
Personnel Strength of the German Armed Forces, Annex to CFE Treaty, 
November 19, 1990. 

17. Sergei A. Karagonov, “Toward a New Security System in Europe,” in Vilho 
Harle and Jyrki Iivonen, eds., Gorbachev and Europe (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1990), pp. 40-50. 



42 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


18. “Assembly Supports Pact Withdrawal,” Budapest Domestic Service, June 
26, 1990, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-Eastern 
Europe, June 27, 1990. 

19. “Hungarian, USSR Delegates at CFE Talks,” Die Presse (Vienna), August 
10, 1990, in FBIS-Western Europe, August 14, 1990; “Pact Discusses 
Structural Changes, Arms Ceilings,” Flopodarske Noviny (Prague), 

October 2, 1990, in FBIS-Eastern Europe, October 9, 1990. 

20. Interview with Ambassador Lynn Hansen, U.S. Government CFE Treaty 
Negotiator, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Ramstein Air Base, 
Germany, December 14, 1993. See also Beschloss and Talbott, At the 
Highest Levels, pp. 269-270, 288-290; David Hoffman, “U.S., Soviets to 
Press Arms Talks,” Washington Post, September 27, 1990, pp. A31-32; 
and Alan Riding, “U.S.-Soviet Differences Are Said to Threaten Arms-Cut 
Pact,” New York Times, November 19, 1990, p. A6. 

21. Craig R. Whitney, “The Legacy of Helsinki,” New York Times, November 
19, 1990, pp. Al, A6; “The Peace of Paris,” The Times (London), 
November 19, 1990; Alan Riding, “Designing the New Europe: Plenty to 
Argue About,” New York Times, November 19, 1990, p. A6; Arms 
Control Reporter 1990, pp. 407.B.409-412; “The Paris Conference: The 
Thrill of Europe’s Rebirth,” The Economist, November 24, 1990, pp. 49- 
53. 

22. For a text of the agreement, see “The Charter of Paris for a New Europe,” 
Paris, France, November 21, 1990, in S1PRI Yearbook 1991, pp. 603-610. 
For the contemporary political context in Paris, see Alan Riding, “The 
Question That Lingers on Europe: How Will the Goals Be Achieved?” New 
York Times, November 22, 1990, p. A17. 

23. Arms Control Reporter 1990, pp. 402.B.273-275. 

24. For the text, see U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 
Dispatch Supplement: Vienna Document 1990, Vol. 2, Supplement 2, May 
1991. For the European background, see Sharp, “Conventional Arms 
Control in Europe,” pp. 451-456. 

25. R.W. Apple, Jr., “East and West Sign Pact to Shed Arms in Europe,” New 
York Times, November 20, 1990, pp. Al, A14; Riding, “Designing the 
New Europe,” New York Times, November 19, 1990, p. A6. 

26. Riding, “Designing the New Europe,” New York Times, November 19, 
1990, p. A6. 

27. Ibid. 

28. For the CFE Treaty text, protocols, and declarations, see “Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE),” this book, Appendix A. 

29. Lynn M. Hansen, “Towards an Agreement on Reducing Conventional 
Forces in Europe,” Disarmament, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1990, pp. 61-76; Sharp, 
“Conventional Arms Control in Europe” (1990), pp. 478-501; R. Jeffery 
Smith, “U.S. Offers Compromise on Military Planes in Europe,” 
Washington Post, Janurary 31, 1990, p. A16. 

30. Arms Control Reporter 1990, pp. 407.B.305-307, 336-337, 340-341, 
346-347, 357-360, 380. 

31. Thomas L. Friedman, “Pact on European Armies May Skip Troop Limits 
to Speed Accord,” New York Times, September 12, 1990, p. A14; Arms 
Control Reporter 1990, pp. 407.B.390-391, 393-396; Hoffman, “U.S., 
Soviets to Press Arms Talks,” Washington Post, September 27, 1990, pp. 
A31-32; Thomas Friedman, “U.S.-Soviet Accord on Europe Armies is 
Reported Near,” New York Times, October 4, 1990, pp. Al, A6; 



43 


The Treaty and the Mission 


“Kondrashov Assesses Atmosphere for Vienna Talks,” TASS (Moscow), 
October 1, 1990, in FBIS-Soviet Union , October 1, 1990; David White, 
“Political Fixers Confident of Seeing CFE Deal,” Financial Times 
(London), September 27, 1990. 

32. See “Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE),” this book, 
Appendix A. 

33. Hopmann, “From MBFR to CFE,” p. 981; Arms Control Reporter 1990, 
p. 407.B.412. 

34. For the specific parts of the treaty, see “Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe (CFE),” Appendix A. 

35. Sharp, “Conventional Arms Control in Europe” (1991), p. 426. 

36. Interview with Mary Margaret Evans, Deputy Director, Conventional Arms 
Control and Compliance, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Acquisi¬ 
tion, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Washington, D.C., December 
8, 1993, and February 21, 1996; and Interview, Hansen. 

37. Interview, Hansen. 

38. Interview, Evans, February 21, 1996. 











Chapter 2 

Initial Preparations: United 
States and the NATO Nations 



Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney speaking at NATO Headquarters following the first meeting of NATO 
and former Warsaw Pact delegations in April 1992. 

O n May 29, 1990, President Bush signed National Security 
Directive 41, instructing the On-Site Inspection Agency 
(OSIA) to prepare to conduct on-site inspections under 
the CFE Treaty. 1 Simultaneously, the President expanded OSIA’s 
mission by directing it to recruit, train, and plan for conducting 
on-site inspections under the Chemical Weapons Convention, the 
Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty, and the Nuclear Testing Trea¬ 
ties. On-site inspection was a common element in monitoring and 
verifying compliance with these new arms control treaties. In 
December 1987 President Reagan had signed the Intermediate- 
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which laid the groundwork 
for future arms control agreements. “Trust but Verify,” Reagan’s 
oft-repeated phrase for characterizing American attitudes toward 
arms control treaties with the Soviet Union, remained a powerful 
policy objective throughout all treaty negotiations in the early 
1990s. 2 














46 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Ratification and entry into force of these treaties would allow 
the United States and other signatories to conduct on-site inspec¬ 
tions at military and industrial sites in as many as 160 nations. 
Hundreds of different weapon systems and thousands of indi¬ 
vidual weapons would be subject to inspection. With inspection 
rights came escort responsibilities. Under all the treaties, the U.S. 
government assumed an obligation to escort foreign inspection 
teams at U.S. sites and facilities. Inspectors and escorts with exper¬ 
tise on these divergent treaties and their weapon systems would be 
drawn from many different fields: conventional arms, strategic 
nuclear arms, chemical weapons, and underground nuclear testing. 
In addition, the demand for linguists would increase in response to 
new treaty requirements. The On-Site Inspection Agency would 
expand significantly to fulfill the United States’ obligations under 
these treaties. 3 

In fact, the expansion began in 1990. President Bush signed 
three major arms control agreements: new protocols for the 
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Ex¬ 
plosions Treaty (PNET) with the USSR on June 1, 1990; a new 
agreement on the Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical 
Weapons with the USSR, also on June 1, 1990; and the Conven¬ 
tional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) with 20 
European nations and Canada on November 19, 1990. 4 
On-site inspection, a key element in each of these agree¬ 
ments, provided critical information for verifying that 
other nations were complying with their treaty obligations. 
For the U.S. government, the determination of treaty com¬ 
pliance rested with the president. In 1990, President Bush 
stated his administration’s policy in his annual arms con¬ 
trol report to the U.S. Congress 5 : 

“Without exception, the United States expects me¬ 
ticulous fulfillment of all existing and future arms control 
agreements, and all obligations that they entail. I am com¬ 
mitted to ensuring that there is scrupulous compliance 
with all arms control agreements and related undertakings. 
We cannot and will not accept any lesser standard. Put 
simply, arms control commitments must be precisely de¬ 
fined and scrupulously observed. Nothing less will do.” 



The On-Site Inspection Agency prepared 
to implement several other treaties and 
agreements, such as the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. 


Defining CFE Treaty Roles and Missions 

In accordance with precedents established in implementing 
the INF Treaty, the On-Site Inspection Agency had a strictly opera¬ 
tional role in implementing the CFE Treaty. President Bush, in 
National Security Directive 41, directed Brigadier General Roland 
Fajoie, Director of OSIA, to prepare to conduct on-site inspections 
under the CFE Treaty. In that same May 1990 directive, the presi- 




47 


Initial Preparations: United States and the NATO Nations 


dent stipulated that the secretary of defense would be responsible 
for ensuring that the U.S. government was in compliance with all 
CFE Treaty provisions. 6 After considerable debate within the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 
the military services, General Colin L. Powell, USA, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended to Secretary of Defense 
Richard B. Cheney in April 1991 that the U.S. Commander-in- 
Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR) be designated the Department of 
Defense’s (DoD) executive agent for treaty implementation. On 
June 14, 1991, Secretary Cheney gave General John R. Galvin, 
USA, USCINCEUR, authority to task all DoD forces and organi¬ 
zations within the CFE Treaty’s area of application. Responsibili¬ 
ties of the executive agent included developing procedures to 
monitor the status of U.S. forces and equipment subject to the 
treaty and reporting periodically on that status to the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. In addition, the executive agent was to ensure that all U.S. 
forces developed and carried out plans to receive foreign on-site 
inspectors. The plans had to incorporate provisions to protect 
sensitive points and special access programs. General Galvin and 
the USCINCEUR staff would supervise the transfer of U.S. treaty- 
limited equipment (TLE) to allied nations under the NATO Har¬ 
monization Plan. Finally, he was responsible for any treaty- 
required reduction of U.S. equipment. 


General Galvin directed treaty implementation through the 
U.S. European Command and three subordinate commands: U.S. 
Army Europe (USAREUR), U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), 
and U.S. Navy Europe (USNAVEUR). For U.S. forces and facilities 
stationed in the Azores and in Iceland, which were subject to the 
CFE Treaty but were not under USCINCEUR’s command, the U.S. 
Atlantic Command issued directives ordering them to comply with 
the secretary of defense’s memorandum. To define the roles, mis¬ 
sions, and responsibilities required to implement the CFE Treaty, 
the U.S. European Command, the U.S. Atlantic Command, and 
OSIA developed a joint Memorandum of Understanding. 8 

Essentially, this key memorandum delineated the responsibili¬ 
ties for training, logistics, and inspection operations. It tasked 
American land, air, and naval forces within the treaty’s area of 
application to plan and train to receive on-site inspections by 
Eastern group inspection teams. The memorandum also defined 
the type of logistical support U.S. military units and site com¬ 
manders would provide for the inspection teams, specifically, 
security, ground transportation, emergency medical care, medical 
evacuation, and administrative work areas. Site commanders were 
to provide meals and accommodations, if available on the installa¬ 
tion, for the inspection and escort teams. If this was not possible, 
then that responsibility fell to OSIA. U.S. site commanders were to 
facilitate the inspection process by having their equipment and 
facilities ready for the foreign inspection teams, and by providing 



General John R. Galvin, U.S. 
Commander-in-Chief, Europe. 



48 


On-Site Inspection Agency 



helicopter overflights when required. They would also designate 
sensitive sites to the OSIA personnel escorting the on-site inspec¬ 
tion teams. 

Moreover, the Memorandum of Understanding required that 
OSIA assist military commanders in training site personnel and 
evaluating their site preparations. The memorandum explicitly 
stated that the OSIA escort team chief represented the U.S. govern¬ 
ment in all treaty-related matters during inspections. A related 
provision required that OSIA provide liaison officers to meet 
arriving inspection teams at the designated points of entry and 
during the inspection to maintain continuous communications 
with the U.S. European Command. Finally, the memorandum 
stipulated that the U.S. Atlantic Command would provide the 
necessary logistical and operational support for U.S. military 
facilities subject to inspection in Iceland and the Azores. 9 


Several aspects of this memorandum were contentious. For 
example, the U.S. Army Europe’s position on feeding and housing 
inspection teams was that their units would be hard pressed to 
support the requirement. Most U.S. Army units in Europe, they 
maintained, did not have adequate facilities to house inspection and 
escort teams. Feeding the teams would be difficult, unless they ate 
during regular meal hours in the dining hall. Since the chief of the 
inspection team set the schedule for the conduct of the inspection, 
teams often took their meals very late, after dark, or very early, 
before first light. Therefore, General Crosbie E. Saint, USA, 
USAREUR Commander-in-Chief, recommended that OSIA be 
responsible for providing housing and food for the inspection and 
escort teams. The new director of OSIA, Major General Robert W. 
Parker, USAF, countered that the agency had no housing or messing 
facilities, and that the U.S. Army personnel at each site knew the 
surrounding area better than did OSIA escort or liaison teams. 10 


It took many months to resolve this dispute of defining re¬ 
sponsibilities for the support mission. While USAREUR and OSIA 
ironed out these support issues, the first order of business for 
OSIA was to evaluate the inspection/escort mission: just how 
many people, teams, and support personnel would it take to con¬ 
duct and escort on-site inspections under the CFE Treaty? 


OSIA: Sizing the CFE Treaty Mission 

To implement the INF Treaty, OSIA set up a small field office 
in 1988 at Rhein-Main Air Base in Frankfurt, Germany. This 
office became the gateway for U.S. teams conducting on-site in¬ 
spections of Soviet INF missile sites located in the western USSR. 
Inspection teams originated in Washington, D.C., flew to Germany 
where they received inspection equipment and briefings, and then 
proceeded to Moscow, the point of entry for INF Treaty inspec- 




49 


Initial Preparations: United States and the NATO Nations 



Lt Colonel Joseph J. Drach, Jr., 
and Sergeant Jill Robinson 
preparing for a helicopter flight 
over a Ukrainian declared site. 


tions. On completion of their inspection missions, the American 
teams returned to Germany, turned in their inspection equipment, 
and flew back to the United States. The personnel assigned to 
OSIA’s Rhein-Main office also escorted Soviet teams inspecting 
U.S. INF missile sites in Europe. From 1988 through 1991, this 
small office assisted in more than 200 INF Treaty inspection and 
escort missions. With the CFE Treaty, OSIA’s Field Office, Europe 51 ' 
assumed a far larger and more significant role. 11 

All CFE Treaty inspection, escort, and liaison operations 
would originate from this field office. It would also manage all 
gateway activities in support of the INF Treaty, the Threshold Test 
Ban Treaty, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Three expe¬ 
rienced senior officers, Colonel Frederick E. Grosick, USAF, Chief 
of the Field Office, Europe; Ft. Colonel Paul H. Nelson, USA; and 
Ft. Colonel Thomas S. Brock, USA, former INF inspection team 
chiefs and current headquarters planners, began in the spring of 
1990 to examine treaty requirements to determine manpower 
needs. In May 1990, 20 people were assigned to OSIA’s European 
Operations Command, to support the INF Treaty mission. This 
number would increase to more than 127 by July 1992, when the 
CFE Treaty entered into force. Initially, projections for this sixfold 
increase had been much greater. In January 1990, a key headquar¬ 
ters planner, Commander Edward J. Higgins, USN, had projected 
that the agency would need 159 people in Frankfurt and 49 in 


*The European component of the On-Site Inspection Agency underwent several 
redesignations over the years. In 1988, OSIA’s detachment at Rhein-Main Air Base 
was called the Field Office, Europe. On December 1, 1990, it was made a stand-alone 
directorate and redesignated as OSIA-Europe. On 9 March 1992, another reorganization 
of OSIA gave this directorate status as a command, and it was renamed the European 
Operations Command. Throughout this history, the designation of European Operations 
Command will be used. 




50 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


European Operations Command 
carried out OSlA’s INF escort 
responsibilities. 



Washington to carry out its CFE Treaty responsibilities. Higgins had 
estimated that OSIA’s European Operations Command would need 
81 inspectors, 51 escorts, and 27 logistics, administrative, and op¬ 
erations center personnel. Senior DoD policy and acquisition com¬ 
mittees reviewed and approved OSIA’s manpower projections. 12 

Later, some of Commander Higgins’s assumptions proved to 
be incorrect. This was understandable, since they had been formu¬ 
lated in January 1990, nearly 10 months before the treaty was 
signed and two-and-a-half years before it entered into force. One 
assumption concerned the size of inspection teams. The INF 



Dual-qualified OSIA teams — Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert leads an escort team in Germany. 












51 


Initial Preparations: United States and the NATO Nations 


Treaty provided an early planning model for a 10-person team; 
negotiators for the CFE Treaty, however, agreed to a maximum of 
only 9 inspectors per team. This treaty change lowered manning 
projections. Another change came when Colonel Lawrence G. 
Kelley, USMC, OSIA European Operations Command’s new Chief 
of Operations, redefined what constituted a “qualified” inspection 
team. Under the INF Treaty, teams qualified either as escorts or 
inspectors, and during treaty operations they operated exclusively 
in that role. Under the CFE Treaty, Kelley directed that all OSIA 
CFE Treaty teams would be dual qualified: capable of conducting 
both inspections and escorts. This redefinition further reduced the 
manning projections for the number of OSIA CFE Treaty teams, 
inspectors, and escorts. 13 

There were other changes as well. Perhaps the most decisive 
change came in the projected number of CFE Treaty baseline 
inspections that the U.S. would conduct. American planners antici¬ 
pated that the level of inspection activity would be at its zenith 
during baseline, the treaty’s first 120 days. This assumption was 
decisive in determining manning authorizations. Two factors af¬ 
fected all U.S. projections for baseline inspections: the number of 
inspections to be conducted by the NATO states, and the United 
States’ portion of the NATO inspections. 

During October-November 1990, the number of inspections 
to be conducted by the NATO states decreased significantly from 
previous projections. Two events contributed: Germany’s unifica¬ 
tion in October 1990, and the Soviet Union’s first official treaty 



Dual-qualified OSIA teams—Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert leads an inspection team in Romania. 











52 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


data exchange. In the first event, East Germany’s CFE Treaty 
sites—the designated military bases, depots, and installations— 
became German sites. NATO allies had agreed that there would be 
no inspections within the alliance. Further, the NATO states 
agreed that following unification, only Germany would inspect 
Soviet forces still stationed on the territory of the former East 
Germany. 14 


NATO states agreed that there 
would be no inspections within 
the alliance. 



Second, there was a decrease in the total of Soviet CFE Treaty 
objects of verification (OOVs). At treaty signature, the Soviet 
Union exchanged data that indicated one-third fewer OOVs sub¬ 
ject to inspection than their senior representatives had disclosed 
during treaty negotiations. 15 This was a major surprise for the 
NATO states despite the fact that in the two months before treaty 
signature, satellite reconnaissance had revealed that the Soviet 
Army was moving thousands of pieces of equipment out of Cen¬ 
tral Europe to areas east of the Ural Mountains. 16 Since the treaty 
was not yet signed, these large-scale redeployments were legal, but 
they raised questions of treaty circumvention. In addition to hav¬ 
ing substantially fewer forces and equipment in the treaty zones 
and flanks, the Soviet High Command had reassigned some forces 
to naval infantry and coastal defense units. The Soviets interpreted 
the treaty as not applicable to naval forces, including naval infan¬ 
try. The Soviet position followed that there was no obligation to 
report naval forces as inspectable units under the CFE Treaty. 
Treaty experts would wrestle over these Soviet issues for months 
following treaty signature. 1 ' In fact, these issues became so conten¬ 
tious that they delayed ratification. The more immediate issue for 
OSIA, however, was how to revise manning projections. In order 
to identify, train, and relocate people to Europe, it was vital to 
know how many inspectors, escorts, and support personnel would 
be needed. Clearly, the number of inspections available to the 
NATO states had decreased; but so too had the United States’ 
proportion of those inspections. 18 

The treaty did not address the allocation of inspection quotas 
within each group of states—that process rested with each group. 
Under the CFE Treaty, each Eastern group state was subject to a 
specific number of inspections per treaty period/ 1 ' The allocation 
of inspections among the NATO allies was a give-and-take pro¬ 
cess. A Verification Coordinating Committee (VCC) handled this 
allocation process at Headquarters NATO. The VCC was a new 
organization, established in 1990 specifically to coordinate the 
alliance’s implementation of the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Docu¬ 
ment. 14 Initial U.S. planning had American inspection teams con¬ 
ducting at least 20 percent, and perhaps as many as 50 percent, of 


’Under the CFE Treaty, there were four treaty periods: baseline, reduction, residual level 
validation, and residual. 












_ Initial Preparations: United States and the NATO Nations 


53 


all the CFE baseline inspections available to the NATO states. This 
estimate proved too high because most of the other NATO nations 
asserted their treaty rights to conduct CFE inspections. After con¬ 
siderable internal discussion among the NATO nations and within 
NATO’s VCC and its staff to determine a fair share of the inspec¬ 
tions, the committee allotted the United States 18 percent of 
NATO’s active inspection quota for the CFE baseline period. 20 As 
a consequence of the decrease in the total number of inspections to 
be conducted by the NATO states and the decrease in the United 
States’ portion of NATO’s baseline inspection quota, the United 
States reduced its projections for conducting inspections from an 
estimated 60-150 to approximately 44-45 inspections. This new 
figure proved to be quite accurate. 21 

As discussed in the next chapter, Ratification Delayed, the 
Soviet movement of TLE east of the Urals and its reassignment of 
forces to the naval infantry seriously threatened treaty ratification 
and entry into force. Resolution of these issues required seven 
months of negotiation before a political-military-diplomatic solu¬ 
tion emerged that addressed the other parties’ apprehensions. In 
the interim, OSIA’s European Operations Command had to rede¬ 
fine its manpower requirements based on the projected figure of 
44-45 baseline inspections. Ultimately, the command was autho¬ 
rized 112 people to conduct the CFE Treaty’s baseline period. This 
authorization specified 15 team chiefs and deputies, 18 linguists, 
14 weapons specialists, and 65 other personnel responsible for 
planning, communications, logistics, transportation, command 
and control, and administration. From this number, the United 
States would man, equip, and train seven complete CFE Treaty 
inspection teams and one partial team. 22 



The VCC coordinated the NATO 
alliance’s implementation of the 
CFE Treaty and Vienna Document. 


The European Context 

Massive Military Force Withdrawals 

Two events profoundly changed the military context of the 
European continent as preparations for implementing the CFE 
Treaty were under way: the unification of Germany and the col¬ 
lapse of the Central European Communist governments. In re¬ 
sponse to these events, Soviet leaders accelerated the massive with¬ 
drawal of Soviet military forces from Central Europe. On October 
1, 1990, the Soviet Union had 17 divisions (363,700 military 
personnel) stationed in East Germany. Organized into five armies, 
the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) was the largest 
military force outside the USSR. The Soviets withdrew all of these 
armies, along with another 337,000 Soviet military personnel 
stationed in the Central European and Baltic nations, over a five- 
year period, 1989-94. 23 President Bush, in turn, ordered substan- 


Group of Soviet Forces in 
Germany 
1990 — 363,700 
1994—0 




54 


On-Site Inspection Agency 







The deployment of thousands of pieces of equipment to the Persian Gulf coincided with the inactivation of U.S. 
units in Europe. 


U.S. Aimy Europe: 

1990 — 217,000 

1993 — 92,200 


tial withdrawals of U.S. military forces stationed in Western 
Europe. In 1990 the U.S. Army Europe had 217,000 military 
personnel; three years later, it had 92,200. 24 

Simultaneous with this American withdrawal, the U.S. Army 
and U.S. Air Force deployed a substantial number of their Euro¬ 
pean combat units to the Persian Gulf in late 1990 in support of 
the Gulf War deployment, Desert Shield. Following the decisive 
coalition victory over Iraq in February 1991, many of these Ameri¬ 
can units did not return to Europe but were sent to garrisons and 
training bases in the United States. Thus, the combination of the 
Soviet Union’s massive force withdrawal and the United States’ 
military redeployments, coupled with the sudden transfer of per¬ 
sonnel and materiel to the Gulf, caused massive troop movements 
across the length and breadth of the European continent during 20 
months of the CFE Treaty preparations. 

General Crosbie E. Saint, Commander-in-Chief, USAREUR, 
said that in 1992, his command was “averaging 500 soldiers a day 
leaving Europe.” 2 - In 1991-92, General Saint inactivated or ro¬ 
tated back to the States 125 army battalions. Compared with 1990 
strengths, these battalion reductions were striking: infantry (54%), 
armor (62%), armored cavalry (50%), field artillery (71%), and 






















_ Initial Preparations: United States and the NATO Nations 


55 


air defense artillery (48%). USAREUR inactivated so many of its 
sites that the United States returned 157 installations, mostly in 
Germany, to their European host nations. Commanding and man¬ 
aging this American withdrawal was a time-consuming effort that 
demanded detailed planning. At one point, General Saint com¬ 
pared a battalion leaving a German caserne to painting a floor in a 
house. “You have to start at the far end and paint yourself out the 
door. But the ‘whole system’ does not stop until you are out the 
door.” 26 Complicating this extraction process was the American 
military’s practice of announcing and quickly enforcing field grade 
officer retirements, and accepting voluntary separations from all 
ranks with alacrity. At the same time, General Saint demanded 
that the traditional American standards of combat readiness be 
maintained. In 1992 he had every USAREUR infantry, armor, 
attack helicopter, engineer, and air defense artillery battalion train 
in a force-on-force battle at the large range at Hohenfels, Ger¬ 
many. “Soldiers in Europe,” Saint declared, “don’t have time to sit 
around feeling sorry for themselves. They train; and when they’re 
finished with that, they train some more.” 2 The combination of 
USAREUR’s maintaining combat readiness and managing the 
substantial force withdrawal meant that the CFE Treaty prepara¬ 
tions, especially the mock inspections at U.S. Army installations, 
could become contentious. At OSIA’s European Operations Com¬ 
mand, the American commanders responsible for preparing in¬ 
spection teams for implementing the CFE Treaty had to work with 
the U.S. Army and Air Force in Europe. Those American forces 
would be subject to CFE inspections; they needed training to be 
ready. Tensions developed, especially during 1991-92 when CFE 
Treaty training was most intense and when the U.S. military force 
reductions were at full flood. 28 



Thousands of American forces in 
Europe deployed to the Persian 
Gulf during Operation Desert 
Shield. Most did not return to 
Europe after the Gulf War. 





56 


On-Site Inspection Agency 



Seal of the German verification 
agency, Zentrum fur 
Verifikationsaufgaben der 
Bundeswehr (ZVBW). 


New National Verification Agencies 

Even before the CFE Treaty was signed in November 1990, 
some European nations had begun to establish their treaty verifica¬ 
tion agencies. Two of the largest CFE Treaty nations, the United 
States and the Soviet Union, already had established professional 
military inspection agencies. The INF Treaty’s extensive on-site 
inspection provisions had caused both nations to act; the United 
States set up the On-Site Inspection Agency, and the USSR estab¬ 
lished the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center. INF Treaty inspections 
began in July 1988, and the U.S. and USSR agencies had con¬ 
ducted more than 400 on-site inspections by the time the CFE 
Treaty was signed. The agencies had recruited, trained, tested, 
equipped, and deployed hundreds of inspectors and dozens of 
teams. They had accumulated experience that was directly trans¬ 
ferable to implementing the CFE Treaty. 

Germany, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Italy, Spain, Canada, Luxembourg, and the other CFE Treaty 
signatories had had only limited experience with on-site inspec¬ 
tions. The Stockholm Document of 1986, a product of the 
Helsinki Process, was the earliest modern European agreement 
permitting on-site inspections of military units and sites. It con¬ 
tained provisions that would provide experience in some aspects of 
implementing an on-site inspection regime. The Stockholm Docu¬ 
ment mandated notification procedures for the United States, 
Canada, and each of the 33 European signatory states when they 
scheduled and conducted military activities involving at least 
13,000 troops or 300 tanks. Moreover, to confirm that the activi¬ 
ties were nonthreatening, each state had the right to observe field 
military activities of another state when participating forces ex¬ 
ceeded 17,000 ground troops or 5,000 airborne or amphibious 
troops. Across Europe, there were few such large-scale events. 
When an exercise occurred, however, a state would issue a simple 
declaration that “compliance was in doubt” and the state being 
inspected had to accept the inspection team. There was no right of 
refusal by the nation to be inspected. Each state, however, was 
liable for only three inspections per year of its field exercises, and 
no nation could inspect another twice in the same year. Thus, the 
opportunities for inspections were infrequent. 29 

By any measure, the number of people required to implement 
the inspection rights and requirements of the Stockholm Docu¬ 
ment of 1986 was minimal. In fact, the number was so small that 
no European nation saw fit to establish a full-time treaty verifica¬ 
tion center to carry out those provisions. The Stockholm Docu¬ 
ment signatories assigned the inspection missions to a section of 
their military staffs at national military headquarters. In contrast, 
the bilateral INF Treaty between the United States and the USSR 
contained on-site inspection rights that allowed more than 250 




Initial Preparations: United States and the NATO Nations 57 


inspections in the first year alone. The CFE Treaty’s inspection, 
escort, reduction, and data functions were so substantial that all of 
the European signatory states set up separate verification agencies 
or specific military staff offices. Their mission was to assist their 
military forces to comply with the treaty and to monitor other 
nations’ compliance. 

Among the NATO nations, Germany, France, and Great 
Britain elected to establish separate treaty verification agencies. 
Brigadier General Doctor Heinz Loquai, Director of the Zentrum 
fur Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr (ZVBW) (Federal 
Armed Forces Verification Center), said that Germany’s decision¬ 
making process began in 1989, with the new center being estab¬ 
lished in October 1990. “The main reason,” he explained, “for the 
establishment of the center was Germany’s foreseeable workload 
in the area of the CFE Treaty. Germany had more CFE sites than 
did the Soviet Union.” 30 The mission of the new German verifica¬ 
tion center was to inspect, escort, and monitor all activities under 
the CFE Treaty. It also had responsibility for inspections under the 
Vienna Document 1990, which substantially broadened the scope 
of inspection activities of the earlier Stockholm Document agree¬ 
ment. In the fall of 1990, the ZVBW had 65 officers and noncom¬ 
missioned officers (NCOs); two years later it had 400. 31 

The French government established its treaty verification 
unit, L’Unite Fran^aise de Verification (UFV), in September 1990 
at the Creil Air Station, 65 kilometers north of Paris. The new 
French unit consisted of an inspection and escort staff of approxi¬ 
mately 100 officers and NCOs drawn from all the military ser¬ 
vices, army, navy, and air force. The mission of this new unit, led 
by Brigadier General Jean-Paul Huet, was to implement the CFE 



Brigadier General Doctor Heinz 
Loquai, ZVBW Director, welcomes 
Major General Robert Parker, 
Director, OSIA, to the ZVBW. 




58 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Treaty and the Vienna Document 1990. According to Colonel 
Francois Rozec, the UFV’s second commandant, “The Arms Con¬ 
trol Division of the General Staff in Paris and their political 
equivalents, it is their concern to inform our [political] authorities 
on all aspects of verification. We are strictly implemented.” 32 

Great Britain’s experience with inspections under interna¬ 
tional arms control agreements prior to the CFE Treaty was simi¬ 
lar to Germany’s. For the Stockholm Document of 1986, the Brit¬ 
ish Ministry of Defense assigned the mission to a small cadre of 
military officers and NCOs, principally people with experience in 
the British Military Liaison Mission in Berlin. This small staff 
carried out both inspecting and escorting missions. In August 
1990, the British Ministry of Defense established the Joint Arms 
Control Implementation Group (JACIG), under the leadership of 
Colonel Roy Giles, at RAF Scampton in Lincolnshire. Its mission 
was to carry out the United Kingdom’s commitments and entitle¬ 
ments under the CLE Treaty and the Vienna Document 1990. 
Initially, the new group’s manpower strength was 120 officers, 
NCOs, and civilians; after review it decreased to slightly less than 
100. It was a four-service group, with Royal Navy, Marine, Army, 
and Air Lorce personnel. 33 



Colonel Roy Giles, bead of the 
United Kingdom’s verification 
agency, Joint Arms Control 
Implementation Group (JACIG). 


Among the other NATO nations, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
and Italy chose a different organizational concept when they set up 
their units to implement the CLE Treaty. They used a cadre model 
of organization. This meant that the national military command, 
usually the ministry of defense, authorized the establishment of a 
small unit responsible for implementing the treaty, usually com¬ 
posed of 20-30 military officers. Organized at the level just below 
the senior military headquarters, this unit’s mission was to recruit, 
train, conduct inspection and escort missions, transmit treaty data, 
and monitor reductions mandated by the treaty. The Belgian verifi¬ 
cation agency, L’Unite Beige de Verification (UBV), located in 
Brussels, was typical. Its mission was to lead all CLE Treaty in¬ 
spection teams and to participate as inspectors on the team. For 
the escort mission, the Belgian agency had complete responsibility 
for the logistics, preparations, and presentation of the sites and 
units to be inspected by the Eastern states’ CFE Treaty inspection 
teams. They also had responsibility for collecting all treaty-man¬ 
dated data on the Belgian armed forces and for transmitting that 
data to all other CFE Treaty signatory nations. During CFE in¬ 
spection and escort operations, personnel from the military forces 
augmented the staff of the Belgian verification agency. These mili¬ 
tary officers and NCOs had studied the treaty in special courses 
led by the agency’s senior officers. In most cases, especially during 
escort missions, the bulk of the Belgian team consisted of 
augmentees from its military forces. 34 





59 


Initial Preparations: United States and the NATO Nations 



Major General Joseph DiMaria, 
Director of Italy’s verification 
agency, Centro Italiano de Verifica 
de Armi (CIVA). 


Italy had a similar organizational structure. The Director, 
Major General Joseph DiMaria, of the Centro Italiano de Verifica 
de Armi (CIVA), explained that initially a cadre of approximately 
250 personnel went through training on the CFE Treaty. 35 Once 
they had completed the course, they returned to their military 
units, and were available for inspection duty as needed. According 
to General DiMaria, “They come and they stay a couple of days in 
the agency; they have a refresher course, some particular training, 
or some special training for the target.” The Italian agency, he 
reported, kept one team on duty 24 hours a day “in case Italy is 
notified a CFE Treaty inspection team is arriving.” 

The Netherlands had a small arms control treaty coordina¬ 
tion section in the Ministry of Defense at The Hague. 36 The Dutch 
military forces carried out the bulk of Holland’s CFE Treaty in¬ 
spection and escort activities. The Dutch Army had approximately 
80 officers and NCOs trained as CFE inspectors, the Dutch Air 
Force 35, and the Dutch Navy 1. The actual size of the Nether¬ 
lands’ professional staff committed to implementing the CFE 
Treaty was much smaller, with the Dutch Army providing 10-12 
personnel, the Air Force 4-5, and the Navy 1. According to Navy 
Commander C.N.M. Wierema, Ministry of Defense Coordinator, 
the Netherlands set up a “decentralized organization,” with the 
“bulk of the work done in the arms control sections of the forces.” 

In general, the NATO nations established their CFE Treaty 
verification organizations along two lines. Nations with the largest 
military forces and the most sites subject to inspection—the United 
States, Germany, France, and Great Britain—set up separate verifi¬ 
cation agencies. Fed by senior military officers and staffed with 




60 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


career officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilians, these 
agencies ranged in size from 100 to 400 personnel, depending on 
the number of treaties and ancillary functions assigned to them. 
NATO nations with smaller military forces and fewer sites in¬ 
cluded in the treaty, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy, 
adopted a cadre model. Led by a senior colonel or general officer, 
these verification units were considerably smaller and relied on 
augmentees drawn from the military forces for inspection and 
escort responsibilities. In general, these national verification agen¬ 
cies and staffs had six basic functions: force data presentation, 
communication, inspection, escort, treaty training for national 
military forces, and coordination among the other verification 
agencies. 

NATO’s VCC 

During CFE Treaty negotiations, the NATO alliance had been 
deeply involved in every aspect of developing the treaty’s text, 
protocols, and annexes. Yet in the final document neither NATO 
nor the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) were identified as 
alliances in the formal treaty provisions. Instead, the treaty dealt 
with two “groups of states,” and each state was responsible for 
properly implementing the treaty. However, NATO constituted an 
experienced, bureaucratic organization for its group of states to 
develop group objectives and negotiating positions, and to coordi¬ 
nate treaty planning efforts. During treaty negotiations, NATO’s 


NATO’s Verification Coordinating Committee 


Under the CFE Treaty, the execution of all 
treaty rights and obligations is reserved to the 
signatory nations. However, during negotiations 
the NATO states had worked closely together; 
and during implementation they continued this 
cooperation, agreeing to work through NATO’s 
Verification Coordinating Committee (VCC). 

This VCC is a joint political-military coordi¬ 
nating organization with two representatives 
from each of the 16 NATO nations. It meets at 
HQ NATO, usually in monthly sessions. A small 
professional staff, the Verification and Implemen¬ 
tation Coordination Section (VICS) facilitates the 
work of the larger committee. For most meetings, 
the head of the professional staff chairs the VCC 
sessions. All actions are taken by consensus. 


The VCC has several important functions. For 
the NATO Alliance it apportions the CFE Treaty 
inspection quotas to the 16 member states. It 
coordinates the CFE Treaty declared site inspec¬ 
tions to ensure compliance with treaty protocols 
and to ensure maximum coverage. The VCC 
establishes and maintains a common treaty data¬ 
base for the NATO nations. It also assists the 
NATO states in collating and assessing the treaty 
data concerning treaty compliance. In the area of 
training, the VCC supports formal NATO CFE 
Treaty courses to ensure a “common approach” 
to implementation. Finally, the VCC has respon¬ 
sibility to exchange, among the signatory states, 
“information” on verification matters. 


Source: Necil Nedimoglu, Head, Verification and Implementation Coordination Section, NATO, presentation to United Nations 
Group of Governmental Experts, July 19, 1994. 






61 


Initial Preparations: United States and the NATO Nations 


High Level Task Force (HLTF) at Brussels had served as an impor¬ 
tant coordinating body for screening and approving proposals for 
discussion in the formal sessions in Vienna. 37 Collectively, the 
NATO nations would be reducing more than 12,900 TLE items 
under the CFE Treaty, and they would have a total of 2,447 OOVs 
subject to inspection throughout the alliance. Clearly, after treaty 
signature, NATO as an organization would continue its strong 
commitment to the CFE Treaty throughout implementation. 

In fact, six months before the treaty was signed in Paris, 
NATO established the Verification Coordinating Committee 
(VCC) in Brussels in May 1990. Its purpose was to coordinate the 
implementation of disarmament and arms control agreements 
among the 16-nation alliance. General John R. Galvin, USA, 
USCINCEUR, was instrumental in encouraging Headquarters 
NATO to establish this important committee. General Galvin 
insisted that NATO had a central role in treaty implementation, 
specifically in coordination, training, and scheduling. NATO’s 
Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, Gebhardt von 
Moltke, became the VCC’s permanent chairman. The committee 
set up a small professional staff for its Verification Coordination 
Implementation Section. Led by Leo Verbruggen, a retired navy 
captain from the Netherlands, this professional staff became an 
important element in carrying out the CFE Treaty. 38 

Just what did the VCC do? Much of the work in the first 18 
months consisted of examining the CFE Treaty’s bloc-to-bloc 
quotas for declared site inspections and establishing a schedule of 
inspections among NATO’s 16 states. In addition, it developed an 
approach to scheduling reduction inspections of the Eastern states. 
Aided by initiatives from the member states, in 1991 the VCC 
developed a plan for “deconflicting” the schedule of national 
inspections. “Deconfliction” was vital because the treaty limited 
each state’s inspection obligations in several ways. The treaty 
limited a nation’s inspection liability during any treaty period. It 
also limited simultaneous inspections in a nation or specific mili¬ 
tary district to two, as well as allowing no more than one inspec¬ 
tion team on-site at any time. 

To comply with these restrictions and yet permit NATO 
nations to conduct all inspections available to them, the VCC 
evaluated a deconfliction schedule concept in December 1990. 
Authored by Colonel John C. Reppert, USA, OSIA, this concept 
called for a matrix system that had the six Eastern nations and the 
Soviet Union's military districts with inspectable sites along one 
axis. The other axis had three-day increments for conducting the 
actual inspections. Working with the number of inspections al¬ 
lowed, each NATO nation under this system would “sign up” to 
conduct an inspection during a particular three-day block of time 
against a particular state. Next, the VCC staff would compare the 



On-Site Inspection Agency 


national requests and negotiate any conflicts among the alliance’s 
states. This required a great deal of negotiation because there was 
significant interest by most NATO states to inspect Russia and, to 
a lesser degree, Ukraine, and considerably less interest in inspect¬ 
ing the other states. After protracted discussions, the VCC adopted 
this matrix system for deconflicting the schedule of national in¬ 
spections. 39 While this process was unfolding in Brussels, OSIA’s 
European Operations Command was receiving new leadership at 
Rhein-Main. 

New Leadership 

In 1990, before the CFE Treaty was signed, General Lajoie, 
OSIA’s Director, selected two senior colonels to lead the OSIA 
European Operations Command’s rapidly expanding effort. Air 
Force Colonel Frederick E. Grosick became Commander and 
Marine Corps Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley was the new Chief of 
Operations. Since the INF Treaty was still extremely active, with 
missile elimination, site closeout, and short-notice and continuous 
portal monitoring inspections, OSIA’s European Operations Com¬ 
mand retained all of its “gateway” responsibilities. At Rhein- 
Main, it was responsible for supporting all INF Treaty inspection 
teams transiting Europe to inspect missile sites in the western 
Soviet Union. It also supported Threshold Test Ban Treaty inspec¬ 
tors and equipment specialists, as well as U.S. and USSR START 
Treaty inspection teams traveling through the gateway to conduct 


CFE Inspection Deconfliction Matrix 

PLANNED BASELINE INSPECTIONS BY: USA 



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The VCC adopted a matrix system to schedule and coordinate inspection missions. 
















































Initial Preparations: United States and the NATO Nations 63 


exhibition inspections. But its principal activity, beginning in late 
summer 1990, was to organize, prepare, train, and be ready to 
conduct inspections and escorts under the CFE Treaty. 

Both Colonel Grosick and Colonel Kelley had considerable 
experience in commanding, planning, and developing military 
units. 40 Grosick was a command pilot with over 3,100 flying 
hours. A graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy, he held an ad¬ 
vanced degree from Indiana University. Fie had served in opera¬ 
tional and staff jobs in the Strategic Air Command, Pacific Air 
Forces, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, and Headquarters USAF. Just 
prior to commanding OSIA’s European Operations Command, 

Colonel Grosick had served as Deputy Commander for Operations 
of the 42d Bombardment Wing, a B-52 and KC-135 wing located 
at Loring AFB, Maine. Colonel Kelley was a Princeton University 
graduate who had studied at Leningrad State University, the U.S. 

Army Russian Institute, and Georgetown University (master of 
arts). In Vietnam, Kelley was a Marine attack pilot, flight instruc- Colonel Frederick E. Grosick, 
tor, infantry company commander, and battalion air liaison officer. Commander, OSIA European 
A Russian foreign area officer (FAO), who spoke German as well, Operations Command. 
he served as a presidential translator on the Washington-Moscow 
Hot Line. In 1983 he went to the U.S. Military Liaison Mission 
(USMLM) in Potsdam, German Democratic Republic, as the naval 
representative and later as deputy to the Chief of the Mission, 

General Lajoie. Early in 1988, Lt. Colonel Kelley came to OSIA as 
an INF inspection team chief, leading 15 inspection missions in the 
Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Following a two-year stint as a 
senior instructor at the NATO School at Oberammergau, Ger¬ 
many, he returned to OSIA as General Lajoie’s choice to be OSIA 
European Operation Command’s Chief of Operations. 

The two officers brought different strengths and personalities 
to the operation. At Rhein-Main Air Base, Colonel Grosick used 
his Air Force experience to address issues of personnel, transporta¬ 
tion, office space, communications, housing, and facilities. The 
command would expand sixfold in less than two years; that 
growth required attention to all manner of personnel and organi¬ 
zational details. At the same time, Colonel Kelley focused on de¬ 
fining the CFE Treaty’s operational mission. He drew upon his 
experience as an INF Treaty inspection team chief, his knowledge 
of NATO and the U.S. Military Liaison Mission, and his extensive 
study of Soviet military forces. The personalities of these two 
colonels were quite different. Grosick was a tall, robust, gregari¬ 
ous aviator experienced in handling the details of an active opera¬ 
tional field command. Kelley was a lean, ascetic, ramrod Marine 
who had an exceptionally clear concept of the CFE Treaty, the 
NATO alliance, and the Soviet Union. In the early months, plan¬ 
ning dominated. At Rhein-Main, there was more work than time, 
people, or resources; the division of leadership responsibilities 
worked well. 





64 On-Site Inspection Agency 


Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC 

Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, U.S. Marine Corps, was the Chief of 
Operations, OSIA European Operations Command, from October 
1990 through January 1995. He recruited, organized, planned, trained, 
and led OSIA’s CFE Treaty on-site inspection operations. 


When you came to the command, did you have an 
operational concept? 

“Yes. I planned to replicate what we did in the 
INF Treaty. I planned to use integral teams, as we 
had during the baseline period for INF. The num¬ 
bers changed somewhat, but I thought that the 
composition of the team would be similar. Over the 
first several months after I arrived at Frankfurt, the 
manning document was the center of our attention. 

“For the team chiefs, I looked for the kind of 
personnel that we had at the beginning of the INF 
period and which we had and routinely looked for 
in U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM). 

“The team chiefs would be, to use an analogy, 
the independent patrol leaders, with whom you’d 
have precious little contact once they deployed, and 
on whom you had to rely implicitly. You had to 
train them up as far as you could, give them ad¬ 
equate guidance, fill them full of treaty specifics, 
provide them the kind of surrogate wisdom that 
they might not otherwise have at the outset, give 
them ‘what if’ situations to death, force them to do 
all of the homework that this required, and then 
count on them to apply the tools of their trade to 
get the job done.” 

How did the command deal with the shifting plan¬ 
ning assumptions ? 

“The primary reason why the treaty data 
changed was not because of German unification, 
but [because of] internal decisions made within the 
Soviet Union. Initially, as a round figure, the Soviets 
had said that their data would contain 1,500 objects 
of verification. That had been the estimate of U.S. 
authorities, and it was confirmed as a working 
figure by the Soviets during treaty negotiations, 
fdowever, when the data were actually submitted, 
on 17 November 1990, there were only about 900 
Soviet objects of verification. 

“The result was that, although our manning 
document had been crafted for 16 teams, we were 
directed by OSIA’s Chief of Staff to reduce man¬ 



power. Ultimately 
we acquiesced, 
reducing it to eight 
teams, with some 
misgivings on my 
part because it took 
away any opera¬ 
tional reserve that 

we had in the event that anything went wrong. But 
we did so, nonetheless.” 

What was your concept for inspector and team 
training? 

“I expected them to learn the treaty as part of a 
treaty course, initially. But then would come a great 
deal of self-study and study in groups, such as with 
the team or in the Inspectors and Escorts branch. 

“I made a conscious decision very early on to 
foster the team as the unit with which I wanted the 
inspectors to identify. Prior to their identification 
within the branch or even the unit as a whole, I 
wanted them to think of themselves first and fore¬ 
most as a member of Team One, or Two, or Six, or 
Team Jones, or Team Kelley, or whatever it would 
be. That is where I wanted the allegiance to be 
initially. That is where I wanted the identification. 
That’s where I wanted the standards to be set. 
That’s where I anticipated that the key to training 
and success ultimately would come, as a matter of 
cohesiveness. Because of their internal training, 
because of knowing each other, backing each other 
up, bonding, and so forth, they would develop into 
a cohesive unit: a team. I think that was a very 
important operational concept that we started 
within the INF Treaty, and were successful in con¬ 
tinuing throughout the INF Baseline Period, al¬ 
though OSIA later abandoned it for reasons of 
convenience. 

“I have always been a very firm believer in unit 
cohesiveness. So I consciously set the teams up that 
way, and insisted that they work as units, think as 
units, act as units.” 


Source: Interview, Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC, with Dr. Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, May 18, 1994. 






65 


Initial Preparations: United States and the NATO Nations 


The first months, Kelley said, were largely spent working and 
reworking the manning document. This effort involved extensive 
coordination with senior treaty planners at Headquarters OSIA: 
Colonel John C. Reppert, USA; Lt. Colonel Paul H. Nelson, USA; 
and Lt. Colonel Thomas S. Brock, USA. By December 1990 the 
manning document had gone through more than 25 versions. 
Following the Soviet Union’s February 1991 decision to reclassify 
its CFE Treaty TLE, the manning document changed again in 
March 1991. Throughout the process, the focus of the numerous 
planning efforts was on the inspection team: just what was the 
right number of teams, the type of leadership, the degree of lan¬ 
guage competency, and the mixture of inspection skills. Another 
consideration was the availability of potential team members— 
when could they be identified and report to Europe for individual 
treaty training, team training, and full-scale mock inspections? 41 


The team leaders were 
officers “with whom you 
would have precious little 
contact...on whom you had 
to rely implicitly. ” 

—Col. Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC 
Chief of Operations, OSIA European 
Operations Command 


The American CFE Treaty Inspection Teams 

A Treaty-specified limit of nine inspectors per team drove the 
design of all inspection teams. The U.S. teams consisted of inspec¬ 
tors who were professional military officers and noncommissioned 
officers; other U.S. augmentee inspectors were civilian specialists. 
The team chiefs would be, in Colonel Kelley’s terms, “independent 
patrol leaders.” 42 Based on OSIA’s experience with the INF Treaty 
inspections, General Lajoie and Colonel Kelley decided that the 
team chiefs would be experienced field grade officers. During an 
inspection, these officers and their teams would be traveling under 
escort to remote places in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 
and at times they would have to lead inspections in extremely 
severe weather conditions on the Eurasian continent. As Kelley 
saw it, the team leaders were officers “with whom you would have 
precious little contact once they deployed, and on whom you had 
to rely implicitly.” 43 From the beginning, he wanted a specific type 
of officer: a U.S. Army or Marine Russian foreign area officer 
(FAO) or Air Force officers with similar skills, although the Air 
Force did not have a comparable program. FAOs were career 
military officers who had served in one of the combat branches 
and then had specialized in Russian language and Soviet military 
force structure. Highly trained and educated, Russian FAOs were 
in demand as attaches, arms control specialists, and plans/analysis 
staff officers. In fact, the demand for them was so great that they 
were not available for assignment to fill all the CFE team chief 
positions. 

Consequently, Headquarters OSIA and its European Opera¬ 
tions Command accepted a different composition of team chiefs: 
some Russian FAOs, some West European FAOs, and some line 
officers—artillery officers, aircraft commanders, or armor officers. 
The U.S. Army’s European FAOs had similar education, training, 




66 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Military Experience 





U.S. inspectors were professionals 
in their fields. 


and experiences to the Russian FAOs, except that they had spent 
much of their career working with NATO armies, air forces, and 
staffs. The line officers had served nearly all of their Army or Air 
Force careers working with combat units in armor, infantry, artil¬ 
lery, or tactical aircraft. They knew U.S. military force structure, 
weapons, units, and personnel, specifically how the soldiers, ma¬ 
rines, and airmen combined to make an operational unit. Equally 
important, they were experienced in serving in and evaluating 
operational military units. So it was from these three groups that 
the CFE team chiefs came. As for the deputies, Colonel Kelley and 
Colonel Grosick decided that the second officers would be field 
grade officers, ideally at the rank of major. Their backgrounds 
would complement those of the team chiefs, so that if one officer 
could not speak Russian, the other would. 

How did these plans work out? Six of the eight team chiefs 
were lieutenant colonels. The eight deputy team chiefs, except for 
one captain and one warrant officer, were majors or major select¬ 
ees. Noncommissioned officers filled the two team positions for 
treaty linguists. Trained as Russian linguists, these NCOs had 
served in the U.S. military with its high standards for noncommis¬ 
sioned officer leadership and training. They were professional 
soldiers. Two other inspection team members were also NCOs; 
they were weapons specialists who had direct experience with 
conventional armed forces in the European theater. Rounding out 
the nine-person inspection team were three specialists who were 
knowledgeable in Soviet and Central European military forces. 44 

This purposeful mix of military skills and experiences among 
team members gave Colonel Kelley flexibility in assigning inspec¬ 
tion teams to missions. Any American team could inspect either a 
Polish armor regiment or a Soviet tactical air unit because some¬ 
one on the team had firsthand experience with armor and some¬ 
one else had worked on or flown aircraft. The CFE Treaty’s Proto¬ 
col on Inspections allowed each inspection team to break into 
three subteams, and it was American policy to routinely use three 
subteams. The protocol, however, required each subteam to pos¬ 
sess linguistic capability in the inspected country’s language. Since 
every U.S. team had two linguists, either the team chief or deputy 
had to speak Russian to allow the team to break down into three 
subteams for greater operational coverage at an inspection site. 

At treaty signature in November 1990, the best estimate for 
entry into force was April 1, 1991. To be ready to inspect and 
escort on that date, OSIA's European Operations had to have the 
team chiefs, deputies, linguists, and weapons specialists in place in 
Europe by January 1, 1991. This did not happen. Because of the 
Gulf War, the limited availability of FAOs, and the drawdown of 
American forces, the U.S. military personnel system could not 
provide qualified officers and NCOs rapidly for reassignment to 

















67 


Initial Preparations: United States and the NATO Nations 


Europe. Frustrated because the unit had to be ready regardless of 
the U.S. military’s systemic problems, Colonel Kelley recalled that 
they “were totally unable to acquire personnel until, at the earliest, 
January 31, 1991,” and even then the fill was only partial. This 
delay was serious: individual treaty training would be postponed, 
team training could not begin, and mock inspections evaluating 
the readiness of U.S. CFE sites in Western Europe could not be 
undertaken. Nominations came late, arrivals still later. Not until 
the summer of 1991 did six of the eight team chiefs arrive at 
Rhein-Main. Two of the deputy team leaders did not reach Ger¬ 
many until December 1991, 12 months behind initial expecta¬ 
tions. 45 


An Unforeseen Delay 

There was an unforeseen development. No nation had rati¬ 
fied the CFE Treaty in time for the projected April 1991 entry into 
force date. In fact, the national ratification process was not com¬ 
pleted at all in 1991; it was not until July 1992 that the treaty 
entered into force provisionally. This delay allowed time for five 
parallel developments. 

First, it allowed time for the national ratification processes to 
conclude in 1991-92 in the congresses, parliaments, and govern¬ 
ments of all the CFE Treaty signatory states. Next, it allowed time 
for intense diplomatic negotiations by the CFE Treaty states with 
the Soviet Union over two significant issues: the relocation 
and transfer of its TLE beyond the Ural Mountains, and the 
redesignation of forces as naval infantry. Because of those diplo¬ 
matic discussions, the NATO nations delayed treaty ratification 
until the summer and fall of 1991. Third, it gave the Western and 
Eastern European national verification agencies, many of which 



U.S. inspectors received experience 
during training in Czechoslovakia. 




68 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


were newly established, time to develop leadership cadres, inspec¬ 
tion teams, escort teams, communications systems and procedures, 
and operational plans for conducting on-site inspections and es¬ 
corts. Fourth, there was time for the new verification agencies to 
conduct extensive practice, or mock, inspections with their own 
national military forces, with the military forces in their respective 
alliances, and in a few instances, with the military forces of na¬ 
tions in the opposing alliance. Finally, it allowed time for the 
consequences of the Soviet Union’s demise to unfold. That epochal 
development resulted in the establishment of 15 successor nations 
and set in motion a series of political, military, diplomatic, and 
economic developments. Six months after the collapse of the So¬ 
viet Union, the successor states agreed in May 1992 at Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan, to partition the former USSR’s military forces and 
accept all of its CFE Treaty obligations. 

These five developments profoundly influenced the CFE 
Treaty. Discussed in the next chapter, they demonstrated how the 
changing international order profoundly altered the mission of 
implementing a signed arms control treaty. The CFE Treaty was 
essentially a European arms reduction and conflict prevention 
treaty. When Europe changed profoundly in 1991-92, so too did 
the context for planning the treaty’s implementation. There is a 
simple historical truth, known to every experienced verification 
agency director: “Every treaty has its own particular history.” This 
was never more apparent than in 1991-92 with the ratification 
process and operational preparations for the Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe Treaty. 


Notes 

1. Joseph P. Harahan, On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty (Washing¬ 
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 152. Major General 
Robert W. Parker, USAF, Director OSIA, Statement before the House of 
Representatives, Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Arms Control and 
International Security and Science, March 21, 1991. In his statement, Gen. 
Parker discussed President Bush’s National Security Directive and its 
implications for the On-Site Inspection Agency. See also House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, Report to the Congress on the Activities of the On-Site 
Inspection Agency of the Department of Defense, 102d Congress, 2nd 
Sess., 1992. Washington D.C. 

2. For the attitude of the Reagan administration (1981-1988) regarding U.S.- 
USSR relations, arms control treaties, and verification, see Don Oberdorfer, 
The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era—The United States and the 
Soviet Union, 1983-1990 (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991); and George 
P. Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New 
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993). For accounts of the Bush administra¬ 
tion (1988-1992) see Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest 
Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, 

Brown, and Co., 1993); Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany 
Unified and Europe Transformed: A study in Statecraft (Cambridge, Mass.: 



69 


Initial Preparations: United States and the NATO Nations 


Harvard University Press, 1995); and Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Autopsy on an 
Empire: The American Ambassador’s Account of the Collapse of the Soviet 
Union (New York: Random House, 1995). 

3. For an account of the agency’s expansion, read David M. Willford, “A 
Brief History of the On-Site Inspection Agency,” OSIA Reference Report 
No. 1 (Washington, D.C.: On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996), pp. 5-7. 

4. After signature, the president submitted these treaties to the U.S. Senate 
for ratification. For the text of each treaty, accompanied by the Bush 
administration’s interpretation of each major article, provision, and 
protocol, see Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Executive Report 
101-31: Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties, 
101st Cong., 2d sess., 1990; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 

Treaty Document 102-8: Message from the President of the United States 
Transmitting the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), 
102d Cong., 1st sess., 1991; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 

Treaty Document 103-21: Message from the President of the United States 
Transmitting the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Stockpiling 
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, 103d Cong., 

1st sess., 1993. 

5. President George Bush, The President’s Report to Congress on Soviet Non- 
Compliance with Arms Control Agreements, February 23, 1990. 

6. President George Bush, National Security Directive 41, Organizing to 
Manage On-Site Inspections for Arms Control, May 29, 1990. The impact 
of this directive on the agency was discussed by Gen. Parker, in his 
statement before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on March 21, 
1991. 

7. General Colin L. Powell, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum 
for the Secretary of Defense, “CFE Treaty Executive Agent,” April 3, 1991; 
Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, Memorandum for the Secretaries 
of the Military Services, “Executive Agent for the Secretary of Defense for 
the CFE Treaty,” June 14, 1991. Later, these directives were incorporated 
into the final instruction; see President George Bush, National Security 
Directive, Organizing to Manage On-Site Inspections Under the CFE 
Treaty, February 11, 1992. 

8. United States European Command, “Memorandum of Understanding 
Between USEUCOM, USLANTCOM, and OSIA for Mutual Liaison and 
Support Operations in Implementation of the CFE Treaty,” Fall 1991. 

9. Ibid. 

10. Interview with Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC, Chief, Operations 
Division, European Operations Command, OSIA, by Joseph P. Harahan, 
Historian, OSIA, Washington, D.C., May 18, 1994; Interview with Major 
Richard J. O’Shea, USAF, Liaison Officer, European Operations Command, 
OSIA, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Rhein-Main Air Base, 
Germany, July 12, 1993. 

11. Harahan, On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty, pp. 47-64, 117-150. 

12. Colonel James S. Loftus, Jr., USA, Chief, Negotiations Plans Office, 
Headquarters OSIA, Report on Planning Assumptions for Future Treaties, 
January 22, 1990; Commander Edward J. Higgins, USN, Planner, 
Negotiations Plans Office, Headquarters OSIA, Report on Planning for 
Arms Control Inspection Activities, March 6, 1990; Directorate of 
Resources Manpower Office, Headquarters OSIA Report, On-Site 
Inspection Agency Joint Table of Distribution, April 17, 1990; Colonel 




~0 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


James S. Loftus, Jr., USA, Chief, Negotiations Plans Office. Headquarters 
OSIA. Memorandum for Distribution. Treaty Planning Assumptions, 
October 4. 1990. 

13. Interview, Kelley. 

14. Antis Control Reporter 1990, pp. 407.B.382-383: Jane M.O. Sharp, 
"Conventional Arms Control in Europe," in SIPR1 Yearbook 1991, World 
Armaments and Disarmament, pp. 420-421. 

15. Sharp. "Conventional Arms Control in Europe" 1991), pp. 429—430. 

16. Arms Control Reporter 1990, pp. 407.B.393, 40 - .B.410-411; R. Jeffery 
Smith, "Soviets Said to be Removing Arms from Europe Before Treaty,” 
Washington Post , October 5, 1990, p. A20; R. Jeffery Smith. "U.S.-Soviets 
Disagree on Arms Cuts,” Washington Post, December 1”, 1990, pp. Al, 
A20; Michael R. Gordon, "Soviets Shift Many Tanks to Siberia,” Xew 
York Times, November 15. 1990, p. A3; International Institute for 
Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, 1991-1992 i London: Brassey's 
Inc., 1991), pp. 30-31. 

I - . See this book. Chapter 3, Ratification Delayed. 

18. P. Terrence Hopmann, "From MBFR to CFE. Negotiating Conventional 
Arms Control in Europe," in Richard Dean Burns, ed.. Encyclopedia of 
Arms Control and Disarmament. Yol. II. pp. 983-984. For a good insight 
into the internal pressures on the senior officers responsible for mission 
readiness, see Interview, Kelley. 

19. In June 1990, the NATO foreign ministers agreed at a meeting at Turnbury. 
Scotland, to establish a small coordinating mechanism at Headquarters 
NATO. This became the Verification Coordinating Committee YCC). See 
Arms Control Reporter 1990, pp. 407.B.383, 407.B.409. 

20. These changes had other effects. For instance, the number of U.S. sites 
subject to inspection increased twofold by the L’.S. quota of 18 percent. See 
Interview, Kelley. 

21. Ibid. 

22. Chief of Staff, Administration, Headquarters OSIA. On-Site Inspection 
Agency Personnel Roster, May 20, 1992; Director of Resource Manage¬ 
ment, Manpower Office. Report on On-Site Inspection Agency Manning 
Document, October 8, 1992. 

23. International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military,' Balance, 1991- 
1992 , pp. 32—45; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military 
Balance, 1995-1996 London: Brassey's Inc., 1995), pp. 102-120. 

24. President George Bush. "State of the Union Address, January 31. 1990,” 
published in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1990 Washington. 
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1991 >, pp. 18-21. 

25. General Crosbie E. Saint, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Europe and 
Seventh Army. "Changing the Face of USAREUR,” Field Artillery 
Magazine, August 1992. pp. 10-15. See also Patrecia Slayden Hollis, “An 
Introduction: USAREUR in Transition." Field Artillery- Magazine, August 
1992, pp. 8-9. 

26. Saint. "Changing the Face of USAREUR,” p. 13. 

27. Ibid., p. 14. 

28. Interview, Kelley; Interview, O'Shea. 



_ Initial Preparations: United States and the NATO Nations 


71 


29. James Macintosh, “Confidence-Building Measures in Europe, 1975 to the 
Present,” in Richard Dean Burns, ed., Encyclopedia of Arms Control and 
Disarmament, Vol. II , pp. 929-945; Don O. Stovall, “The Stockholm 
Accord: On-Site Inspections in Eastern and Western Europe,” in Lewis A. 
Dunn and Amy E. Gordon, eds., Arms Control Verification and the New 
Role of On-Site Inspection (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 
15-38. For a broader discussion of the CSCE, the CFE Treaty, and the 
growth of regional arms control institutions in Europe, see Catherine 
McArdle Kelleher, “Cooperative Security in Europe,” in Jane E. Nolan, ed., 
Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1994), pp. 293-351. 

30. Interview with Brigadier General Dr. Heinz Loquai, Director, Zentrum fur 
Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, 
OSIA, Geilenkirchen, Germany, January 31, 1994. 

31. Ibid. See also Interviews with Lt. Colonel Roland Keitel and Lt. Colonel 
Bernd Mecke, Zentrum fur Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr, by 
Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Geilenkirchen, Germany, January 31, 
1994. 

32. Interview with Colonel Francois Rozec, Commandant, L’Unite Fran^aise de 
Verification, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Creil, France, 
February 1, 1994. 

33. Squadron Leader Antony Kerr, Joint Arms Control Implementation Group, 
Great Britain, Special Report on the JACIG, sent to the Historian, OSIA, 
March, 23, 1994. 

34. Interview with Lt. Colonel Fred Janssen and Lt. Colonel Henri Van der 
Auera, L’Unite Beige de Verification, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, 
OSIA, Brussels, Belgium, January 27, 1994. 

35. Interview with Major General Joseph DiMaria, Centro Italiano de Verifica 
de Armi (CIVA), by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Washington D.C., 
October 19, 1993. 

36. Interview with Commander C.N.M. Wierema, Director, Arms Control 
Branch, Ministry of Defense, the Netherlands, byjoseph P. Harahan, 
Historian, OSIA, The Hague, Netherlands, January 28, 1994. 

37. Kelleher, “Cooperative Security in Europe,” pp. 304-310; Hopmann, 
“From MBFR to CFE,” pp. 967-989; Arms Control Reporter 1990, pp. 
407.B.291-409; Ambassador Amedeo de Franchis, “The CFE Treaty—The 
Role of the High Level Working Group,” NATO Review, No. 5, October 
1992, pp. 12-16. 

38. Necil Nedimoglu, Head of the NATO Verification and Implementation 
Coordination Section, “NATO’s Role in Verification and Compliance 
Monitoring for the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document,” speech 
presented to the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on 
Verification in All its Aspects, New York, July 19, 1994. See also Arms 
Control Reporter 1990, pp. 407.B.376, 407.B.383. 

39. Colonel John Reppert, OSIA, Trip Report for Conventional Forces in 
Europe Treaty (CFE) Activities with the NATO’s Verification Coordinating 
Committee, January 10-February 8, 1991, Headquarters OSIA, February 
13, 1991; Lt. Colonel Thomas A. Dudley, OSIA, Trip Report for 
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Activities with the NATO 
Verification Coordinating Committee, March 1-May 7, 1991, Headquar¬ 
ters OSIA, May 28, 1991. For the NATO perspective see Nedimoglu, 
“NATO’s Role in Verification and Compliance Monitoring for the CFE 
Treaty and the Vienna Document.” 


72 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


40. Public Affairs Office, OSIA, News Release: “Biography of Colonel 
Frederick E. Grosick, USAF, Commander European Operations,” 
December 1993; and Public Affairs Office, OSIA, News Release: 
“Biography of Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC, Deputy Commander 
and Chief of Operations, European Operations Command,” December 
1993. 

41. Interview, Kelley. 

42. Ibid. 

43. Ibid. 

44. This summary is based on a series of lengthy interviews with American 
CFE Treaty team chiefs, deputy team chiefs, linguists, and weapons 
specialists. See interviews with Lt. Colonel Jan S. Karcz, USA, December 
13, 1993; Lt. Colonel Joseph J. Drach, Jr., USA, December 17, 1993; Lt. 
Colonel Thomas C. Fiser, USA, July 12, 1993; Lt. Colonel Keith A. 
Oatman, USA, July 13, 1993; Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert, USAF, July 12, 
1993; Lt. Colonel Edward G. Gallagher, II, USA, December 13, 1993; 
Chief Warrant Officer 4 Michael R. Lukes, USA, July 12, 1993; Sergeant 
First Class George A. Partridge, USA, July 13, 1993; Sergeant First Class 
Mark A. Bumala, USA, July 13, 1993. All interviews conducted by Joseph 
P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, at Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany. 

45. Interview, Kelley. 



Chapter 3 

Ratification Dei 
Europe in Tub 


ayed, 



Soviet Union in Revolution 



East German guard on patrol hours before the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989. 

A s Europe entered the 1990s, it was in turmoil. From 1989 
to 1992—coinciding with the years of the CFE Treaty’s 
negotiation, ratification, and entry into force—nations on 
the European continent were experiencing their greatest changes 
since the end of World War II. There was the unification of Ger¬ 
many; the “velvet” political revolutions casting out Communist 
systems in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia; the bloody 
revolution in Romania; the continuous integration of the Euro¬ 
pean Union; the recurrent economic and political crises in the 
Soviet Union presaging its collapse; the national independence 
movements in the former Soviet republics; and, running through¬ 
out, the large-scale military withdrawals from Central and West¬ 
ern Europe by the Soviet Union and the United States. Politically, 



































74 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


diplomatically, and militarily, the European continent was in the 
midst of revolutionary changes. It was in this context that ratifica¬ 
tion and implementation of the CFE Treaty proceeded. 


From Treaty Signature to Ratification 



U.S. ratification—December 26, 
1991. 


In constitutional governments, treaties require two acts for 
legitimacy: executive signature and legislative ratification. For the 
United States, President Bush signed the CFE Treaty in Paris on 
November 19, 1990. That same day, the leaders of 21 other 
NATO and Warsaw Pact nations signed the treaty. Ratification, 
however, took nearly two years. On October 30, 1992, just 20 
days short of two full years, the final two states, Belarus and 
Kazakstan, ratified the treaty and deposited their instruments of 
ratification at The Hague in the Netherlands. Why did it take so 
long? 

One CFE Treaty signatory state, the Soviet Union, was in 
such turmoil in 1991 and 1992 that its very existence was in ques¬ 
tion. 1 When the USSR collapsed in late December 1991, its succes¬ 
sor states had to form new governments, and those governments 
had to work out military and security relationships with Russia, 
the largest and most powerful of the former republics. 

So great were the repercussions from the Soviet Union’s inter¬ 
nal difficulties that the CFE Treaty signatory states had to convene 
four separate extraordinary meetings to approve, authorize, and 
incorporate new statements, understandings, declarations, and 
agreements into the treaty regarding entitlements and obligations. 
In June 1991, the signatory states met at The Hague; in October 
1991 they convened in Vienna; in June 1992 they met in Oslo; 
and, finally, in July 1992, they assembled just before the Confer¬ 
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) summit in 
Helsinki. At each of these meetings, the diplomats took up specific 
treaty issues for the group to resolve before the individual states 
would proceed with ratification and implementation. Every issue 
was a consequence of the Soviet Union’s collapse as an empire. 
Throughout these extraordinary meetings across Europe, the com¬ 
mitment of the European and North Atlantic states to the CFE 
Treaty as the “cornerstone of European security” proved to be 
remarkably strong and durable. 


The First Crisis: Surprises at the 
Data Exchange 

The first, and most serious, issue arose at the time of the 
CSCE/CFE Treaty summit in November 1990. On November 18, 
one day before treaty signing, representatives from each of the 








75 


Ratification Delayed, Europe in Turmoil, Soviet Union in Revolution 


signatory states placed stacks of treaty-mandated data books on 
long rows of tables in the Hofburg Palace in Vienna. The books 
listed detailed information on force structure, force size, military 
units and organizations, and military weapons in the five treaty 
categories of armaments: tanks, artillery, armored personnel carri¬ 
ers, helicopters, and combat aircraft. Shortly thereafter, state del¬ 
egates moved from table to table scooping up copies of these in¬ 
valuable military force data. U.S. CFE Treaty Negotiator Lynn M. 
Hansen, who was in the Hofburg Palace that morning, character¬ 
ized the exchange as having the “aura of a bazaar.” He remem¬ 
bered military officers and specialists excited and buzzing at the 
opportunity to compare treaty declarations against current esti¬ 
mates. 2 Within days, however, the atmosphere changed for the 
worse as serious questions arose about the Soviet Union’s force 
data (see table 3-1). 3 


It appeared to many of the state delegates in Vienna that the 
Soviet Union had underrepresented its treaty holdings by a signifi¬ 
cant degree. In July 1988, when all the states had presented their 
force data to the negotiating teams, the Soviet Union had given out 
one set of data. Now in November 1990, at treaty signature, it 
had presented a much different set of data. When compared, there 
were major discrepancies. U.S. officials reported to President Bush 
that the Soviet discrepancy was between 20,000 and 40,000 items: 
6,000 to 11,000 tanks, 12,000 armored fighting vehicles, 12,000 
artillery pieces, and 3,000 combat aircraft. 4 This was a serious 
discrepancy, one that clearly threatened ratification. Was there a 
Soviet explanation? 

In Vienna, Soviet diplomats explained that during the two 
years of treaty negotiations, 1989-90, the Soviet High Command 
had conducted a large-scale operation that withdrew thousands of 
military personnel, weapons, and units from Central and Eastern 
Europe. It was this military equipment, they asserted, that ac¬ 
counted for the difference. 5 They explained that in one category 
alone, tanks, the Soviet Army had destroyed, exported, or con¬ 
verted more than 4,000 items since 1989. The Soviet military had 
sent another 8,000 tanks to motor rifle and other divisions sta¬ 
tioned in Asia, or to military storage depots located beyond the 
Ural Mountains. In addition, they pointed out that the Soviet 
military had sent thousands of items from other treaty-limited 
equipment (TLE) categories—artillery, armored combat vehicles 
(ACVs), and helicopters—to military depots and active units sta¬ 
tioned beyond the Urals. 6 The Ural Mountains were the CFE 
Treaty’s easternmost boundary; military equipment located east 
of the Urals was not subject to any of the treaty’s requirements. 
There would be no requirement for its inclusion in the initial data, 
for on-site inspection teams to count it, or for it to be reduced 
within a set period of time. Finally, the Soviet diplomats explained 
that since much of this equipment had been transferred from spe- 



Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze detailed the 
movement of TLE east of the 
Urals. 









On-Site Inspection Agency 


Table 3-1. Declared National CFE Holdings in November 1990 


Nation 

Tanks 

Artillery 

ACVs 

Combat 

Aircraft 

Attack 

Helicopters 

Warsaw Treaty Organization States 





USSR 

20,694 

13,828 

29,348 

6,445 

1,330 

Bulgaria 

2,416 

2,474 

2,010 

387 

44 

Czechoslovakia 

3,035 

3,485 

4,359 

369 

56 

Hungary 

1,345 

1,047 

1,720 

110 

39 

Poland 

2,850 

2,300 

2,377 

654 

128 

Romania 

2,851 

3,819 

3,135 

407 

104 

Total WTO 

33,191 

26,953 

42,949 

8,372 

1,701 

NATO States 

Belgium 

359 

376 

1,282 

191 

0 

Canada 

77 

38 

277 

45 

12 

Denmark 

419 

553 

316 

106 

3 

France 

1,358 

1,330 

4,125 

700 

429 

Germany 

7,133 

4,644 

9,598 

1,064 

357 

Greece 

1,725 

1,941 

1,639 

480 

0 

Italy 

1,912 

2,222 

3,591 

584 

169 

Netherlands 

913 

838 

1,467 

196 

91 

Norway 

205 

532 

146 

90 

0 

Portugal 

146 

334 

259 

96 

0 

Spain 

854 

1,373 

1,259 

252 

28 

Turkey 

2,888 

3,202 

1,554 

589 

0 

UK 

1,198 

636 

3,193 

842 

368 

USA 

5,904 

2,601 

5,747 

704 

279 

Total NATO 

25,091 

20,620 

34,453 

5,939 

1,736 


Source: Arms Control Reporter 1990 , p. 407, E-0.7. 







77 


Ratification Delayed, Europe in Turmoil, Soviet Union in Revolution 


cialized combat support units, those units no longer held any 
TLE. Those units, by the treaty’s inspection protocols, would not 
be objects of verification (OOVs). As a result, the Soviet Union’s 
OOVs dropped from approximately 1,500 to fewer than 1,000. 

Further, the Soviet diplomats asserted that this information 
should not have come as a surprise. In early October, Soviet Gen¬ 
eral Mikhail A. Moiseyev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, had 
announced the specific details of many of these force movements 
at a Pentagon press conference in Washington, D.C. 8 Just four 
weeks before the Vienna meeting, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze had sent a detailed letter on October 13, 1990, to 
U.S. Secretary of State James Baker listing the number and cat¬ 
egory of equipment removed from Central Europe to the east. 9 But 
some Soviet officials had made statements that indicated a far 
different situation. In early October, Soviet Ambassador Oleg 
Grinevsky spoke informally with the other CFE Treaty diplomats 
in Vienna, stating that the USSR would have 1,600 OOVs at 
treaty signature, and approximately 1,500 OOVs at the end of the 
40-month reduction phase. 10 Therefore, when the Soviet Union 
revealed in Vienna, just one day before the official signing of the 
treaty in Paris, the scope of its unilateral military equipment relo¬ 
cation and the decrease in its inspectable sites, it surprised and 
disturbed many diplomats from the other CFE nations. At the very 
least, it raised serious questions of credibility. 

Within a few weeks, diplomats linked these questions to 
other unilateral treaty-related actions by the Soviet Union. The 
Soviet High Command, according to the USSR’s data books, had 
resubordinated three motor rifle divisions to naval infantry forces. 
In terms of CFE Treaty equipment, this meant they had transferred 
to the naval forces 120 tanks, 753 armored personnel vehicles, and 
234 artillery pieces. The Soviet High Command also had estab¬ 
lished a new kind of naval unit, the coastal defense forces, and 
assigned to it 813 tanks, 972 ACVs, and 846 artillery pieces. In 
addition, the Strategic Rocket Forces received 1,791 ACVs. 11 
During treaty negotiations, delegates considered all this equipment 
to be a part of the USSR’s CFE Treaty TLE ceilings, subject to 
reduction quotas and inspection protocols. In Vienna, Soviet dip¬ 
lomats argued that since the Soviet High Command had reassigned 
this equipment to naval units, which they asserted were not in¬ 
cluded in the treaty, the equipment would not be subject to treaty 
inspections or ceilings. Further, they asserted that the Strategic 
Rocket Forces’ 1,791 ACVs should be classified as internal secu¬ 
rity equipment, again outside the treaty’s quantitative provisions. 
Finally, the Soviet data omitted 18 PT-76 armored combat ve¬ 
hicles, which had belonged to the civil defense forces, from the 
TLE category of heavy armament combat vehicles. Neither in their 
data submission nor in subsequent discussions did the Soviets give 
any explanation for this omission. 12 



On-Site Inspection Agency 


Despite these discrepancies, the treaty was signed on Novem¬ 
ber 19, 1990. Nonetheless, four states—the United States, Ger¬ 
many, Canada, and Great Britain—raised specific questions about 
the Soviet data. The forum they used was the newly established 
CFE Treaty Joint Consultative Group (JCG). 13 One of this group’s 
responsibilities was to seek resolutions of ambiguities in data or 
differences of interpretation resulting from treaty implementation. 
Clearly, the dispute with the Soviet Union, a major signatory party, 
over its initial data submission fell within the scope of the JCG. 
Article V of the treaty, and a separate protocol, authorized and set 
forth the responsibilities and procedural rules governing this im¬ 
portant joint treaty group. Consisting of representatives from 
every signatory state, the JCG was to meet in Vienna twice a year, 
with each session lasting four weeks. In fact, the initial issues were 
so contentious that the JCG met in nearly continuous monthly 
sessions beginning in late November 1990. 


Over my dead body!” 

—Ambassador R. James Woolsey, 
U.S. CFE Treaty Negotiator 



The state parties had 90 days—until February 15, 1991—to 
correct any discrepancies in their initial data and to respond to 
ambiguities. The United States, Great Britain, Germany, and 
Canada urged the Soviet Union to reconsider its initial submission. 
During this 90-day period, diplomats from the United States and 
several other NATO nations sought to use bilateral diplomacy 
to resolve the issue. Early in December, Ambassador R. James 
Woolsey, U.S. CFE Treaty Negotiator, Brigadier General Daniel W. 
Christman, USA, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) representative, and a 
small team flew to Moscow to meet with Defense Minister Mar¬ 
shal Dmitriy Yazov, General Moiseyev, and other members of the 
Soviet Supreme High Command. 14 Foreign Minister Shevardnadze 
was not present. Defense Minister Yazov refused categorically to 
consider any changes to the Soviet position on the former TLE 
equipment assigned to naval and civil defense units. That equip¬ 
ment, he asserted, might become part of a possible future treaty on 
conventional naval forces, but the Soviet military did not have to 
count it with the Soviet Union’s TLE for the CFE Treaty. Ambassa¬ 
dor Woolsey rejected Yazov’s assertion out of hand. He regarded 
the Soviet defense minister’s position as directly contravening the 
negotiated and signed treaty. An angry confrontation ensued. 
Woolsey told Yazov that the United States would accept the Soviet 
position “over my dead body!” 15 

This exchange hardened the impasse. At subsequent U.S.- 
USSR diplomatic meetings in Houston, Texas, and Brussels, 
Belgium, in December 1990 and January 1991, Soviet military 
leaders remained obdurate. Then, on February 14, 1991, the So¬ 
viet Union presented its updated treaty data to the JCG in Vienna. 
It retained every essential element under dispute—the exempted 
TLE reassigned to the coastal defense forces, naval infantry forces, 
Strategic Rocket Forces, and civil defense units. Given this fact, 





79 


Ratification Delayed, Europe in Turmoil, Soviet Union in Revolution 


U.S. Secretary of State James Baker declared on the same day that 
President Bush would not submit the CFE Treaty to the U.S. Sen¬ 
ate for ratification. 16 

It is interesting that in the midst of this frosty atmosphere, the 
diplomats resolved one issue: the 20,000-40,000 discrepancy in 
the Soviets’ data. Analysis of two key documents supported the 
Soviet position. First, Soviet Minister Shevardnadze’s letter to 
Secretary of State Baker, dated October 13, 1990, had contained 
specific figures on the Soviet forces and equipment in the treaty’s 
zones as well as details on the TLE transfers from 1988 to 1990. 
Excerpted, the data revealed the following information: 


Table 3-2. Soviet Union’s ATTU* Holdings 
and Transfers, 1988-1990 



1 Jul 88 

1 Aug 90 

18 Nov 90 

Transferred 

Percent 

Tanks 

41,580 

24,898 

20,694 

20,886 

50% 

Artillery 

42,400 

18,300 

13,828 

28,572 

67% 

ACVs 

57,800 

32,320 

29,348 

27,452 

47% 

Totals 

141,780 

75,518 

63,870 

76,910 

54% 


‘Atlantic to the Urals. 

Source: Jane M.O. Sharp, “Conventional Arms Control in Europe," SIPRI Yearbook 1991, 
p. 430. 


Secretary Baker and General Cohn Powell, Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, had received these Soviet figures in late Octo¬ 
ber. Then, three weeks later, the Soviets had presented these same 
figures in Vienna at the initial data exchange. Consequently, con¬ 
tinued U.S. objections in the winter of 1990-91 stood on thin ice. 
The ice got even thinner in January 1991 when U.S. intelligence 
estimates confirmed that the Soviet Union’s data discrepancy was 
not in the 20,000-40,000 range, but probably entailed 2,000- 
3,000 items. 17 With this new estimate, the issue melted away, 
losing its power to influence treaty ratification. 

What did not disappear, however, was the Soviet High 
Command’s insistence on the legitimacy of resubordinating the 
three motorized rifle divisions to the naval infantry and the coastal 
defense forces. This position alone meant that on February 14, 
1991, the date when the Soviet Union submitted its updated data, 
the CFE Treaty was at an impasse. Some believed that the Soviet 
High Command wanted to stop the CFE Treaty ratification pro¬ 
cess cold and substitute for the treaty a “status-quo” military 







80 


On-Site Inspection Agency 



While the old system was untenable, it 
Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Dmitriy Yazov meets would take many months for the new reality to 

with Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. emerge. The Soviet Union remained a great mili¬ 

tary power and a major CFE Treaty state party. 
Following the Gulf War, President Bush began a series of arms 
control initiatives. 20 He directed Secretary of State Baker to initiate 
diplomatic discussions with Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander A. 
Bessmertnykh. Baker focused on resolving both the CFE Treaty 
impasse and the outstanding issues of the still-unsigned Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty (START). In the White House, President 
Bush set up a small, high-level experts group on arms control to 
draft presidential letters and new treaty positions and to formulate 
immediate responses. Led by Arnold Kanter of the National Secu¬ 
rity Council, this four-person group worked closely with Secretary 
Baker, Ambassador Woolsey, CFE Treaty Negotiator Hansen, and 
the START Treaty negotiators. Initially there was little change. In 
March, Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh met with Secretary 
Baker in Moscow. He asked Baker to reconsider the United States’ 
opposition to the Soviet High Command’s resubordination of CFE 
TLE to naval and coastal defense units. Baker replied: “I don’t 
know what there is to talk about. Twenty-two countries have 
signed this treaty, and only one has changed the rules.” 21 


relationship of the Soviet Union with Central and 
Western European nations. ls If this were true, the 
Soviet military’s vision proved to be shortsighted 
in view of subsequent events. 

In the spring and summer months of 1991, 
the Soviet Union’s internal and external policies 
were subject to larger and more powerful events. 
In late February, a United Nations coalition, led 
by the United States, won a decisive victory in 
the Gulf War over Iraq, a former Soviet ally. 
Simultaneously, in late January and February, the 
people of the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania rebelled against Soviet imperialism. 19 
Following a brief, violent confrontation, they 
won recognition of their sovereignty from Mos¬ 
cow. Then, throughout April, May, and June, 
President Gorbachev and the Communist central 
government gradually lost power to Boris 
Yeltsin, Russian reformers, and nationalistic 
leaders in the republics. The Soviet High 
Command’s desire to establish a Soviet-domi¬ 
nated imperial security system based on the 
military status quo became untenable as the 
Soviet Union unraveled both as an empire and 
a nation. 





81 


Ratification Delayed, Europe in Turmoil, Soviet Union in Revolution 


Next, President Bush wrote directly to President Gorbachev 
asking him to resolve the dispute on the reassignment of the 
military equipment. Secretary Baker made a direct appeal to 
Bessmertnykh in Russia in late April. Neither Bush’s letter nor 
Baker’s personal diplomacy had much effect. Then in late May 
a breakthrough occurred. President Gorbachev sent General 
Moiseyev to Washington for a two-day meeting with the president, 
senior military leaders, and treaty negotiators. 22 He brought with 
him new proposals. General Moiseyev stated the Soviet Union’s 
final position: all equipment in the Soviet naval infantry and 
coastal defense forces would remain in their units, but they would 
be counted against the USSR’s overall CFE Treaty ceilings. The 
number of armored personnel vehicles assigned to the Strategic 
Rocket Forces (SRF) would be limited to 1,701, but they would 
not be counted against the Soviet Union’s aggregate number of 
treaty ACVs. The naval forces would not be counted as OOVs, 
limiting the number of inspections the Soviets would be liable for, 
but these units would still be vulnerable to inspection under the 
challenge inspection provisions. More important, the naval forces 
equipment would be counted in Soviet TLE totals. The issue of 
armored personnel vehicles in the SRF was countered somewhat 
by the U.S. concern for the security of Soviet nuclear materials if 
the Soviet Union became less stable. After consideration, U.S. 
experts accepted the Soviet position. The next day General 
Moiseyev met with President Bush in the White House. According 
to a recent account, President Bush was insistent and very firm on 
the United States’ commitment to the treaty and the consequences 
of any nation trying to back out at this late stage. 23 General 
Moiseyev agreed, stating his support for President Gorbachev, 
perestroika, and arms control. 



Soviet President Mikhail 
Gorbachev. 



Tampere 


Helsinki 


d TaH,nn < 

ESTONIA 


Gotland 


★ LATVIA 


Goteborg 


Baltic 

Sea 


LITHUANIA 


Oland 


Bornholm 

fe, Kaliningrad RUSSIA 


Minsk 


Vilnius 1 


BELARUS 


Gdansk 


Rostock 


Warsaw 


SWEDEN 


_ —■—. Aland 

Stockholm Islands 

★ 




St. Petersburg 


Berlin 




Smolensk 


The Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania—gained sovereignty 
from the Soviet Union in January 
and February 1991. 





82 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


The CFE Treaty was multilateral, with 22 signatory 
nations; no one could deny, however, that bilateral 
negotiations had resolved this treaty impasse. The 
United States and the Soviet Union acted decisively, but 
bilaterally, in reaching these settlements. At times allies 
were informed; other times they were not. Hungary, 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Germany complained that 
the United States and the USSR were settling multilat¬ 
eral treaty issues among themselves. 24 Yet during months 
of turmoil and real uncertainty, U.S. and Soviet political 
leaders focused again and again on the CFE Treaty; their 
persistence produced results. 

It was only a matter of weeks from the time of 
General Moiseyev’s Washington visit in May 1991 to 
the USSR’s formal declaration to all other treaty states 
in Vienna. In early June, Secretary Baker and Ambassa¬ 
dor Woolsey flew to Moscow and met with Foreign 
Minister Bessmertnykh and Soviet CFE Treaty Negotia¬ 
tor Grinevsky. The result was a complex, three-part 
solution. 2i First, France, as a CFE Treaty signatory state, 
would request that the Netherlands convene an extra¬ 
ordinary conference of state parties to the treaty at The Hague. 
Next, the Soviet Union, at that conference, would issue a legally 
binding statement explaining the obligations it would undertake 
“outside of the framework of the treaty” to account for its TLE 
holdings within the treaty’s area of application. The Soviet Union 
would declare its willingness to limit the equipment in its naval 
infantry forces, coastal defense forces, and Strategic Rocket Forces 
to the exact number previously announced in Vienna. Then, they 
would declare that 40 months after entry into force, the USSR’s 
maximum TLE holdings would include the total TLE assigned to 
the naval infantry forces, coastal defense forces, and Strategic 
Rocket Forces. This meant that the Soviet Union would reduce an 
equivalent number of TLE elsewhere to meet its maximum hold¬ 
ings. Specifically, the Soviets pledged to destroy or convert 933 
tanks, 1,725 ACVs, and 1,080 artillery pieces. They would reduce 
one-half of the 933 tanks and 1,080 artillery pieces from forces 
within the ATTU and the other half from forces east of the Urals. 
The Soviets also stated that they would modify 753 of the 1,725 
ACVs to become MTLB-AT types. These were “look-alikes” and 
thus, not limited by the treaty. 26 

The Soviets were adamant in their position that the coastal 
defense forces and naval infantry units were not OOVs and there¬ 
fore not subject to declared site inspections. They agreed, however, 
that this equipment would be subject to challenge inspections. 

They also declared that they would limit the number of armored 
combat vehicles of the SRF, but that these limits would not count 
against the total number of ACVs allocated under the CFE Treaty 



President George Bush. 





83 


Ratification Delayed, Europe in Turmoil, Soviet Union in Revolution 


to the Soviet Union. In response to the Soviet Union’s statement, 
each of the other 21 states at the extraordinary conference would 
issue a statement accepting the Soviet Union’s declaration as le¬ 
gally binding and the basis for proceeding toward ratification and 
implementation. When the extraordinary conference convened at 
The Hague on June 18, 1991, the respective ambassadors read 
their carefully crafted, legally binding statements into the record 
and, with no objections, the chairman accepted them as official 
treaty documents. 27 

On the issue of the Soviet military equipment positioned east 
of the Ural Mountains, the Soviet government presented a politi¬ 
cally binding statement to the state delegates attending the CFE’s 
Joint Consultative Group in Vienna. The Soviet Union pledged to 
destroy or convert to civilian use no fewer than 6,000 tanks, 1,500 
ACVs, and 7,000 artillery pieces located beyond the Ural Moun¬ 
tains. They would reduce these items by November 1995 in such a 
way as to provide “sufficient visible evidence” of their destruction 
or their having been rendered militarily unsuitable. Essentially, the 
pledge meant that the Soviet Union would display this equipment 
so that treaty states could use satellite reconnaissance to monitor 
and confirm its reduction. 28 


East of the Urals: 

Soviets would destroy or 
convert at least 
6,000 tanks 
1,500 ACVs 
7,000 artillery pieces 


Once these Soviet legal and political statements had been 
accepted as official treaty documents, most of the CFE Treaty 
signatory states turned to ratification. President Bush submitted 
the CFE Treaty to the U.S. Senate on July 9, 1991, stating, “The 
CFE Treaty is the most ambitious arms control agreement ever 
concluded.” 29 He declared that the treaty was in the “best inter¬ 
ests of the United States” and that it was an important step in 
“defining the new security regime in Europe.” Other states went 
through the ratification process as well. Czechoslovakia was the 
first nation to ratify the treaty and deposit the instruments of 
ratification in the treaty depository at The Hague. Other nations 
followed and by the end of 1991, 14 nations, including Hungary, 
the Netherlands, Bulgaria, United Kingdom, Poland, Germany, 
and the United States, had ratified the treaty. Before all the origi¬ 
nal 22 treaty signatories could complete the ratification process, 
however, three new developments influenced the treaty. 


The Second Crisis: The Baltic States 

This issue dealt with the legal status of the Soviet Union’s 
TLE in the three Baltic nations—Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia. 30 
Resolution came expeditiously. None of the Baltic states wanted to 
become parties to the CFE Treaty. None wanted the Soviet military 
forces, which they considered to be armies of occupation, to be 
stationed permanently on their national territory. They were con¬ 
cerned that any treaty participation by a Baltic state would lend 




On-Site Inspection Agency 


legitimacy to a Soviet presence in the Baltics. All desired, however, 
that the Soviet Union’s conventional military equipment and units 
subject to the treaty still count against the Soviet Union’s TLE 
ceilings and, if possible, be reduced in accordance with the proto¬ 
cols of the treaty. 

Recognizing the Baltic nations’ demands, and sensing that the 
Soviet Foreign Ministry was willing to discuss a diplomatic solu¬ 
tion, U.S. diplomats in Moscow informally raised the possibility 
of another “agreed statement” regarding the Soviet Union’s CFE 
Treaty obligations. As a direct consequence of this bilateral diplo¬ 
macy, the CFE Treaty’s Joint Consultative Group convened an¬ 
other extraordinary meeting in Vienna on October 18, 1991. 31 The 
chairman read statements from the Soviet Union and other state 
parties that stipulated that the three Baltic nations were not parties 
to the CFE Treaty and that all Soviet TLE on the territory of those 
states would count against the USSR’s treaty ceilings. Read aloud 
to the assembled state delegates, the statements were accepted 
without comment. Following procedure, the statements were sent 
to the treaty depository at The Hague for deposit with the official 
treaty. 32 

By this time the Soviet Union as a nation was in a tenuous 
state. Its government had barely survived a failed coup d’etat in 
mid-August, its ruling Communist party had been outlawed, and 



Soviet forces in Moscow during failed coup attempt in August 1991. 









85 


Ratification Delayed, Europe in Turmoil, Soviet Union in Revolution 


its national leadership appeared incapable of stemming the twin 
forces of a collapsing empire and rising nationalism. By December 
1991, the creation of an independent Ukraine and Belarus, and the 
establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, sealed 
the fate of the USSR. On December 25, 1991, the USSR formally 
dissolved as a nation and was replaced by 15 newly independent 
states. 5 ' Eight of these new states—Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakstan, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine—had former 
Soviet military forces and units stationed on their territory that 
were subject to the CFE Treaty. What would be their fate? Would 
these new nations simply nationalize the military forces stationed 
on their territory? Or would they seek to join the all-European 
CFE Treaty and commit themselves to destroying conventional 
military equipment that could be used by their new armies and air 
forces? And under what aegis would they discuss joining the CFE 
Treaty states? They were not members of any international forum 
such as the CSCE, Warsaw Pact, or NATO. 34 


The Third Crisis: New State Parties 

On December 8, 1991, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and 
Belarus gathered in Minsk, Belarus, to place their signatures on the 
document creating the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS). Within a week, the leaders of five other republics— 
Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan—had met in Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan, and pledged 
to join the new commonwealth. All the military forces of the col¬ 
lapsing Soviet Union would be placed under the control of this 
commonwealth. These events signaled not only the end of the 
Soviet Union as a nation but also its end as a state party to the 
CFE Treaty. In Vienna, the CFE state delegates sought some 
mechanism to bring the new republics into the CFE Treaty orbit. 5 ' 1 

In the late fall of 1991, a new pan-European organization, 
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was set up with 
U.S. and German leadership. By December, its membership con¬ 
sisted of the 16 NATO nations, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Romania, Bulgaria, and the 15 newly independent states from the 
former Soviet Union. Shortly after the creation of the CIS in 
December, the new North Atlantic Cooperation Council invited all 
member states to meet in Brussels at NATO headquarters on Janu¬ 
ary 10, 1992. The objective was to convene a high level working 
group to discuss the future of the CFE Treaty. Every state accepted 
and attended, with the exception of Kazakstan. This was the first 
time the new CIS nations, represented by their foreign and defense 
ministers, had been at NATO headquarters. At this historic meet¬ 
ing, they participated as sovereign independent nations, sitting 
beside the leaders of the former Warsaw Pact nations and, of 
course, the foreign and defense ministers of the NATO nations. 56 



86 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


In their opening statements, the foreign ministers of the newly 
independent states declared that the CFE Treaty was “the corner¬ 
stone of European security.” In his statement, Vladimir Petrovskiy, 
the Russian representative, asserted that only Russia needed to 
ratify the CFE Treaty. 3 " He said that Russia would subsequently 
negotiate the “necessary adjustments” with the other republics. All 
other NACC states rejected this Russian interpretation. Instead, 
they proposed that each of the newly independent states be consid¬ 
ered a successor state. Furthermore, following signature and ratifi¬ 
cation, each would become an original state party to the treaty. 
This concept carried the day, and after lengthy discussion, the 
delegates agreed on the following points: 38 

• The CFE Treaty should enter into force without renegotiation 
and should be fully implemented as soon as possible. 

• Treaty obligations of the former USSR should be wholly 
accounted for by all the newly independent states and appor¬ 
tioned among them in a manner acceptable to all parties to 
the treaty. 

• All newly independent states in the area of application of the 
CFE Treaty should ratify the treaty. 

• Some updating of the treaty would be necessary, but it would 
be done after its entry into force. 



First meeting of North Atlantic Cooperation Council defense ministers at NATO Headquarters, April 1, 1992. 





Ratification Delayed, Europe in Turmoil, Soviet Union in Revolution 



Severing of a turret in Belarus. 


• The deadline for entry into force should be as soon as pos¬ 
sible, preferably by the time of the Helsinki Review Confer¬ 
ence (March-July 1992). 

• Further work by the high level working group was war¬ 
ranted. 

The NACC high level working group met again in February, 
March, April, and May of 1992. These were extraordinary months 
for the newly independent states. First, as new nations, they had to 
define their relationships with the nations of Central and Western 
Europe. The CFE Treaty lay at the center of the military dimension 
of this relationship. Second, they had to define their relationship 
with Russia, the largest and most powerful of the former Soviet 
republics. Here the CFE Treaty was also a focal point, since it 
mandated reductions in the former Soviet Union’s vast arsenal of 
conventional weapons. The question of how the USSR’s arsenal 
would be partitioned among the sucessor states, and then how 
these national portions would be subject to the treaty, had to be 
decided. The two issues were related, and the working group 
resolved them in the first six months of 1992. 

On January 16, 1992, Russia proposed at a CIS meeting in 
Minsk that it should receive two-thirds of the ground weapons of 
the former Soviet Union. At that meeting, Valery Shustov, Russia’s 
CFE Treaty Negotiator, declared that Russia would coordinate the 
inspection, escort, and reduction activities of all the CIS states 
implementing the CFE Treaty. 39 The other CIS states, especially 
Ukraine, rejected this assertion. Two weeks later, on January 30, 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
admitted 10 CIS states as members. The new states signed letters 
pledging to “move forward promptly with the ratification of the 
CFE Treaty and to assume ... all CFE obligations of the former 







88 


On-Site Inspection Agency 



Ukrainian Foreign Minister (later 
President) Leonid Kravchuk. 


Soviet Union.” 40 With this important international diplomatic and 
political act completed, the CIS nations turned to the tough nego¬ 
tiations on partitioning the former Soviet Union’s conventional 
armed forces. They set up a group of experts, largely consisting 
of senior military officers, who examined force structure, treaty 
ceilings, and treaty reduction requirements. Throughout February, 
March, and April of 1992, this group labored to devise a distribu¬ 
tion formula acceptable to all states. 

It was not easy. At one point, Leonid Kravchuk, then Ukrai¬ 
nian foreign minister, complained about the CIS nations’ failure to 
resolve the CFE Treaty TLE problem: “Not one major military 
question has been resolved ... within the framework of the Com¬ 
monwealth.” 41 Then, in early April, the Russian Parliament voted 
not to ratify the CFE Treaty, even though the USSR Supreme So¬ 
viet had ratified it in 1991. At that point, President Yeltsin inter¬ 
vened, stating that Russia would accept all treaty obligations of 
the former Soviet Union. 42 In separate actions, the leaders of Ar¬ 
menia and Azerbaijan complained that they should be allocated 
more tanks than proposed by the group of experts. These two 
nations were locked in an intense ethnic war over separatist 
Nagorno-Karabakh; consequently, they sought more conventional 
armaments. 


Amidst these internal CIS negotiations, the monthly NACC 
meetings of the foreign ministers at NATO headquarters contin¬ 
ued. These meetings put pressure on Russia and the other succes¬ 
sor states to divide the Soviet Union’s entitlements and obligations 
in an equitable manner. In April 1992, Ambassador Lynn M. 
Hansen, the U.S. CFE Treaty Negotiator who had replaced Am¬ 
bassador R. James Woolsey in June 1991, led a small delegation to 
Minsk, Kiev, Chisinau, and Moscow to discuss treaty ratification 
and implementation. 43 On this same trip, Ambassador Hansen’s 
delegation met in Moscow with representatives from Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakstan. Over the course of 10 days, 
Hansen learned that all the newly independent states had the 
political will to achieve an agreement on the CFE Treaty TLE. He 
also discovered that the smaller states distrusted Russia’s tactics 
and attitudes. Characteristically, Hansen went directly to see the 
Russian first deputy foreign minister; they discussed ratification of 
the treaty. Hansen told him “an agreement was there for the tak¬ 
ing, if they would just modify the way they negotiated.” 44 The 
Russian minister listened, but action would not come until mid- 
May. 

Finally, following further CIS negotiating sessions in Moscow, 
Minsk, Kiev, and other capitals, the leaders of the successor states 
met in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on May 15, 1992. There they signed 
an agreement on the division of the former Soviet Union’s CFE 
Treaty obligations and entitlements. 45 The Russian military was 



89 


Ratification Delayed, Europe in Turmoil, Soviet Union in Revolution 


Table 3-3. The Tashkent Agreement: Allocation of Soviet TLE 



Total 

Tanks 

Active 

Stored 

Total 

ACVs 

Active 

Stored 

Total 

Artillery 

Active 

Stored * 

A/C 

Total 

Helos 

Total 

Russia 

6,400 

4,975 

1,425 

11,480 

10,525 

955 

6,415 

5,105 

1,310 

3,450 

890 

Ukraine 

4,080 

3,130 

950 

5,050 

4,350 

700 

4,040 

3,240 

800 

1,090 

330 

Belarus 

1,800 

1,525 

275 

2,600 

2,175 

425 

1,615 

1,375 

240 

260 

80 

Armenia 

220 

220 

0 

220 

220 

0 

285 

285 

0 

100 

50 

Azerbaijan 

220 

220 

0 

220 

220 

0 

285 

285 

0 

100 

50 

Georgia 

220 

220 

0 

220 

220 

0 

285 

285 

0 

100 

50 

Moldova 

210 

210 

0 

210 

210 

0 

250 

250 

0 

50 

50 

Kazakstan 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

Total 

13,150 

10,500 

2,650 

20,000 

17,920 

2,080 

13,175 

10,825 

2,350 

5,150 

1,500 


Source: Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, May 21, 1992 


instrumental in devising this agreement; without their detailed 
work it would not have happened. The division at Tashkent is 
detailed in table 3-3. 


With the Tashkent accords signed on May 15, 1992, atten¬ 
tion turned to Vienna where the CFE Treaty’s Joint Consultative 
Group was meeting in preparation for a third Extraordinary Con¬ 
ference. In Vienna, the state delegates drafted a document, to be 
signed on June 5, 1992, at an Extraordinary Conference in Oslo. 
This document made legal both the entry of the new state parties 
and their acceptance of all the obligations and entitlements of the 
former USSR. In short order, the JCG delegates and technical 
specialists drafted new treaty annexes containing treaty under¬ 
standings, notifications, confirmations, and commitments. They 
incorporated the new annexes into the “Final Document,” which 
changed the wording in the treaty to reflect the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and the inclusion of eight new state parties. The 
Final Document set a deadline of July 1, 1992, for each signatory 
state to provide to all other states information concerning inspec¬ 
tions and verification. In addition, it stated that the TLE reduction 
liabilities of the new state parties collectively would be no different 
from those of the former Soviet Union. It also reaffirmed the two 
previous JCG statements: the Soviet Union’s June 15, 1991, state¬ 
ment regarding the TLE reassigned to the naval infantry and 
coastal defense forces, and the October 18, 1991, Soviet statement 
on the status of TLE stationed on the territory of the three Baltic 
nations. Finally, it addressed the problem of stationing armored 



Tashkent, 

Uzbekistan 


Tashkent Agreement — 
May IS, 1992 






90 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs) on the flanks; but it left resolu¬ 
tion to the JCG forum following entry into force. 

All of these changes and new annexes were incorporated into 
the treaty, translated into the six treaty languages, and presented 
at the Oslo Extraordinary Conference. There, delegates from the 
now 29 signatory states signed the new documents on June 5, 
1992. The CFE Treaty stipulated that from that moment the eight 
new states were “original state parties” and that each assumed the 
same rights and obligations that every other state party had under 
the treaty. 46 


The Last Crisis: Final Ratification 

Following the Oslo conference, attention turned to complet¬ 
ing ratification and exchanging final treaty documents at the 
CSCE summit in Helsinki on July 9-10, 1992. Of the 29 states 
that were party to the treaty, 11 had not ratified and deposited 
their instruments of ratification at The Hague as of mid-June. As 
stipulated by the treaty, entry into force would occur 10 days after 
all the states had deposited their ratification articles. Turkey rati¬ 
fied on June 18, Moldova on July 1, and Russia on July 8. Five 
other nations deposited their ratification articles on July 6, 8, and 
9. That left three nations—Armenia, Belarus, and Kazakstan—that 
would not, or could not, act in time for the CSCE summit in 
Helsinki, slated for July 9-10. Treaty diplomats in Vienna viewed 
this inaction as disastrous; the 26 states that had completed ratifi¬ 
cation held more than 90 percent of the treaty’s TLE, units, terri¬ 
tory, and zones. Further delay might dissipate the momentum 
created in the past seven months. 


“We have to provisionally 
implement the whole treaty. ” 

—Ambassador Lynn M. Hansen, 
U.S. CFE Treaty Negotiator 


Over the next 10 days, Ambassador Hansen and the other 
state negotiators in Vienna explained, cajoled, and succeeded in 
persuading their colleagues to accept the concept of provisional 
implementation of the CFE Treaty. Meanwhile, new documents 


When Ambassador Hansen returned to Vienna from Oslo 
in mid-June, he realized that the Helsinki summit might be held 
without a ratified CFE Treaty and no entry into force. “Near panic 
struck,” he recalled. “One night, in the middle of the night, I 
concluded what we had to do. I said: ‘We have to provisionally 
implement the whole treaty.’” 47 For a multinational, 29-nation 
treaty, this was a radical idea. The next day when Hansen called 
Washington and discussed the idea with U.S. international treaty 
lawyers, “They rejected it totally.” Then, he recalled, “We had a 
bit of a screaming match.” 4 * Hansen won; but the president and 
key U.S. senators had to approve the concept before U.S. officials 
could discuss it with the NATO allies and the other signatory 
nations. When the secretary of state, the president, and the sena¬ 
tors approved, events moved swiftly. 





91 


Ratification Delayed, Europe in Turmoil, Soviet Union in Revolution 


were prepared in six languages for the 29 states to approve and 
sign in Helsinki. On July 10, 1992, representatives of all state 
parties met in Helsinki for the fourth extraordinary conference on 
the CFE Treaty. They signed three documents. In the first, the 
individual states agreed to provisionally implement the CFE 
Treaty. In the second, the individual states affirmed the relation¬ 
ship between the CFE Treaty and the CFE 1A agreement, officially 
titled: The Concluding Act of the Negotiations on Personnel 
Strength of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Essentially, 
CFE 1A was a “political” statement by each of the treaty states 
declaring that they would not exceed self-imposed limits on mili¬ 
tary manpower strength. The limits were, in fact, quite high. Con¬ 
sequently, the treaty’s national manpower figures were not as 
significant as the fact that they were declared in a politically bind¬ 
ing treaty. These figures were subject to monitoring and question¬ 
ing, and if exceeded, the guilty states would be subject to interna¬ 
tional censure. This was the first time in the twentieth century that 
the European nations, acting collectively, had agreed to limits on 
their national military forces. In the third document, each signa¬ 
tory state declared it would provisionally implement the CFE 1A 
Concluding Act. Then, and only then, could treaty implementation 
begin. 49 

These actions set the clock running on entry into force, but 
they did not complete the formal ratification process. Armenia 
deposited its ratified CFE Treaty instruments at The Hague on 
October 12, 1992. Belarus and Kazakstan completed the group of 
original states by depositing their instruments of ratification on 
October 30. Ten days later, on November 9, the CFE Treaty and 
the CFE 1A Concluding Act officially entered into force. 50 


Summing Up 

It had taken 24 months—November 1990 to November 
1992—to move from treaty signature through the national ratifi¬ 
cations to official entry into force. Along the way a series of 
treaty-related crises had been resolved: TLE relocations, re¬ 
subordinations, reclassifications, new state parties, redistribution 
of the former USSR’s entitlements and obligations, and new na¬ 
tional manpower ceilings. But the larger, more serious crisis of the 
Soviet Union’s collapse struck at the existence of the CFE Treaty. 
In the face of turmoil and revolution, German, French, American, 
Russian, British, and Central European leaders and diplomats had 
fought hard to retain the treaty. Throughout these difficulties, the 
CFE Treaty retained its importance for the future of Europe. With 
treaty operations about to start, attention turned to the national 
inspection agencies and their inspectors who would monitor the 
treaty, and the military services that would reduce and account for 
thousands of items of treaty-limited equipment. 



On-Site Inspection Agency 


Table 3-4. CFE Treaty Original State Parties 


State 

Ratified 

Deposited 

Czechoslovakia 

19 July 1991 

5 August 1991 

Hungary 

9 September 1991 

4 November 1991 

Netherlands 

6 November 1991 

8 November 1991 

Bulgaria 

13 September 1991 

12 November 1991 

United Kingdom 

November 1991 

19 November 1991 

Canada 

7 November 1991 

22 November 1991 

Poland 

22 November 1991 

26 November 1991 

Norway 

29 November 1991 

29 November 1991 

Belgium 

November 1991 

17 December 1991 

Germany 

December 1991 

23 December 1991 

Iceland 

14 December 1991 

24 December 1991 

Denmark 

December 1991 

30 December 1991 

Luxembourg 

19 December 1991 

22 January 1992 

United States 

26 December 1991 

29 January 1992 

France 

16 March 1992 

24 March 1992 

Romania 

NA 

21 April 1992 

Italy 

21 December 1991 

22 April 1992 

Spain 

26 February 1992 

1 June 1992 

Georgia 

NA 

6 July 1992 

Moldova 

1 July 1992 

6 July 1992 

Greece 

28 May 1992 

8 July 1992 

Turkey 

18 June 1992 

8 July 1992 

Azerbaijan 

NA 

9 July 1992 

Ukraine 

NA 

9 July 1992 

Portugal 

NA 

14 August 1992 

Russia 

8 July 1992 

3 September 1992 

Armenia 

NA 

12 October 1992 

Belarus 

21 October 1992 

30 October 1992 

Kazakstan 

NA 

30 October 1992 







Ratification Delayed, Europe in Turmoil, Soviet Union in Revolution 


For the United States, the On-Site Inspection Agency had the 
mission of conducting the CFE Treaty inspections and escorts. 
During the long and arduous two-year ratification process, OSIA’s 
European Operations Command underwent what Colonel 
Lawrence Kelley, Chief of Operations, called “Standing Up the 
Unit.” 


Notes 

1. David Remnick, Lenin's Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire (New 
York: Random House, 1993), pp. 277-279, 306-324, 357-372; John B. 
Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire, Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 186-254, 256-284. 

2. Interview with Ambassador Lynn Hansen, U.S. Government CFE Treaty 
Negotiator, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Ramstein Air Base, 
Germany, December 14, 1993. See also Lynn M. Hansen, “Adaptation and 
Innovation: CFE and CFE1A, From Signature to Entry Into Force,” 
unpublished report, December 1993, p. 2. 

3. See note above, pp. 2-3; Michael R. Gordon, “Soviets Shift Many Tanks to 
Siberia,” New York Times, November 15, 1990, p. A3; R. Jeffery Smith, 
“U.S., Soviets Disagree on Arms Cuts,” Washington Post, December 17, 

1990, pp. Al, A20. 

4. Arms Control Reporter 1990, pp. 407.B.410-411, 407.B.413. See also 
Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside 
Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1993), 
pp. 289-290. 

5. “State Treaty Signatory Powers Agree to Revisions,” Die Presse (Vienna), 
December 12, 1990, in FBIS-Western Europe, December 3, 1990; Arms 
Control Reporter 1990, pp. 407.B.414-416. The best analysis is in Jane 
M.O. Sharp, “Conventional Arms Control in Europe,” SIPRI Yearbook 

1991, World Armaments and Disarmament, pp. 429-433. 

6. Arms Control Reporter 1990, pp. 407.B.414-415; Sharp, “Conventional 
Arms Control in Europe” (1991), pp. 429-430. 

7. Sharp, “Conventional Arms Control in Europe” (1991), pp. 429-430. 

8. R. Jeffery Smith, “Soviets Said to be Removing Arms from Europe Before 
Treaty,” Washington Post, October 5, 1990, p. A20; International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1990-1991 (London: Brassey’s 
Inc., 1990), pp. 31-32. 

9. Sharp, “Conventional Arms Control in Europe” (1991), p. 429; James A. 
Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992 
(New York: G.P. Putnam & Sons, 1995), pp. 473-474, 477. 

10. Sharp, “Conventional Arms Control in Europe” (1991), p. 420. 

11. Arms Control Reporter 1990, pp. 407.B.414-415. 

12. “Chernychev on CFE Treaty, Soviet Implementation,” TASS (Moscow), 
November 22, 1990, in FBIS-Soviet Union, November 27, 1990. 

13. Smith, “U.S., Soviets Disagree on Arms Cuts,” Washington Post, December 
17, 1990, pp. Al, A20; Arms Control Reporter 1990, pp. 407.B.413-414. 
For insights into the CFE Treaty delegations in Vienna, see Interview with 



94 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Colonel Schuyler Foerster, USAF, U.S. Representative to the CFE 
Delegation, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Washington, D.C., 
May 19, 1994. 

14. The best account of this meeting is in Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest 
Levels , pp. 289-290. 

15. Ibid., p. 290. 

16. Michael Z. Wise, “ Soviets Face Criticism as Talks Begin on European 
Troops Cuts,” Washington Post , February 15, 1991, p. A13 ; Arms 
Control Reporter 1990, pp. 407.B.427-428; Timothy J. McNulty, “Baker 
Urges Delay on Arms Treaty,” Chicago Tribune, February 7, 1991; R. 
Jeffery Smith, “Soviet Dispute Threatens Arms Pact Approval,” Washing¬ 
ton Post, February 8, 1991, pp. A12, A16. 

17. Sharp, “Conventional Arms Control in Europe” (1991), pp. 429-433. 

18. Wire Service Report, “ Sovietskaya Rossiya Acknowledges Shift of Weapons 
to Avoid Treaty,” Reuters (Moscow), January 9, 1991. 

19. Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb, pp. 372-397; Dunlop, Rise and Fall, pp. 104- 
106. 

20. Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, pp. 362-373; R. Jeffery 
Smith and Ann Devroy, “Bush Urges Gorbachev to Drop Arms Treaty 
Claims,” Washington Post, March 26, 1991, p. A8. 

21. Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, p. 364. 

22. Ibid., pp. 367-370; Fred Kaplan, “Soviet Aide to Arrive, Summit 
Bellwether Seen,” Boston Globe , May 20, 1991; David Hoffman, “U.S. 
Officials See Signs of Cooperation by Soviets,” Washington Post, May 23, 
1991, p. A42; David Hoffman, “U.S., Soviet Union Settle Dispute on Arms 
in Europe,” Washington Post, June 2, 1991, pp. Al, A26; Andrew 
Rosenthal, “U.S. and Soviets Near Settling Arms Pact Dispute,” New York 
Times, May 23, 1991, p. A10; Michael Z. Wise, “Soviets Accept Fimits on 
Arms in Europe,” Washington Post, June 15, 1991, pp. A16, A18. 

23. Beschloss and Talbott, At the Highest Levels, p. 368. For details on this 
complex diplomatic solution, see Arms Control Reporter 1991, pp. 

407.B.438-442. 

24. Arms Control Reporter 1991, pp. 407.B.444-446. 

25. Ibid., pp. 407.B.449-450; Thomas F. Friedman, “U.S. and Soviets Bridge 
Gap on Conventional Weapons and Plan for Summit Soon,” New York 
Times, June 2, 1991, pp. Al, A12. 

26. Hansen, “Adaptation and Innovation,” pp. 5-6. For the text of the Soviet 
Union’s declaration, see this book, Appendix B. 

27. For these statements, see this book, Appendix B. 

28. Ibid. 

29. For President Bush’s statement, see Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Treaty Document 102-8: Message from the President of the United States 
Transmitting the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), 
102d Cong. 1st sess., 1991. 

30. The best account of this issue as it related to the CFE Treaty is in Hansen, 
“Adaptation and Innovation,” pp. 7-9. 

31. Interview, Hansen; for an immediate report, see Message from JCS Joint 
Staff, Washington D.C., “CFE: Ambassador Hansen’s Visit to Fithuania,” 
October 18, 1991, pp. 1-8. 



95 


Ratification Delayed, Europe in Turmoil, Soviet Union in Revolution 


32. See this book, Appendix B. 

33. Remnick, Lenin’s Tomb, pp. 493-530; Dunlop, Rise and Fall pp. 256- 
285. 

34. These same questions were being discussed in the European media. See Eric 
Schmitt, “Arms Pact Allows for Soviet Breakup,” New York Times, 
November 20, 1991, p. A3, and Edward Mortimer, “The Soviet Union’s 
Security Agreements Must be Made Binding on Its Successor States,” 
Financial Times (London), November 27, 1991. In an ironic twist, the U.S. 
Senate ratified the CFE Treaty on November 25, 1991, by a vote of 90-4; 
see Congressional Record, Senate, 18038, November 25, 1991. 

35. Dunlop, Rise and Fall, pp. 271-284; Arms Control Reporter 1991, p. 

407.B.462; Interview, Hansen; Interview, Foerster. 

36. Arms Control Reporter 1992, pp. 407.B.463-465. 

37. Ibid., p. 407.B.464; Hansen, “Adaptation and Innovation,” pp. 10-11. 

38. Arms Control Reporter 1992, pp. 407.B.463-464. 

39. “CFE Participants Reassured on Arms Treaties,” TASS (Moscow), January 
16, 1992, in FBIS-Soviet Union, January 17, 1992. See also Arms Control 
Reporter 1992, p. 407.B.465. 

40. Arms Control Reporter 1992, p. 407.B.465. See also Thomas L. Friedman, 
“Big-2 Horse Trade,” New York Times , January 31, 1991, p. A15. 

41. Arms Control Reporter 1992, p. 407.B.470. See also Serge Schmemann, 
“Ukraine Uses Summit to Berate Russians and the Commonwealth,” New 
York Times, March 21, 1992, pp. Al, A5; and “Summit ‘Pretty 
SuccessiuV ” Izvestiya, March 25, 1992, in FBIS-Soviet Union, March 25, 
1992. 

42. Arms Control Reporter 1992, p. 407.B.472. 

43. Interview, Hansen. 

44. Ibid. 

45. Arms Control Reporter 1992, p. 407.B.473. 

46. Ibid.; Interview, Hansen; William Droadziak, “29 Nations Approve Arms 
Control Treaty,” Washington Post, June 6, 1992, p. A16; Craig R. 
Whitney, “Europeans Agree to Honor Arms Pact by Old Blocs,” New York 
Times, June 6, 1992, p. A5; Hella Pick, “NATO and Former Warsaw Pact 
Sign Agreement on Arms Cuts,” The Guardian (London), June 6, 1992. 

47. Interview, Hansen. 

48. Ibid. 

49. Arms Control Reporter 1992, p. 407.B.477. 

50. Arms Control Reporter 1992, p. 407.B.480. 







































Chapter 4 



OSIA’s operations expand significantly throughout Europe in preparation for the CEE Treaty. 


OSIA’s European Operations Command: 

The Year of Expansion, 1991 

T he major influx of people into OSIA’s European Operations 
Command began in January 1991. Thirty people arrived 
that month, primarily filling support positions, but includ¬ 
ing nine weapons specialists. Most of the January arrivals came 
from units in Europe. A month later, OSIA European Operations 
had doubled in size, expanding from 27 to 57. By the end of April, 
18 more people had arrived, including Lt. Colonel David P. 
Gessert, USAF, the first of the CFE Treaty team chiefs. Through 
July another 18 had come on board, and by the end of 1991, more 
than 100 personnel were on duty. All CFE inspection team mem¬ 
bers, except for one weapons specialist, two linguists, and two 
deputy team chiefs, were in some phase of treaty training. As 
people continued to arrive, the number and precise function of 
U.S. liaison officers remained unresolved. OSIA would not have 
final answers on liaison officers until mid-1992, just before the 
treaty entered into force. 1 






98 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Colonel Fred Grosick, Commander, and Colonel Lawrence 
Kelley, Director of Operations, shaped the rapidly expanding CFE 
inspection force around three key operational concepts. The first 
was knowledge of the treaty, especially its inspection protocol. The 
treaty was the “alpha and omega” of the inspectors’ training, 
preparation, and operational mission. Over and over in small team 
meetings and in individual sessions, Colonel Kelley stressed the 
importance of knowing the treaty “inside and out, chapter and 
verse,” because the “other side would.” Kelley’s long experience 
with the Soviet/Russian officer corps had made him aware of their 
professionalism, thoroughness of preparations, suspicion of for¬ 
eigners, and their insistence on the letter of the law in granting 
treaty rights to inspectors. If inspectors from other nations knew 
the treaty well, Kelley and Grosick believed that U.S. inspectors 
had to know the provisions of the treaty even better. 

The second concept placed extraordinary personal responsi¬ 
bility on the team leader for each inspection/escort mission. Care¬ 
fully chosen, personally interviewed, and continuously observed, 
these Army and Air Force field grade officers were responsible for 
their team, the mission, and the exercise of the U.S. government’s 
CFE Treaty rights and entitlements. Colonel Kelley interviewed 
each new team chief when he reported to OSIA’s European Opera¬ 
tions Command. It was, by all accounts, an intense session, com¬ 
bining a treaty tutorial with a lecture on leadership and personal 
standards of conduct. It also included a detailed explanation of the 
U.S. objectives in implementing the CFE Treaty. It was neither 
subtle nor collegial; it was a serious meeting. Colonel Kelley later 
recalled that at some point he would tell the new CFE team chief, 

“I wanted to have confidence that when the going got tough, when 
the team had not slept for 24 hours, when team members felt ill, 
when the pressure was on, the temperature was low, the plan had 
fallen apart, the team personnel were not performing as expected, 
the Russians were applying pressure, and the team chief encoun¬ 
tered a point in the inspection which had not been anticipated, 
that I could still trust his judgment. Would he make the right 
call?” These standards of leadership set the tone for the developing 
inspection organization. 

The third concept was integral inspection teams. The “inspec¬ 
tion team” was the primary operational unit for inspections under 
the CFE Treaty. Teams would have designated leaders, perma¬ 
nently assigned inspectors, and specific training programs designed 
to build treaty knowledge, team cohesiveness, and team recogni¬ 
tion of inspection objectives. Here too Kelley and Grosick knew 
what they wanted: inspection team identity, inspector allegiance to 
the team, and absolute standards of conduct by all team members. 
“I have always been,” Kelley said, “a firm believer in unit cohe¬ 
siveness. So I consciously set the teams up that way, and insisted 
that they work as units, and act as units.” Given these three clear, 




99 


Standing Up the Unit 


fixed concepts, the new inspection team leaders and inspectors 
entered a rigorous, detailed training program. 2 

Initial Training 

The CFE Treaty on-site inspections would be challenging 
because the mission required different people to bring various 
skills together in a team effort. Team chiefs, deputies, linguists, 
and weapons specialists all needed individual and small team 
training to develop and refine their specific skills. It was also im¬ 
portant for those in support positions to fully understand their 
contribution to the success of the mission. The range of training 
topics was broad, including several courses on the treaty and its 
protocols, three levels of instruction on equipment identification, 
and several Russian language courses. Individual training, like 
improving language skills, was important, but as individual needs 
were met, the focus shifted to team training. 

Both in personal and team training, knowledge of the treaty 
formed the cornerstone for all training. The CFE Treaty Inspector/ 
Escort Course was the fundamental course for everyone. The first 
CFE Treaty course was taught February 4-14, 1991, at the De¬ 
fense Intelligence College in Washington, D.C. Bill Parsons and 
David Sloss, members of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency and active participants in CFE negotiations, provided 25 
hours of instruction on the treaty and its protocols. Experts from 
the U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center contributed 
15 hours of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) familiarization. This 
initial course also dealt with topics such as the history of arms 
control, Warsaw Pact forces, Congress and treaty ratification, 
health, and public affairs. Inspectors assigned to OSIA’s European 



Training was continuous at OSIA’s European Operations Command; here Colonel Kelley 
discusses an upcoming mission with inspectors. 











100 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Operations Command would receive significantly more training 
after the course. This included a three-tiered program on equip¬ 
ment recognition developed by and for inspectors. 

Twenty people from OSIA’s European Operations attended 
the first CFE Treaty course in Washington, D.C., along with 170 
others from Headquarters OSIA and other agencies. In April 1991, 
OSIA’s European Operations Command sponsored a CFE Treaty 
course for an additional 90 people at Rhein-Main Air Base in 
Frankfurt, Germany. By October 1991, 24 other inspection team 
members had completed a two-week CFE Treaty course sponsored 
by NATO at Oberammergau, Germany. Colonel Kelley drew from 
his experience with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) 
Treaty to design the NATO course. The objective was to establish 
CFE Treaty inspection standards across the NATO group of states. 
Instructors from OSIA’s European Operations focused on inspec¬ 
tion and escort techniques based on the U.S. experience under the 
INF Treaty. On April 8, 1992, OSIA presented a five-day CFE 
Treaty course in Washington, D.C. Treaty negotiators and experi¬ 
enced OSIA European Operations officers and noncommissioned 
officers (NCOs) taught the course, focusing on the treaty and the 
inspection process. A videotaped version of this April course al¬ 
lowed newly assigned inspectors to receive the required training 
without waiting for another formal class. The treaty course re¬ 
mained the fundamental building block, but it was only one re¬ 
quired element to qualify as a CFE inspector/escort. 3 



The U.S. Military Liaison Mission 
in Potsdam, Germany, was a 
primary source for CFE inspectors. 


When treaty ratification lagged in the fall of 1991, teams 
were able to build more inspection-related issues into their training 
program. The Inspection/Escort Branch assembled inspection 
teams weekly. The teams reviewed and discussed treaty inspection 
and reduction protocols, standardized inspection and reporting 
procedures, and studied current presidential and Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS) guidance. Individually, each team trained daily on the 
treaty and its protocols. They discussed inspection scenarios they 
might confront and worked through problems they might encoun¬ 
ter. In addition, TLE recognition was a part of each team’s daily 
regime. 


Equipment Recognition Training 

A group of Army weapons specialists who came to OSIA’s 
European Operations Command on a temporary basis beginning 
in October of 1990 played a key role in the TLE recognition train¬ 
ing program. Sergeant First Class George A. Partridge, Staff Ser¬ 
geant Thomas A. Favia, and Sergeant Joseph S. Nelson were mem¬ 
bers of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission in Potsdam, Germany. 
The Mission was staffed by NCOs and foreign area officers 
(FAOs) with a strong working knowledge of Soviet and East Ger¬ 
man armies, their equipment, units, and force structure. Because of 










101 


Standing Up the Unit 




- 




Photo of a T-72 tank used in level 
one recognition training. 


German unification, however, this Cold War outpost was no 
longer needed and was closing. Having served at the Mission, 
Colonel Kelley knew the caliber of the people associated with it 
and its reputation for excellence. He made a point of actively 
recruiting weapons specialists from the Mission. 

These specialists contributed immediately to the command. 
They laid the groundwork for OSIA’s European Operations’ equip¬ 
ment recognition program. From October 1990 through January 
1991, while still assigned to the Mission in Potsdam, they devel¬ 
oped courses on treaty-related ground equipment and conducted 
training classes. They traveled from Berlin to work at Rhein-Main 
during the week, returning home to Berlin on weekends. They 
acquired photos and slides of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces’ 
treaty-related equipment. Their sources were within the Depart¬ 
ment of Defense, other U.S. government agencies, NATO allies, 
commercial publications, and from the training kits they had 
developed at the Mission. They also took their own photos of 
treaty-related equipment during mock inspections and on field 
trips. 

Weapons specialists from the Army and Air Force later joined 
the specialists from the Mission and added to the growing stock of 
information. Sergeant First Class Curtis E. Ingram, USA, focused 
his efforts on tanks while Master Sergeant Richard D. DiFormato, 
USA, gathered information on armored combat vehicles, and Staff 
Sergeants Gilbert Sierra, Jr., and Cecil F. Ward, USA, concentrated 
on artillery. The U.S. inspection teams also required a working 
knowledge of treaty-related aircraft and helicopters. Senior Master 
Sergeant Clifford A. Schroder, USAF, and Technical Sergeants Paul 
R. Angus and James F. Towne, USAF, provided that expertise. 
Their knowledge of aircraft and helicopters complemented the 
information their Army counterparts had assembled. The weapons 














102 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


An armored vehicle launched 
bridge on display during 
Czechoslovakian training course. 





1 

II 

•. Ij 

Si ' 





specialists’ collection of information and photographs were the 
basis for a three-level training program on equipment identifica¬ 
tion. 4 

Level one covered 10 categories of equipment: tanks, ar¬ 
mored personnel carriers (APCs), armored infantry fighting ve¬ 
hicles (AIFVs), heavy armament combat vehicles, artillery, combat 
aircraft, helicopters, mortars, armored vehicle launched bridges, 
and multiple-launch rocket systems. There were also subdivisions 
in several categories; helicopters for example, could be broken 
down into three categories—attack, support, and transport. Level 
one training, a requirement for inspector certification, enabled 
inspectors to identify all Soviet, Eastern European, and U.S. TLE. 

Level two training dealt with Soviet, Eastern European, and 
U.S. equipment, listed in the Protocol on Existing Types of Con¬ 
ventional Armaments and Equipment, that was reportable but not 
limited under the treaty. Instructors broke this equipment down 
into 17 areas. This equipment included “look-alike” armored 
personnel carriers and armored infantry fighting vehicles, training 
aircraft, combat support helicopters, and transport helicopters. 
The armored look-alikes were vehicles built on the chassis of a 
treaty-limited vehicle but modified for purposes other than trans¬ 
porting a combat infantry squad. By treaty definition, these modi¬ 
fied vehicles could not be armed with a 20 millimeter or greater 
gun or cannon. The two levels of training encompassed more than 
400 pieces of Soviet, Eastern European, and U.S. equipment. 

Level three training differed from the other two levels cover¬ 
ing equipment not listed in the treaty. Although not limited to 
weapons specialists, level three training was geared to maximizing 
weapons specialists’ capabilities, whereas levels one and two were 
for all team members. Level three dealt with recognition and iden- 













103 


Standing Up the Unit 


tification of the thousands of pieces of Soviet, Eastern European, 
or U.S. equipment that a team might encounter during an inspec¬ 
tion. This equipment varied from communications vans to engi¬ 
neering vehicles to motorcycles. Training would enable an inspec¬ 
tor to make more accurate observations about the inspected unit’s 
mission and status. Training also included order of battle, organi¬ 
zational structures, and equipment markings. Level three training 
could vary to prepare inspectors for a particular mission. Inspec¬ 
tors supplemented their classroom training on weapons identifica¬ 
tion with field trips to locations with large concentrations of 
equipment. Teams traveled to the U.S. Air Forces in Europe 
(USAFE) Combat Threat Facility at Einsiedlerhof, Germany, to 
U.S. Army Europe’s (USAREUR’s) Hohenfels Training Area, Ger¬ 
many, and to other NATO sites. These trips provided inspectors 
direct experience with Soviet and Eastern European equipment, as 
well as U.S. and allied equipment. As development of the different 
levels of training progressed, however, a problem arose concerning 
space to conduct the training. 5 

Rhein-Main, normally an active and somewhat congested 
base, served as a focal point for tons of supplies, equipment, and 
thousands of troops headed for the Middle East in support of 
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Facilities on Rhein- 



During a CFE mock inspection at the Hohenfels Training Area in Germany, inspectors checked these armored 
personnel carriers. 









104 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Main were at a premium. The OSIA facilities at the Air Force base 
were taxed heavily by OSIA’s increased manning and equipment to 
implement the CFE Treaty. Weapons specialists did not have ad¬ 
equate facilities to conduct equipment recognition classes. The 
solution to their problem came from the man who would become 
the first OSIA CFE team chief. 


Although not yet assigned to OSIA, Lt. Colonel David P. 
Gessert, USAF, offered the use of his squadron’s facilities, which 
were adjacent to OSIA European Operations’ building. Colonel 
Gessert commanded the Air Force’s 7580th Aerospace Squadron, 
known as the Berlin Corridor Flyers. Its mission ended with Ger- 


Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert, USAF 

Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert, USAF, was the first CFE team 
chief selected at OSIA’s European Operations Command. An Air 
Force Academy graduate, he was a command navigator with 
3,000 flying hours. Just prior to this assignment, Lt. Colonel 
Gessert had commanded the Air Force’s 7580th Squadron, the 
Berlin Corridor Flyers. 


On the initial months — recruiting, training, en¬ 
listed force: “I was the first team chief here. My 
deputy, Chief Warrant Officer Mike Lukes, was 
an old INF Treaty inspector; he had a lot of 
experience. In all honesty, he probably trained me 
more than anybody else did. He and I went out 
as the team chief and deputy for all the initial 
NATO mock inspections. We had the opportunity 
to take out all of the enlisted teams. There were 
four enlisted members on each team, and we had 
eight teams. There were two interpreters and two 
weapons specialists, and it was a mix and match 
of Air Force and Army guys. Chief Lukes and I 
essentially set the teams up and initiated their 
training. The first real mock inspection we did 
was with the French, and we took our teams out 
and escorted the French; then we worked with the 
Luxembourgers, Belgians, Dutch, and Germans. 



“We had all these extremely qualified NCOs, 
but they were either qualified in rocket systems or 
they were qualified in tanks, master gunners, etc. 
We also had some very, very qualified Air Force 
maintenance personnel who worked on F-4s or 


F-15s or F-llls, but they didn’t know tanks, our 
own tanks, let alone Russian tanks. So we were 
pretty much starting at ground zero. Everybody 
was extremely professional; there was real exper¬ 
tise in certain fields, but no one had expertise in 
all of the Russian equipment, or in the variety of 
Russian equipment. What helped was that these 
guys were professional NCOs, and they were 
operators. They knew how to turn a wrench, so 
they weren’t guys who just looked at pictures 
from behind a desk or some intelligence analysts. 
These guys were soldiers, they knew how to walk 
into a wing, a brigade, or a regiment, and decide 
quickly if they had their act together or not. 
That’s why they were hired. So we had all these 
real smart guys, soldiers and airmen. These guys 
could walk and chew gum; they’d done some 
stuff in their life.” 







105 


Standing Up the Unit 


man unification. While closing down the 7580th, he allowed 
OSIA’s weapons specialists to develop and conduct equipment 
identification classes in the squadron’s briefing rooms. These 
classes, while important for all inspectors, were critical for weap¬ 
ons specialists because none were expert on all weapons systems. 
U.S. Air Force weapons specialists, for example, knew U.S. air¬ 
craft, but they had little or no knowledge of U.S. Army weapons 
and equipment, much less the weapons of the Warsaw Pact’s 
ground forces. The same was true for U.S. Army weapons special¬ 
ists, who were expert in U.S. and some Soviet ground forces, albeit 
using NATO designations, but had little exposure to U.S. and 
Soviet aircraft. 6 


continued 

On the initial mock inspections: “The initial 
mock inspections were very brutal, especially 
with our allies. The allies looked at this CFE 
mission initially as an opportunity to talk and to 
celebrate together. From our own INF experience, 
we knew that the Russians were very profes¬ 
sional, and that we had to approach it that way. 
We exercised every aspect of the treaty and made 
it very, very tough and very, very difficult. The 
allies, at first, regretted it. They didn’t like it. 

They didn’t think the Americans were nice. What 
we tried to explain to them was that you train 
harder than what you actually do in reality. By 
the time the inspections began, I think the allies 
became tougher and we became easier. But when I 
say easier, it’s because we were not reasonable in 
our mocks, for we always pushed to the extreme 
to make treaty points. Many times we would 
purposely be unreasonable with the allies for 
training purposes. 

“Mock inspections taught you how to orches¬ 
trate an inspection, how to organize an inspec¬ 
tion, the mechanics of trying to get a crew of 
eight people underneath the team chief to work 
together as subteams. You did it so that when you 
hit the ground you weren’t worried about who 
had what room or where’s the equipment going. 
You had to learn how do to the mechanical things 
to make an inspection work. When you hit the 
site, your time was very limited. You had to use it 
wisely. 


“It takes organization and some thought. I 
believe I’ve used the example before that we 
learned that it takes a much longer time to do a 
treaty inspection report than ever anticipated 
because of the legal aspects, using the proper 
verbiage, and referencing the proper points in the 
treaty. These things just took longer than antici¬ 
pated. There are also some straight mechanical 
things you have to do to facilitate and to keep 
your inspection going.” 

On leading multinational inspection teams: “I 
think that actually made the mocks more impor¬ 
tant. Learning how to put together and orches¬ 
trate an inspection with three new people helped. 
We always have three new people on every one of 
our real inspections, in addition to the core six- 
man team. During the mock inspections we 
learned how to make it work. How to make it 
task-oriented, to know what task you want to 
give to a new member, and what you want to give 
to an experienced inspector. You learned how to 
organize and how to set up a true, thorough 
inspection. Sometimes it was very, very tough 
because you had to learn how to use somebody 
from another country who had a slightly different 
agenda than yours. But if you know how to facili¬ 
tate an inspection, how to organize—which we 
learned during the mock regime—it made it much 
easier. That’s what the training really taught us to 
do, how to conduct a good, well-orchestrated, 
well-organized inspection. And it took a while to 
learn that. You don’t go into it blindly.” 


Source: Interview, Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert, USAF, with Dr. Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, July 12, 1993. 





106 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Training for Linguists 

While weapons specialists developed their lesson plans in 
equipment identification, linguists had their own training require¬ 
ments. Once selected for duty with OSIA, most linguists attended 
the Defense Language Institute’s (DLI) Intermediate Russian 

Course in Monterey, California. The 27-week 
course provided linguists intense training to 
expand their ability to speak Russian. The course 
also introduced students to arms control treaty 
terminology. After successful completion of the 
DLI course 

Operations, and shortly thereafter attended a 
two-week course at the U.S. Army Russian Insti¬ 
tute (USARI) at Garmisch, Germany. This course, 
sponsored by the Treaty Verification Division of 
USARI, put linguists into classrooms where they 
spoke only Russian as they studied terminology 
specific to the CFE Treaty. Freed from the daily 
pressures and distractions of individual and team 
training at Rhein-Main, students at Garmisch 
focused on the treaty’s complex, technical lan¬ 
guage for six to seven hours a day. Back at Rhein-Main, in addi¬ 
tion to individual daily practice, linguists gathered in small groups 
led by Alan J. French, OSIA European Operations’ in-house Rus¬ 
sian language professional. They drilled in Russian three to five 
hours a week, for practice in conversation and interpretation. 
Linguists enhanced their training by viewing taped Russian televi¬ 
sion broadcasts and reading any available written materials. Most 
linguists agreed, however, that the most realistic training for the 
inspection teams, short of an actual treaty inspection, was the 
mock inspections. 7 


, linguists arrived at OSIA’s European 



Mock Inspections 

One lesson Americans had learned in preparing to implement 
the INF Treaty was that mock inspections were an extremely 
valuable training tool. These inspections enabled teams to practice 
inspection and escort procedures, make and correct mistakes on 
the spot, uncover unanticipated problems or situations, and im¬ 
prove their procedures in accordance with treaty protocols. Teams 
went beyond scenario development and discussion in their offices 
to exercising their treaty knowledge at an inspectable site on a 
military installation. 8 Seventeen months into treaty implementa¬ 
tion, Lt. Colonel Joseph J. Drach, Jr., USA, an experienced OSIA 
CFE Treaty team chief, led a series of training classes and a mock 
inspection with Moldovan inspectors in December 1993. He told 
the Moldovan team about the approach American inspectors took 
during mock inspections: 










107 


Standing Up the Unit 


“Our experiences during the mock inspections before baseline 
and during the real treaty inspections, both inspecting and escort¬ 
ing, were very similar. This (fact) indicates that our level of realism 
during training was very high. That is always one of the main 
goals in training, to train the way you would fight, to be as realis¬ 
tic as you can .” 9 


Initial OSIA mock inspections for the CFE Treaty placed 
OSIA inspectors and escorts opposite their NATO counterparts. 
This was realistic training—teams traveled, lost sleep, missed 
meals, inspected unfamiliar military facilities, discussed treaty 
rights and obligations with foreign officers, and completed the 
inspection reports as required by the treaty. As inspectors, they 
aggressively demanded all of their government’s treaty rights; as 
escorts, they made certain that their government’s interests were 
fully protected. Colonel Kelley was a strong proponent of mock 
training inspections because his INF Treaty experience had con¬ 
vinced him that— 

“The mock inspections are now and have always been the 
single most important training tool that we have at our disposal 
for a number of reasons. First, they force you to put into practice 
the skills that you have developed individually in these various 
areas over time. Second, the experience forces a team—or, in many 
cases, multiple teams—to function as a team. Mocks develop the 
cohesiveness that we wanted to see and permit the teams to further 
test each other on knowledge of the treaty, and knowledge of 
policy .” 10 

Colonel Kelley turned the responsibility for the detailed coor¬ 
dination and planning of mock inspections over to Captain David 
R. Carter, USAF. As Chief of European Operations’ Plans Branch, 
he worked directly with other NATO nations’ treaty verification 
agencies to plan each series of mock inspections. Much of the 
initial coordination was completed over the phone, but final plan¬ 
ning was done in person, approximately one month prior to in¬ 
spection. Face-to-face, the planning officers from the nations 
ironed out the details of the exercise. After several planning meet¬ 
ings Colonel Kelley opted for a higher ranking team chief, a lieu¬ 
tenant colonel, to accompany Carter as a matter of protocol for 
the usually senior allied counterparts. For inspections of U.S. 
facilities, United States European Command (USEUCOM) relin¬ 
quished the coordination of site selection to OSIA. Captain Carter 
or one of the Plans Branch NCOs then dealt directly with the 
component commands to determine which U.S. sites would 
be available to participate, either ground forces assigned to 
USAREUR or air forces under USAFE. With a list of U.S. sites 
available for mock inspection, U.S. planners and their NATO 
counterparts developed an agenda for the mock inspection includ¬ 
ing dates, units, locations, notification procedures, expenses, and 
team composition . 11 



Seal of the French 
verification agency L’Unite 
Frangaise de Verification. 


E to > 











108 


On-Site Inspection Agency 



Inspection Team 
Composition 


1 Team Chief 

1 Deputy 
Team Chief 

2 Linguists 

2 Weapons 
Specialists 

3 Treaty 
Specialists 



The initial U.S. mock inspections were conducted with 
France’s verification agency, L’Unite Frangaise de Verification. 

Lt. Colonel Gessert led this mission and the next five U.S. mock 
inspection missions. Because Lt. Colonel Gessert was new to the 
on-site inspection process, he relied heavily on his deputy, Chief 
Warrant Officer 4 (CW4) Michael R. Lukes, USA, who was an 
experienced INF Treaty inspector. On this first mission, Gessert’s 
nine-person team drove from Rhein-Main Air Base on May 14, 
1991, to Strasbourg, France, the point of entry (POE) for this 
mission. The following day they continued on to Nancy-Ochey 
Airfield, where Lt. Colonel Gessert declared the French Air Force’s 
3rd Fighter Wing the object of verification (OOV) for the first 
OSIA CFE mock inspection. Because the French airfield was very 
large and there was much to be inspected, Lt. Colonel Gessert 
surprised his hosts by declining the prepared, formal luncheon. 

At the site, Gessert divided his team in two subteams for the 
inspection, with CW4 Lukes leading the second team. The U.S. 
teams set out on foot to inspect the site, overlapping each other’s 
efforts to ensure double coverage. Their approach was strictly 
business, as if the inspection were an actual CFE inspection in 
Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union. “We exercised every aspect 
of the treaty,” Gessert recalled, “and made it very, very tough 
and very, very difficult” for the French escorts. After both U.S. 
subteams counted all the TLE and confirmed their counts to be 
correct, Lt. Colonel Gessert declared a sequential inspection. He 
then signed the inspection report, completing the mock inspection. 
The following day the American team traveled to Chenevieres for 
the sequential inspection. There Gessert declared the French 
Army’s 3rd Tank Battalion as the OOV his team would inspect. 
During this second inspection, Gessert observed that the French 
military escorts had become much more aggressive in their escort 
procedures, trying to minimize U.S. access and photography, but 
always remaining within the guidelines of the treaty. These first 
mock inspections mirrored what would become the U.S. trade¬ 
mark for all future CFE inspections: an aggressive, “letter of the 
law” approach to gaining all rights allowed under the treaty. 

These missions confirmed that a detailed knowledge of the 
treaty was the key to a successful mission. Without a thorough 
knowledge of the treaty, team members could not effectively exer¬ 
cise all their government’s treaty rights. Lt. Colonel Gessert also 
recognized the importance of teamwork and planning. Because an 
inspection team had limited time on-site, the team needed to de¬ 
velop a plan that allowed all team members to carry out their 
specific tasks, while allowing for a thorough inspection of the 
declared site, inspecting all areas and equipment twice. Each indi¬ 
vidual had to understand his role as an inspector so that the team 
could complete an inspection effectively. With a strong base of 











109 


Standing Up the Unit 


preparation and training, the team leader could make adjustments 
on-site as circumstances dictated. 12 

At Rhein-Main, OSIA inspection teams continued to hone 
their skills in areas such as treaty knowledge, equipment identifica¬ 
tion, language, and photography. The allied mock inspections 
allowed teams to test those skills, to encounter different ap¬ 
proaches to the same treaty, and to establish inspection standards. 
Over time nearly all the Eastern countries, as well as the allies, 
pressed U.S. representatives to commit to scheduling mock inspec¬ 
tions. Colonel Kelley believed that the United States had an obliga¬ 
tion to give preference to the NATO nations to conduct mock 
inspections because they “had stuck with us in hard times and 
been true allies to us.” In addition to loyalty to allies, it was also 
in the U.S. interest that all NATO inspections of Eastern nations 
be thorough and consistent to provide reliable and accurate infor¬ 
mation for a confident assessment of treaty compliance. 

From May 1991 until the treaty entered into force in July 
1992, OSIA inspectors participated in mock CFE inspections with 
inspection teams from 13 NATO nations. All allied nations except 
Turkey and Italy participated in 27 OSIA missions, during which 
U.S. inspection teams conducted mock inspections at more than 50 
sites. In addition to mock inspections with NATO teams, OSIA 
inspectors deployed on 11 missions to U.S. declared sites through¬ 
out Western Europe to conduct mock inspections with other OSIA 
teams. These OSIA-on-OSIA mock inspections provided training 
not only for the U.S. teams but also for the American military 
units that would receive Eastern inspection teams when the treaty 
entered into force. On several occasions, OSIA teams provided 
classroom training followed by demonstration mock inspections 
at U.S. declared sites. These missions, known as “road shows,” 



Lt. Colonel Joseph J. Drach, Jr., 
briefing Greek inspectors during a 
mock inspection at Bitburg Air 
Base, Germany, October 18, 1991. 






110 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


allowed OSIA inspectors to reach various groups of people who 
would be responsible for treaty implementation, usually as instal¬ 
lation escorts during inspections. 

One such mission began on October 28, 1991, when Lt. 
Colonel Jan S. Karcz, USA, led a team to Sembach Air Base, Ger¬ 
many. During this mission OSIA inspectors trained CFE points of 
contact (POCs) from USAFE units on treaty escort and challenge 
inspection procedures. Participants from the 16th Air Force bases 
in Greece, Italy, Crete, and Turkey gathered, along with Colonel 
Schuyler (Sky) Foerster, USAF, a member of the U.S. delegation at 
Vienna, representatives from the 17th Air Force, USAFE, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, European Command (EUCOM), and Team Karcz 
at Sembach Air Base, Headquarters of the 17th Air Force. On 
October 28th, Colonel Foerster provided classroom treaty train¬ 
ing, emphasizing the inspection protocol. Representatives from 
JCS, EUCOM, and USAFE then offered their organizations’ cur¬ 
rent guidance on treaty escort and challenge inspection proce¬ 
dures. The final blocks of the course provided instruction on 
working with linguists and with the U.S. government’s liaison 
procedures. The next day Lt. Colonel Karcz demonstrated on-site 
the lessons taught in the classroom, leading his inspection team 
through the mock inspection at Sembach Air Base. 


1st U.S./Eastern Mock 
Inspections 

October 7-9, 1991 



Participation in mock inspections enabled OSIA CFE team 
members to gel as competent, professional inspection teams. Indi¬ 
viduals traveled as a team to new and unfamiliar locations, carried 
out specific tasks as part of an overall team effort to exercise all 
treaty rights, and gained valuable experience on how best to 
implement the CFE Treaty. The next step in preparation for the 
treaty’s entry into force was mock inspections with teams from the 
Eastern group of states. 13 


Eastern Mock Inspections 

The United States participated in mock inspections with 
Czechoslovakia, Russia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria 
before the treaty entered into force in July 1992. A major reason 
for the success of those missions was Germany’s participation as 
the host state. As a stationing state, the United States needed the 
cooperation and permission of the German government to bring 
in Eastern inspection teams. Germany was to be a major player 
during treaty implementation because there were more than 900 
declared sites in the newly unified Germany, including the sites of 
stationing states such as the United States, France, Canada, and 
the United Kingdom. These mock inspections offered Germany’s 
Zentrum fur Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr (ZVBW) an 
opportunity to test many aspects of implementing the treaty as a 
host state—these included procedures at the POE, transportation 



Ill 


Standing Up the Unit 


to the declared site, and providing lodging and 
food when required. 

The first of these inspections occurred on 
October 8, 1991, when a Czechoslovakian in¬ 
spection team came to Germany to inspect U.S. 
forces at Camp Vilseck and the Merrill Barracks. 

Major Elmer G. (Guy) White, USA, the escort 
team chief, noted that the drawdown of U.S. 
forces, coupled with the deployments to the Gulf 
War, had dramatically changed U.S. forces in 
Europe. Consequently, the information ex¬ 
changed at treaty signature was no longer accu¬ 
rate. Because there would be no exchange of data 
until 30 days after the treaty’s entry into force, 

OSIA escorts would be busy explaining differ¬ 
ences between the old data and the status of 
forces during the initial days of baseline. 

Major White also highlighted a communications problem 
between his team and Headquarters EUCOM. This problem 
would recur later during other mock inspections, and it came up 
during the treaty’s baseline phase. One of the duties of U.S. escort 
team chiefs and liaison officers was to communicate the inspection 
team’s status to EUCOM, which in turn initiated a series of notifi¬ 
cations to U.S. forces in Europe. Because of limited phone lines or 
poor connections through various phone systems, and the com¬ 
pressed time during an inspection, OSIA team chiefs and liaison 
officers were sometimes unable to contact EUCOM. Instead, they 
passed the information on to OSIA’s European operations center at 
Rhein-Main. From the operations center, team status was passed 
to Headquarters EUCOM. It worked, but it was not the way that 
it had been envisioned. Communications in the future would rou¬ 
tinely go through OSIA’s operations center and then on to 
EUCOM. 

The next mock inspections with an Eastern nation, and the 
first opportunity to train outside a NATO nation, were to occur in 
January and February of 1992, following preliminary discussions 
in December 1991. 14 As Christmas 1991 approached, Colonel 
Kelley and Major Henry J. Nowak, USA, traveled from Frankfurt 
to Moscow, accompanied by Lt. Colonel Peer Schwan of the 
ZVBW, the German treaty verification organization, to arrange tri¬ 
national mock inspections at CFE facilities in both the Soviet 
Union and Germany. Again, Germany’s cooperation was pivotal. 
As a stationing state, the United States owned none of the territory 
in the ATTU; consequently, it turned to the sovereign host state 
before arranging a visit by Soviet inspection teams. Major Griffith 
S. Hughes, USA, of the Arms Control Implementation Unit of the 
American Embassy in Moscow, accompanied Colonel Kelley, 







112 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Major Nowak, and Lt. Colonel Schwan in Moscow. On December 
18, 1991, these four officers met a Soviet delegation of 10 officers 
led by General-Lieutenant Vladimir I. Medvedev, head of the 
Soviet Nuclear Risk Reduction Center. Jointly, they planned two 
mock inspection missions. 

The first mission was scheduled for January 1992 in Ger¬ 
many. The inspection sites were the German Artillery Branch 
School at Idar-Oberstein, the U.S. Air Force’s 52d Tactical Fighter 
Wing at Spangdahlem Air Base, and the U.S. Army’s 200th The¬ 
ater Army Materiel Command (TAMC) at the Germersheim Army 
Depot. The second mission, planned for February 1992, would be 
held in the Leningrad Military District. There, the designated sites 
were the Soviets’ 67th Bomber Regiment at Siverskiy Air Base and 
the 457th Howitzer Artillery Regiment at Pushkin. 



General-Lieutenant Vladimir I. 
Medvedev, Director, Soviet Nuclear 
Risk Reduction Center. 


The parties then turned to discussing the ground rules for 
these mock inspections. These included planning administrative 
breaks to allow for discussion of possible technical difficulties as 
they occurred. This provision contributed to a major aspect of 
these training missions—allowing key treaty participants time to 
iron out problems before the real inspections took place. The 
parties also modified treaty inspection timelines to allow for over¬ 
night stays. Another deviation from treaty requirements was desig¬ 
nating Frankfurt as the single POE for the Soviet mission into 
Germany. Normally Frankfurt could not be a POE for the three 
declared sites selected for the inspections. The officers determined 
that the Soviets would fly into Rhein-Main Air Base and be bussed 
across the shared runway to Frankfurt International Airport. 

There German escorts would exercise host state POE procedures; 
Americans would test their liaison officer procedures; and the 
Soviets would perhaps avoid airport fees by landing at Rhein- 
Main. The conferees also discussed notification procedures, the 
number of inspectors/observers, team composition, inspection 
languages, dining schedules, equipment markings, and distribution 
of expenses. 

These detailed planning discussions in Moscow, as had been 
the case with all planning sessions, prevented problems that would 
have detracted from the quality of training during the mock in¬ 
spections. For example, Colonel Kelley reminded the Soviets that 
U.S. inspectors occasionally skipped lunch when conducting in¬ 
spections, and that escorts were obliged to assist inspectors in 
carrying out an inspection, even if that meant a missed meal. 

Other discussions confirmed the U.S. intent to record all external 
markings of TLE. The Soviets stated that there would be no access 
to the interior of any equipment for the purpose of recording serial 
numbers. The planning agendas for both inspection series were 
reviewed, and both sides agreed to hold postinspection discussions 
(“hotwashes”) at each site to clarify points they had discussed 








Standing Up the Unit 


113 



Colonel William R. Smith checks 
the serial number on an ACV. 


during each inspection. The group also agreed to discuss any prob¬ 
lems encountered during the two missions and to pursue how each 
nation planned to conduct its inspections. 


During this conference several issues arose that were beyond 
the authority of the conferees and required resolution by their 
respective governments. A change of inspection dates for the mock 
inspections in the Leningrad Military District required U.S. gov¬ 
ernment approval. Lt. Colonel Schwan, the ZVBW representative, 
turned to the German government for approval of a Soviet request 
to allow a Soviet military aircraft to use Sperenberg Air Base in 
transit, either before or after dropping off the Soviet inspection 
team in Frankfurt. Sperenberg Air Base would provide the Soviets 
an opportunity to refuel their aircraft without purchasing fuel in 
Frankfurt, which had been a common practice during the INF 
Treaty implementation. Once those decisions were made, and 
despite the fact that the Soviet Union had collapsed as a nation on 
Christmas Day 1991, only seven days after this meeting, planning 
for the tri-nation mock inspections moved forward." 

For OSIA, these mock inspections in Russia differed from all 
previous CFE mock inspections. Colonel Kelley elected to forgo 
the usual team structure. Instead, he formed teams using only team 
chiefs and deputies, with the one exception of Technical Sergeant 
Joseph A. Amen, USAF. Fie did this because many of the American 
team leaders had never been in the Soviet Union. As Kelley put it: 


“I wanted very badly to 

avoid a situation...” 

—Col. Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC 
Chief of Operations, OSIA European 
Operations Command 


“I wanted very badly to avoid a situation in which our team 
leaders would be rendered ineffective for the first several hours, if 
not a day, after their entry into the former Soviet Union for the 
first time, by virtue of awe. They had to get over that awe. The 
best way to do it was to do so at some time other than when they 
were performing a real inspection.” 









114 


On-Site Inspection Agency 



Captain David R. Carter 
coordinating a mock inspection 
at the Operations Center. 


Colonel Kelley wanted to be certain that team leaders realized 
that military superpower status did not equate with a strong 
economy; that they held no misconceptions as to whom and what 
they would be dealing with in the Soviet Union. If team leaders 
were going to be distracted by their surroundings, Colonel Kelley 
wanted it to happen in a benign environment, during a mock 
inspection. When the CFE Treaty entered into force, he wanted the 
team leaders to be focused on the actual inspection. Kelley thought 
that this would probably be the only opportunity for team chiefs 
and deputies to enter the Soviet Union before baseline started—it 
was a one-shot deal. The team chiefs and deputies would then 
share their experiences with their teams in preparing them for 
baseline inspections. 16 

A total of 13 American team chiefs or deputies got firsthand 
exposure to Russian CFE inspection/escort techniques during these 
mock inspections. Major General Robert W. Parker, USAF, Direc¬ 
tor of OSIA, was an observer on both missions. Five OSIA team 
chiefs and three deputies were on the escort team in Germany, 
January 27-31, 1992, when the Russians visited Spangdahlem Air 
Base and Germersheim Army Depot. In addition to augmentees 
and observers, five U.S. team chiefs and two deputies were as¬ 
signed to the American team that inspected Russian forces at 
Siverskiy Air Base and at Pushkin, February 10-14, 1992. These 
nation-to-nation mock inspections revealed differences in treaty 
interpretation that simply would not have been uncovered except 
for these exercises. 

Captain David R. Carter, USAF, of the Plans Branch at OSIA 
European Operations, coordinated the effort among USAFE, 
USAREUR, the German ZVBW, and OSIA to bring about the 
Russian/German/U.S. mock inspections. The official U.S. escort 
team chief was Lt. Colonel Donald C. Snedeker, USA, and his 
deputy was Lt. Colonel Edward G. Gallagher, II, USA. The liaison 
officers for this mission were Majors Richard J. O’Shea, USAF, 
and Keith A. Oatman, USA. Major Oatman was an excellent 
resource for facilitating these inspections because he spoke Ger¬ 
man and Russian, a benefit derived from the emphasis placed on 
language skills when manning the unit. Technical Sergeant Joseph 
A. Amen, USAF, the only enlisted member of the team, was the 
logistics coordinator, a position usually referred to as the 
“bagman.” Technical Sergeant Amen’s role was to make certain 
that inspectors and escorts were billeted and fed when it was the 
U.S. government’s responsibility to do so. Before departing on the 
mission, he withdrew funds from the 435th Tactical Airlift Wing 
accounting and finance center to cover anticipated expenses. He 
arrived with the escort team at the declared site ahead of the in¬ 
spectors. There, he made arrangements and paid for billeting or 
hotel rooms if the teams were spending the night. He also paid for 
all meals. 17 



115 


Standing Up the Unit 


At the first Russian/American/German CFE mock inspection, 
January 27-31, General Parker greeted the incoming inspectors 
and briefly spoke of the importance of this series of inspections. 
He welcomed the opportunity for joint training, continued coop¬ 
eration, mutual trust, and most important—developing a “key 
blueprint for the CFE verification regime.” 


On January 27, 1992, little more than a month after the Soviet 
Union had collapsed, a Russian inspection team arrived in Frankfurt 
to conduct mock inspections, thus maintaining continuity in arms 
control treaty implementation. The Russian inspection team and six 
Russian observers underwent POE procedures with the host Ger¬ 
man escort team. The U.S. liaison team, General Parker, and Colo¬ 
nel Kelley were also there. The Russians declared their first inspec¬ 
tion site, Idar-Oberstein, and departed with the German host state 
escorts. After an overnight administrative hold, the Russian inspec¬ 
tors arrived at Idar-Oberstein at 0830 for the mock inspection. 
Following the inspection, the two teams held an informal discus¬ 
sion, reviewing the procedures and inspection issues. Then, the 
Russian team chief followed treaty protocol procedures and de¬ 
clared a sequential inspection at Spangdahlem Air Base. Finally, 
again following treaty protocols precisely, the two team chiefs 
signed the inspection report. While the Russian inspectors and 
observers, the U.S. liaison team, and General Parker and Colonel 
Kelley spent the night at Idar-Oberstein, the U.S. escort team trav¬ 
eled ahead to Spangdahlem Air Base. There they made final, last- 
minute preparations for the next day’s inspection. 


Mock inspections develop 
a “key blueprint for the CFE 
verification regime. ” 

—Maj. Gen. Robert W. Parker 


Upon leaving Idar-Oberstein, the German escort team contin¬ 
ued their responsibilities for the Russian inspection team and 
transported them to the next inspection site. The U.S. escort 
team greeted the Russian and German teams upon arrival at 
Spangdahlem Air Base and once again assumed escort responsibili¬ 
ties from the Germans. After providing refreshments and the site 
diagram to the Russians at the Officers’ Club, Lt. Colonel Snedeker 
and his team waited 30 minutes for the Russians to declare the 
OOV to be inspected. The Russian team chief declared the 52nd 
Tactical Fighter Wing, and the Americans began the site briefing. 

Following this briefing, the entire Russian inspection team 
participated in a bus ride around the base. Colloquially known 
as a “windshield tour,” this bus ride gave the inspection team a 
chance to compare the site diagram with the actual facilities, a 
practice that many nations would later adopt in escorting inspec¬ 
tion teams. After the windshield tour the Russian team broke into 
three subgroups, which departed immediately for different areas 
on the base to begin their inspections. The Russian inspectors 
requested access to all doors that exceeded the treaty’s two-meter 
limit and were satisfied with visual access if they could readily 
determine there was no TLE present in a building. If the inspectors 




116 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


U.S. escorts confirm a two-meter 
opening during a mock inspection 
at Lakenheath Air Base, England. 



could not immediately determine that there was no TLE in a facil¬ 
ity, the American escorts provided them access as far into a facility 
as necessary to confirm there was no TLE there, or until they 
encountered doors that did not exceed two meters. 

When one subgroup requested access to the Munitions Stor¬ 
age Area, Lt. Colonel Snedeker responded that the area was a sensi¬ 
tive point with limited access. He offered the inspectors an option 
to select four of the bunkers within the storage area for visual 
access only. The inspectors however, wanted either total access or 
no access to the area. Lt. Colonel Snedeker referred to the treaty 
definition of a sensitive point as allowing total, limited, or no 
access. At that point the Russian inspectors declined the American 
offer for limited access and proceeded to inspect other areas. By 
evening, the Russian team had finished its inspection, conducted a 
briefing, declared the sequential inspection (the 200th TAMC at 
Germersheim Army Depot), and completed the inspection report. 
After a dinner at the NCO Club, all teams left for Germersheim, 
where they remained overnight. The next day the Russians con¬ 
ducted their inspection, participated in a briefing, completed their 
report, and departed promptly for Rhein-Main, where they re¬ 
mained overnight before returning to Moscow the next day. 18 

Several issues arose during the inspections of the two U.S. 
sites. Photography was a point of contention on several occasions, 
specifically, the framing of photos. The U.S. escorts insisted that 
inspectors photograph an entire object, not just a part of it. U.S. 
escorts stated that an inspection team’s photos were a tool in 
counting equipment, not a means to focus on an aspect of a spe¬ 
cific piece of equipment or the area around it. Subsequently, in 
February 1992, during the U.S. mock inspection at Siverskiy Air 









117 


Standing Up the Unit 


Base, Russian escorts reciprocated by changing the framing of U.S. 
photos of Russian aircraft. Announcing when inspectors were 
going to take a picture also became an issue when the Russians 
declared that, under the treaty, they were required to announce 
their intention to take photos only once. In December 1991 at 
Vienna, however, General Medvedev had stated that an announce¬ 
ment should be made prior to each photo. Later, Russian escort 
officials concurred with that position during a U.S. mock inspec¬ 
tion at Pushkin. 

Because the treaty does not define a container, differences of 
interpretation arose during the mock inspections at U.S. facilities. 
The inspection protocol allows for the inspection of any container 
that exceeds two meters in all dimensions. The Russian inspectors 
defined a container as anything that “contains,” to include the 
trailer of a tractor trailer rig or a communications vehicle. The U.S. 
position was that the back of a truck was a piece of equipment, and 
if the vehicle was not a piece of conventional armaments and equip¬ 
ment subject to the treaty (CAEST), inspectors had no right to 
inspect the vehicle. Later, in April 1992, Joint Chiefs of Staff guid¬ 
ance on containers allowed inspectors to view the interior of cargo 
vehicles or tractor trailers. Other vehicles that had been modified 
for other uses, such as communications vehicles, called for different 
procedures. If the modification to the vehicle were not readily ap¬ 
parent, an effort would be made to show that it was a modified 
piece of equipment and did not contain TLE. 14 

Another question was sparked by the presence of two Egyp¬ 
tian F-4 fighters at Spangdahlem. The Russian inspectors felt the 
fighters should have been declared as CAEST; the U.S. response 



U.S. site escorts open a container 
during a mock inspection. 














118 


On-Site Inspection Agency 



SU-24 parked outside aircraft 


shelter at Siverskiy Air Base, Russia, during mock inspection in February 1992. 


was that since Egypt was not a signatory to the treaty, the Egyp¬ 
tian fighters were not subject to the treaty, and the United States 
would not report it during a site briefing or through formal CFE 
reporting channels. 

Shortly after these Russian mock inspections in Germany 
were complete, a nine-man American inspection team led by Lt. 
Colonel Gallagher conducted the mock inspections in Russia. The 
inspection team and six observers departed Rhein-Main on an Air 
Force C-141 on February 10, 1992. They arrived in Moscow 
around noon and, after a brief greeting, the Russians immediately 
initiated POE procedures. After Gallagher declared Siverskiy Air 
Base to be the first inspection site, the teams agreed to stop the 
inspection clock. The team—along with General Parker, Colonel 
Kelley, and other observers—remained overnight in Moscow. The 
following morning all departed for Siverskiy Air Base, where they 
conducted the first inspection. The American team departed for 
Pushkin the next day, where it conducted its inspection of the 
Russian Army artillery site over the next two days. After complet¬ 
ing the second inspection on the 13th, Ft. Colonel Gallagher’s 
team spent the night in Pushkin, returning to Moscow the next 
morning and then to Rhein-Main to complete the mission. 

Photography again proved to be a source of questions during 
these inspections. One situation dealt with the number of photo¬ 
graphs inspectors were allowed to take of CAEST. Escort officials 
questioned the need to take more than one photo of any piece of 
CAEST. Lt. Colonel Gallagher countered that photos were allowed 














119 


Standing Up the Unit 


to account for CAEST. He added that there was no way of deter¬ 
mining how many subteams had photographed a piece of equip¬ 
ment and that treaty-authorized use of video cameras made the 
question moot. This issue was resolved when the Russian escorts 
reluctantly agreed that there was no limit. Reciprocity, which was 
an element of operations under INF inspections, also came into 
play during these CFE mock inspections when the Russians re¬ 
quired U.S. inspectors to frame photos of SU-24s, just as U.S. 
escorts had required Russian inspectors to frame F-16 photos in 
January. 

In addition to photo questions, a site diagram issue arose 
during the inspection at Pushkin. Russian escorts presented to the 
American inspectors a site diagram that did not indicate common 
areas, only the areas specific to the two OOVs at Pushkin. The 
American team chief, Ft. Colonel Gallagher, asserted that the 
diagram was not complete because it did not show the extent of its 
manmade external boundary. This limited the inspection team’s 
access on the site. The Russian escorts did not agree with his inter¬ 
pretation of the treaty and did not alter the boundary of the site 
on the diagram. Ft. Colonel Gallagher noted the problem on the 
inspection report. It was a problem that would resurface during 
the baseline period and become the focus of a concerted allied 
effort to change the Russian interpretation. 20 

The February 1992 mission to Russia was the first CFE mock 
inspection deployment into the Eastern group of states. Following 
that mission, from March 15 through May 9, OSIA teams con- 


7. COMMENTS BY STATES PARTIES INVOLVED (CONTINUED) 
b. OTHER COMMENTS 


INSPECTING STATE PARTY 

state party whose conventional armaments 

AND EQUIPMENT ARE BEING INSPECTED 

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C\r c a j ai p rtf v . d e d Avr • Aw 

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ca pit Z3 (13 ). 

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T/tsA/ c <ze. 

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S/ye 


Extract of report from mock inspection at Pushkin, Russia, February 1992. 












120 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


ducted mock inspections in Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
and Poland before the treaty entered into force in July 1992. The 
final OSIA mock inspection with an Eastern nation before the 
treaty’s entry into force occurred on May 11, 1992, when Bulgar¬ 
ian inspectors deployed to Belgium. Each of these missions uncov¬ 
ered problems that were corrected on the spot, or noted and 
passed on for resolution by the U.S. government. One problem 
that inspectors could not correct was the presence of look-alike 
equipment in Czechoslovakia that was not included in the proto¬ 
col on existing types of conventional armaments and equipment. 

Site diagrams also proved to be a problem at several loca¬ 
tions. In Czechoslovakia, an escort team gave a thorough site 
briefing using wall charts; however, the site diagrams provided to 
the inspection team were not as accurate. The Czech escorts be¬ 
lieved that the treaty requirement to provide a site diagram was 
satisfied by the wall charts and that giving diagrams to the inspec¬ 
tors exceeded treaty requirements. The Czechs later changed their 
view on this issue. In Romania, escorts presented a site diagram 
that included the entire town adjacent to the military installation. 
The American inspection team discussed treaty requirements for 
site diagrams with their hosts, whereupon the Romanians nar¬ 
rowed the scope of their site diagram. In several states the U.S. 
teams experienced difficulties communicating with the U.S. Em¬ 
bassy. National phone systems were sometimes inadequate, and 
often U.S. Embassy personnel were not yet aware of notification 
requirements mandated by the treaty. 

In all, from May 14, 1991, through July 5, 1992, OSIA in¬ 
spection teams deployed on 44 mock inspection missions. During 
these missions, OSIA inspectors participated in nearly 100 mock 
inspections. American inspectors trained with inspectors from 18 
nations and shared their knowledge with representatives or units 
from USAREUR, USAFE, and U.S. Navy Europe. Typically, a 
mission lasted for several days and involved two or more mock 
inspections. Although the stay at any one location was brief, the 
mock inspections provided an understanding of how U.S. teams 
would conduct an inspection and how U.S. teams would work 
with foreign teams inspecting U.S. forces. In addition, these inspec¬ 
tions familiarized U.S. inspectors with the environment of the 
Eastern states, which would prepare them for contingencies that 
might arise during an actual inspection mission. These missions 
also tested the efficiency of the logistics system used to prepare 
and transport U.S. teams. One group that did not benefit from this 
series of mock inspections, however, was the U.S. liaison person¬ 
nel, who would not be ready to perform until days before the 
treaty entered into force. 



121 


Role of the Liaison Officers 

During treaty negotiations, U.S. delegates were satisfied that 
proposed escort provisions would protect American interests when 
Eastern teams conducted CFE inspections at U.S. installations. It 
wasn’t until late in negotiations that the United States recognized 
that there were many U.S. facilities, equipment, and personnel 
throughout Western Europe that were not subject to the treaty but 
were nonetheless vulnerable to CFE inspections. These forces were 
located on allied installations or at separate locations, not on U.S. 
installations. They were vulnerable during challenge inspections of 
specified areas or inspections of allied forces. Consequently, the 
United States insisted that the treaty contain a provision requiring 
a liaison officer’s presence during any inspection of a nation’s 
forces. OSIA’s European Operations Command was not manned to 
carry out these liaison duties. The manning document allowed for 
two liaison officers; however, their planned duties did not include 
deployments throughout Western Europe whenever Eastern teams 
conducted CFE inspections. 

The first American liaison officer (LNO), Major Richard J. 
O’Shea, USAF, arrived at OSIA’s European Operations Command 
in February 1991. One of O’Shea’s first tasks was to develop a list 
of the locations of American forces throughout Europe. OSIA 
LNOs needed to know exactly what U.S. interests could be vulner¬ 
able to an Eastern CFE Treaty inspection team. The list proved 
difficult to start and impossible to complete. No single headquar¬ 
ters in Europe maintained a list of all U.S. forces in Europe. Lists 
of major units—units that would be reportable under the treaty as 
well as non-CFE units—were readily available from USAFE and 
USAREUR. Determining the whereabouts of the many small 
groups of U.S. military people and equipment, however, proved 
extremely difficult. Within a few months, Major O’Shea deter¬ 
mined that his list encompassed more than 1,200 locations 
throughout the NATO treaty area; in Germany alone there were 
140 U.S. OOVs as well as 741 U.S. facilities that were not on U.S. 
declared sites. In addition, the drawdown of U.S. forces from 
Europe caused movements of people and equipment, much of 
which were not reportable under the CFE Treaty. This made it 
difficult to maintain a current list. 

Two NCOs assigned to the Plans Section—Technical Sergeant 
Ronald S. Fox, USAF, and Staff Sergeant Thomas J. Bradley, 

USAF—assisted Major O’Shea by designing and building a com¬ 
puter database nicknamed “Big Hog” to identify U.S. forces, de¬ 
clared sites, and POEs throughout Europe. The numerous loca¬ 
tions made the list difficult to compile; the locations of classified 
programs made it impossible to complete. The JCS placed respon¬ 
sibility for the CFE liaison mission on OSIA; however, OSIA was 
not privy to ongoing classified programs. Consequently, the 


Standing Up the Unit 



Major Richard J. O’Shea, first U.S. 
Liaison Officer. 




122 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


“working” list that Major O’Shea developed provided OSIA liai¬ 
son teams the most reliable and current information available in 
Europe. It was clear, however, that U.S. teams could be called to 
protect U.S. interests, whatever they might be, at any place and at 
any time within the NATO states. 21 

Although the JCS guidance on the OSIA liaison mission 
spelled out what was to be accomplished, manpower to carry out 
that mission was not addressed. The JCS guidance required that a 
U.S. liaison team be available to the NATO states’ escort team 
whenever Eastern inspectors arrived at a POE to conduct CFE 
inspections. Each U.S. liaison team would arrive ahead of the 
inspection team and remain available to the host escort team 
throughout the Eastern team’s mission in case U.S. interests were 
involved. By October 1991, OSIA European Operations did not 
have sufficient manning to accomplish the liaison mission during 
baseline, and Major O’Shea remained the lone LNO assigned. 
Colonel Kelley turned to Headquarters to press for a solution. He 
indicated that 13 temporary duty two-person teams would be 
required during the 120-day baseline period. Kelley recommended 
13 teams based on the inspection quotas of the U.S. and the 
NATO allies, travel time to all NATO POEs compared to notifica¬ 
tion times, and the assumption that the Eastern states would con¬ 
duct all inspections available to them in Western Europe. He also 
pointed out that following the baseline period, OSIA would re¬ 
quire four officers to carry out the continuing liaison mission; 
therefore, three additional officers should be assigned perma¬ 
nently. Colonel Kelley emphasized the importance of experience 
with life in Europe and a proficiency in a European language— 
German, French, Italian, Spanish, Turkish, Greek, or Portuguese 
(in that order)—when selecting officers for liaison duty. 22 



OSIA inspectors inside bomb bay 
of B-52 bomber during mock 
START inspection. 


? 




123 


Standing Up the Unit 


The issue of who would supply the 13 temporary teams was 
not resolved until the summer of 1992. Headquarters and other 
OSIA locations had sufficient personnel to execute the CFE liaison 
mission. However, many of these people were preparing to imple¬ 
ment other treaties such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START) and the Chemical Weapons Convention. When the issue 
of CFE liaison support arose, Headquarters personnel pointed to 
the possibility that these treaties might enter into force simulta¬ 
neously, requiring a maximum effort from Headquarters to imple¬ 
ment these other treaties. Outside OSIA, an increasingly smaller 
USAREUR also balked at providing teams for the 120-day tempo¬ 
rary duty. In February 1992, Major General Robert W. Parker, 
USAF, Director of OSIA, decided that unless START and CFE 
entered into force simultaneously, OSIA would provide the tempo¬ 
rary liaison support. By June 1992, it became apparent that in the 
following month the CFE Treaty would enter into force, and it 
was equally clear that START, stranded in the ratification process, 
would not enter into force. The liaison teams would come from 
OSIA. 23 

On each team, the temporary liaison team members, one 
officer and one enlisted, were knowledgeable and experienced in 
one of the other arms control treaties, but not the CFE Treaty. All 
would require training on the CFE Treaty and on the specific 
duties and responsibilities of a U.S. LNO. In addition to LNOs, 
two additional temporary teams for escort and reduction inspec¬ 
tions would receive CFE Treaty training at the same time. Major 
O’Shea recommended that European Operations conduct the 
training at Rhein-Main so that students would be free of the dis¬ 
tractions of Headquarters and home. At Rhein-Main the future 
team members could focus on their upcoming duties. 

During the course Major O’Shea provided more than a third of 
the classroom treaty instruction and nearly all the liaison-specific 
instruction. Throughout the course he stressed activities expected to 
occur in Germany. Other treaty experts taught equipment familiar¬ 
ization and demonstrated an escort mission, while representatives of 
the German and the British verification agencies provided their 



Headquarters OSIA near 
Washington, D.C., was the primary 
source for liaison officers during 
CFE baseline. 






124 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


U.S. CFE LIAISON TEAM DEPLOYMENTS 



agencies’ perspectives on liaison operations. 
Three days after the CFE Liaison (7-11 July) and 
CFE Treaty (13-16 July) courses, half the gradu¬ 
ates were in place throughout Europe awaiting 
Eastern inspection teams, while the rest returned 
to their duty sections. Midway through baseline, 
at the end of 60 days, the two groups would 
rotate positions. 24 

The concentration of American and NATO 
forces in Central Europe dictated that the U.S. 
liaison mission focus on Germany. Conversely, 
the flanks or outlying areas, such as Portugal, 
held far fewer U.S. or NATO forces, would be 
subject to fewer Eastern inspections, and there¬ 
fore would require fewer American LNOs. The 
primary consideration in team placement was 
response time. Six liaison teams in Germany could operate effec¬ 
tively from Rhein-Main to meet inspection teams in Germany, 
Belgium, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Greece. Com¬ 
mercial airline schedules were not timely enough, and military 
airlift was too limited to support LNO missions that could be 
unpredictable and possibly frequent in the United Kingdom, Tur¬ 
key, Spain, or Portugal. To satisfy the U.S government policy to 
have a liaison team available for each Eastern inspection team, 
two teams deployed to the United Kingdom while two teams trav¬ 
eled to Turkey, and one team deployed to Spain to stand by to 
carry out liaison operations. The single team in Madrid was also 
prepared to respond to an Eastern team in Portugal. 


Luxembourg, Iceland, and France were exceptions for U.S. 
liaison operations. There were no U.S. forces in France, only six 
M47 tanks. In the unlikely event of an inspection of those tanks, 
the U.S. would forgo its right to be present at the inspection. Lux¬ 
embourg and Iceland had no OOVs of their own, but there were 
U.S. OOVs and declared sites located on their territory. When an 
Eastern state announced its intent to inspect in one of these na¬ 
tions, an entire U.S. escort team would deploy because the inspec¬ 
tion had to be on a U.S. declared site. 25 


Final Preparations 

During the 30 days prior to the CFE Treaty’s entry into force, 
Colonel Kelley provided the inspection teams one last opportunity 
to shore up any weak spots in their readiness to conduct their 
missions. He directed the support branches to provide the inspec¬ 
tion division with briefings and refresher training programs on 
specific topics he felt would be critical to a successful baseline 
effort. The Logistics Division reviewed and refined “bagman” 





















125 


procedures, vehicle operations, supply, and procuring air transpor¬ 
tation under several different scenarios. Plans and Analysis briefed 
inspection teams on target folders, special databases, and other 
areas of direct assistance. The Plans Branch also reminded inspec¬ 
tors of their responsibility to provide accurate information needed 
to develop treaty notification messages. The Operations Branch 
provided training on its capabilities for assisting teams through 
communications and current information on different countries. 
Other briefings and training dealt with team equipment, photogra¬ 
phy, TLE identification, emergency medical training, and prepara¬ 
tion of CFE Treaty reports. 26 

Transportation 

Transportation was critical for successful implementation of 
the treaty. Inspection teams traveled hundreds or even thousands 
of miles to arrive at distant points of entry (POEs) at the notified 
time. Liaison and escort teams had to react with minimal notice to 
the arrival of Eastern inspection teams at NATO states. The escort 
teams had to transport up to 10 people, including a bagman. 
Escort and liaison teams needed flexible and timely transportation 
to meet the limited notifications allowed in declared site or chal¬ 
lenge inspections. Trains and commercial planes in the region were 
excellent, but they ran only on fixed schedules and didn’t go di¬ 
rectly to the inspection sites or all POEs. Because automobiles 
could satisfy mission requirements for 90 percent of the U.S. 
OOVs, escort and liaison teams in Germany and the nearby 
Benelux countries relied on minivans. Vans allowed teams to leave 
at any time and to go directly to the inspection site or POE. Dur¬ 
ing baseline, each escort team was assigned two minivans to trans¬ 
port all team members and their gear. The two-person LNO teams 
deployed by station wagon. The motor pool at Rhein-Main could 
not support OSIA with a fleet of 15 minivans and 7 station wag¬ 
ons, so OSIA leased them from two local companies. Liaison 
teams pre-positioned outside Germany normally used rental cars 
in their missions. Motor vehicles, however, could not satisfy all of 
OSIA’s mission requirements. 2 

To conduct CFE inspections in the Eastern states, U.S. teams 
would deploy to national entry points as far away as Moscow. 
American escort teams would also respond, on short notice, to 
areas across Western Europe from the United Kingdom to Turkey. 
Airlift was the only way to implement the treaty in those circum¬ 
stances. In early planning Major Steven E. Pestana, USAF, of the 
Mission Coordination Branch, studied the possibility of using 
C-20 class aircraft. These small business jets were perhaps the best 
suited for the mission, although there was concern that all the 
inspectors and their belongings could exceed weight limits of the 
aircraft. With the Gulf War and the drawdown of American forces 
in Europe, however, the C-20s were no longer an option. There 


Standing Up the Unit 



N 


Minivans and station wagons were 
primary transportation for escort 
and liaison teams. 





126 


On-Site Inspection Agency 



A C-141 from the 437th MAC prepared to depart Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, on an OSIA mission. 

were not enough suitable U.S. aircraft in Europe to support the 
CFE mission. In January 1990, the director of operations at Head¬ 
quarters USAFE announced that the Military Airlift Command 
(MAC) would provide C-141, C-130, or C-5 airlift for the CFE 
mission, based on passenger or load requirements. In addition, 
USAFE would provide C-130 aircraft to support the CFE mission. 
The 435th Tactical Airlift Wing at Rhein-Main, a USAFE unit,* 
and the 437th and 438th Military Airlift Wings from Charleston 
AFB, South Carolina, and McGuire AFB, New Jersey, both MAC 
wings, would provide airlift support to OSIA teams. 

The 435th crews flew C-130s on inspection missions into 
Eastern Europe, and also were tasked to support CFE escort mis¬ 
sions outside Central Europe. To perform that mission, which 
could be on short notice for escort operations, the 435th kept two 
crews and one C-130 on alert. Meanwhile, crews of the 437th and 
438th flew C-141s on inspection missions into the former Soviet 
Union. The MAC wings alternated support with two C-141s that 
were pre-positioned at Rhein-Main. Wilbur Lewis, Jr., of OSIA’s 
Military Airlift Coordination Branch, arranged for the C-141 


‘During the same time OSIA was preparing for CFE Treaty implementation, the U.S. Air 
Force underwent a reorganization. As a part of this reorganization, control of Rhein-Main 
Air Base and its host unit, the 435th Tactical Airlift Wing, passed from MAC to USAFE. 
Previously, while USAFE played a major role in scheduling the 435th's C-130 theater 
airlift forces, it did not actually own the unit. The reorganization also resulted in many 
redesignations, both to field units and major commands. On 1 June 1992, MAC inactivated 
and was replaced by the Air Mobility Command (AMC). In addition, both Military Airlift 
Wings and Tactical Airlift Wings were redesignated simply as Airlift Wings. 




127 


Standing Up the Unit 


support from OSIA Headquarters. The Plans Branch at European 
Operations (EO) coordinated C-130 missions at Rhein-Main. 

One of the elements of coordinating airlift support was track¬ 
ing vital information on all aircrew members. 28 The protocol on 
inspection required that each signatory provide a list to all other 
treaty nations of aircrew members (600 maximum) and inspectors 
(400 maximum) designated to support or participate in CFE in¬ 
spections. The list included names, gender, date and place of birth, 
and passport number. The long, detailed U.S. list was compiled by 
OSIA’s Treaty List Management Branch. Once the list was com¬ 
piled, OSIA turned it over to the U.S. State Department for dis¬ 
semination to other nations at Vienna. The inspection protocol 
required each state to provide this list to all other signatories 
within 90 days after treaty signature. The next opportunity to 
update lists came within 30 days of treaty implementation. In 
addition, the treaty allowed a nation receiving the list up to 30 
days to review it and request that the originating state delete cer¬ 
tain names from the list; there was no right of refusal to delete 
names. Because of the long period between signature and entry 
into force, the U.S. list was outdated at entry into force. Some 
people were no longer available for duty but were still on the list, 
and others who arrived after the original list was submitted were 
available for duty but not listed. This situation would affect 
OSIA’s early baseline operations. 29 

Communications 

Communications under the INF Treaty had been relatively 
simple. The Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) at the U.S. 
State Department passed information directly to the Soviet 
Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in Moscow. A single conduit 
passed all required data. Under the CFE Treaty, a new system, the 
CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) com¬ 
munications network, was only partially functional when the 
treaty’s baseline inspection phase started in July 1992. 

The CSCE members had anticipated a communications net¬ 
work linking 35 CSCE capitals and three CSCE institutions 24 
hours a day. The system, designed to support the Vienna Docu¬ 
ment, was linked by a central switching center at The Hague. 
Unfortunately, when the system was designed, the Soviet Union 
required only one terminal, in Moscow. With the breakup of the 
USSR, however, a glaring weakness in the CSCE communications 
system surfaced. No nation in the former Soviet Union, except 
Russia, had the hardware to connect to the system. Hardware was 
expensive, and newly emerging nations opted to apply their lim¬ 
ited resources to other pressing matters. As a result, during CFE 
baseline the U.S. NRRC transmitted CFE messages to only those 
nations that were operating on the CSCE network. 



128 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


To reach those nations that were not yet 
on the network, and as a backup in case of a 
system failure, the State Department also sent 
CFE notification messages through diplo¬ 
matic channels. Diplomatic channels some¬ 
times entailed hand-carried messages from 
the U.S. Embassy to the appropriate officials 
in that state. Acknowledgment of receipt and 
acceptance of an inspection required addi¬ 
tional hand-carried notes from state agencies 
to the U.S. Embassy. This added a burden to 
some embassy staffs that were already ex¬ 
tremely busy and, as was discovered during 
mock inspections, were sometimes unaware 
of notification requirements of the CFE 
Treaty. Meanwhile, the Plans Branch and 
Operations at EO had opened an informal “back door” communi¬ 
cations network that eclipsed the formal system during the early 
stages of baseline. 

This informal communications system was based on the 
excellent working relationships of staff with their counterparts in 
verification agencies throughout Europe. This informal system 
developed with the initial outreach for mock inspections and grew 
day to day as the agencies—particularly the German, French, 
British, and U.S. agencies—repeatedly looked to each other for 
reliable and timely information. This informal network would 
prove valuable during baseline, when the formal notification sys¬ 
tem occasionally failed. Fortunately, the informal communication 
system provided a safety net, and frequently OSIA liaison teams 
had to prepare or deploy based on information from this network. 

As baseline drew near, the teams were trained and eager, 
equipment was in place, transportation stood ready, and several 
communications systems were operating. 30 

Notes 

1. Interview with Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert, USAF, Team Chief, OSIA, by 
Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, July 
12, 1993; Director of Resource Management, Manpower Office, Report on 
“On-Site Inspection Agency Manning Document,” October 8, 1992. 

2. Interview, Gessert; Interview with Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser, USA, Team 
Chief, OSIA, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Rhein-Main Air 
Base, Germany, July 12, 1993; Interview with Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, 
USMC, Chief, Operations Division, European Operations Command, 

OSIA, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Washington, D.C., May 18, 
1994. 

3. Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, “Briefing Papers for Senate Committee on 
Intelligence Hearings,” September 4, 1991; Directorate for Operations, 



The Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in the Department of 
State sent and received treaty messages. 
















129 


Standing Up the Unit 


Training Branch, OSIA, “Syllabus of Arms Control Training Conventional 
Forces in Europe Treaty: Inspector/Escort Course,” February 4-14, 1991. 

4. Interview, Kelley; Interview with Master Sergeant George A. Partridge, 

USA, Weapons Specialist, European Operations Command, OSIA, by 
Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, July 
13, 1993; Interview with Chief Warrant Officer 4 Michael R. Lukes, USA, 
Deputy Team Chief, OSIA, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Rhein- 
Main Air Base, Germany, July 12, 1993. 

5. Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, “Briefing Papers for Senate Committee on 
Intelligence Hearings,” September 4, 1991; Operations Division, Training 
Branch, European Operations Command, OSIA, “Listing of Equipment 
Identification Training Levels and Associated Equipment,” July 19, 1993; 
Lt. Colonel Donald Snedeker, Operations Division, Inspection/Escort 
Branch, European Operations Command, OSIA, “Memorandum on Level 
III Conventional Arms and Equipment,” May 22, 1992; Interview, Kelley. 

6. Interview, Gessert; Interview, Kelley. 

7. Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, “Briefing Papers for Senate Committee on 
Intelligence Hearings,” September 4, 1991; Interview with Sergeants First 
Class Gary E. Karstens and Kenneth D. Periman, USA, OSIA linguists, by 
Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, 
December 17, 1993; Major General Robert W. Parker, USAF, Director, 
OSIA, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International 
Security and Science of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 
Representatives , May 12, 1992. 

8. Joseph P. Harahan, On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty (Washing¬ 
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 27-30. 

9. Interview with Lt. Colonel Joseph J. Drach, Jr., USA, Team Chief, OSIA, by 
Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, 
December 17, 1993. 

10. Interview, Kelley. 

11. Interview, Kelley; Interview with Master Sergeant William N. Chesney, Jr., 
USA, Plans NCO, OSIA, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Rhein- 
Main Air Base, Germany, July 12, 1993; OSIA European Operations 
Command, “Report on Bi-Weekly Activities, May 15-31, 1992,” June 5, 
1992; Lt. Colonel Donald C. Snedeker, USA, Branch Chief, Inspector/ 
Escort Branch, European Operations Command, “Memorandum on DOF 
(I&E) Outline Plans for Jan-Feb,” January 6, 1992; Plans/Liaison Branch, 
European Operations Command, “Talking Paper on Planning, Preparation, 
and Conduct of Trial (Mock) Inspections,” January 1992; Captain David 
Carter, USAF, Planner, Plans/Liaison Branch, European Operations 
Command, “Talking Paper on Excess Operations Planning Personnel at 
OSIA-Europe,” January 16, 1992. 

12. Colonel Frederick E. Grosick, USAF, Director, Field Office Europe, 
“Memorandum on CFE Mock Inspections,” June 4, 1991; Lt. Colonel 
David P. Gessert, “After Action Report on French Mock Inspection,” June 
3, 1991; Plans Branch, Field Office Europe, “Planning Order for French 
Mock Inspection,” May 1991; Interview, Gessert. 

13. Interview, Kelley; Interview with Lt. Colonel Jan S. Karcz, USA, Team 
Chief, OSIA, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Rhein-Main Air 
Base, Germany, December 13, 1993; Lt. Colonel Jan S. Karcz, “After 
Action Report on Mock Inspection C-91-MOC-27A (Sembach Air Base),” 
November 15, 1991; Plans/Liaison Branch, European Operations 
Command, “Report from Inspection Data Base,” November 11, 1992. 



130 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


14. Interview, Kelley; Major Elmer G. White, USA, Team Chief, “After Action 
Report of Escort of Czechoslovak Mock Inspections, October 8-9, 1991,” 
November 8, 1991; Lt. Colonel J.D. Pesterfield, USAF, Chief, Operations 
Branch, Plans, Requirements, and Schedules Division, Operations 
Directorate, OSIA, “Trip Report on Vienna JCG Meeting, December 9-13, 

1991, ” December 23, 1991. 

15. Lt. Colonel John D. Pesterfield, USAF, “Staff Coordination Sheet on U.S.- 
Soviet Mock,” December 24, 1991; Interview, Kelley; Colonel Lawrence G. 
Kelley, “After Action Report on U.S.-USSR CFE Mock Inspection Planning 
Conference,” December 20, 1991. 

16. Interview, Kelley. 

17. Plans/Liaison Branch, European Operations Command, “Planning Order 
for Mission C92-MOC-029A,” January 23, 1992; U.S. Department of 
State, “Message on CFE Mock Inspections in Russia and Germany,” 
January 11, 1992; Major Keith A. Oatman, USA, “What a way to start the 
new year!” On-Site Insights, March 1992, p. 11. 

18. Lt. Colonel Stephen L. Harris, USAF, Deputy Chief, Implementation 
Requirements Office, OSIA, “After Action Report on U.S.-Russian Mock 
CFE Inspections,” March 9, 1992; Colonel Michael S. Brake, USAF, Vice 
Commander, 52nd Tactical Fighter Wing, “Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe Crosstell,” February 7, 1992. 

19. Joint Staff Message, “Response to HQ USEUCOM Request for Guidance,” 
April 22, 1992. 

20. Lt. Colonel Stephen L. Harris, “After Action Report on U.S.-Russian Mock 
CFE Inspections,” March 9, 1992; CFE Inspection Reports, “Siverskiy, 
Russia,” February 11, 1992, and “Pushkin, Russia,” February 13, 1992; 
Operations Division, European Operations Command, “Talking Papers— 
Declared Site Diagram and Photography, Blue on Red Practice Inspection, 
February 10-14, 1992,” March 13, 1992. 

21. Interview with Major Richard J. O’Shea, USAF, Liaison Officer, European 
Operations Command, OSIA, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, 
Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, July 12, 1993; Interview, Kelley; Interview, 
Chesney. 

22. Interview, Kelley; Steve Schlein, Planner, Implementation Requirements 
Office, OSIA, Proposal for JCS approval on “Concept of Operations: CFE 
Liaison Officer Duties,” November 25, 1991; Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, 
“Memorandum on CFE Liaison Officer Requirement,” October 21, 1991. 

23. Colonel Frederick E. Grosick, USAF, Director, Plans, Operations, and 
Training, OSIA, “Memorandum on CFE Liaison Officer and Escort 
Reduction Teams,” May 1992; Major Richard J. O’Shea, USAF, Liaison 
Officer, European Operations Command, OSIA, “Memorandum on 
Liaison Officer Training,” February 12, 1992. 

24. Major Richard J. O’Shea, “Memorandum on Liaison Officer Training,” 
February 12, 1992; Interview, O’Shea; “Syllabus for OSIA Liaison Officers 
Course,” July 7-11, 1992; European Operations Command, “Liaison 
Officers’ Deployment Schedule,” July 10, 1992. 

25. Major Richard J. O'Shea, “Memorandum on Liaison Officer Training,” 
February 12, 1992; Interview, O’Shea; U.S. CFE Treaty Exchanged Data as 
of July 17, 1992. 

26. Interview, Kelley; Operations Division, European Operations Command, 
“Briefing on Milestones for Entry Into Force of the CFE Treaty,” May 

1992. 




Standing Up the Unit 


27. Interview, Kelley; Vehicle Operations Section, European Operations 
Command, “Inspector/Escort Vehicle Status Log,” July 1992. 

28. Major Steven E. Pestana, USAF, Chief, Mission Coordination Branch, 
Logistics Division, Field Office Europe, OSIA, “Talking Paper on Airlift for 
CFE Inspector/Escort Teams,” August 19, 1991; Eleadquarters USAF 
Message on “OSIA Airlift Support,” January 27, 1992. 

29. Interview, Fiser; Treaty List Management Branch, Plans, Operations, and 
Training Directorate, OSIA, “Treaties Inspector/Aircrew List,” March 1, 
1993. 

30. Pierce S. Corden, Multilateral Affairs Bureau, U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, Memorandum on “The CSCE Communications 
Network and CFE Implementation,” April 15, 1992; Steve Schlein, 

Planner, Interagency Affairs Office, OSIA, “Talking Paper on Support and 
Information Needed for CFE Implementation,” June 30, 1992; Jennifer 
Laurendeau, Office of European Security and Political Affairs, Bureau of 
European and Canadian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, “Memorandum 
on How to Manage CFE Notifications at Home and Abroad,” July 13, 
1992; Interview, Chesney. 


131 
























Chapter 5 

Final Preparations: 
NATO and WTO Nations 



Defense ministers of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council meet at NATO headquarters. 


W hat was the status of the other CFE Treaty states as they 
prepared to implement the treaty? On the first day of 
the treaty’s entry into force, every state had to be ready 
to carry out its treaty obligations and rights. Obligations meant 
that states had to be prepared to display and account for their 
treaty-limited equipment (TLE); ready to send and receive treaty- 
required communications regarding force data, reduction activi¬ 
ties, and notifications of all inspections; and ready to receive in¬ 
spection teams, transport them to the declared sites, host and 
escort them on-site, and return them to the point of entry (POE) 
after completion of the inspection. Treaty rights focused on the 
selection, preparation, and training of inspection teams that would 
monitor the different phases of the treaty. They also included the 
opportunity to send national delegates to serve on the Joint Con¬ 
sultative Group (JCG), which was responsible for facilitating the 
treaty’s implementation. A survey of the 29 CFE Treaty states on 











134 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


The Russian NRRC—the largest, 
most experienced verification 
agency in the Eastern states. 



the eve of the treaty’s entry into force on July 17, 1992, revealed 
a wide degree of preparedness, as one might expect from a wide 
array of nations—large and small, stable and unstable, and spread 
over a continent. 

Within NATO, four nations—the United States, Germany, 
France, and Great Britain—had established new agencies or ex¬ 
panded existing on-site inspection organizations in 1990-91. 

Other NATO nations, such as Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands, 
set up small arms control verification staffs in their ministries of 
defense or on their general staffs. Generally, nations with larger 
military forces set up separate agencies to implement the treaty, 
while smaller nations opted for military staff offices to satisfy CFE 
requirements. 

Within the Eastern group of states, the Soviet Union/Russia 
had the largest and most experienced inspection agency. Estab¬ 
lished in 1987 to implement the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces (INF) Treaty, the Soviet Union’s inspectorate, the Nuclear 
Risk Reduction Center (NRRC), became the new Russian nation’s 
inspection agency late in 1991. To implement the INF Treaty, the 
Soviet Union’s NRRC had established treaty support organizations 
in the Soviet military districts. From 1988 to 1991, when all INF 
treaty items had been eliminated, these support elements gained 
invaluable experience working with inspection regimes, reduction 
protocols, notification requirements, and timelines. Consequently, 
when Belarus and Ukraine set up their CFE Treaty verification 
agencies in 1992, they had a cadre of people experienced in imple¬ 
menting arms control treaties. Six months after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, eight of the newly independent states became parties 
to the CFE Treaty in June 1992 at the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) summit in Oslo. They were Russia, 
Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and 
















135 


Final Preparations: NATO and WTO Nations 


Kazakstan. Of these states, only Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine 
possessed a professional cadre of inspectors, escorts, reduction 
facilities, and institutional relationships with national military 
forces. The other states, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
and Kazakstan, had little or no direct treaty experience. Many of 
these new nations were caught up in internal and external wars 
and had little time or interest in any treaty that would reduce 
conventional armaments. 

As with agencies of the NATO nations, the size and structure 
of the Eastern European nations’ inspectorates varied consider¬ 
ably. Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania 
established CFE Treaty verification agencies either before treaty 
signature in November 1990, or shortly thereafter in early 1991. 
In 1991, Poland established a separate verification agency with an 
authorized force of 85 military officers and civilians, and placed 
the new organization in the Ministry of National Defense. Hun¬ 
gary, by contrast, set up a small arms control section within its 
national armed forces in 1990. 

Characteristics of European and Russian 
CFE Treaty Inspection Teams 

When Germany established its Federal Armed Forces Verifi¬ 
cation Center, the Zentrum fur Verifikationsaufgaben der 
Bundeswehr (ZVBW), in October 1990, it had an authorized staff 



German team chief signing reduction inspection report in Slovakia. 




On-Site Inspection Agency 



German officers of the ZVBW training to implement the Open Skies Treaty. 


of 65 inspectors, communicators, trainers, logisticians, and admin¬ 
istrators. 1 For its initial cadre of CFE Treaty inspectors, the new 
German center drew upon a small group of military officers who 
had been conducting inspections of large-scale military exercises of 
the CSCE states under the Stockholm Document of 1986. A few of 
these experienced officers became CFE inspection team leaders. 

For the other CFE team leaders, the German Bundeswehr re¬ 
quested volunteers. Many officers applied, and by December 1989, 
some 11 months before the CFE Treaty was signed, all the German 
CFE team leaders had been selected and enrolled in an intensive 
Russian language course. Colonel Joern Steinberg recalls that he 
and the other German team leaders studied for nine months at the 
national language school at Hurth, Germany. 2 All German team 
leaders were professional military officers, 40 to 50 years old, with 
15 to 25 years of service in the German army, air force, or navy. 

The German verification center opened in October 1990 at 
Geilenkirchen and immediately began the process of organizing 
inspection teams. Each team trained as a unit, concentrating on 
learning the treaty as well as the current military force structure 
and the TLE of a single signatory state or group of states. German 
CFE Treaty inspection teams were led by colonels, with lieutenant 
colonels serving as deputies and captains, lieutenants, and non¬ 
commissioned officers (NCOs) as inspectors. In 1991 and 1992, 
the German verification center grew rapidly, acquiring new mis¬ 
sions under the Open Skies Treaty and the Vienna Documents of 
1990 and 1992. By July 1992, the center had 400 personnel on 
board. A considerable part of this growth reflected the incorpora- 




Final Preparations: NATO and WTO Nations 137 


tion of the former German Democratic Republic’s (GDR) treaty 
verification unit. 3 


Following German unification in October 1990, the German 
federal armed forces incorporated the GDR’s army and air force 
personnel and equipment. Approximately six months later, in 
March 1991, the GDR’s verification agency became a branch 
office of the German Federal Armed Forces Verification Center. 

It had 140 officers, NCOs, and civilians and was located at 
Strausberg, 30 kilometers east of Berlin. Many of the Strausberg 
personnel had direct experience with the INF Treaty. Now, in 
1991 and 1992, their mission would be to supervise the CFE 
Treaty reduction centers located in eastern Germany and to escort 
inspection teams from the Eastern group of states. 4 


One interesting aspect of German unification was the large 
quantity of former GDR army and air force weapons and equip¬ 
ment available for incorporation into the federal armed forces. 
Shortly after unification, the German minister of defense decided 
that most of the former GDR military equipment was not suited 
for the federal army and air force. Since the mid-1950s, West 
Germany’s military forces had been equipped with weapons and 
munitions that met NATO standards. Most, if not all, of the GDR 
army and air force equipment had been designed and produced for 
use with the Soviet armed forces. Operationally incompatible, it 
was surplus equipment and would be eliminated. Since many of 
the former GDR’s offensive weapons fell under the provisions of 
the CFE Treaty, Germany would have to destroy them during the 
treaty’s reduction period. Before the CFE Treaty entered into force, 
however, Germany’s CFE Treaty inspection teams used this former 
GDR equipment as an opportunity to study firsthand Soviet army 
TLE and “look-alike” equipment. For the new German verification 
center, this was both an unexpected and important opportunity.’ 

The French CFE inspection teams were led by professional 
military officers, usually lieutenant colonels, 38 to 45 years old, 
with service on command headquarters staff or on the French 
General Staff. In February 1994, Colonel Francois Rozec, Com¬ 
mandant of L’Unite Fran^aise de Verification, explained that three 
areas were important in selecting inspection team leaders: profes¬ 
sional skill, linguistic ability, and maturity. “As far as maturity is 
concerned,” Colonel Rozec said, “We consider it to be psychologi¬ 
cal equilibrium, judgment, and ease of communication.” 6 

The French agency was formed in September 1990 to carry 
out French “verification and hosting” responsibilities under the 
CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document 1990. Focated approxi¬ 
mately 70 kilometers north of Paris, on French Air Station 110 at 
Creil, France, the unit was subordinate to the Arms Control Divi¬ 
sion of the French General Staff in Paris. For its personnel, the 
new treaty verification unit drew upon specialists from the French 



Colonel Frangois Rozec, 
Commandant, L’Unite Frangaise de 
Verification. 









138 


On-Site Inspection Agency 





army, air force, and navy. Under the CFE Treaty, France declared 
1,355 tanks, 1,392 artillery pieces, 4,154 armored combat ve¬ 
hicles, 376 helicopters, and 688 fighter aircraft. As a state party, 
France declared 168 sites and 211 objects of verification. Brigadier 
General Jean-Paul Huet served as the first Commandant; in April 
1992, Colonel Rozec assumed command. 

From the beginning, the French inspectorate developed “or¬ 
ganic teams,” each with a dedicated team leader, deputy, linguists, 
and inspectors. Their approach to preparing for an inspection 
mission was similar to the German inspection teams’—studying a 
specific nation’s TFE holdings, current force structure, and organi¬ 
zational lines. For part of their time, each French inspection team 
worked directly with French army and air force units and installa¬ 
tions subject to CFE Treaty inspections, providing training on the 
treaty, inspection protocols, and reduction procedures. 8 

Great Britain had experience with on-site inspections under 
the Stockholm Document of 1986 and with the British Military 
Fiaison Mission in Berlin from 1947 to 1991. Its officers were 
professional, knowledgeable, and at the forefront in analysis and 
evaluations. In August 1990, the British Ministry of Defense se¬ 
lected Colonel Roy Giles, RAF, to lead the Joint Arms Control 
Implementation Group (JACIG). Focated at RAF Scampton, the 
new four-service group drew personnel from the Royal Navy, 
Marines, Army, and Air Force. It had an assigned strength of 120 
officers, NCOs, and civilians. From the beginning, Colonel Giles 
directed that the British group would use full-time inspection and 
escort teams. Most of the initial cadre of inspectors had served in 
Berlin with the British Military Fiaison Mission or had worked as 
interpreters in the Berlin Corridor. They were very knowledgeable 
on the Soviet Union, its armed forces, and its military equipment. 
Colonel Giles encouraged volunteers, especially officers and NCOs 
with Russian language skills. 9 

The Belgian concept of operations called for the establish¬ 
ment of a small professional verification staff attached to the 
Ministry of Defense in Brussels. This staff would organize, train, 
and lead the Belgian CFE Treaty inspection and escort teams, 
which were composed of inspectors drawn from the ranks of the 
military services. Early in 1990 the General Staff selected two 
groups of five midlevel officers, all lieutenant colonels, and en¬ 
rolled them in an intensive Russian language course. 10 According 
to Ft. Colonel Fred Janssen, Director of Operations, F’Unite Beige 
de Verification, initial language training for the team leaders 
would enable them “to express themselves in normal, ordinary 
daily talks” with their Russian military escorts. 11 For treaty issues 
and technical questions that might arise during the inspection, 
Janssen indicated that each team would have some inspectors who 
were qualified interpreters. It is interesting that the leaders of the 





Final Preparations: NATO and WTO Nations 139 


Belgian verification agency envisioned, almost from the beginning, 
multinational CFE inspection teams composed of inspectors from 
several different nations. Inspectors from Luxembourg joined the 
Belgian agency’s initial language training course, as did officers 
from the Dutch inspectorate. For the three Benelux nations, this 
joint language training signaled a willingness to participate in 
other joint activities in implementing the treaty. 12 


In the Netherlands, in early 1990 the Ministry of Defense set 
up a small treaty verification staff called the Arms Control Branch. 
Its mission was to assume responsibility for the nation’s CFE 
Treaty compliance and to coordinate with the Dutch military 
forces on all aspects of treaty implementation. According to Navy 
Commander C.N.M. Wierema, Director of the Arms Control 
Branch, the Netherlands operated under a “cadre” concept in 
implementing the CFE Treaty, meaning that the Arms Control 
Branch would be a small, joint-service staff, with approximately 
16 to 18 military officers. Their principal role was compiling the 
Netherlands’ required treaty data submissions, developing all 
official treaty notifications, coordinating the scheduling and con¬ 
duct of inspections and reductions with the military forces, and 
representing the nation at the Verification Coordinating Commit¬ 
tee meetings held at Headquarters NATO. The Dutch army identi¬ 
fied 80 to 85 officers and NCOs to be trained as CFE Treaty in¬ 
spectors and escorts, and the Dutch air force dedicated 30 to 35 
officers to assist in implementing the treaty. When it came to con¬ 
ducting CFE Treaty inspections in the Eastern nations, the Arms 
Control Branch selected senior army or air force officers, usually 
in the rank of lieutenant colonel, to serve as team chiefs. The 
Dutch required their inspectors to speak and understand Russian. 
According to Commander Wierema, “It takes about a year and a 
half before the inspectors reach the required level in their language 
skills. Russian is very difficult.” 13 

When Poland established its verification agency in 1990, the 
Polish government was in the midst of a general restructuring of 
its armed forces. Colonel Stanislaw Malinowski, Director of the 
Polish Verification Unit, explained that Poland had elected to 
place the new center in the civilian component of the Ministry of 
National Defense, outside the military structure of the armed 
forces. He added, “It cooperates very closely with the military 
component.” 14 After CFE Treaty signature in November 1990, 
the Ministry of National Defense determined that the verification 
center’s initial staffing was not sufficient to carry out Poland’s 
treaty requirements. In its November 1990 data submission, 
Poland stated that it had 124 declared sites and 149 military units, 
or objects of verification (OOVs) with TLE. At the same time, 
Poland’s reduction liability was approximately 1,120 tanks, 690 
artillery pieces, 1,130 armored personnel vehicles, and 91 aircraft. 
Consequently, the Ministry of National Defense organized special 



Colonel Stanislaw Malinowski, 
Director, Polish Verification Unit. 



140 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


arms control sections in each of the Polish army’s 
military districts and at the Polish Armed Forces 
Headquarters. Colonel Malinowski explained, 
“The center’s present activities are, among other 
things, to supervise activities of these divisions in 
the military structure.” 1 '’ For CFE inspection and 
escort team leaders, Poland used professional 
military officers who were experienced and 
knowledgeable about armaments and equipment 
included in the CFE Treaty. Competence in a 
foreign language was an important criterion for 
selection. Colonel Malinowski said that from 
their initial planning, they had anticipated host¬ 
ing many national inspection teams at Polish 
reduction facilities and declared sites. 16 

The largest CFE Treaty state, Russia, had significant advan¬ 
tages in recruiting, selecting, and training its CFE inspection teams 
because of its experience in implementing the INF Treaty. The 
Soviet Union’s inspection agency, the Nuclear Risk Reduction 
Center (NRRC), was located in Moscow. When Russia emerged as 
a successor state, the NRRC retained all the agency’s missions, 
functions, and personnel. Thus, Russia had an existing treaty 
verification organization, experienced leaders, and a corps of 
professional inspectors and escorts steeped in the procedures and 
processes of conducting and escorting on-site inspection teams. 17 
To carry out the provisions of the CFE Treaty, the INF Treaty, and 
the other arms control agreements, the Russian center had ap¬ 
proximately 150 to 200 personnel. 

General-Lieutenant Vladimir I. Medvedev, Director of the 
NRRC, selected General-Major Sergey Fedorovich Tsygankov to 
lead CFE Treaty operations. Six months before state representa¬ 
tives signed the CFE Treaty in Paris, Tsygankov arrived in Mos¬ 
cow to become Deputy Director of the NRRC. He began all of his 
preparations, he said, “with the treaty theory.” 18 He also drew 
upon his years of service with the Soviet Armed Forces Group of 
Western Forces, where he had participated in inspections under the 
Stockholm Document. In selecting CFE team chiefs, deputies, and 
inspectors, General Tsygankov worked closely with General 
Medvedev and Colonel S.N. Slepnev, Director of Operations for 
the CFE Treaty Section. For team leaders they selected career 
military officers with at least 15 years of service. General 
Tsygankov indicated that some of Russia’s CFE team chiefs had 
been “regimental commanders,” others had held important “staff 
positions,” and all “were considered professionals.” The key ele¬ 
ment, he declared, in the selection of team chiefs was their “leader¬ 
ship skills.” He observed, “Almost every officer in the center 
works as an inspection team leader or as an escort team leader. 
When they go on an inspection, they are responsible for supervis- 



General-Major Sergey Fedorovich Tsygankov, Deputy 
Director, Russian NRRC. 






141 


Final Preparations: NATO and WTO Nations 


ing at least nine people. When you are assigned to the escort team, 
you are to some extent the leader of the inspection facility, so you 
are in charge of that facility. The inspection team leader, or the 
escort team leader, is the representative of Russia. This is a very 
important appointment because everything that he says is on be¬ 
half of Russia.” 19 

The Belarus National Agency for Control and Inspection 
(NAKI) was established in June 1992, just weeks before the CFE 
Treaty entered into force. Under the treaty, Belarus had 87 sites 
subject to inspection. Even more important, the nation had a reduc¬ 
tion liability of 1,873 tanks, 1,441 armored personnel vehicles, and 
130 fighters. This was a significant reduction liability, especially 
since Belarus was a newly independent nation, having achieved its 
independence in December 1991 following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. When the national verification agency was set up, the presi¬ 
dent made it directly subordinate to the Deputy Minister of Defense 
for Military Policy of the Republic. General-Major Viktor K. Vakar 
served as the agency’s first Commander. 

Although the Belarussian agency was set up just weeks before 
the CFE Treaty entered into force, the initial cadre of inspectors, 
escorts, and linguists had had experience under the Soviet Union in 
implementing arms control treaties and agreements. Belarus had 
been a Soviet military district with 27 sites subject to inspection 
under the INF Treaty. From 1988 through 1991, U.S. inspection 
teams had conducted more than 100 INF Treaty inspections in 
Belarus. Two major INF Treaty reduction centers, Fesnaya and 
Stankovo, had been located within the Byelorussian Military Dis¬ 
trict. Most of the officers and specialists who operated these re¬ 
duction centers were incorporated into the new Belarus National 
Agency for Control and Inspection. 

The Belarus NAKI had five divisions: planning, operational 
communications and information systems, international relations, 
escorting and inspecting, and support and logistics. Colonel M.Y. 
Melomedov, Deputy Chief of NAKI, explained that the escort and 
inspection division had responsibility for hosting all foreign in¬ 
spection teams that would be monitoring Belarus’s substantial 
reduction liabilities. To reduce its large quantities of allotted tanks, 
artillery, and armored personnel vehicles, Belarus set up three 
reduction centers at Borisov, Stankovo, and Baranovichi. Accord¬ 
ing to Ft. Colonel I.G. Gerus, Group Feader, CFE Treaty Reduc¬ 
tion Division, the first task was to “prepare the reduction sites. 
There, the most complicated issue was to prepare a technology for 
setting up a reduction line.” 20 The reduction of all 1,837 tanks in 
accordance with the provisions of the treaty’s reduction protocols, 
Ft. Colonel Gerus explained, took considerable planning and 
expense by the Belarus NAKI and the armed forces. He observed 
that “We spent a lot of effort just organizing the reduction effort.” 



142 


On-Site Inspection Agency 



Lt. Colonel I.G. Gems, Group Leader, CFE Reduction Division, Belarus, and Lt. Colonel 
Steven A. Barneby, OSIA Team Chief, sign inspection report. 


The initial manning for the Belarussian verification center called 
for an authorized strength of 87, although the actual number of 
officers and specialists at the treaty’s entry into force was less than 
50. The agency’s headquarters was located in Minsk, the nation’s 
capital. Under the CFE Treaty, Minsk was designated as a point of 
entry for arriving and departing inspection teams. 21 

Ukraine was another new nation with significant CFE Treaty 
rights and responsibilities. In defining its foreign policy and mili¬ 
tary department treaty responsibilities, the Ukrainian government 
set up a new, presidential-level national committee. Led by 
Konstantyn Gryschenko, a senior diplomat, this new National 
Committee for Disarmament reported directly to the president. Its 
staff and offices were located in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
where it was responsible for representing Ukraine at the negotiat¬ 
ing sessions of the CFE Treaty’s JCG in Vienna, and in future 
negotiations on other international arms control treaties, such as 
the Open Skies and START treaties. This national committee also 
collected, processed, and prepared Ukraine’s CFE Treaty data and 
reports. 22 

The Verification Center of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was 
located in Kiev, and was organized under the Ministry of Defense. 
According to General-Major N.T. Honcharenko, Director, the 
center had four departments: conventional armed forces, open 
skies, nuclear disarmament, and administration. When the center 
was established in May 1992, it had approximately 50 officers and 
civilians. Subordinate to the verification center were four treaty 
















_Final Preparations: NATO and WTO Nations 


143 


implementation support centers. Located in Kiev (army and air 
force), Odessa, and Lvov, each center was manned with 25 to 45 
military personnel. 23 

Before the Ukrainian government established its Verification 
Center of the Armed Forces in May 1992, General Honcharenko 
said the government hosted several small, high-level delegations 
from other CFE Treaty states. These groups presented an informal 
briefing, explaining their assigned roles and missions, their organi¬ 
zational structure, and their experiences in implementing various 
treaties. In April 1992, a team arrived in Kiev from the Canadian 
Verification Agency. In June 1992, Dr. Edward M. Ifft, Deputy 
Director for External Affairs, OSIA, led a small, six-person Ameri¬ 
can team to Kiev. He was accompanied by Colonel William R. 
Smith, the new Commander of OSIA’s European Operations Com¬ 
mand, two planning officers, and two linguists. They explained 
OSIA’s charter, structure, and treaty experiences. 

The visit to Kiev was part of an extended 21-day trip to seven 
CFE Treaty states of the Commonwealth of Independent States: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Moldova, and 
Ukraine. Colonel Smith’s impression of the preparations of Belarus 
and Ukraine was favorable. “In Minsk and Kiev we met with large 
groups of people who knew a lot about arms control.” He found 
that “they had set up very professional organizations,” and were 
well prepared to carry out their treaty responsibilities. 24 Smith 
learned that the Ukrainians had researched many of the national 
verification centers and agencies. General Honcharenko said they 
had studied reports from treaty verification centers in Great Brit¬ 
ain, Germany, and the United States. 



Dr. Edward M. Ifft, Deputy 
Director for External Affairs, 


OSIA. 



Dr. Ifft’s team on its 14,000-mile mission to seven states in 21 days. 










144 


On-Site Inspection Agency 



Belarussian seal. 


In addition to reviewing the structure and mission of other 
nations’ verification centers, General Honcharenko explained that 
“Our verification center was founded on the base of the imple¬ 
mentation department of the Kiev Military District.” That depart¬ 
ment had been established by the Soviet Union to carry out the 
INF Treaty. Honcharenko indicated that “most of the officers who 
had served in that department ... became the officers of the Ukrai¬ 
nian verification center.” In May and June of 1992, the center 
organized special training for its escort teams. Personnel also went 
to every unit of the Ukrainian military forces and held classes on 
how to prepare OOVs for inspection. Then they conducted a 
full-scale mock inspection with the units, sending an inspection 
and escort team from the verification center. Finally, General 
Honcharenko said that they conducted a few joint mock training 
inspections with teams from the United States and Germany. 25 

From these different national experiences in establishing CFE 
Treaty inspection organizations, certain generalizations emerge. To 
begin with, all NATO, Eastern European, and USSR successor 
states recruited, trained, and used their professional military as 
CFE Treaty inspectors and escorts. In the NATO nations, the 
selection, training, and leadership responsibilities of the inspection 
team leaders were quite similar in all of the inspectorates. The 
selection of inspectors varied, however. The larger verification 
agencies—those in the United States, Germany, France, and Great 
Britain—used a concept of organic, fixed teams, while the smaller 
verification organizations—those in Holland, Belgium, Luxem¬ 
bourg, and Italy—opted for composite teams with permanent 
leaders and linguists as the core team. Inspectors drawn from the 
military forces augmented the teams. 


Among the Warsaw Pact nations, there was a similar concep¬ 
tual distinction. Russia, with its INF Treaty experience, used the 
fixed team model for escort and inspection operations under the 
CFE Treaty. Belarus and Ukraine focused their operations on 
escorting, but here again, they used professional military officers 
dedicated to implementing the treaty. In both nations, the national 
CFE Treaty obligations were substantial in terms of the numbers 
of OOVs and TLE subject to inspection. The likelihood of these 
sites and units being inspected by the NATO nations was con¬ 
siderable; consequently, the greatest burden in both Belarus and 
Ukraine fell to the escorting mission. Further, the poor economic 
conditions in these nations after the collapse of the centralized 
Soviet Union limited their governments’ capability to organize and 
send CFE inspection teams abroad. Hungary, Czechoslovakia, 
and, to a degree, Poland used composite inspection and escort 
teams. 



Final Preparations: NATO and WTO Nations 



Local escorts hosted INF inspections in the Soviet Union; later they brought their experience 
to the newly formed national verification agencies. 

Other generalizations applied. Among CFE inspection team 
leaders, virtually all were colonels or lieutenant colonels. As com¬ 
missioned officers, they had trained and served with their respec¬ 
tive military forces during the Cold War. Within the NATO alli¬ 
ance, these senior and mid-level officers had served in NATO 
military commands or on combined staffs; thus they were familiar 
with the military structure of the national armies and air forces of 
the 16 NATO nations. By 1990, NATO was a mature, experi¬ 
enced, cohesive alliance, and this fact contributed directly to plan¬ 
ning, training, and communicating operational concepts in imple¬ 
menting the CFE Treaty. 

The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) experience was 
considerably different. There the Soviet Union—and by extension 
Russia—commanded the dominant role. Within its officer corps, 
there was a clear sense of professionalism and commitment to 
direction from Moscow. Compared to NATO nations, there was 
far less communication among the former nations of the Warsaw 
Pact. Among the states of the former Soviet Union, Belarus and 
Ukraine had team chiefs who had, with some exceptions, direct 
experience with escorting American inspection teams monitoring 
Soviet missile eliminations under the INF Treaty. Thus they shared 
a distinct set of experiences with Russian inspectors and escorts. 














146 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


One final generalization applied: the directors, 
commandants, and commanders of the national 
CFE Treaty inspection agencies saw their or¬ 
ganizations and inspection/escort teams as 
implementers of the treaty. Their mission was to 
monitor on-site the entitlements and obligations 
of the respective nations; they did not articulate 
policy or advocate future agreements. Theirs was 
a limited role. 

Patterns of Training 

A distinctive pattern of training emerged 
during the 20-month period from CFE Treaty 
signature in November 1990 to entry into force 
in July 1992. This pattern applied in both the 
larger, separate national verification agencies and 
in the smaller, cadre type of inspection organiza¬ 
tions. The key concept was the use of mock 
inspections in which two teams of inspectors, an 
inspection and an escort team, conducted a full- 
scale on-site inspection at an active military 
installation using the CFE Treaty as “the law." 

All the treaty’s provisions and protocols applied, 
from the team’s arrival at a treaty-designated 
POE through the conduct of a detailed, thorough 
inspection, to the inspection and escort team 
leaders’ signatures on the final inspection report. A joint evalua¬ 
tion followed each mock inspection, with the participation of 
the two teams, the military installation commander, and invited 
observers. As Colonel Lawrence Kelley, the Director of Operations 
for OSIA’s European Operations Command, declared, “Mock 
inspections are now and have always been the single most impor¬ 
tant training tool that we have at our disposal.” 26 

In setting up the U.S. CFE inspection operations, Colonel 
Kelley established a three-pronged approach for these training 
inspections. One involved a series of mock inspections conducted 
with inspection teams from the NATO nations. Rigorous and 
thorough, these inspections developed a common understanding of 
the process, the CFE Treaty, and national obligations of the 
inspectorates. Another had American CFE inspection teams con¬ 
duct rigorous mock inspections opposite other American teams on 
U.S. military sites and installations throughout Europe. These 
training inspections educated both the American inspection teams 
and the American military personnel at each of the installations, 
from the security police at the gate to the combat commander at 
the unit that was the object of verification. Participants tested all 



A U.S. site commander conducts a “windshield tour ” 
of the declared site. 








Final Preparations: NATO and WTO Nations 


aspects of the on-site inspection protocols, particularly the line 
between the treaty rights of the inspectors and the treaty obliga¬ 
tions of the inspected state. The final aspect of the American ap¬ 
proach had U.S. inspection teams participating in a series of mock 
inspections with Russia and the Eastern European nations. 
Through mock inspections with Russia, Poland, Hungary, Czecho¬ 
slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, OSIA built early and continuing 
liaisons. The mock inspections initiated these ties, and over the 
course of many discussions among inspectors and escorts, and 
directors and commanders, common approaches to many areas of 
treaty implementation developed. 27 

Among the other NATO nations preparing to implement the 
CFE Treaty, a three-stage training pattern emerged: mock inspec¬ 
tions with the national military forces, mock inspections with 
allied inspection teams and their organizations, and finally, mock 
inspections with the inspection agencies of the former Warsaw 
Pact nations and their military forces. These latter mock inspec¬ 
tions usually were planned and organized on a reciprocal basis, 
with inspections in one nation followed by inspections in the other. 
Because nation-to-nation relationships varied considerably across 
the European continent, there was no set order or sequence to this 
pattern of inspections. In some nations, mock inspections with 
allied nations preceded training inspections with their own mili¬ 
tary forces. In others, mock training events with former Warsaw 
Pact nations were scheduled before similar events with NATO 
allies. 



Group Captain D.A.G. Bremner, Commandant of the United 
Kingdom’s Joint Arms Control Implementation Group (JACIG), 
explained that British inspector training began with an intensive 
four-week course on the CFE Treaty and other current arms con¬ 
trol agreements. Then team training began with the agency’s in¬ 
spectors “simulating a foreign inspection group and a JACIG 
escort team conducting mock inspections at United Kingdom 
sites.” 28 According to Group Captain Bremner, these inspections 
developed team skills and standard operating procedures for both 
the British military installation commanders and the British inspec¬ 
tion group’s escort and inspection teams. Next, the British group 
arranged and conducted bilateral mock training inspections with 
teams from the inspectorates of the NATO nations, and then they 
set up a series of mock training exercises with the nations of the 
Warsaw Pact from mid-1991 to mid-1992. The French experience, 
according to Colonel Francois Rozec, Commandant, L’Unite 
Frangaise de Verification, followed a pattern similar to that of the 
other NATO nations’ inspection agencies. “All of the verification 
agencies,” Colonel Rozec explained, “more or less, worked along 
the same lines. We first started doing mock inspections on a na¬ 
tional level, then bilaterally with the NATO allies. Then, as a third 



148 


On-Site Inspection Agency 



German escorts, representing the host state, took Eastern teams to inspection sites. 


step, we started working on mock inspections with the Eastern 
bloc countries, especially with Russia, Belarus, Hungary, and 
Czechoslovakia.” 29 

Germany developed one of the most extensive training pro¬ 
grams of the NATO nations. To begin with, the unified German 
nation, because of its incorporation of East Germany’s military 
forces and equipment, had more than 900 CFE Treaty OOVs, 
more than any other NATO nation. All of these sites had to be 
surveyed and their personnel trained and prepared for on-site 
inspections under the CFE Treaty. Since most, if not all, of the 
former GDR’s military equipment was either Soviet-made or built 
to Soviet military specifications, it provided a training windfall for 
German CFE Treaty inspection teams. Germany was one of the 
principal NATO nations for implementing the CFE Treaty. Ger¬ 
man inspection teams would be leading and conducting 20 percent 
of the NATO alliance’s inspection quota. Another important op¬ 
erational consideration driving Germany’s training was the fact 
that many of NATO’s military installations and CFE reduction 
sites were located on German territory. When the Eastern group of 
states’ CFE teams conducted inspections on stationed forces’ mili¬ 
tary units and equipment located on German territory, German 
escort officers had to meet them at the point of entry, transport 
them to the declared military installation, and, following the in¬ 
spection, accompany them back to the exit point. Germany had to 
anticipate, over the 40-month reduction phase, dozens of inspec¬ 
tion teams arriving at designated points of entry in the former 













Final Preparations: NATO and WTO Nations 149 


German Democratic Republic, traveling under escort to the reduc¬ 
tion sites, and then, for a period of days, monitoring TLE destruc¬ 
tion. Finally, because of Germany’s strategic position in middle 
Europe, its national political leaders encouraged and supported 
joint training with all the Central European national verification 
agencies during preparations for implementing the CFE Treaty. For 
all these reasons, the German verification agency was extremely 
active during the 20-month treaty preparation phase. 30 

By the time of the CFE Treaty’s entry into force in July 1992, 
the Germans had conducted more than 200 mock inspections and 
escort missions. Brigadier General Doctor Heinz Loquai, Director, 
ZVBW, recalled a particularly important series of mock inspec¬ 
tions: 


“We arranged with the Eastern European countries, the 
former Warsaw Pact countries, a series of test inspections or mock 
inspections in order to establish with them practical cooperation. I 
think one of the most crucial mock inspections was our inspection 
in the Soviet Union. It was agreed on at the ministerial level and 
took place in August 1991. Two guest inspectors participated in 
this inspection, a Dutch and a French inspector. Two weeks later, 
the Soviets came to Germany, conducting an inspection on a Ger¬ 
man site.... These were revolutionary times, with the attempted 
coup d’etat in Moscow, but I was convinced that if the coup had 
succeeded, the new government would have done everything to 
fulfill the obligations of the CFE Treaty.” 31 


The Russian experience in training paralleled in many re¬ 
spects the experiences of the other large state parties to the treaty. 
In explaining Russia’s training concept, General-Major Tsygankov, 
Deputy Director of the Russian NRRC, was characteristically 
forthright: “The most important task was to prepare the training 
for our forces. Objects of verification must be prepared, beginning 
with diagrams of the declared sites. The correct stand on these 
issues must come from the NRRC.” 32 The Russian center handled 
virtually every aspect of treaty preparations, from drawing up site 
diagrams, to designating administrative zones, to defining the 
OOVs. Every Russian military district, according to General 
Tsygankov, had an arms control department, staffed with 10 to 16 
persons. Officers from the Russian NRRC trained these district 
officers on the CFE Treaty. Every Russian army division had two 
or three CFE Treaty specialists assigned to the division’s training 
brigade. The scope of the CFE Treaty and the size of the Russian 
Army meant that training had to be reinforced by regulations and 
regular training visits from NRRC officials. In July 1992, at the 
time of the CFE Treaty’s entry into force, Russia declared 9,342 
tanks, 8,346 artillery pieces, 19,399 armored personnel carriers, 
and 4,624 aircraft. This vast array of treaty equipment was main¬ 
tained at 488 declared sites and 503 OOVs throughout Russia. 33 


“The most important task 
was to prepare the training 
for our forces. ” 

General-Major Tsygankov, 
Deputy Director, Russian NRRC 




150 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


From April to July 1991, General Tsygankov had the CFE 
Treaty section plan and organize mock inspections with several 
military commands and units of the army, air force, and air de¬ 
fense forces. Their objective was to train the inspection teams and 
Soviet forces on the practical aspects of treaty implementation. 
They conducted full-scale CFE inspections at several facilities of 
the army, air force, and air defense forces. “Our approach,” Gen¬ 
eral Tsygankov stated, “was that we call it a training inspection if 
we carried it out with our people on Russian territory, but we call 
it a mock inspection if inspectors from a foreign country partici¬ 
pated.” 34 From August 1991 to April 1992, the Russian NRRC 
conducted mock inspections on a mutual basis with seven treaty 
states—the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Denmark, 
Turkey, Holland, and France. Observers participated in the post¬ 
training inspection debriefing in all these mock inspections. 3 " 

It is important to remember that throughout this lengthy, 20- 
month CFE Treaty training phase, Eastern Europe was in turmoil. 
The Soviet Union was in revolution, and it ceased to exist as a 
nation in late 1991. After its collapse, eight new states became 
signatory parties to the CFE Treaty. Throughout these changes, 
CFE inspection teams from the NATO nations and the Warsaw 
Pact nations, including the successor states of Russia, Ukraine, and 
Belarus, conducted several hundred CFE Treaty mock inspections. 
They refined all aspects of treaty implementation, from communi¬ 
cations, to inspection/escort procedures, to logistics. Slowly and 
deliberately, a consensus emerged over time among the national 
inspectorates on certain “understandings of the treaty,” as did a 
general agreement on what constituted “standards of an inspec¬ 



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Logistics requirements increased 
for OSIA’s European Operations 
Command under the CFE Treaty. 


























151 


Final Preparations: NATO and WTO Nations 


tion.” These by-products of extensive bilateral and multilateral 
mock training inspections would become even more significant 
when the treaty entered into force. Consensus, especially when 
based on actual experience, became a powerful instrument in 
implementing this multinational arms reduction treaty. 

In negotiating the CFE Treaty, diplomats in Vienna had 
reached an understanding of the treaty’s language, protocols, and 
requirements. Now, in preparing to implement the treaty, leaders 
of the national inspectorates were trying to reach a similar mea¬ 
sure of understanding about the practical, operational aspects of 
conducting recurring on-site inspections. Given the turmoil across 
Central and Eastern Europe in 1991 to 1992, the significance of 
these national agency-to-agency, military-to-military mock training 
inspections cannot be underestimated. They occurred, like the CFE 
Treaty itself, on the cusp of major political and economic changes 
across the European continent. 


Readiness for Entry into Force 

When the diplomats met at the CSCE summit in Helsinki 
on July 10, 1992, they signed documents that permitted the CFE 
Treaty to enter into force provisionally. Ten days later, CFE Treaty 
baseline inspections would begin. Were the respective national 
verification agencies ready? Were the military forces prepared? 

Had the site diagrams been drawn properly, were the POEs ready, 
were the nation-to-nation communications systems ready to go? 

By and large, directors of verification agencies were confi¬ 
dent. At the German verification center in Geilenkirchen, General 
Loquai stated unequivocally that they were ready. Only a few 
weeks before, the German center had organized a maximum-level 
mock inspection exercise involving inspection teams from the 
United States, Canada, France, Great Britain, and, of course, Ger¬ 
many. Within one week, these national teams conducted 10 on-site 
inspections, exercising every element of the inspection process: 
notifications, communications, security, logistics, site preparations, 
escort procedures, inspection rights, photography, emergency 
procedures, and report sequencing. “The normal military logic,” 
General Loquai observed, “is that you should perform training 
exercises under conditions more difficult than real life.” 36 After 
completing this training exercise without incident, General Loquai 
knew the German agency was ready. Germany had conducted 
more than 200 mock training inspections prior to entry into force. 

Directors at other agencies also were ready. At the Belgian 
verification agency, Lt. Colonel Fred Janssen, Director of Opera¬ 
tions, expressed his confidence, declaring, “Without any doubt we 
were ready, more than ready, I should say. We were eager to go 
in.” 37 The Belgians had conducted 56 mock inspections prior to 








152 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


entry into force. At the French verification unit in Creil, Colonel 
Rozec acknowledged, “I think we were ready, considering that you 
can never be completely ready for this kind of job.... Some of our 
new inspectors were not on the list of inspectors, but we were as 
ready as we could possibly be.” 38 In Warsaw, Colonel Malinowski 
noted that the period from treaty signature to entry into force was 
“a long time.” He believed that Polish armed forces were well 
prepared and that the verification center was ready: “I wouldn’t 
like to boast, but I think that Poland, the United States, Nether¬ 
lands, Germany, and Britain were very well prepared at that 
time.” 39 In Moscow, General-Major Tsygankov had reached a 
similar conclusion: “The center was ready. The center had a mis¬ 
sion, and we were responsible for carrying it out. We knew that 
when the treaty entered into force, there would be no time for 
further preparations.” 40 In Frankfurt, Colonel Kelley, speaking of 
the U.S. effort, concluded, “I think that although the butterflies 
were there, and although there were certain areas where we were 
not quite satisfied that we had the optimal solution, communica¬ 
tions, liaison officers, transportation, operations center, we did feel 
at entry into force that operationally, we were ready.” 41 

Colonel Kelley’s next comment, provided with the perspective 
of thinking back over all the inspection and escort operations 
conducted during the CFE Treaty baseline phase, was both short 
and insightful: “And, that turned out to be the case.” 42 


Notes 

1. Interview with Lt. Colonel Roland Keitel and Lt. Colonel Bernd Mecke, 
Zentrum fur Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr, by Joseph P. Harahan, 
Historian, OSIA, Geilenkirchen, Germany, January 31, 1994; Lt. Colonel 
Kuhlein, Zentrum fur Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr, Letter with 
attached report, “Information on the Arms Control Process in Germany,” 
April 12, 1994; Zentrum fur Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr, 
Report, no date, circa 1990. See also Joseph P. Harahan, “Germany’s 
Federal Armed Forces Verification Center Conducts Numerous Treaty 
Functions,” On-Site Insights , October 1995, pp. 6-7. 

2. Interview with Colonel Joern Steinberg, CFE Treaty Inspection Team Chief, 
Zentrum fur Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr, by Joseph P. Harahan, 
Historian, OSIA, Geilenkirchen, Germany, January 31, 1994. 

3. Lt. Colonel Kuhlein, “Information on the Arms Control Process in 
Germany”; Interview with Brigadier General Dr. Heinz Loquai, Director, 
Zentrum fur Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr, by Joseph P. Harahan, 
Historian, OSIA, Geilenkirchen, Germany, January 31, 1994; Brigadier 
General Dr. Heinz Loquai, Briefing to Canadian Armed Forces Staff, 
Headquarters NATO, Brussels, Belgium, September 4, 1992. 

4. Interview, Loquai. 

5. Ibid.; Lt. Colonel Kuhlein, “Information on the Arms Control Process in 
Germany.” 



153 


Final Preparations: NATO and WTO Nations 


6. Interview with Colonel Francois Rozec, Commandant, L’Unite Frangaise de 
Verification, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Creil, France, 
February 1, 1994; L’Unite Frangaise de Verification, Report, “The French 
Unit of Verification,” December 1993. 

7. Interview, Rozec. See also Joseph P. Harahan, “French Treaty Inspection 
Agency Has Major Role in Shaping Europe’s Future,” On-Site Insights, 
January 1996, pp. 10-11. 

8. Interview, Rozec. 

9. Squadron Leader Antony Kerr, Joint Arms Control Implementation Group, 
Great Britain, “Special Report on the JACIG,” sent to Joseph P. Harahan, 
Historian, OSIA, March 23, 1994. 

10. Interview with Lt. Colonel Fred Janssen and Lt. Colonel Henri Van der 
Auera, L’Unite Beige de Verification, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, 
OSIA, Brussels, Belgium, January 27, 1994. 

11. Ibid. 

12. Ibid. See also Joseph P. Harahan, “Treaty Verification Agencies of Belgium 
and the Netherlands,” On-Site Insights, March 1996, pp. 8-9. 

13. Interview with Commander C.N.M. Wierema, Director, Arms Control 
Branch, Ministry of Defense, the Netherlands, by Joseph P. Harahan, 
Historian, OSIA, The Hague, Netherlands, January 28, 1994. For the 
Dutch activities under CFE and other treaties, see Harahan, “Treaty 
Verification Agencies of Belgium and the Netherlands,” pp. 8-9. 

14. Interview with Colonel Stanislaw Malinowski, Chief Inspector, Polish 
Verification Center, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Warsaw, 
Poland, February 3, 1994; Report, “CFE Inspection with Belgium,” Polish 
Verification Agency, December 17, 1993. 

15. Interview, Malinowski. 

16. Ibid. 

17. Joseph P. Harahan, On-Site Inspections Under the INF Treaty (Washing¬ 
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 57-60, 67-96, 123— 

133. Interview with General-Lieutenant V.I. Medvedev, Director (Ret.), 
Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, Ministry of Defense, Russia, by Joseph P. 
Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Magna, Utah, August 30, 1994. See also Joseph 
P. Harahan, “Russian Federation’s Nuclear Risk Reduction Center,” On- 
Site Insights, November/December 1995, pp. 12-13. 

18. Interview with General-Major S.F. Tsygankov, Deputy Director, Nuclear 
Risk Reduction Center, Ministry of Defense, Russia, by Joseph P. Harahan, 
Historian, OSIA, Moscow, Russia, February 8, 1994. 

19. Ibid. 

20. Interview with Colonel M.Y. Melomedov, Deputy Chief; Colonel M.M. 
Volochko, Chief, International Treaties Division; Lt. Colonel I.G. Gerus, 
Group Leader, CFE Treaty Reductions; and Major G.E. Brusnikov, 

Linguist; National Agency for Control and Inspections (NAKI), Belarus, by 
Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Minsk, Belarus, February 4, 1994. 

See also Joseph P. Harahan, “The Belarus Republic National Agency for 
Control and Inspection,” On-Site Insights, September 1995, pp. 8-9. 

21. Interview with General-Major Y.I. Nikulin, Director, National Agency for 
Control and Inspections (NAKI), Belarus, by John C. Kuhn, Historian, 
OSIA, August 1, 1995. 



154 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


22. General-Major N.T. Honcharenko, Chief, Armed Forces Verification 
Center of Ukraine, “Chronicles of the CFE Treaty,” response to questions 
from Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, July 27, 1995. See also Joseph P. 
Harahan, “Verification Center of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” On-Site 
Insights , February 1996, pp. 4, 28. 

23. Interview with General-Major N.T. Honcharenko, Chief, Armed Forces 
Verification Center of the Ukraine, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, 
August 1, 1995. 

24. Interview with Colonel William R. Smith, USAF, Commander, European 
Operations Command, OSIA, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, July 
12, 1993. 

25. Interview, Honcharenko. 

26. Interview with Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC, Chief, Operations 
Division, European Operations Command, OSIA, by Joseph P. Harahan, 
Historian, OSIA, Washington, D.C., May 18, 1994. See Mock Inspections 
in Chapter 4 for an in-depth discussion of these important, realistic 
practice inspections. 

27. Interview, Kelley. 

28. Squadron Leader Antony Kerr, “Special Report on the JACIG.” 

29. Interview, Rozec. 

30. Interview, Keitel and Mecke; Lt. Colonel Kuhlein, “Information on the 
Arms Control Process in Germany”; Interview, Loquai. 

31. Interview, Loquai. 

32. Interview, Tsygankov. 

33. Ibid. 

34. Ibid. 

35. Ibid. 

36. Interview, Loquai. 

37. Interview, Janssen and Van der Auera. 

38. Interview, Rozec. 

39. Interview, Malinowski. 

40. General-Major N. Honcharenko, “Chronicles of the CFE Treaty”; 
Interview, Honcharenko. 

41. Interview, Tsygankov. 

42. Interview, Kelley. 



Chapter 6 




American and Russian team chiefs sign the report completing the inspection of Russian forces in Gyandzha, 
Azerbaijan. 

O n July 17, 1992, the CFE Treaty entered into force, albeit 
provisionally. While Armenia, Belarus, and Kazakstan 
had not yet ratified the treaty, by early July their represen¬ 
tatives assured other nations in Vienna that they would soon 
ratify. Consequently, when the European and North American 
leaders arrived at the Helsinki Summit on July 10, 1992, they were 
prepared to sign the CFE 1A Agreement and to approve the CFE 
Treaty’s provisional entry into force. As promised, Armenia depos¬ 
ited its instrument of ratification at The Hague on October 12, 

1992, and Belarus and Kazakstan followed on October 30, 1992. 

Two weeks later, the 29-nation Joint Consultative Group (JCG) 
assembled in Vienna and confirmed that the treaty had officially 
entered into force 10 days after the final instruments of ratification 
had been deposited. Consequently, the provisional entry into force 
status ended on November 9, 1992. Regardless, the formal date 
for the CFE Treaty’s entry into force remained July 17, 1992.' 








156 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


NATO's VCC allotted the 
United States a total of 45 
baseline inspections. 


U.S. Inspection Quotas 
Passive — 8% 

Active — 18% 


The start of the treaty’s baseline phase was not a shotgun 
blast of national inspection teams racing across Europe. Instead, 
NATO nations dispatched their teams according to a coordinated, 
well-planned schedule. This was necessary to prevent inspection 
teams of different NATO nations from trying to inspect the same 
site simultaneously or sending too many teams into one country at 
once. The treaty’s Protocol on Inspection limited the number of 
teams a nation was required to host at any given time within its 
national territory or at any given declared site. In addition, the 
protocol dictated the number of inspections any nation was liable 
to receive during any period of the treaty’s life, and it limited a 
nation to conducting no more than 50 percent of the declared site 
and challenge inspections any nation was liable for during a calen¬ 
dar year. On the other hand, there were no provisions stipulating 
how many inspections any one nation could conduct or how the 
inspections were to be divided among the participating states. 
There was no central monitor. Consequently, planning inspection 
schedules and monitoring activity during any phase of the treaty 
was an option that fell to the two groups of state parties. 

The NATO Verification Coordination Committee (VCC), 
with membership from all 16 allied nations, determined the num¬ 
ber of inspections that each NATO nation would conduct annu¬ 
ally. A starting point for determining each nation’s quota of in¬ 
spections in the East (active quota) was the number of inspections 
it was liable to receive (passive quota). A nation’s passive quota 
compared to the total NATO passive quota produced a percentage 
that could be applied to the Eastern group of states’ total passive 
quota. This calculation produced a potential active quota. 

The U.S. passive quota was 8 percent of the passive quota for 
the NATO states. The VCC, however, agreed to allow the United 
States an active quota of approximately 18 percent of the NATO 
states’ total share. This was the result of heated debate among 
VCC delegates. The U.S. had requested a greater share of the 
Eastern inspection quota because its contributions to NATO were 
not measured only in terms of its OOVs. Moreover, the United 
States had experience in arms control treaty implementation as 
well as the financial and logistical capability to conduct numerous 
inspections. On the other hand, the United States was only one of 
16 nations in the alliance. European nations wanted their share of 
inspections as participants in the security affairs of Europe. Some 
nations did not set up verification agencies, only small sections 
with a handful of treaty experts, because they had few objects of 
verification (OOVs); Iceland had none. These nations were not 
interested in developing inspection teams and spending money to 
conduct inspections. A solution to their needs was relinquishing 
inspections to the United States with the proviso that their inspec¬ 
tors join U.S. teams on those missions. After much haggling and 





157 


CFE Treaty Baseline 


bargaining, the VCC allotted the United States a 
total of 45 baseline inspections out of a total of 
251 to be conducted by NATO allies. 

The Verification and Implementation Coor¬ 
dination Section, which was the VCC’s working 
staff, had the task of taking the inspections allo¬ 
cated by the VCC and guiding the NATO nations 
through a process in which each received a block 
of time (three days) and an Eastern nation to 
inspect. Selection of the specific OOV for inspec¬ 
tion was left to the NATO state. The time blocks 
were critical because the NATO nations had to 
conduct 251 inspections in the Eastern states 
during baseline—only 120 days. This 
“deconfliction” schedule would enable the 
NATO allies to conduct all possible inspections 
during baseline. Every state could benefit from 
information gained and shared in those inspec¬ 
tions. 



European Operations Command’s Operations Center, 
a focal point for CFE inspection communications. 


Assigning states to be inspected was also important because 
of the greater demand among the NATO allies to inspect OOVs 
in Russia than those in any other Eastern state. The coordinated 
effort of all NATO states ensured each of at least some opportu¬ 
nity to inspect OOVs in nations that were important to them. This 
schedule also precluded NATO states from exceeding the inspec¬ 
tion protocol limits of two simultaneous inspections in a country 
and one inspection team on a declared site. 2 The first NATO states 
to conduct inspections were Canada and the United States. The 
Canadians notified the Russians that they would arrive for a de¬ 
clared site inspection on July 17, 1992. On the day the Canadians 
were arriving to conduct the first NATO inspection, the U.S. gov¬ 
ernment notified Russian authorities that on July 18, 1992, an 
American inspection team would arrive at the Russian point of 
entry (POE), Moscow, for a declared site inspection. The differ¬ 
ence in dates of notification reflected a different interpretation of 
implementation; the Canadians viewed the arrival for the inspec¬ 
tion on the 17th as the first step of implementation, whereas the 
United States considered the notification of intent to inspect the 
first step of implementation. 3 


First U.S. Inspection 

The first U.S. CFE inspection team, led by Lt. Colonel Elmer 
G. (Guy) White, USA, arrived in Moscow at 1700 GMT on July 
18, 1992. Before Team White deployed to Russia, a great deal of 
coordination and preparation had been completed. In Washington, 
the Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee had selected 




















158 On-Site Inspection Agency 


U.S. inspection equipment in metal 
cases known as “silver bullets.” 



Buy, Russia, to be the first CFE inspection site and had notified 
Headquarters OSIA of the selection. Headquarters OSIA had then 
forwarded that information to OSIA European Operations. In 
Europe, Team White began its many checks to prepare for the 
mission. Lt. Colonel White prepared a “mission warning order” to 
notify his eight team members of the upcoming mission and the 
schedule of briefings required before departure. Through his warn¬ 
ing order, he also assigned responsibilities for different elements of 
mission preparation to his team members. 4 He later gave the Plans 
Section the information necessary to prepare the “Notification of 
Intent to Inspect” message, which would ultimately arrive in Mos¬ 
cow 36 hours before the American inspection team’s arrival there. 

The Plans Branch of OSIA’s European Operations Command 
compiled the information Lt. Colonel White had provided for the 
intent-to-inspect message and forwarded it to Headquarters OSIA. 
There, Robert G. Green of the Treaty List Management Branch 
verified aircrew and team augmentee data such as names, birth 
dates, and passport numbers. Any discrepancies between the 
Headquarters computer lists and the data transmitted from the 
European Operations Command were resolved at OSIA before the 
Headquarters Operations Center forwarded the message to the 
Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) at the U.S. State Depart¬ 
ment. Changes or discrepancies discovered in treaty inspector or 
flight crew lists would be corrected in a “Remarks” block of the 
notification. This action was critical to ensure that U.S. inspectors 
would be allowed entry without delay to conduct their inspections. 
Next, the NRRC sent the official U.S. government announcement 
of intent to inspect through the Conference on Security and Coop¬ 
eration in Europe (CSCE) network, and the State Department sent 
the same message through diplomatic channels. 5 






159 


CFE Treaty Baseline 


While Headquarters OSIA, the NRRC, and the State Depart¬ 
ment processed the CFE Treaty notification, Team White contin¬ 
ued its preparation for this first CFE on-site inspection. The 
American inspection team gathered information, equipment, and 
documents required for their mission. Current weather reports for 
the inspection area, and news of ongoing activities by NATO ally 
inspection teams, provided information that could improve the 
odds of a successful mission. The team checked that its equipment 
was operational and ready for deployment. Each team had its own 
set of equipment in metal suitcases nicknamed “silver bullets.” In 
addition to their equipment, the team gathered passports, inspec¬ 
tor badges, dog tags, bottled water, and mementos to be ex¬ 
changed with their hosts. Team documents included maps of the 
area, photos of the treaty-limited equipment (TLE) submitted by 
the inspected nation at the exchange of treaty information, CFE 
inspection forms, inspection notification messages, copies of the 
treaty, and checklists to be used at various stages of the inspection 
trip. As the team assembled these items, Lt. Colonel White worked 
with the Inspection Support Staff (ISS) to develop a detailed mis¬ 
sion briefing on the Russian site to be inspected. 

Lt. Colonel White’s briefing paralleled his mission operations 
order. In both, he outlined his basic game plan for the inspection 
mission, covering the type of inspection, the specific site, equip¬ 
ment subject to the treaty as well as any other equipment the team 
could anticipate encountering at the inspection site, and the com¬ 
position of his inspection team. His briefing also addressed the 
site’s terrain, the weather forecast for the mission, and how those 
conditions might affect the inspection. He also made certain that 
the team’s time in country, from arrival at the POE to its return to 
a POE after the inspection, would be under 48 hours. The treaty 



A British inspector drinks bottled 
water during an inspection mission. 




160 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


allowed 48 hours in country to execute a single declared site in¬ 
spection, and for any sequential inspections planned, the treaty 
allowed an additional 36 hours per inspection, up to a maximum 
of 10 days. 

White also set up three subteams and planned the inspection 
to ensure redundant coverage of the entire declared site. At the 
same time, he assigned specific responsibilities to individual team 
members, such as video filming, timekeeping, passport checking, 
and monitoring the team equipment case throughout the inspec¬ 
tion. The American team set up a subteam communications plan 
to use during the inspection, with code words for key events. Lt. 
Colonel White also announced the departure staging area and 
time, where final checks would be made on equipment and 
luggage. 6 

In addition to White’s briefing, the ISS also provided team 
briefings before deployment. These included the latest information 
available about the inspection site, including imagery from na¬ 
tional technical means (NTM), findings from inspections under the 
Vienna Document, and the CFE data exchanged. The ISS briefings 
provided an insight about the significance of the site selected and 
guidance on the kind of information required to satisfy U.S. gov¬ 
ernment concerns. 

In addition to these briefings, the Counterintelligence Section 
reminded inspectors of personal and team security requirements 
during CFE inspection missions. Topics included adherence to the 
two-person rule that prohibited U.S. inspectors from being alone 
outside their rooms or bathrooms during an inspection mission, 
the policy on alcohol consumption during a mission, and guide¬ 
lines on what was appropriate for discussion with an Eastern 
escort, both in personal and business matters. The U.S. govern- 



Team White preparing to depart on 
the first U.S. CFE mission to Buy, 
Russia. 



161 


CFE Treaty Baseline 



U.S. policy allowed U.S. inspectors to engage in toasts at the completion of the inspection. 


ment expected its CFE Treaty inspectors to be open with their 
Eastern bloc escorts, but to remain unimpeachable in their behav¬ 
ior while implementing the treaty. 

Having completed these final briefings, the team was pre¬ 
pared to deploy on their mission to Buy, Russia. Lt. Colonel 
White’s team, including OSIA’s Director, Major General Robert W. 
Parker, gathered on July 18th to perform their final predeparture 
checks for this historic mission. Final checks confirmed that every¬ 
one was on the flight manifest and had passports, inspector 
badges, and dog tags. Certain that both personnel and equipment 
were ready for departure, Lt. Colonel White led the nine-person 
team to the bus for the short ride across the ramp to the waiting 
military aircraft. 

The U.S. Air Force C-141 aircraft departed Rhein-Main 
at 1545 Frankfurt time, flew for three hours, and landed at 
Moscow’s Sheremetyevo I Airport at 2052 Moscow time. As the 
team prepared to depart the aircraft, General Parker and Lt. Colo¬ 
nel White met the senior Russian CFE Treaty escorts. The team 
chiefs agreed to 1700 Greenwich mean time (GMT) as the official 
arrival time, as had been announced in the message of intent to 
inspect. A representative of the U.S. Embassy’s Arms Control 
Implementation Unit (ACIU) met the American inspection team to 
assist them and the aircrew if needed. Meanwhile Captain Jeremy 
Wintersteen, USAF, the deputy team chief, gathered passports for 




162 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


processing. While “in country,” diplomatic privileges and immuni¬ 
ties were extended to inspectors and aircrews as outlined in the 
treaty. Team members unloaded their gear and, as planned for all 
changes of transportation, one member of the team performed a 
final sweep for anything left behind. The team then proceeded 
through a routine Russian customs inspection of personal belong¬ 
ings. Russian CFE escorts also completed a treaty-specified check 
of American inspection equipment. In accordance with the CFE 
Treaty’s inspection protocol, the U.S. notification of intent to 
inspect specified a seven-hour delay between arrival time at the 
POE in Moscow and Lt. Colonel White’s declaration of the first 
inspection site. 

Exactly seven hours after the team’s arrival, Lt. Colonel 
White announced to the Russian escort team that Buy was the site 
for the first U.S. CFE inspection. It was now 0400 Moscow time, 
0200 Frankfurt time. 8 The American team had worn civilian 
clothes on the flight to Moscow, but changed into field military 
uniforms, called BDUs—battle dress uniforms—in preparation for 
the trip to Buy. During INF Treaty inspections, American inspec¬ 
tors wore civilian clothes throughout the missions, but CFE in¬ 
spections were to be conducted in much more rugged conditions, 
so field uniforms were more practical. After declaring the site to be 
inspected, the American team notified the ACIU of its plan to 
depart for Buy and estimated the time of arrival at 0700 GMT on 
July 19th. 

Nearly three hours after the American team chief had de¬ 
clared the site, the Russians escorted Team White to an IL-18 
aircraft, and the two teams left for Tunoshna. After a two-and- 
one-half-hour delay in acquiring ground transportation in 
Tunoshna, the team and escorts continued on, switching vehicles 
once again before arriving at Buy at 0855 GMT. The arrival time 
at Buy was within five minutes of the maximum nine-hour transit 
time the treaty permitted from the POE to the declared site, in this 
case approximately a 250-mile trip. The treaty allowed the in¬ 
spected nation six hours to prepare a site following the inspection 
team’s site declaration. In this mission the six-hour allowance was 
easily satisfied. Despite the long transport time, the American team 
was ready and eager to begin their inspection. 

Shortly after arriving at Buy, the team notified the U.S. Em¬ 
bassy of its arrival. The senior Russian escort then presented the 
site diagram to the Americans. Lt. Colonel White immediately 
declared the 22nd Central Tank Reserve Depot as the object of 
verification for the inspection. The Russian escorts and site repre¬ 
sentatives in turn commenced a 42-minute preinspection briefing. 
During this briefing, they announced the depot’s equipment quan¬ 
tities; they were considerably higher than Russian data had previ¬ 
ously indicated in November 1990. A correction to the 1990 infor- 



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2es. 


mation had been made in February 1991, but even that was 17 
months ago. The Russian military had experienced many changes 
since then, just as the U.S. military had in Europe. The Russian 
February 1991 data were outdated and would be updated soon, 
but that was one reason for the on-site preinspection briefing: to 
update information and explain any differences. 

The Russian briefing provided the U.S. team with specific 
quantities of the various CFE Treaty equipment on-site, an expla¬ 
nation for the dramatic increase of equipment since the CFE data 
had been exchanged, and a listing, to be attached to the inspection 
report, providing information on when the additional equipment 
had arrived and where it had come from. Three categories of 
equipment were present on the declared site: tanks, armored com¬ 
bat vehicles (ACVs), and ACV look-alikes. In 1991, Soviet data 
had indicated that there were no tanks at Buy; but now, in July 
1992, the Russian military briefers informed the American team 
that there were 996 tanks on site. The number of ACVs briefed 
was 301 versus a reported holding of 31. The number of ACV 
look-alikes briefed was 176 more than previously reported. The 
Russians also provided safety and administrative information 
specific to the 22nd Central Tank Reserve Depot. M 

With approximately 31 hours remaining for the American 
team to complete its inspection and return to the POE, Lt. Colonel 
White broke the team into three subteams and began counting the 
equipment on-site. White led one team while his deputy, Captain 
Wintersteen, and Sergeant First Class Curtis E. Ingram, USA, led 
the other teams. Sergeant First Class Ingram, Staff Sergeant Walter 
E. Hare, USA, and weapons specialist Mike Holthus identified and 
documented the equipment at the 22nd Central Tank Reserve 
Depot. General Parker also contributed to the effort to identify 
and count equipment and record serial numbers. Two other spe¬ 
cialists, John L. Detch, Jr., and Kip Melat, handled photography 


_ CFE Treaty Baseline 163 


Russian attachment to the Buy 
inspection report to clarify 
differences between declared data 
and current data. 








164 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


duties, while Sergeant First Class Kenneth D. Periman, USA, a 
linguist, bridged the communications gap. 


The teams inventoried the equipment twice and confirmed 
their figures with the Russian escorts when they completed a facil¬ 
ity or group of equipment. This procedure avoided last-minute 
recounts to clear up discrepancies. It proved to be a timesaver 
because the U.S. inventory figures did not match those in the pre¬ 
inspection briefing. The U.S. team inventoried 254 T-54 tanks and 
417 T-55 tanks, which varied from the briefed figures of 361 and 
308, respectively. Russian escorts and U.S. inspectors agreed on a 
combined total of 671 T-54s and T-55s on-site. Both sides agreed 
that the difference of two in total tanks was an accounting mis¬ 
take, while the difference in totals for the two types of tanks 
stemmed from the difficulty in identifying the many variants of 
these tanks. The ACV and ACV look-alike inventories were nearly 
error-free. The Russians briefed 301 ACVs on-site, 1 more than 



CFE inspectors participated in brief cultural events or 
sight-seeing after completing their missions. 


the teams found, and again the difference was 
attributed to a tabulating error. In all, the Ameri¬ 
can inspection team counted and recorded 1,315 
pieces of treaty equipment. The inspection ended 

22 hours and 37 minutes after it began, with the 
signing and exchanging of inspection reports by 
the two team chiefs on July 20th, at 0720 GMT. 

Team White notified the U.S. Embassy that 
the inspection was complete and that the Russian 
escorts had arranged for transportation to the 
POE within 20 minutes after completion of the 
inspection. Team White departed the site within 

23 hours of its arrival on-site. That night the 
team toured Moscow, enjoying the hospitality 
arranged by its Russian hosts. The next morning, 
July 21st, the host escorts transported Team 
White to Sheremetyevo I Airport, where the team 
rendezvoused with the American C-141 aircrew 
and left Russia at 1115 GMT. Team White had 
completed the first U.S. CFE inspection and left 
Russia within the three-day timeline required by 
the NATO deconfliction schedule. 10 

While the inspection in Russia was over, the 
mission was far from finished. The C-141 flight 
back to Rhein-Main was a working trip as team 
members reviewed notes taken during the inspec¬ 
tion. During the flight, Captain Wintersteen 
completed the CFE mission report for Lt. Colo¬ 
nel White’s review. White would submit the 
report within an hour of the 1430 GMT touch¬ 
down at Rhein-Main. Over the next several days, 





























165 


CFE Treaty Baseline 


while memories were fresh, the team partici¬ 
pated in mission debriefs. They labeled the 
inspection film and turned it in for develop¬ 
ment, checked and repaired equipment as 
needed, replaced expendables, and returned 
issued clothing. Team White would soon pre¬ 
pare for its next CFE inspection mission, sched¬ 
uled for August 4th at Shuya, Russia. 


U.S. CFE Treaty Team Leaders 

Declared Site/Challenge Inspections 
July 17-November 17, 1992 

Lt. Colonel Joseph J. Drach, Jr. U.S. Army 

Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser U.S. Army 

Lt. Colonel Edward G. Gallagher, II U.S. Army 


The declared site inspection at Buy, Russia, 
was significant because it was a historical 
first—the first U.S. inspection under the CFE 
Treaty. However, the inspection’s significance 
was not only historical. The Russian equipment 
declared at Buy in the initial equipment data 
exchange of February 1991 was outdated and 
differed significantly from what satellite recon¬ 
naissance indicated in July 1992. Questions 
raised by NTM could only be answered by a 
team on-site, a team that had the right to enter 
buildings and determine their contents; inspect 
all areas on the site that could hold conven¬ 
tional armaments and equipment subject to the 
treaty (CAEST); and take a detailed, exact 
inventory of the equipment. The openness the Russian escorts and 
local site officers displayed during the inspection and during dis¬ 
cussions explaining the increased equipment on-site were impor¬ 
tant benchmarks for the United States and the CFE Treaty. Team 
White had fulfilled its inspection mission. This first American CFE 
inspection—well-prepared, professional, and thorough—became 
the norm for the 120-day CFE Treaty baseline phase and beyond. 


Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert 
Lt. Colonel Jan S. Karcz 
Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley 
Lt. Colonel Keith A. Oatman 
Major George P. Weller 
Lt. Colonel Elmer G. White 


U.S. Air Lorce 
U.S. Army 
U.S. Marine Corps 
U.S. Army 
U.S. Air Lorce 
U.S. Army 


Reduction Inspections 
July 17-November 17, 1992 

Lt. Colonel Edward G. Gallagher, II U.S. Army 
Lt. Colonel John D. Pesterfield 
Major Timothy C. Shea 
Lt. Colonel David L. Stack 
Major George P. Weller 


U.S. Air Force 
U.S. Army 
U.S. Air Force 
U.S. Air Force 


First U.S. Escort Mission 

U.S. inspectors had completed seven missions (nine inspec¬ 
tions) before they escorted the first Eastern inspection team on a 
declared site inspection of U.S. facilities. On August 10, 1992, the 
Russian government sent notices of intent to inspect to the Ger¬ 
man, Canadian, and U.S. governments. 11 The Russians intended to 
inspect U.S. and Canadian forces stationed in Germany. Germany 
received notice because it was the host nation for the Russian 
inspection mission, and as such would be responsible for the POE 
procedures, transportation, and other support for the Russian 
team while it was in Germany. On August 13th, treaty representa¬ 
tives of the three nations were present when the Russian team 
arrived at Frankfurt. 

When the Aeroflot AN-72 touched down at Frankfurt Inter¬ 
national Airport, the Russian inspection team disembarked and 





166 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


proceeded to the VIP lounge where the POE procedures were 
conducted. The Russian team chief, Colonel Lev Vladimirovich 
Patsiorin, and the German escort team chief, Lt. Colonel Klaus 
Urban, agreed on a 1000 GMT arrival time for the inspection 
report. The U.S. liaison team—Major Dee Dodson Morris, USA, 
and Staff Sergeant Kent O. Elliston, USA—along with a Canadian 
liaison team, participated in the German escort team’s inspection 
of the Russians’ treaty-authorized equipment. The treaty allowed 
each inspected nation to evaluate the inspection team’s equipment 
at the POE or, if necessary, at the inspection site. This one-time 
group inspection of the Russian team’s equipment facilitated the 
inspection process. The Russian inspection equipment was accept¬ 
able as outlined in the Protocol on Inspection. 

The Russian team declared Canadian Forces Base Lahr as its 
first inspection site. Major Morris notified European Command 
(EUCOM) and OSIA of the selection and then proceeded to the 
site. Major Morris did not attend the preinspection briefing be¬ 
cause it was a Canadian military facility, and the Canadians chose 
to protect their national sovereignty. However, she remained in the 
Lahr area as the Russians inspected, in case any U.S. facilities were 
encountered. The Canadians billeted all inspectors for the night at 
Lahr. The next morning the Russian team finished its inspection 
and announced the sequential inspection site before signing the 
inspection report. 



Major Les Garrison, USMC, and a Canadian inspector on a reduction inspection. 








167 


CFE Treaty Baseline 


The sequential inspection was to be at an American site, the 
U.S. Army Airfield at Giebelstadt, Germany. Colonel Patsiorin 
declared the first sequential inspection site at 1150 GMT; 10 min¬ 
utes later, Lt. Colonel Urban, the German escort team chief, noti¬ 
fied Major Morris of the next inspection. Immediately, she notified 
Headquarters EUCOM of the sequential declared site inspection 
and then alerted the operations center at OSIA European Opera¬ 
tions. Within 30 minutes of the Russian team’s declaration, Major 
George P. Weller, USAF, the American escort team chief for this 
mission, received word of the inspection site. Ten minutes later his 
10-member American escort team departed Rhein-Main, arriving 
at Giebelstadt at 1500 GMT. 

While Team Weller drove to Giebelstadt, Headquarters 
EUCOM held a conference call with USAREUR, USAFE, and 
Headquarters OSIA to pass on the status of the inspection and to 
alert Giebelstadt to prepare for the upcoming inspection. Mean¬ 
while, the German team assumed escort responsibilities from the 
Canadians as the Russians left the Canadian facilities at Lahr. 12 
The German escorts delivered the Russian inspectors to 
Giebelstadt Army Air Field at 1915 GMT, seven hours and 15 
minutes after Colonel Patsiorin had announced the site for this 
sequential inspection. Travel time to Giebelstadt was well within 
the nine-hour maximum, but long enough to provide six hours of 
preparation time at the Army Air Field. Team Weller arrived four 
hours ahead of the inspection team. The U.S. team used that time 
for its own site familiarization and to help site personnel prepare 
for the CFE inspection. 

Five minutes after Colonel Patsiorin’s team arrived, site offi¬ 
cials presented him a site diagram. Thirty minutes later, he de¬ 
clared the 2nd Squadron, 3d Aviation Regiment as the OOV for 
inspection. At this time, unit personnel presented the preinspection 
briefing, which ended 50 minutes later, 2040 GMT. One point of 
confusion arose. The data presented in the briefing were dated 
August 14, 1992. The Russian team had deployed before the most 
recent data exchange and consequently held data from the previ¬ 
ous exchange. Colonel Patsiorin accepted the new information, 
and he and his team retired for the evening. 

The next morning, August 15th, at 0715 GMT, the Russian 
inspectors began the inspection. Site officials had briefed them that 
there were 14 AH-64 “Apache” attack helicopters, 11 OH-58 
“Kiowa” multipurpose attack helicopters, and 3 UH-60 
“Blackhawk” helicopters on site. There were differences between 
the reported and briefed numbers, and the reasons for those differ¬ 
ences were explained to Colonel Patsiorin’s satisfaction. At 2100 
GMT Colonel Patsiorin officially announced the sequential site, 
the U.S. Army’s garrison at Schweinfurt, Germany. At 2130 GMT 
Patsiorin completed his inspection report and both he and Weller 
signed the report. 1 ' 



168 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


The Demands of a CFE Mission 



Top to bottom: Long flights in 
military aircraft; harsh 
environments; challenging 
conditions; fatigue from the 
inspection pace, lack of sleep, 
and tracking numerous details. 


1 







■fip ' ■ -zM. 




















169 


CFE Treaty Baseline 



U.S. AH-64 “ Apache ” helicopters ready for inspection. 

When the Russian inspection team left Giebelstadt Army 
Airfield at 2145 GMT, the Germans again assumed escort respon¬ 
sibilities. The Russian and German team chiefs agreed to follow 
the spirit of the treaty, not the letter of the law, and exceed the 
nine-hour travel time limit to the next site, allowing the inspection 
team to take advantage of a comfortable hotel in the vicinity of 
Giebelstadt for the night. The following morning the inspection 
team arrived at Schweinfurt at 0720 GMT. There, the Germans 
relinquished responsibility for the Russian team to the U.S. escorts 
for the inspection of the U.S. Army’s Conn Barracks facilities at 
Schweinfurt, home of the 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division. 

Following the inspection of Conn Barracks, the Russian 
inspection team continued through three more CFE inspections: at 
the Grafenwoehr Training Area, 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Divi¬ 
sion; at Mainz, the Mainz Army Depot; and finally at Baben- 
hausen, the 41st Field Artillery Brigade. The Russians had not 
planned to conduct the Grafenwoehr inspection, but all the tanks 
and most of the ACVs normally in place at Conn Barracks in 
Schweinfurt were not on-site; the American units had deployed to 
the training areas at Grafenwoehr. As a result, the Russian inspec¬ 
tion at Schweinfurt was brief, since there was little equipment 
there. Because the deployed equipment represented over 15 per¬ 
cent of the declared equipment for Conn Barracks, the Russians 
exercised their treaty right to declare a sequential inspection to the 
location where the equipment was in place: the Grafenwoehr 
Training Area. Team Weller, OSIA’s escort team, stayed with the 
Russian inspection team through the first three inspections. Colo¬ 
nel Lawrence G. Kelley, OSIA European Operations Command’s 
Chief of Operations, chose to have Major Keith A. Oatman, USA, 
and his team relieve Team Weller enroute to the Mainz Army 
Depot. Kelley did this to mitigate fatigue and to allow Weller’s 
team time to prepare for an upcoming inspection mission. Colonel 
Kelley also wanted to spread the escort experience among all of 
the teams. 14 Major Morris and Staff Sergeant Elliston remained as 
the liaison team throughout the nine-day inspection trip, assisting 







170 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Colonel Kelley changed escorts at 
the Mainz Army Depot during the 
Russian inspection mission to 
mitigate fatigue and spread escort 
experience among the teams. 



HEADQUARTERS 
MAINZ ARMYJ3EPQI 


PARTNERSCHAFT MIT GE ^ T ^ P0T 

m I nREH - WISPERTAL 


fT 6317 



the American escort teams and USAREUR site officials as neces¬ 
sary. At Grafenwoehr, a very large Army training facility, Major 
Morris also assisted in escorting the Russian team. This concluded 
the first series of Russian CFE inspections at American facilities. 
Colonel Patsiorin’s team departed Frankfurt for Moscow at 0914 
GMT on August 22, 1992. 

The Russian team did not declare ambiguities during the in¬ 
spections of the five U.S. declared sites. There were instances in 
which the briefed and the observed equipment totals differed, but 
U.S. escorts and site representatives fully explained those differences 
to the inspectors, who annotated them in the inspection reports. 15 


First U.S. Liaison Mission 

The first U.S. liaison activity during baseline occurred in 
England on July 20, 1992, just three days after entry into force. 
Captain Ellen Merkle, USAF, and Petty Officer First Class (POl) 
David E. Sparks, USN, were the liaison team that met the British 
escort team chief, RAF Wing Commander Griffiths and his nine- 
person team at the POE, RAF Scampton. The Russian inspection 
team arrived on July 20th at 1730 GMT and declared a challenge 
inspection near Catterick Garrison at Richmond; the team contin¬ 
ued with sequential declared site inspections at Roman Barracks at 
Colchester, Meany Barracks at Colchester, and finally Carver 
Barracks at Wimbish. The Russians were in England for seven 
days during this four-site inspection trip. The inspection team did 
not come upon any U.S. facilities on these British Army installa¬ 
tions, so it was a quiet mission for the American liaison team. 
Captain Merkle and POl Sparks stayed in contact with the British 
escort team from the time the Russian team arrived in country 
through its departure. They then returned to their staging area, the 
East Gate Hotel in Lincoln, to wait for the next mission. 16 






















171 


CFE Treaty Baseline 


“Backdoor” Communications 

Formal communications proved to be a problem during this 
first liaison mission and continued to be a source of concern 
throughout baseline. An informal communications system devel¬ 
oped among the Allies that enabled them to complete their mis¬ 
sions. As an example, Russia notified the United Kingdom that a 
Russian inspection team intended to arrive in the United Kingdom 
on the evening of July 20, 1992, to conduct one challenge and 
three declared site inspections during a CFE mission in England. 
Russia satisfied its treaty notification responsibilities with the 
single message to the United Kingdom because it intended to in¬ 
spect only English sites. Diplomatic channels, however, failed to 
carry out the treaty requirement to notify allies within a group of 
states when a state received a notification of intent to inspect. The 
United States would have been unaware of the impending inspec¬ 
tion had it not been for the informal, “backdoor,” communica¬ 
tions system. 

This system operated as an informal network among the arms 
control verification organizations throughout Europe. It developed 
during the coordination of mock inspections, grew as entry into 
force approached, and matured during baseline when the various 
inspection organizations came to rely on it. For the United States, 
assigning personnel with linguistic skills to OSIA’s European Op¬ 
erations was a key to the development of the communications 
network. Colonel Kelley looked not only for Russian-speaking 
inspectors but also for personnel conversant in the six CFE lan- 



U.S. Master Sergeant William N. Chesney, Jr., participates in a French-led reduction inspection. 







172 On-Site Inspection Agency 


guages when filling assignments. For instance, Captain William C. 
Plumlee, USA, and Major John D. Monahan, USA, were combat 
arms officers and West European FAOs. Their language skills 
proved invaluable as they directed the Command’s Operation 
Center in communicating with the European verification agencies. 
It was these skills that enabled OSIA personnel to establish profes¬ 
sional and personal relationships with their counterparts through¬ 
out Europe. 

The Plans Branch provided ample opportunity for U.S. per¬ 
sonnel to exercise their language capabilities and to communicate 
effectively with U.S. allies. Master Sergeant William N. Chesney, 
Jr., USA, and Technical Sergeant Ronald S. Fox, USAF, of OSIA 
European Operations Command’s Plans Branch, both spoke Ger¬ 
man; Chesney also spoke French and dabbled in several other 
languages. They frequently spoke with the Zentrum fur 
Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr (ZVBW) officials during 
preparations for mock inspections, and whenever possible, they 
spoke German. They coordinated with the ZVBW not only U.S./ 
German mocks but also U.S. mocks with other nations at U.S. 
facilities in Germany. The United States respected German sover¬ 
eignty when inviting other states to visit U.S. facilities, and Ger¬ 
many took every opportunity to exercise its role as host nation for 
these inspections. These planners helped OSIA develop a working 
relationship with the busiest of the NATO verification agencies in 
implementating the CFE Treaty. Whenever possible, OSIA’s Euro¬ 
pean Operations Command communicated with its counterparts 
in their language. As the number of mocks increased and baseline 
drew near, communications among the agencies increased; people 
working in the verification agencies grew increasingly confident in 
each other. 17 

When baseline began it soon became apparent that the formal 
treaty notification system would not be 100 percent reliable. Most 
verification agencies did not transmit the official notifications to 
other states—other agencies within their governments were re¬ 
sponsible for these formal notifications. The verification agencies, 
however, relied on accurate and timely information to properly 
implement the treaty. The “Group of Four”—the French, English, 
German, and American verification agencies—called each other daily 
and faxed situation reports to each other. In the first U.S. liaison 
mission, discussed above, the United States received notification of 
the Russian inspection only because the Joint Arms Control Imple¬ 
mentation Group (JACIG), the United Kingdom’s verification 
agency, faxed a copy of the notification to OSIA’s European Op¬ 
erations Command on August 18th, two days before Russian CFE 
inspectors would arrive in England. This gave the American 
inspectorate sufficient time to notify one of the two OSIA liaison 
teams prepositioned in England and to notify Headquarters 
EUCOM of the impending inspection. 18 



173 


CFE Treaty Baseline 


Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser, U.S. Army 

Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser, U.S. Army, was one of 
the original American CFE team chiefs during the 
baseline and reduction phases of treaty implementa¬ 
tion. He holds a master's degree in Russian area 
studies. An armor officer (tanks) and a foreign area 
officer (Russian), Lt. Colonel Fiser served with the 
1st Cavalry Division in the Gulf War prior to re¬ 
porting to OSIA European Operations in Frankfurt, 
Germany. 

On preparing the team for its inspection mission: 

“The first thing I always do is give my operations 
order. This is pretty much a standard, five para¬ 
graph, U.S. Army operations order: situation, mis¬ 
sion, execution, administration/logistics, and com¬ 
mand, control, communication, coordination. I lay 
out all the deployment information so everybody 
knows where we’re going, when we’re going, what 
we’re going to do when we get there, and how we’re 
going to do it. They know who is on what subteam, 
when we break down into two- or three-person 
subteams, who carries what equipment, and any 
specific instructions covering a myriad of issues, like 
drinking water or specific team equipment. It also 
covers individual tasks like who does the voice 
format reports to the embassy or who’s responsible 
for laying on transportation. 

“Following the operations order, we have a 
period of training on all the inspection equipment. 

The only thing that presented a challenge for any¬ 
body was our photographic equipment, the video 
or 35mm cameras, and the dictaphone. Those are 
really the only pieces of equipment that required 
any training. We’d also have training, usually two 
or three hours, on the signature piece of equipment 
that we expected to see at that particular type of 
unit, so everyone was well versed in what we were 
going to be seeing, whether it be ground or air 
equipment.” 

On use of CFE Treaty's database: “The point of 
departure was always the submitted data: Charts 
one, three, and five data, and their submission 
photos. We’d usually expand on that quite a bit. I’d 
assign my weapons specialist the job of presenting 
classes on the declared TLE and other types of 
vehicles, equipment that we expected to see in the 
unit, be it a motorized rifle regiment or an air regi¬ 
ment. We studied both order of battle and equip¬ 
ment types and we’d expand our study from there.” 


On CFE team chiefs 
and inspectors serving 
as soldier-diplomats: 

“That is a very impor¬ 
tant aspect of being a 
treaty inspector. It was 
something I wasn’t 
really prepared for until 
I arrived here. First, I 
did some mock inspec¬ 
tions, and then had one 
or two real CFE Treaty 
inspections under my belt. I found, especially in the 
Eastern bloc nations, that at meals, and often at the 
report-signing ceremony, you would be expected to 
make some sort of toast. You’re expected to speak, 
to some extent, about the opening of relations 
between our countries, and on how the CFE Treaty 
was bringing us closer together. There were varia¬ 
tions on that theme, but you are almost invariably 
expected to say something along those lines. That 
was a new experience in my career. There is defi¬ 
nitely a diplomatic side to being an inspector.” 

On the differences between being an inspector and 
an escort: “I have to be careful here. The main 
thing that makes being an escort more difficult is 
that you are defensive as opposed to being on the 
offense. You have to react to the inspector. The 
treaty requires that you aid him whenever necessary 
in carrying out his inspection. At the same time, 
obviously, we have U.S. interests that we are trying 
to protect. So there’s a fine line you have to walk. 
There have been times when we have had disagree¬ 
ments concerning the interpretation of certain 
treaty points with representatives from different 
U.S. military headquarters here in Europe. We’ve 
also had confrontations or issues arise with the 
inspectors from various countries at U.S. sites. That 
makes escorting more difficult. Another aspect of 
escorting is the logistics. They are much more 
difficult during the escort mission because you’re 
also dealing with the host nation escorts. You are 
trying to make lodging arrangements, many times 
off post, for 20 to 25 people, sometimes as many as 
28 or 29 people. Going from site to site, there is an 
extreme amount of coordination that has to be 
done. It makes for a very difficult time, and some 
very, very long nights. I’ve had some escort missions 
where if you got a couple of hours sleep a night you 
were doing well.” 



Source: Interview, Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser, USA, with Dr. Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, July 12, 1993. 





174 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


U.S. Baseline Inspection Operations 

The U.S. inspection teams conducted 44 baseline inspections 
at Eastern sites. Because of civil unrest in Georgia, the U.S. govern¬ 
ment canceled one mission out of concern for the safety of its 
inspectors. Teams deployed to nine different countries, inspecting 
Russia most frequently. Of the 44 inspections, only one was a 
challenge inspection, conducted in Belarus; the other 43 U.S. in¬ 
spections were declared site inspections. In total, the United States 
conducted 22 CFE single inspection missions and 11 missions 
during which teams inspected two sites. Unlike their Eastern coun¬ 
terparts, U.S. teams inspected only one or two sites per mission, 
never approaching the 10-day in-country allowance outlined in the 
treaty. 

The U.S. pattern of inspection operations was influenced by 
the NATO deconfliction schedule. The schedule allocated each 
NATO state three-day inspection periods, or “slots,” in which to 
conduct CFE inspections. The three-day slot restricted a team’s 
ability to conduct sequential inspections. The treaty allowed 84 
hours to conduct two declared site inspections, 48 hours for the 
first and 36 hours for each sequential inspection. The NATO slot 
allowed only 72 hours; the team lost 12 hours when squeezing two 
inspections into the same slot. In the later stages of baseline, the 
slots were sometimes consecutive, allowing a team six days in 
country to complete its mission. By contrast, the Russian CFE 
teams adopted a less costly approach by inspecting 10 U.S. sites 
during two inspection missions. The cost of supporting and trans¬ 
porting an inspection team was borne by the inspected state, while 
the inspecting state paid its way to and from the inspected state. 



Inspectors discuss treaty provisions behind an ACV in Azerbaijan. 

















175 


CFE Treaty Baseline 



Escorts could deny access to 
aircraft shelters, but inspectors 
could require that TLE be brought 
out of the shelter. 


Two trips instead of five or six produced a significant savings for 
the inspecting state. 19 

Inspections were extremely intrusive, and U.S. inspectors 
were trained to probe and push as deeply as possible when inspect¬ 
ing. An inspection team had significant rights when conducting an 
inspection; however, the treaty also stipulated limits that protected 
the inspected state. The treaty authorized an inspection team to 
inspect all areas within a declared site except those that belonged 
exclusively to another OOV. In addition, inspectors had the same 
rights at locations separated from the site where CAEST of the 
inspected unit were routinely present, such as a railhead. This 
meant, among other things, that the inspection team had the right 
to access, entry, and unobstructed inspection of any location, 
structure, or area within a structure in which CAEST were perma¬ 
nently or routinely present. 

Escorts, however, could apply treaty restrictions on an inspec¬ 
tion team to limit access to or within a structure in several ways. 
The first and most common way was by citing the two-meter rule. 
An escort could deny an inspector access through any entrance 
that was less than two meters wide because that was the threshold 
through which no CAEST could fit. Having passed through an 
entrance greater than two meters wide, the team could continue its 
inspection within the facility until it reached a point where escorts 
could successfully apply the two-meter rule. A second limitation 
was the right to shroud sensitive equipment and deny inspectors 
access to any shrouded item or container, so long as any one of its 
measurements fell under two meters. Third, escorts could also 
deny inspectors access to hardened aircraft shelters. While an 
escort team could normally prevent an inspection team from enter¬ 
ing a hardened aircraft shelter, inspectors had the right to look in 
to determine if any CAEST were present. Further, if CAEST were 




176 On-Site Inspection Agency 


Conventional 

Armaments and 
Equipment 

Subject to the 

Treaty 

positioned in an aircraft shelter and the inspectors were denied 
entry, they had the right to counterdemand that all treaty-limited 
equipment (TLE) be brought out for display to determine quanti¬ 
ties, types, and models. 

Finally, escorts could deny, limit, or delay access to those 
areas or shrouded equipment that the inspected state’s government 
considered sensitive. Sensitive areas could hold equipment that the 
inspected state considered critical to national security, such as a 
communications center or a special weapons storage facility. But 
not all sensitive areas dealt with national security; prisons, for 
example, were frequently declared sensitive areas. If an escort 
team chief declared an area or object sensitive, he then needed to 
state whether there were any CAEST in the area. If CAEST were 
present, the escort team was required to report the amount, type, 
and model and to take steps to satisfy inspectors that no addi¬ 
tional equipment was present. 

As with access to facilities, the treaty allowed the inspected 
state to impose limits on inspectors’ access to CAEST. The Proto¬ 
col on Inspection limited inspectors’ access to the extent they 
could confirm visually the number, type, and model or version of a 
piece of CAEST. If inspectors encountered recategorized helicop¬ 
ters, reclassified aircraft, armored vehicle look-alikes, or reduced 
equipment, specific inspection protocol procedures allowed inspec¬ 
tion of the interior of these vehicles to confirm the status of the 
equipment. Inspectors could require that the doors of an armored 
vehicle look-alike be opened to confirm that the vehicle could not 
transport a combat infantry squad. Equipment within or on such a 
vehicle could be shrouded, and the inspectors had no right to enter 
the vehicle. 


Declared Site Access 

During baseline, declared site access became the most conten¬ 
tious issue that U.S. inspectors faced during inspections of Eastern 
states. As baseline began, the U.S. understanding of access on 
a declared site had not changed since American Ambassador 

Lynn Hansen and the Soviet verification negotiator, Gennadiy 
Yeftaviyev, ironed out an agreement in November 1990. During a 
declared site inspection, a team could select and inspect only one 
OOV on a declared site—the OOV was the subject of the inspec¬ 
tion. The team, however, could inspect the entire declared site, to 
its outermost natural or manmade borders, to include areas com¬ 
mon to all OOVs located on the site. Inspectors were prohibited 
only from any area on the declared site that supported another 
OOV exclusively. 

The first indication of a different understanding of inspector 
access during a declared site inspection arose during the U.S./ 




177 


CFE Treaty Baseline 



Lt. Colonel Edward G. Gallagher, II (right), leading an inspection at Ovrnch, Ukraine. 


Russian mock inspection at Pushkin, Russia, on February 12, 
1992. During the Russian preinspection briefing at Pushkin, es¬ 
corts presented a site diagram that depicted only the two OOVs at 
Pushkin and a limited portion of the common areas. Lt. Colonel 
Edward Gallagher, the U.S. team chief, pointed out that U.S. sat¬ 
ellite reconnaissance indicated that there were other inspectable 
areas within the outermost boundary of the garrison. The Russian 
escorts responded that the Pushkin site diagram was correct. This 
problem was noted in the mock inspection report; the Russians 
countered that U.S. inspectors had been given access to the entire 
declared site associated with the OOV. 20 


Inspect...to its outermost 
natural or manmade 
borders... 


When the treaty entered into force, it became obvious that 
some states were not using the declared site definition that had 
been negotiated. On August 5, 1992, during an early baseline 
inspection of the 228th High Power Artillery Brigade at Shuya, 
Russia, Lt. Colonel White received a site diagram that illustrated 
the OOV but not all of the common areas on the site. Escort offi¬ 
cials subsequently denied the team access to the common areas not 
included on the diagram. Nine days later, when all states again 
exchanged treaty data, it became apparent that Lt. Colonel 
White’s experience would not be an isolated one. The original 
Soviet site diagrams had displayed multiple OOVs and common 
areas on a single site. The new August 14th diagrams indicated 
one OOV on one declared site that was defined by the boundaries 
of that OOV. 21 The sites were no different physically—the com¬ 
mon areas remained—but some states had changed their concept 
of a declared site. 










178 


On-Site Inspection Agency 



Lt. Colonel Joseph J. Drach, Jr., atop a tank while leading a declared site inspection. 


On August 29, 1992, U.S. inspectors had their first opportu¬ 
nity to confirm, on-site, that the new diagrams reflected changes in 
the concept of a declared site. In addition, inspectors would deter¬ 
mine how these changes affected inspector access during an inspec¬ 
tion. Colonel Joseph J. Drach, Jr., USA, led an inspection of the 
336th Rocket Artillery Brigade in Osipovichi, Belarus. Drach 
received a site diagram from the Belarussian escorts that did not 
include all common areas within the manmade boundaries of the 
site. More important, the escort team denied the inspectors access 
to common areas that were on the installation but excluded from 
the site diagram. While Drach documented this fact as an ambigu¬ 
ity in his inspection report, another U.S. team was preparing to 
deploy to Russia. 22 

Four days later, on September 4, 1992, Lt. Colonel Jan S. 
Karcz, USA, led his team to the 752nd Guards Motorized Rifle 
Regiment at Novyy, Russia, to test the Russian definition of a 
declared site. His mission was to draw a “line in the sand” on the 
issue of the definition of a declared site and inspector access. In 
preparing his team to confront those issues, Karcz worked closely 
with Colonel Schuyler (Sky) Foerster, USAF, who had participated 
in the negotiation process in Vienna and was knowledgeable of the 
negotiators’ intentions on the issue of declared sites and access. 
Karcz and Foerster worked with team linguist Sergeant Danny K. 
Boyd, USAF, and Alan J. French, Russian language professional, to 
prepare treaty-based responses to questions that might arise during 
the inspection. When the team deployed to Moscow, Russia’s only 
POE, they brought along five to six pages of Russian text to con- 





179 


CFE Treaty Baseline 


vey the U.S. position on declared sites and access in language that 
would be unambiguous to an escort team chief. 

On arrival at Novyy, Lt. Colonel Karcz received a site dia¬ 
gram of the OOV that was limited specifically to the area taken up 
by the OOV. It did not include common areas outside the OOV on 
the installation. The Russians defined the site’s boundary using 
roads that were well within the fenced area that was military 
property at Novyy. At that point Lt. Colonel Karcz cited Article 
XV of the treaty that allowed the use of NTM and produced a 
map developed from overhead photography. Karcz pointed out to 
Colonel V. Pavlenko, the Russian escort team chief, what the U.S. 
considered the outermost boundary of the site. After two to three 
hours of discussion, Colonel Pavlenko left the briefing area to 
notify Moscow of the U.S. position. He soon returned and would 
not stray from the Russian definition of a declared site. He reiter¬ 
ated that the Russian site diagram was accurate as drawn and that 
the U.S. team would have access only to the area depicted on the 
diagram. At this point Lt. Colonel Karcz recognized that Colonel 
Pavlenko was at his final position and would not budge. Karcz 
commenced the inspection. 

As the inspection proceeded, Pavlenko adhered to the Russian 
definition of the declared site and did not allow the Americans 
access to all areas that the U.S. team considered common areas. 
This prompted Karcz to declare an ambiguity. Pavlenko protested 
that an ambiguity was not appropriate in this situation because the 
issue did not address TLE nor was it based on objective facts. 
Karcz countered that the declared site definition and access issues 
were indeed based on objective facts: the negotiating history pro¬ 
vided a very specific definition of a declared site and the access to 
be granted to an inspection team at a declared site. The current 
Russian approach did not follow that specific definition and did 
not satisfy CFE Treaty requirements, thus the ambiguity. Karcz 
reminded Pavlenko that, ultimately, inspectors write the reports. 



Lt. Colonel Jan S. Karcz signing an 
inspection report in Ukraine. 










180 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


The inspecting team chief had the right to determine if an ambigu¬ 
ity was to be written, just as the escort team chief determined what 
response, if any, would be made on the report. 2 ’ 

This new interpretation of a declared site spawned several 
other problems that surfaced repeatedly during baseline inspec¬ 
tions. The first problem inspectors faced on-site was the site dia¬ 
gram. The new diagrams illustrated that the declared site was 
defined solely by the OOV—each OOV was a declared site. In 
addition, states depicted OOVs bounded by internal roads, build¬ 
ings, and fences specific to the OOV, not by the outermost bound¬ 
aries of an installation. These site diagrams omitted common areas 
located within an installation that were outside the narrowly de¬ 
fined OOV. Escort teams, armed with these site diagrams, allowed 
teams to inspect only the OOV, which had become synonymous 
with the declared site, thus limiting access to all common areas. 

The new declared site interpretation also affected the requirement 
under CFE 1A to report organizations and personnel figures for 
activities subject to inspection at the inspection site. Escorts did 
not provide figures for units located in what had previously been 
common areas. Another difficulty arose at the POE, before the 
start of the inspection. Inspection teams were, de facto, required to 
announce the OOV to be inspected while at the POE, because 
OOVs were now located on their own individual declared sites. By 
declaring the site for inspection, inspectors were also revealing the 
OOV for inspection. This fact increased preparation time from 
one hour when inspectors selected the OOV at the site to more 
than six to nine hours when inspectors were forced to select the 
OOV at the point of entry. 

The declared site issue arose repeatedly during baseline, caus¬ 
ing U.S. inspectors to declare eight ambiguities. These ambiguities 
occurred when escorts denied inspectors access to all common 
areas. There were also occasions when states produced site dia¬ 
grams that omitted all common areas, but escorts nonetheless 
allowed access to all common areas. 24 The repeated efforts of U.S. 
and allied inspection teams led to discussions at the Joint Consul¬ 
tative Group (JCG) in Vienna to resolve the situation. 

U.S. Ambassador Lynn M. Hansen addressed the declared site 
issue at the opening meeting of the JCG on September 23, 1992. 

He discussed the site definition and access problems that Team 
Karcz had encountered at Novyy and that other American and 
NATO inspectors had encountered elsewhere. Citing the August 
14, 1992, exchange of information, Ambassador Hansen stated 
that the Russian definition of a declared site was now radically 
different than that negotiated in New York in late October 1990. 
The new Russian data indicated that all multiple OOV sites had 
been converted to multiple declared sites within a single installa¬ 
tion. He highlighted one example in which the left side of a dormi¬ 
tory was within the declared site of one OOV while the right side 



181 


CFE Treaty Baseline 


was in a different declared site. Hansen expressed concern as to 
how this Russian approach might affect verification of treaty 
compliance. 

Ambassador Hansen further pointed out that the new Rus¬ 
sian approach in effect forced a CFE inspection team to declare the 
specific OOV at the POE. This gave the inspected party an oppor¬ 
tunity to move equipment across a road and hide it in a different 
OOV during the inspection team’s nine-hour transit from the POE. 
At a declared site with a single OOV there was nowhere to hide 
the equipment because all areas were subject to inspection. At the 
multiple OOV/declared site installations the inspection process 
could become a pea in the shell game. This Russian change, 

Hansen charged, directly threatened the openness that was a key 
component in the treaty. Inspection teams could no longer visit a 
site and be confident that they had seen all of the equipment there. 
Further negotiations in Vienna led the Russians to agree with the 
U.S. position and to provide assurances that they would change 
their site diagrams. 25 After receiving assurances of change, NATO 
allies tested the Russians again. 

On October 3, 1992, 10 days after Ambassador Hansen’s 
speech and on the heels of a German inspection team, Team 
Gessert deployed to the Russian 423rd Guards Motorized Rifle 
Regiment at Naro-Fominsk. During that inspection, the issues of 



American team chief Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert discussing site diagrams and access issues with Russian 
escorts at Naro-Fominsk. 

















182 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


site diagrams and multiple declared sites on an installation sur¬ 
faced again because the changes had not penetrated through from 
the diplomatic to the operational level of the Russian army. Al¬ 
though he received the personal assurances of General-Major 
Sergey Fedorovich Tsygankov that future access would be pro¬ 
vided, Lt. Colonel Gessert declared an ambiguity. While the two 
officers were discussing the issue, a French team that included Lt. 
Colonel Karcz announced from the POE that it would inspect one 
of the declared sites/OOVs at Naro-Fominsk. General Tsygankov 
initially wanted to refuse the French permission to inspect Naro- 
Fominsk because Team Gessert was already in place, and the 
treaty prohibited more than one team on a site. He soon realized 
however, that Naro-Fominsk was a multiple OOV and a multiple 
declared site, and that the French were not requesting the same 
OOV that Gessert was inspecting. He acknowledged the French 
team’s right to conduct its inspection. They did so. These multina¬ 
tional inspections caused new discussions at the JCG in Vienna. 
They produced new assurances from the Russian representatives 
that the site diagrams and multiple OOV problems would be 
corrected. Three days after Team Gessert departed Naro-Fominsk, 
another U.S. team returned. 26 

On October 9th, Colonel Kelley led a team augmented by 
two foreign members—Lieutenant Ole T. Pedersen from Denmark, 
and Georges M. Vitse from France. Their destination was the 12th 
Guards Tank Regiment at Naro-Fominsk. Again, a major goal of 
the mission was to test the assurances given by Russian delegates 
in Vienna that site diagrams would be changed and inspection 
teams granted full access to an installation. The presence of the 
two augmentees signaled to Russia that a community of nations, 
not only the United States, considered the issue of site diagrams 
and multiple OOVs to be very serious. Team Kelley arrived at 
Naro-Fominsk and, like previous teams, received a restrictive site 



Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser (left) 
leading an inspection in Belarus. 





183 


CFE Treaty Baseline 


diagram that did not include the entire installation. The Russians 
still depicted multiple OOVs as individual declared sites; the Rus¬ 
sians claimed that the change would come with the next treaty 
data exchange. Colonel Kelley declared an ambiguity. After com¬ 
pleting this inspection, the team conducted a sequential declared 
site inspection of the 589th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment at 
Totskoye. Again site diagrams were an issue, and again Colonel 
Kelley declared an ambiguity. 27 

These inspections revealed that the Russians had not yet 
changed their position on OOVs and declared sites, or that direc¬ 
tives to implement change had not yet filtered down to operational 
levels of the Russian army. In Vienna, JCG discussions continued, 
and Russian delegates stated that Russia would soon revise the 
declared sites and site diagrams at issue to reflect multiple OOVs 
colocated on single declared sites. The Russians indicated that they 
would develop new site diagrams that would restrict access only to 
those areas specific to another OOV on the same declared site. 
Russian representatives assured JCG delegates that these changes 
would appear in the annual exchange of data on December 15, 
1992. An encouraging sign that Russia was making headway in its 
changes came on November 8, 1992. During an inspection mission 
of Russian forces in Azerbaijan, the Russian site representatives 
presented Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser, USA, site diagrams that 
indicated multiple OOVs located on a single declared site. He 
conducted two inspections on that mission and had no difficulties 
in either location with site diagrams or inspector access. 

On January 14, 1993, after an evaluation of Russia’s Decem¬ 
ber 15, 1992, exchange of treaty information, President George 
Bush presented his annual “Report to Congress on Noncompli¬ 
ance with Arms Control Agreements.” In the report he stated that 
“the Russian Federation, and to a lesser extent, Ukraine and 
Belarus” had developed an overly restrictive definition of a de¬ 
clared site, consequently restricting access. But he noted that 

“In its December 15, 1992, data exchange, the Russian Fed¬ 
eration has, however, taken action to rectify its data depiction of 
what should be single declared sites with multiple OOVs, and 
discussions are continuing in the Joint Consultative Group to 
resolve the rest of the access issue.” 28 

The December 1992, data exchange indicated a change in the 
Russian position on declared sites, OOVs, and inspection team 
access. Confirmation came during subsequent declared site inspec¬ 
tions in the reduction phase of the treaty. The Russians had indeed 
conformed to treaty requirements, but Belarus and Ukraine did 
not follow Russia’s example. 




184 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Challenge Inspections 

During baseline, U.S. inspectors conducted only one challenge 
inspection. On August 11, 1992, Major Keith A. Oatman, USA, 
led his team to Minsk, Belarus. Their mission was to inspect a 
large holding of TLE that had not been declared in the data ex¬ 
change of 1990. One hour after arrival at Minsk, Major Oatman 
specified the area for inspection, an apparent tank storage facility 
at Urechye. Two hours later Belarussian officials granted the in¬ 
spection request, and within an hour Team Oatman was en route 
to Urechye. According to escort officials, these tanks and storage 
facilities were part of the 969th Central Tank Reserve Base that 
Belarus would declare in a matter of days in its August 1992 data 
exchange. Although none was required, Belarus officials gave 
Team Oatman a modified site briefing that highlighted the 969th’s 
relationship to the other two OOVs that were on the declared site 
at Urechye. The issue of declared site inspection versus challenge 
inspection arose, because Urechye was a declared site for both the 
30th Tank Regiment and the 20th Independent Reconnaissance 
Battalion, and the specified area requested for inspection was 
located on the installation. Ultimately, the Belarus escorts afforded 
Team Oatman access to the tank storage facilities to complete its 
mission, but denied the team access to areas that were part of the 
two declared OOVs. 29 



Lt. Colonel Keith Oatman completes an inspection in Azerbaijan. 









185 


CFE Treaty Baseline 


Multinational Teams 

During the baseline period, NATO guest inspectors fre¬ 
quently joined U.S.-led inspection teams, and U.S. inspectors par¬ 
ticipated as members of allied teams. The increase in inspection 
opportunities provided allied governments, through their guest 
inspectors, a broader view of treaty implementation throughout 
Europe. The multinational teams represented a united front on 
treaty implementation issues at the JCG, as had been the case in 
resolving the declared site definition and access issue. Colonel 
Brenno Tesori of Italy was the first allied inspector to join a U.S. 
team on a U.S. CFE mission, Team Gessert’s declared site inspec¬ 
tion mission to Ukraine, on July 30, 1992. 30 During the baseline 
period, OSIA teams conducted 22 inspections with the assistance 
of allied guest inspectors, usually one or two augmentees per mis¬ 
sion. Inspectors from the Netherlands, France, Germany, Den¬ 
mark, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Italy represented their 
countries on U.S. teams. The allied multinational inspection team 
foreshadowed the international mix of team members subsequent 
to baseline. However, while U.S. inspection teams became multina¬ 
tional, escort teams remained strictly American. 

U.S. Baseline Escort Operations 

The OSIA escort teams stood ready to react at nearly a 
moment’s notice. Teams initially maintained a 30-minute, one- 
hour, or three-hour standby. The team on 30-minute standby lived 
on base in the 21st Replacement Battalion dormitory or the Rhein- 
Main Hotel. Their three-day standby rotation matched the time 
blocks of the NATO baseline deconfliction schedule, facilitating 
planning for inspection deployments. The short reaction time for 
escort teams was driven by the possibility that an Eastern team 



OSIA escort team with local 
escorts during a declared site 
inspection. 





186 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


would declare a sequential inspection of a U.S. site in northern 
Germany or in the flank areas: Turkey, Greece, or Norway. Because 
of the travel time to distant locations, an escort team might need all 
of the six-hour site preparation time allowed by the treaty to arrive 
at one of the outlying inspection sites before the inspection team. 
The U.S. escort teams had to arrive on-site ahead of the Eastern 
inspection teams to avoid delaying the inspection process and to 
make certain that the site was prepared to receive inspectors. 

During baseline, OSIA teams met nine Eastern inspection 
teams and escorted them through inspections of 23 U.S. declared 
sites. Russian teams conducted 10 of those inspections during two 
missions. Elungary, Bulgaria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia each 
inspected three U.S. facilities, and Romania inspected one U.S. site. 
All Eastern inspections of U.S. declared sites occurred in Central 
Europe, the focal point of the treaty; none took place in the flanks. 
Specifically, Eastern teams conducted 21 inspections of U.S. forces 
stationed in Germany, 1 in Belgium, and 1 in Luxembourg. ' 1 

Russian inspectors recorded the only ambiguities against U.S. 
forces during baseline. During the second Russian inspection mis¬ 
sion of U.S. sites in September 1992, Lt. Colonel Oleg Borisovich 
Koptelov declared four ambiguities. On September 25, 1992, 
he declared an ambiguity at the General Support Center at 
Kaiserslautern, Germany, about the categorization of three M-728 
combat engineer vehicles. The Russian team chief asserted that the 
vehicles should be considered M-60 tanks because of their short 
muzzle, 165 millimeter gun, and extra plating. The American team 
chief, Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser, USA, countered that the M- 
728s were not M-60 tanks; the M-728s were designed for mine- 
clearing operations. Fiser cited Article III of the treaty, stating that 
they were not capable of “heavy firepower of a high muzzle veloc- 


American ambulances were based 
on the M-l 13 armored personnel 
carrier. 




187 


CFE Treaty Baseline 


ity direct fire gun.” The Russian team chief did 
not agree and exercised his treaty right to declare 
an ambiguity. 

Lt. Colonel Koptelov declared two more 
ambiguities on September 28th, during a sequen¬ 
tial inspection at Rhine Ordnance Barracks. The 
first concerned ambulances based on the M-l 13 
armored personnel carrier (APC). Lt. Colonel 
Koptelov stated that an M-l 13 ambulance 
should be considered TLE because, with the 
exception of quickly removable interior equip¬ 
ment, it was an APC. Major Guy White, who 
replaced Lt. Colonel Fiser at Rhine Ordnance 
Barracks, responded that because the vehicle 
carried the “red cross and was configured for 
litters, it was not an APC.” 

Lt. Colonel Koptelov’s second ambiguity at 
the Rhine Ordnance Barracks dealt with the site 
diagram and access. The Russian inspection team 
chief stated that U.S. military facilities on terri¬ 
tory west of the declared site should have been 
portrayed on the site diagram. He observed that 
only a small road and chainlink fence separated The Ml 13 armored personnel carrier was a mainstay 
the depicted declared site and military facilities to of American forces in Europe. 
the west. Lt. Colonel Koptelov added that two 
roads connected the two locations, making the facilities a single 
declared site, and therefore the western portion should be acces¬ 
sible to an inspection team. Major White replied that the facility to 
the west was not associated with Rhine Ordnance Barracks—it 
was the Weilerbach Ammunition Storage Area, an old INF site—a 
separate facility. Major White pointed to the eight-foot chainlink 
and barbed wire fences that surrounded both facilities, and to the 
German civilian road that bisected the facilities as evidence that 
they were, in fact, separate military installations. The two team 
chiefs discussed previous site diagram and access disputes that U.S. 
inspectors had documented during inspections of Russian sites. 

Major White maintained that the situations were not the same; 
however, Koptelov was not persuaded and declared an ambiguity. 



The Russian inspector’s fourth and final ambiguity arose 
during the last inspection of his mission, on September 30th, at the 
South Park Storage at Moenchengladbach. After Russian inspec¬ 
tors inventoried another 30 M-l 13 based ambulances there, 
Koptelov repeated the Russian assertion that these ambulances 
should be considered APCs, thus TLE, contrary to the U.S. posi¬ 
tion that as ambulances they were not subject to the treaty. ’ 2 















188 


On-Site Inspection Agency 




im 

i 

^ i 

_ I 



1 







E ML 





/ n 





American Liaison Operations 

As discussed previously, the role of a U.S. liaison officer 
(LNO) was to protect U.S. interests by representing the U.S. gov¬ 
ernment whenever Eastern inspection teams conducted inspections 
in a NATO state. To ensure readiness, OSIA’s liaison teams in 
Germany operated on a rotating standby schedule. Two primary 
standby teams could deploy within three hours of notification. 

Two other teams were on a six-hour alert and moved up to the 
three-hour alert when one of the primary teams deployed. The 
remaining two teams were on a one-day standby schedule. The 
forward-deployed teams in Italy, Turkey, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom were prepared to respond at any time. Twice a day the 
forward-deployed teams checked with European Operations to 
monitor the status of treaty activities in their area. They also main¬ 
tained ties with the host nation’s treaty verification agency and 
with the American Embassy. 


An INMARSAT provided reliable To communicate with European Operations and EUCOM 

but bulky communications. when phones were not available, each team deployed with an 

INMARSAT (International Maritime Satellite) communications 
station. The INMARSAT, an 80-pound self-contained satellite 
communications system, was reliable and effective, but very cum¬ 
bersome. Cellular phones offered LNOs far greater flexibility. 
Cellular phones were not available to all LNOs at the onset of the 
CFE baseline, but were provided when they became available. The 
cellular phones were purchased in Germany; there were different 
national phone systems throughout Europe, and the new cellular 
phones did not work on all of the systems. England and Spain 
were two countries where LNOs experienced some difficulties. 
There were also places where the cellular communications systems 
had “dead spots.” The LNOs ultimately relied on their resource¬ 
fulness to keep lines of communication open with the host escort 
team, European Operations, and EUCOM. 



Procedures for American LNOs varied from nation to nation. 
Before the baseline period, a joint State Department and Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) team traveled throughout the NATO states to 
negotiate bilateral agreements that would outline specifically what 
actions the American teams could take to protect U.S. interests 
and rights. These agreements varied widely. The U.S.-German 
agreement mirrored years of close government cooperation and 
the interaction of significant U.S. and German military forces. This 
agreement permitted an American presence at the POE when 
Eastern inspection teams arrived. Frequently German escort teams 
invited the American LNOs to ride with them and the inspection 
team on the same bus. The German escorts kept U.S. LNOs well 
informed of the inspection team’s status and intentions for sequen¬ 
tial inspections. The timeliness of the German notifications al¬ 
lowed American LNOs, through OSIA’s “Big Flog” database, to 












189 


CFE Treaty Baseline 


quickly determine which U.S. forces were known to be in the 
vicinity of the next inspection. Consequently, those forces had a 
better opportunity to prepare for a possible inspection. 

As discussed previously, maintaining up-to-date databases 
was difficult because of the wide variety of activities of U.S. forces 
in Europe. On two occasions, neither OSIA nor EUCOM data¬ 
bases provided the American LNOs information of U.S. forces 
located on sites to be inspected. In Germany, 600 U.S. soldiers 
participating in an annual major NATO exercise, REFORGER, 
surprised a German escort team when they encountered them near 
Hamburg. The American LNO team standing by in the vicinity 
responded to the German discovery and the inspection proceeded 
smoothly. A similar situation arose in Florennes, Belgium. Neither 
EUCOM nor OSIA databases were updated to show the tempo¬ 
rary deployment of two F-15 and four F-16 aircraft to a U.S. 
training program in Belgium. However, the chief liaison officer, 
Major Richard J. O’Shea, USAF, was aware that the training pro¬ 
gram existed and the U.S. liaison team was able to alert the U.S. 
forces and prepare them for the inspection. In both cases the U.S. 
liaison teams, with the cooperation of host escort teams, protected 
American interests. 33 

Other NATO nations took a much more restrictive approach. 
Turkey and Portugal, for example, preferred to exercise their 
national sovereignty and insisted that U.S. LNOs not be present at 





U.S. aircraft, like the F-16, could be found throughout Europe far from American sites. 










190 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


the POE when Eastern teams arrived. In the opinion of these na¬ 
tions, the inspection process did not involve the United States until 
American forces became subject to inspection. In an October 1992 
inspection, the Portuguese escort team chief told the American 
LNO, Major Charles R. Allison, USA, that the U.S. government 
would be notified through the American Embassy if the Russian 
team wanted to inspect U.S. facilities. 34 

Major John M. Bilyeu, USA, had a similar experience when a 
Bulgarian team arrived in Turkey on July 27, 1992. The Turkish 
government had chosen to minimize U.S. visibility during CFE 
inspections. The American LNOs traveled to the vicinity of the 
POE and attempted to contact the escort team chief, but could 
not. The U.S. team received no information from the Turkish 
escort team until after the Bulgarian team had conducted two 
inspections and was preparing to depart the country. Lacking 
information, the American team deployed to the only known U.S. 
facilities that were in the area of the POE and stood by in case the 
Bulgarians opted to inspect that location. 35 

In August 1992, it was clear that Eastern nations were not 
keeping pace with their allotted CFE baseline inspection quotas. 

It also became apparent that the Eastern inspection teams were 
inspecting several sites during each mission, thus minimizing travel 
expenses. For U.S. liaison teams this implied far fewer deploy¬ 
ments to POEs, but it also meant longer missions when they did 
deploy. 

In late August, Lt. Colonel Stephen A. Barneby, USA, Chief 
of the Plans Branch, evaluated the Eastern states’ inspection pat¬ 
tern and recommended cutting the number of forward-deployed 
liaison teams. On September 3, 1992, Colonel William R. Smith, 
USAF, Commander, OSIA European Operations Command, agreed 
and proposed the cuts to Headquarters OSIA. In mid-September, 
the United States reduced its forward-deployed LNO presence to 
single teams in Italy, the United Kingdom, and Turkey. The single 
team in Spain was eliminated. Colonel Kelley decided that Lt. 
Colonel Barneby, a West European foreign area officer (FAO) who 
had come to European Operations Command in July 1992 from a 
three-year tour in Spain, would deploy from Frankfurt to Spain 
when required. Throughout the rest of the baseline period, the 
remaining LNO teams fulfilled the JCS requirement to provide an 
American presence to protect American rights and interests when¬ 
ever an Eastern inspection team entered a NATO state. 36 

U.S. Baseline Reduction Inspections 

Under the CFE Treaty, reduction inspections provided the 
primary means to determine that nations were meeting their obli¬ 
gations to reduce TLE. Western reduction inspection teams were 



191 


CFE Treaty Baseline 


usually multinational, and team leadership varied from mission to 
mission. The NATO VCC designated which nation would lead 
reduction inspection teams for the group of 16 states. Rotating 
team leadership spread the burden of the expense and the diffi¬ 
culty of providing transportation, billeting, and meals associated 
with the inspection effort. Many nations, however, declined the 
opportunity to lead reduction teams during baseline, largely be¬ 
cause of the cost. 

Initially, the Eastern states reduced small sets of equipment 
over a 30-day period, causing Western inspection teams to deploy 
frequently. Colonel Smith suggested that the VCC consider de¬ 
creasing the size of reduction inspection teams to reduce costs. 
While other nations declined leading reduction inspection teams, 
the U.S. government’s policy dictated that at least one U.S. repre¬ 
sentative would participate on any reduction mission and that the 
United States would accept the lead on a mission whenever the 
VCC offered it. Colonel Smith also recommended that nations 
lengthen their reduction periods to the allowable 90 days and 
increase the amount of equipment for reduction, thereby decreas¬ 
ing the number of reduction inspections. During the baseline pe¬ 
riod, U.S. inspectors led 5 of the 23 NATO alliance reduction 
inspection teams and participated in 12 others. 


At least one U.S. 
representative would 
participate on any reduction 
mission, and the United 
States would accept the lead 
whenever offered. 


The VCC maintained the information for 
subsequent use by the closure inspection team 
that would return to Wuensdorf to confirm the 
reduction of the remaining 98 pieces of equip¬ 
ment. The Wuensdorf reduction period high¬ 
lighted the VCC’s critical role in scheduling and 
data collection for reduction missions. The 
United States did not lead the follow-up team, 
but that team prepared for the mission based on 
the information provided by the VCC. During 


Spanish and Danish inspectors on a multinational 
reduction inspection team. 



The first U.S.-led mission was in Germany. 37 Lt. Colonel John 
D. Pesterfield, USAF, led the first U.S. reduction team to the Capi¬ 
tal Repair Plant at Wuensdorf, Germany, on August 6, 1992. Team 
Pesterfield was composed of five Americans, an Italian, a Belgian, 
a Canadian, and an inspector from the United Kingdom. While 
conducting an opening inspection, the team checked and recorded 
the serial numbers of the 100 ACVs to be reduced over the next 30 
days. The team also watched and confirmed the destruction of two 
ACVs—a BMP-1 and a BTR-60. Lt. Colonel 
Pesterfield signed the inspection report on Au¬ 
gust 8th, indicating that his team had confirmed 
the destruction of two ACVs and recorded the 
serial numbers of those yet to be destroyed. Team 
Pesterfield’s data were available to the govern¬ 
ments involved in the inspection and were sub¬ 
mitted to NATO’s VCC. 

















192 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


the baseline period, OSIA inspectors led four other reduction 
inspections, two to Ukraine, one to Poland, and one to Bulgaria. 
All five reduction inspections were successful multinational efforts 
and provided evidence that nations were satisfying the treaty’s 
central objective: reducing military hardware in Central Europe. 3S 


Operational Issues 

American inspection teams encountered various difficulties 
during the CFE baseline. The major problems that arose concerned 
the definition of a declared site and the resulting difficulties with 
inspector access. As the baseline ended, however, Western states 
held a cautious optimism that Russia had resolved these problems. 
Ukraine and Belarus, however, offered no indication of changing 
their restrictive approach to the definition of a declared site. The 
issue of U.S. armored ambulances versus M-l 13 APCs also re¬ 
mained unresolved. Communications provided the most frequent 
operational problems that OSIA teams confronted. 

During the early stages of baseline, OSIA European Opera¬ 
tions occasionally had to modify notification messages because 
aircrew identification was inaccurate or because treaty-required 
data had to be changed. European Operations had no control over 
aircrew identification information, which was the responsibility of 
the aircrews’ wing. In fact, EO could not confirm aircrew data 
until the crews arrived in Frankfurt. Colonel Smith recognized that 
late changes to inspection notification messages were an irritant to 
State Department communications specialists. Yet, he took excep- 



Bulgarian escorts stand on a treaty- 
limited tank converted for static 
display. 


HP5 



tion to their insistence that no changes could be made after the 
initial message submission. On three occasions during July-August 
1992, State Department representatives balked at transmitting late 
message changes. The problem was simple to state, but difficult to 
resolve. On the one hand, Colonel Smith had to provide 
manditory treaty information about the inspections to the treaty 
states. On the other hand, the State Department had to transmit 
accurate, standardized message data to foreign nations through the 
American embassies. When operational pressures created require¬ 
ments for changing the data, network standards resisted any 
changes. Friction resulted. The problem was resolved over time 
by closer coordination on the manditory CFE Treaty data require¬ 
ments and by better advance mission planning. By the end of the 
baseline period, communicating messages over the State Depart¬ 
ment network had improved considerably. 

Another communications problem stemmed from host na¬ 
tions’ providing late announcements that they had received intent- 
to-inspect messages, and sometimes that information came only 
through informal channels. This problem continued throughout 
the baseline period. As late as November 12, 1992, 118 days into 
baseline, Greece notified the United States of a Hungarian inspec¬ 
tion that had started two days earlier. In this case, an American 
LNO was not in place to protect U.S. interests. 39 Late notifications 
frequently put U.S. liaison teams in the position of catching up 
with inspection teams. These notification problems, coupled with 
some nations’ practice of keeping U.S. liaison teams at a distance, 
made it difficult for LNOs to gather information and be certain 
that all U.S. interests were protected during inspections. 

The strict “letter of the law” approach to treaty implementa¬ 
tion taken by OSIA teams periodically strained working relations, 
especially when U.S. methods were compared with the “spirit of 
the law” approach taken by other nations. As directed by the 
National Security Council, OSIA teams implemented the treaty 
without deviation. American army field commanders complained 
to Headquarters USAREUR that OSIA team chiefs were too rigid 
in their interpretation of treaty timeline requirements; that OSIA 
team chiefs would not allow time requirements to be relaxed so 
that inspection could begin in the morning instead of late at night. 
This would prevent calling civilians into work on overtime and 
keeping military personnel on duty for lengthy periods. Field com¬ 
manders pointed out that other nations took a much more casual 
approach to treaty implementation. 

Similarly, Eastern inspectors expressed displeasure that OSIA 
teams arrived late at night or on weekends, causing difficulties 
with their work force. 40 What was not known to Eastern escort 
teams was the VCC scheduling of inspections and the NATO- 
imposed three-day inspection time block. When U.S. teams de- 


CFE Treaty Baseline 193 


...the “letter of the law ” 
compared with the “spirit of 
the law”... 






194 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


“The main goal of the treaty 
had been accomplished by 
signing the treaty, and the 
inspections were merely a 
formality. ” 

—Bulgarian inspector 


ployed, they had little choice but to execute their plan. An Eastern 
escort team might have been willing to allow an American team to 
relax time requirements; however, by agreeing, the American team 
might have prevented another team, U.S. or allied, from conduct¬ 
ing a planned inspection several hours later. The 120-day baseline 
was a relatively short period in which to complete numerous in¬ 
spections, and there were bound to be inconveniences associated 
with any large-scale effort. Illustrative of many states’ outlook was 
a Bulgarian inspector’s comment during an inspection in Belgium: 
“The main goal of the treaty had been accomplished by signing the 
treaty, and the inspections were merely a formality.” 41 

Many inspectors from nations in both groups of states cited 
the “spirit of the treaty” as a guide for implementation. The U.S. 
experience during INF Treaty implementation, however, indicated 
that participants adhering strictly to treaty requirements had little 
doubt concerning their own or their counterparts’ responsibilities 
and rights. OSIA’s Director, Major General Robert W. Parker, 
USAF, expressed that view in a letter to USAREUR’s Major Gen¬ 
eral Joseph T. Davies, USA, on the issue of inspection teams’ late 
arrivals and briefings at U.S. facilities. Parker pointed out that 
host state escort teams, not OSIA liaison or escort teams, delivered 
inspection teams to a site following treaty guidelines. Once at the 
site, the U.S. government had specific treaty obligations to fulfill. 
General Parker stated categorically that he “would not apologize 
for OSIA standards of inspection.” He said that OSIA inspectors 
followed the treaty strictly so that there would be no doubt as to 
what the requirements were and so that those requirements would 
be fulfilled. He asserted that in this way everyone’s rights were 
being protected. 


General Parker “would not 
apologize for OSIA 
standards of inspection.” 


Despite communication and perception problems, OSIA 
inspectors, escorts, and FNOs succeeded in fulfilling their respon¬ 
sibilities and protecting the rights of the United States as outlined 
in the CFE Treaty. Problems that arose during inspections were 
discussed and handled in a professional manner by OSIA team 
members and their counterparts. Even in situations that resulted 
in declarations of ambiguities, inspection and escort teams main¬ 
tained an “operational” atmosphere, leaving resolution of prob¬ 
lems to their governments. 


During baseline, OSIA inspection teams traveled 33 times 
into Eastern nations to conduct 44 inspections. On one other 
occasion a team traveled to Moscow only to reschedule the mis¬ 
sion because of poor weather conditions at the inspection site. The 
U.S. completed 98 percent of the 45 missions available to it. 
Meanwhile, Eastern teams completed only 66 percent of the 34 
inspections available to them at U.S. declared sites. OSIA escort 
teams responded to 9 Eastern inspection missions to 23 inspection 
sites. 





195 


CFE Treaty Baseline 


Notes 

1. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Provisional 
Application of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 
November 19, 1990, July 10, 1992; Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, Document on Entry into Force of the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, November 13, 1992. 

2. Necil Nedimoglu, Head of the NATO Verification and Implementation 
Coordination Section, “NATO’s Role in Verification and Compliance 
Monitoring for the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document,” speech 
presented to the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on 
Verification in All its Aspects, New York, July 19, 1994; OSIA European 
Operations Command, “Briefing Paper on Group of 16 Inspections 
Conducted, as of: 1800, November 13, 1992: Day 120 of Baseline.” 

3. Arms Control Reporter 1992, p. 407.B.477. 

4. Interview with Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser, USA, Team Chief, OSIA, by 
Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, July 
12, 1993; CFE Treaty Lesson Plan, “Planning, Preparation, and Conduct of 
an Inspection,” Training Division, OSIA, June 9, 1993. 

5. Inspection Mission Message Folder, C92-Blue-001-RS-LTC White; OSIA 
Operations Center Guide, “NRRC Message Transmission Procedures,” no 
date. 

6. Interview, Fiser; CFE Treaty Lesson Plan, 1993. 

7. OSIA Policy Memorandum, “Policy on Alcoholic Beverages,” March 20, 
1991; OSIA Policy Memorandum, “Two Person Rule,” April 30, 1993; 
OSIA Memorandum, “Guidance on Public Discussions Concerning 
Inspection Activities,” March 5, 1990. 

8. Inspection Mission Message Folder, C92-Blue-001-RS-LTC White; 
Inspection Report, C92-Blue-001-RS-LTC White, July 20, 1992. 

9. Inspection Report, C92-Blue-001-RS, July 20, 1992. (An explanation of 
the report filing code: C92 = CFE Treaty 1992; Blue = U.S. inspection; 001 
= 1st inspection; RS = Russian OOV. Other Eastern European nations 
included Armenia, AM; Azerbaijan, AZ; Belarus, BL; Bulgaria, BU; 
Czechoslovakia, CZ [later Czech Republic, CZ and Slovak Republic, SQJ; 
Georgia, GE; Hungary, HU; Moldova, MO; Poland, PL; Romania, RO; 
and Ukraine, UP.) 

10. Ibid. 

11. Message, Secretary of State, “CFE: Copy of Notification to Inspect 
Received from Russia,” August 11, 1992. 

12. Report, Major Dee Dodson Morris, USAF, Liaison Officer, “Liaison 
Officer’s After Action Report - Inspection 92-CFE-013-RS-GM.” 

13. Ibid; Inspection Report, 92-CFE-013-RS-GM, Giebelstadt, August 14, 

1992; Report, Major George P. Weller, USAF, Escort Team Chief, “CFE 
Escort Team Summary, 92-CFE-013-RS-GM,” September 4, 1992. 

14. Interview with Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC, Chief, Operations 
Division, European Operations Command, OSIA, by Joseph P. Harahan, 
Historian, OSIA, Washington, D. C., May 18, 1994; Report, Major Dee 
Dodson Morris, USAF, Liaison Officer, “Liaison Officer’s After Action 
Report - Inspection 92-CFE-013-RS-GM.” 






196 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


15. Inspection Reports, 92-CFE-013-RS-GM, Giebelstadt, August 14, 1992; 
Schweinfurt, August 15, 1992; Grafenwoehr, August 16, 1992; Mainz, 
August 20, 1992; Babenhausen, August 21, 1992; Major George P. Weller, 
“CFE Escort Team Summary, 92-CFE-013-RS-GM,” September 4, 1992. 

16. Report, Captain Ellen Merkle, USAF, Liaison Officer, “Liaison Officer’s 
After Action Report - Inspection 92-CFE-001-RS-UK.” 

17. Interview with Master Sergeant William N. Chesney, Planner, European 
Operations Command, OSIA, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, 
Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, July 12, 1993. Interview, Kelley. 

18. Report, Plans Section, European Operations Command, OSIA, “CFE 
Baseline Actvities, Informal Reporting July 17-30 and July 30-August 14, 
1992.” 

19. Report, CFE Branch, Director of Plans, Operations, and Training, OSIA, 
“CFE Quick Look as of November 13, 1992.” 

20. Report, Implementation Requirements Office, OSIA, “After Action Report 
on U.S.-Russian Mock CFE Inspections,” March 9, 1992. 

21. Inspection Report, C92-Blue-005-RS, August 6, 1992. 

22. Inspection Report, C92-Blue-014-BL, August 30, 1992. 

23. Inspection Report, C92-Blue-015-RS, September 5, 1992; Interview with 
Lt. Colonel Jan S. Karcz, USA, Team Chief, OSIA, by Joseph P. Harahan, 
Historian, OSIA, Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, December 13, 1993; 
President George Bush, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control 
Agreements and the President’s Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompli¬ 
ance with Arms Control Agreemerits , prepared by the U.S. Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, January 14, 1993. 

24. Inspection Reports (All reports start with C92-Blue-) 005-RS, August 5, 
1992; 007-RO, August 7 and 8, 1992; 013-RS, August 27, 1992; 014-BL, 
August 30, 1992; 015-RS, September 5, 1992; 019-RO, September 12, 
1992; 021 BL, September 17, 1992; 024-RS, September 26, 1992; 030-RS, 
October 5, 1992; 032-RS, October 11 and 12, 1992; 033-UP, October 13, 
1992; 039-AZ, November 11, 1992. 

25. Ambassador Lynn M. Hansen, U.S. Government CFE Treaty Negotiator, 
Statement to the Joint Consultative Group, September 23, 1992. 

26. Interview with Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert, USAF, Team Chief, OSIA, by 
Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, July 
12, 1993; Inspection Report, C92-Blue-030-RS, October 5, 1992. 

27. Interview, Kelley; Inspection Report, C92-Blue-032-RS, October 11, 1992. 

28. Bush, January 14, 1993. 

29. Inspection Report, C92-Blue-008-BL, August 12, 1992. 

30. Inspection Mission Message Folder, C92-Blue-004-UP-LTC Gessert. 

31. Report, CFE Branch. 

32. Escort Mission Reports Folder, 92-CFE-032-RS-GE; Lt. Colonel Stephen A. 
Barneby, USA, Plans/Liaison Branch, European Operations Command, 
OSIA, “Background Paper on Ambiguities,” January 7, 1993. 

33. Escort Mission Reports Folder, 92-CFE-038-PL-BE. 

34. Interview with Major Richard J. O’Shea, USAF, Liaison Officer, European 
Operations Command, OSIA, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, 
Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, July 12, 1993; Escort Mission Reports 
Folder, 92-CFE-041-RS-PO. 




197 


CFE Treaty Baseline 


35. Escort Mission Reports Folder, 92-CFE-005-BU-TU. 

36. Interview, O’Shea; Colonel Frederick E. Grosick, USAF, Director of Plans, 
Operations, and Training, OSIA, “Memorandum on Augmentation CFE 
Liaison Officer Teams,” September 11, 1992; Colonel William R. Smith, 
USAF, Commander, European Operations Command, OSIA, “Memoran¬ 
dum on Redeployment of Temporary Liaison Teams, November 8-16, 
1992,” November 9, 1992. 

37. Colonel William R. Smith, USAF, Commander, European Operations 
Command, OSIA, “Memorandum on Reduction Difficulties,” March 4, 
1993; Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC, Chief, Operations Division, 
European Operations Command, OSIA, “Memorandum on Reduction 
Inspections for Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty,” November 
25, 1992. 

38. Inspection Report, DS-l-RS-Wuensdorf. 

39. Colonel William R. Smith, USAF, Commander, European Operations 
Command, OSIA, “Memorandum on Late Notification of Inspection,” 
November 13, 1992. 

40. Lt. Colonel Keith Oatman, USA, Inspection/Escort Branch, European 
Operations Command, OSIA, “Background Paper on NATO Inspection 
Window/Site Deconfliction” and “Background Paper on U.S. Approach to 
Inspections,” January 7, 1993; Major Thomas P. Wilhelm, USA, 
Inspection/Escort Branch, European Operations Command, OSIA, 
“Background Paper on Late Site Briefings During Escort Missions.” 

41. Escort Mission Reports Folder, 92-CFE-035-BU-BE. 



























































Chapter 7 

Reduction Years 



Severed Ukrainian fighters on display during a U.S. reduction inspection. 


“Committed to the objectives of establishing a secure and stable 
balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at lower levels than 
heretofore, of eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and 
security and of eliminating, as a matter of high priority, the capabil¬ 
ity for launching surprise attack and for initiating large scale action 
in Europe,... the States Parties have agreed as follows:...” 


T hese objectives are found in the CFE Treaty Preamble. To 
fulfill them, the treaty requires the elimination of specific 
quantities of conventional armaments located in the treaty’s 
area of application within specific timelines. The elimination—or, 
in treaty terms, the reduction—of equipment had to be complete, 
irreversible, and verifiable. The Eastern group of states’ agreement 
to asymmetrical reductions was instrumental in enabling the two 
groups of states to eliminate the disparities in force strength that 
were “prejudicial to stability.” Collectively, the Eastern states, 
previously the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) states, would 
reduce more equipment than the NATO alliance nations because 
they held a significant numerical superiority in conventional arma¬ 
ments in Europe. 









200 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Reduction Liabilities 

When the 22 nations signed the treaty on November 19, 

1990, they exchanged data declaring their national holdings. 

Based on these declarations, the two groups of states possessed the 
following: 

Table 7-1. National Holdings by Alliance 


Equipment 

On hand 1 

Treaty limit 

Reduction liability 2 

Tanks 




NATO 

25,091 

20,000 

5,949 

WTO 

33,191 

20,000 

13,191 

Armored Combat Vehicles 



NATO 

34,453 

30,000 

4,631 

WTO 

42,949 

30,000 

12,949 

Artillery 




NATO 

20,620 

20,000 

2,334 

WTO 

26,953 

20,000 

6,953 

Aircraft 




NATO 

5,939 

6,800 

0 

WTO 

8,372 

6,800 

1,572 

Helicopters 




NATO 

1,736 

2,000 

0 

WTO 

1,701 

2,000 

0 


1 NATO figures include weapons held by the former German Democratic Republic. 

2 NATO states allocated cuts below treaty limits. 

Sources: Arms Control Reporter 1990 , 407.E-0.7; Jane M.O. Sharp, “Conventional Arms 
Control in Europe,” SIPRI Yearbook 1991, pp. 423-426. 

At treaty signature, the reduction liability of the NATO states 
stood at 12,914 pieces of equipment, the majority of which was 
equipment of the former German Democratic Republic. The 
NATO states placed greater reduction liabilities on themselves 
than the treaty required by setting their tank, armored combat 
vehicle (ACV), and artillery ceilings below those outlined in the 
treaty. In contrast, the Eastern group of states possessed 34,665 
pieces of equipment for reduction. Regardless of quantity, the 
treaty required each group to complete its reductions within 40 
months of the treaty’s entry into force. 1 






Reduction Years 201 



Soviets transferred more than 
57,000 pieces ofTLE east of the 
Urals. 


As discussed in a previous chapter, the Eastern states’ figures 
for treaty-limited equipment (TLE) from data exchanged shortly 
after treaty signature surprised the United States and the NATO 
allies. The Soviets had transferred more than 57,000 pieces of 
equipment out of the treaty’s area of application before November 
19, 1990. In addition to moving equipment east of the Urals, the 
Soviets had reassigned portions of its conventional armaments to 
coastal defense forces, naval infantry units, and the Strategic 
Rocket Forces. The Soviets claimed that these forces and their 
conventional equipment were not subject to the treaty. The NATO 
states countered that TLE within the ATTU (Atlantic to the Urals) 
was TLE, regardless of the organization that possessed it. It was 
accountable. The Soviet movement of equipment east of the Urals 
raised concerns that the Soviets could quickly reintroduce those 
weapons into the ATTU. Some nations declared that shifting the 
TLE east of the Urals was a circumvention of the treaty. These 
Soviet actions brought on political and diplomatic debate that 
stalled ratification of the treaty. On June 14, 1991, after months of 
lengthy and heated Joint Consultative Group (JCG) negotiations, 
Soviet representatives submitted pledges addressing both the 
equipment east of the Urals and the reassigned TLE within the 
ATTU. These pledges allowed the ratification process to move 
forward. 

One Soviet pledge provided a legally binding solution to the 
TLE held by the Strategic Rocket Forces, naval infantry, and 
coastal defense forces. The Soviets agreed to limit TLE assigned to 
the naval infantry and coastal defense forces not to exceed a total 
933 tanks, 1,080 pieces of artillery, and 972 ACVs. In addition, 
the Soviets agreed to increase their total treaty reduction liability 










202 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Soviet limits on naval TLE: 
933 tanks 
1,080 artillery 
972 ACVs 


by the same totals. They would accomplish 50 percent of those 
reductions within the ATTU and would reduce the other 50 per¬ 
cent in the east after transferring that amount of equipment out of 
the ATTU. Once the Soviets transferred the equipment, they would 
reduce that same equipment or an equal number of the same type 
of equipment. The Soviets would not incur any reduction liabilities 
associated with the 1,701 armored personnel carriers (APCs) 
assigned to the Strategic Rocket Forces. 

The other pledge, politically binding, dealt with the equip¬ 
ment the Soviets had transferred east of the Urals prior to treaty 
signature. The Soviets pledged to reduce at least 14,500 pieces of 
that equipment. This broke down to 6,000 tanks, 1,500 ACVs, 
and 7,000 pieces of artillery. These reductions were in addition to 
the obligations they had assumed concerning naval infantry and 
coastal defense forces. The combined reduction obligations for 
equipment the Soviets had moved or would move east of the Urals, 
as outlined in the two pledges, totaled 15,993 items, specifically: 
6,467 tanks, 7,540 pieces of artillery, and 1,986 ACVs. 2 There 
was, however, one major difference between reductions on the two 
sides of the Urals. The NATO states could inspect all reductions 
within the ATTU—the Soviets had no right of refusal. East of the 
Urals, however, satellite reconnaissance was the only means the 
NATO states had for monitoring reductions. The Soviets stated in 
their pledge that all reductions in the East would be readily visible 
for satellite observation. 


The collapse of the Soviet Union on Christmas Day 1991 
threw reduction liabilities for the Eastern group of states into a 
muddle. Out of the former Soviet Union arose eight new treaty 
states: Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Georgia, 
Kazakstan, Ukraine, and Russia. The new nations of the former 
Soviet Union had no agreement on equipment ownership, much 
less who would be responsible for reductions. Individual signatory 
states, not the group, were responsible for treaty implementation, 
and the NATO nations could not ratify the treaty without the 
former Soviet states acknowledging their reduction liabilities. As 
the new states focused on forming new governments, resolving 
domestic issues, and dealing with armed hostilities, it appeared 
that they would not soon agree on TLE and reduction allocations. 
However, on May 15, 1992, at Tashkent, Uzbekistan, the new 
republics came to a dramatic agreement on the national distribu¬ 
tion of the former USSR’s military hardware and established ceil¬ 
ings for holdings in the various categories of equipment. This 
agreement led directly to the Oslo Extraordinary Conference in 
June 1992, where all signatory nations had sufficient confidence 
to proceed with ratification based on the understanding that the 
combined reduction obligations of the newly emerged nations 
would equal those of the former Soviet Union. 3 





203 


Reduction Years 


Months later, after the treaty entered into force, it was clear 
that the individual nations had not reached agreement on all of 
their reduction liabilities. The exchange of treaty data on Decem¬ 
ber 15, 1992, indicated that the new nations’ liabilities, when 
totaled, would not equal the original Soviet obligation. The origi¬ 
nal Soviet reduction liabilities, not including the reductions re¬ 
quired under the agreement on coastal defense forces and naval 
infantry, included 7,575 tanks, 9,890 ACVs, 763 artillery, 1,461 
combat aircraft, and no helicopters. The new data showed short¬ 
falls in declared reduction liabilities of 1,789 tanks and 819 ACVs, 
while producing overages of 68 pieces of artillery, 401 combat 
aircraft, and 115 attack helicopters. 

The disparities stemmed partly from confusion over invento¬ 
ries as new governments continued to be embroiled in domestic 
issues, and some even in armed conflict. None of the nations had 
the expertise that the Russian Nuclear Risk Reduction Center 
(NRRC) had developed through implementation of previous arms 
control treaties. The armed hostilities in the Transcaucasus nations 
(Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia) and in Moldova were a major 
reason for the shortfall in reduction liabilities for tanks and ACVs. 
Nongovernment forces controlled some of the hardware in the 
region, ongoing battles had destroyed or heavily damaged other 
pieces, and withdrawing Russian troops had left behind equipment 



The new nations of the Caucasus were reluctant to declare broken-down equipment left 
behind by the Russian army. 







204 


On-Site Inspection Agency 



U.S. inspectors at a Belarussian reduction site. 


suitable only for scrap. Most important, no one 
claimed ownership or responsibility for the 
equipment. In addition, Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
involved in heavy fighting, wanted recognition 
for TLE destroyed in combat, but the treaty did 
not allow for battlefield losses. These new na¬ 
tions reported no reduction liabilities yet they 
reported possessing equipment in excess of the 
ceilings agreed to at Tashkent. 4 During the two 
subsequent years, JCG discussions brought some 
clarification as the shortfall decreased to 539 
tanks and 1,394 ACVs by November 1994. 
Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s failure to declare a 
reduction liability contributed significantly to the 
1994 shortfall. 

Shortly after the third reduction year, Arme¬ 
nia announced its holdings, as did Azerbaijan; 
both still had more ACVs than the Tashkent 
agreement allowed, Armenia by 65 and 
Azerbaijan by 615. Azerbaijan also held 58 more 
pieces of artillery than the 285 agreed upon at 
Tashkent. Belarus faced economic problems that 
forced a postponement of its reductions during 
the third reduction year; it held 548 tanks, 446 
ACVs, and 88 aircraft to be reduced. Although 
Belarus resumed reductions, it did not meet its 
goals before November 17, 1995. 


Despite these problems, the former Soviet 
states reduced enough TLE as a group to be below their ceilings 
for all categories of TLE. These reductions, coupled with the suc¬ 
cess of the Eastern European states during the third reduction year, 
led to the former Warsaw Pact states’ meeting their CFE treaty 
ceilings. As of November 1995, all NATO nations met their reduc¬ 
tion goals and both groups of states were under the treaty ceiling 
for all categories of TLE. 


The U.S. reduction liability at treaty signature and entry into 
force was 1,898 tanks, 375 ACVs, and 109 pieces of artillery. The 
United States quickly decreased its reduction liabilities, because the 
NATO group of states agreed to transfer equipment, along with 
the equivalent reduction liability, among themselves. A treaty- 
authorized transfer, colloquially called “cascading,” allowed the 
United States, Netherlands, Germany, and Italy to transfer TLE to 
other NATO states. The NATO Equipment Transfer Plan allowed 
donor states to bring their TLE holdings down to treaty-declared 
levels to avoid reduction costs and to modernize and standardize 
armaments throughout the alliance. The initial planning for cas¬ 
caded NATO equipment totaled 2,578 tanks, 1,114 ACVs, and 























_Reduction Years 


205 


Table 7-2. NATO Equipment Transfers 


Donor 

Recipient 

Tanks 

ACVs 

Artillery 

U.S. 

Greece 

671 

150 

84 


Norway 

0 

136 

0 


Portugal 

80 

0 

0 


Spain 

311 

100 

24 


Turkey 

932 

250 

72 

U.S. totals 


1,994 

636 

180 

Germany 

Denmark 

110 

0 

0 


Greece 

0 

200 

0 


Turkey 

85 

187 

131 


Norway 

92 

0 

0 


Portugal 

0 

50 

0 

German totals 


287 

437 

131 

Netherlands 

Greece 

169 

0 

171 


Portugal 

0 

104 

0 

Netherlands totals 


169 

104 

171 

Italy 

Turkey 

0 

97 

0 

NATO totals 


2,450 

1,274 

482 


Source: Report, Under Secretary of Defense Tactical Warfare Programs, “Report on 
Transfer of Certain CFE Treaty-Limited Equipment,” August 30, 1994. 


180 pieces of artillery. By the end of 1993 the final distribution 
differed only slightly from the initial plan. 

The U.S. European Command, the United States’ executive 
agent for the CFE Treaty, managed the cascading of U.S. TLE and 
contracted for the destruction of the 632 excess M-47 tanks in 
Buccino, Italy, and 7 M-47 tanks and 4 M-44 howitzers at the U.S. 
Army Depot at Germersheim, Germany. Italian contractors con¬ 
ducted the first U.S. reductions at Buccino on January 28, 1993. 
Buccino was also the site for the final U.S. TLE reductions on 
November 12, 1993. The combined cascading and destruction of 
TLE enabled the United States to reach its declared TLE ceilings 
of 4,006 tanks, 5,372 ACVs, and 2,492 pieces of artillery. The 
United States had no reduction liabilities for combat aircraft and 







206 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


helicopters because it held 334 combat aircraft against a ceiling of 
784 and 341 helicopters against a ceiling of 518. Thus there was 
no U.S. cascading or reduction for either category.' 


Reduction Methods 

Reduction methods varied depending on the type of equip¬ 
ment, and several options were available to reduce any piece of 
equipment. Destruction was the primary means of reducing TLE, 
and technicians could employ several methods to accomplish it. As 
an option to destroying all equipment, the treaty authorized modi¬ 
fying a small portion of TLE for nonoffensive purposes. Tanks 
could be converted into bulldozers, or combat helicopters into 
support helicopters. States could also elect to modify equipment 
for use as trainers, static displays, or training targets. 

The Protocol on Reduction allowed severing as a method of 
destroying all types of TLE, such as the American M-47 tanks. 

The protocol did not dictate a particular technology to sever TLE, 
but it detailed the cuts required for each category of equipment. 
Tanks, for example, required specific cuts for the gun breech ring, 
the gun tube, one gun trunnion and mount, and the hull. The 
















Reduction Years 207 



Team Drach checking the length 
and location of a cut on a gun 
tube. 


guidance on specific cuts included location, length, and number of 
cuts, as well as the extent of material to be removed in a cut. Sev¬ 
ering with torches was the primary method used to reduce TLE. 

While most states chose to sever equipment, Poland chose to 
smash much of its TLE. Smashing was cheap and efficient. Techni¬ 
cians positioned equipment on a pad below an eight-ton wrecking 
ball suspended on a crane and repeatedly dropped the ball on 
tanks, ACVs, and artillery until they achieved the desired results. 
The pad on which the technicians centered the TLE enabled them 
to smash their equipment successfully. According to Colonel 
Stanislaw Malinowski, Director of the Polish Verification Center, 
“It has to be made of a special material that can be enduring. If 
not, it is easily smashed up with three or four droppings of the 
ball. So the composition, the material that is used...is patented by 
Poland.” The surface withstood the pounding as the Poles success¬ 
fully destroyed their TLE . 6 

The treaty provided for two other destruction methods, but 
states did not use them because they were expensive and less effi¬ 
cient. NATO allies conducted tests to develop an inexpensive and 
effective method for explosive demolition of TLE, but the tests 
produced poor results. The treaty also allowed for the deformation 
of tanks, helicopters, and combat aircraft. Superheating the equip¬ 
ment before pressing the weakened metal led to satisfactory re¬ 
sults, but the expense and efficiency precluded that method. 


The Reduction Process 

Reduction of TLE under the CFE Treaty was a multinational 
effort. The process began with each nation working within its 
group of states to determine its reduction liability. Based on its 
reduction liability, a state determined the number of reduction 









208 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Poland’s Reduction Method—A Smashing Success 



Above and left: Magnetic force releases 
steel ball from gantry onto TLE in 
chamber. Below: Crushed relics, the 
results of smashing by the eight-ton 
ball. 





























209 


Reduction Years 


Reduction Process at Buccino, Italy 




Above: Technicians begin the cutting 
process. Above right: Czech team 
inspects severed components. Right: 
Severed tank ready for scrap. 





















210 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


sites required to reduce its TLE. The treaty did not limit the num¬ 
ber of reduction sites a state could designate, but it did restrict the 
number of sites engaged in reductions at any given time to 20. 

This number proved to be far in excess of what any nation actu¬ 
ally organized. Poland required only four sites during the first 
reduction year to begin reducing its sizable liability of nearly 
1,200 tanks, 715 pieces of artillery, 300 ACVs, and 41 aircraft. By 
the end of the first year, Poland had reduced its 41 aircraft and 
closed its aircraft reduction site. Polish planners evaluated their 
progress and elected to close a second site because the two remain¬ 
ing sites would be sufficient for their needs." 

Reducing massive amounts of equipment, such as tanks and 
APCs, within treaty timelines required scheduling. The treaty 
mandated that states complete at least 25 percent of their reduc¬ 
tions during the first reduction year, followed by 35 and 40 per¬ 
cent of the total in the final two years. In addition, the treaty 
required states to reduce equipment in blocks of time of not less 
than 30 and not more than 90 days, known as calendar reporting 
periods. Moreover, the capacity of reduction sites, in terms of 
space and work flow and the movement of equipment to and from 
the sites, dictated that the work be spread out over time. Cost, a 
major consideration for the Eastern states, slowed work flow 
because of the expense of labor and materials. 

Once the reducing state had planned reductions for a specific 
calendar reporting period, it opened the process to the other signa¬ 
tory nations through an official notification. The treaty obligated 
the reducing state to provide at least 15 days’ advance notice of 
reductions. The state announced the reduction site, the quantities 
and types of equipment, the OOVs that were releasing the equip¬ 
ment, the method of reduction, and the dates of the reporting 
period. The notification also indicated the final date and time 


The reduction liabilities for some 
treaty states were significant, 
taxing facilities, manpower, and 
funds. 










Reduction Years 211 


inspection teams could arrive at a specific point of entry (POE) to 
view the equipment before the reduction began. In addition to 
giving notice of the reduction, the reducing state had to display the 
equipment for inspectors. The requirements for display varied: A 
fuselage satisfied the requirement for an aircraft, whereas a proper 
tank display included the hull, turret, and integral main armament. 
In all cases, the displayed TLE had to be available for inspection 
before reduction, and they had to be complete assemblies, a re¬ 
quirement that would become an issue during U.S. inspections. 

The reducing state also established a register to document serial 
numbers and to record the start and completion dates of reduction 
for each piece of equipment. 

Once an Eastern state sent a notification of reduction, the 
VCC sought a NATO state to lead the reduction inspection. The 
VCC polled member states to determine leadership and participa¬ 
tion on the reduction inspection team. Some nations frequently 
declined; however, the U.S. government’s policy to lead reduction 
inspections and participate whenever possible ensured that a 
NATO team would inspect each Eastern reduction. The nation 
leading the inspection team assumed responsibility to announce its 
intent to inspect, to assemble and prepare the team, and to trans¬ 
port the team to and from the POE. 

The inspected state had no right of refusal to a reduction 
inspection, and the treaty allowed inspectors to be present 
throughout the calendar reporting period to view all reductions. In 
practice, however, one team normally conducted an opening in¬ 
spection at the beginning of the calendar reporting period to 
record serial numbers of the equipment slated for reduction. The 
team then departed, and later another team conducted a closing 
inspection to confirm the proper reduction of TLE and to match 
serial numbers against those previously recorded. Lt. Colonel 
Thomas C. Fiser, USA, recalled that during his first reduction 
inspection, an opening inspection at Tapioszesco, Hungary, he 
required only 20 minutes to record the serial numbers of the 14 
D1 152-millimeter howitzers to be reduced. His team needed just 
over 12 hours to conduct the inspection, confirm that the site 
reduction register was correct, and sign the inspection report with 
the escort team chief. Less than one day on-site was the norm for 
U.S. reduction inspections, but there were exceptions.* 

Lt. Colonel Edward G. Gallagher, II, USA, Chief of the In¬ 
spection and Escort Branch at OSIA’s European Operations Com¬ 
mand, led a three-day reduction inspection of Dabrowa Gornicza, 
Poland. Team Gallagher arrived at the site on October 26, 1992, 
and remained there until October 29—from opening to closing of 
the reduction. Lt. Colonel Gallagher declared the first U.S. ambi¬ 
guity of a reduction inspection because “the 43 T-55 main battle 
tanks were not presented as complete assemblies.” Gallagher’s 



212 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Reduction notifications included 
quantities and type of equipment. 


REDUCTION RECORD 


L 

1 

N 

E 

NO 

ARMAMENTS 

EQUIPMENT 

BEING 

REDUCED 

IDENTIFICATION 

OR 

SERIAL NO 

ORIGIN 

REDUCTION PROCEDURE 

REMARKS 

CON¬ 

FIRMED 

METHOD 

OF 

REDUC¬ 

TION 

REF¬ 

ERENCE 

TO 

PROTOCOL 


(a) 

(b) 

(0 

(d) 

<e> 

(0 

(s) 

(h) 

9 

D-l 


0149 

NO 

SEV 

V. PARA 2 



BREECH 

■3 0 







GUN TUBE 

V VO 







TRAILS 

V 














10 

D-l 

3oS0 

0149 

AJO 

SEV 

V, PARA 2 



BREECH 

3050 







GUN TUBE 

V?/ 







TRAILS 

to 














11 

D-l 

315 <L 

0149 

W Q 

SEV 

V, PARA 2 

# KacArcD r»i -jfrtK. 


BREECH 

3i 5 







GUN TUBE 








TRAILS 

u 














11 

n. i 

-*» -*'—. 

m ao 

.\ 

CPV 

v PABn 

__ _ _ _ _ „ . 




Polish technicians presented 
disassembled, stacked TLE for 
opening a reduction inspection. 


comments reflected the U.S. position that “complete assembly” 
meant an assembled piece of TLE. Inspectors could not determine 
whether the disassembled parts on the site came from TLE or from 
a collection of spare parts. The Poles responded that disassembling 
some tank components and stacking them allowed for more effi¬ 
cient transportation. They added that separating components 
improved the results of the smashing destruction method. Despite 
the ambiguity, Gallagher’s team recorded component serial num¬ 
bers and observed the smashing of tanks for three days, confirm¬ 
ing that the Poles had reduced all 43 tanks. Later in the reduction 
year, Poland changed its presentation practice and presented as¬ 
sembled TLE. 

On two other reduction inspections Lt. Colonel Gallagher 
encountered circumstances that warranted notation on inspection 
reports—one was only a comment, the other an ambiguity. On 
March 17, 1993, Gallagher led an opening reduction inspection 
team at Szabadszallas, Hungary. During the inspection, the team 
recorded the serial numbers of 53 items of TLE scheduled for 
destruction by severing. The 18 T-34 tanks presented for reduction 
did not have breech blocks. The escort team, however, provided 










































Reduction Years 


documentation indicating that technicians had destroyed 86 
breech blocks at the Csepel Iron Works on July 19, 1989, prior to 
treaty signature. Gallagher accepted the explanation and ended the 
American inspection after recording a comment describing the 
situation in the inspection report. 

Lt. Colonel Gallagher recorded an ambiguity during an open¬ 
ing inspection at the Military Repair Works in Trencin, in the 
Slovak Republic, on November 24, 1993. In this case, technicians 
presented 38 OT-62 APCs for reduction by severing, but 10 did 
not have machine gun turrets. Gallagher cited the treaty’s provi¬ 
sions for presenting a complete assembly. The Slovak escort team 
chief responded that the OT-62 was also produced in an “A” 
model and that only the A model had a turret. Gallagher coun¬ 
tered that the exchanged data photos for the OT-62 showed a 
turret. The inspection concluded after Team Gallagher confirmed 
the destruction of three APCs to include two of the APCs that did 
not have turrets, leaving the rest for a future closing inspection. 
The JCG later approved a new piece of TLE, “OT-62, without 
turret.” 9 

Major Marc C. Lieber, USMC, also encountered problems at 
Trencin, a reduction site used jointly by the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, involving turrets on APCs during his team’s opening 
inspection on September 1, 1993. In recording serial numbers for 
50 OT-64 APCs, Major Lieber noted that six of the units were 
actually OT-64A models that had no turrets. The data exchange 
photos indicated that they should have turrets. Czech escorts 
responded that technicians had removed the turrets prior to treaty 
signature as part of a modification program for BMP-1 armored 
infantry fighting vehicles. 10 

Lt. Colonel Lred E. Busing, USAL, declared the last of four 
ambiguities. During his opening reduction inspection on March 
30, 1994, at Novy Jicin, in the Czech Republic, he cited the re¬ 
quirement for complete assembly when presenting TLE for de¬ 
struction. Czech technicians had already disassembled 15 T-55 
tanks and had begun disassembly on 14 other tanks. The required 
components were present and colocated, but not assembled. The 
Czechs, like the Poles, responded that all components were avail¬ 
able in one place and that complete assemblies were on hand but 
not assembled. 11 All in all, during the 110 reduction missions, U.S. 
team chiefs declared only four ambiguities, all of which dealt with 
the standards of presentation. 


Eastern Inspections 

One U.S. mission highlighted a problem that other NATO 
reduction inspection teams had encountered earlier. Major Henry 
T. Storey, USA, led a multinational reduction inspection team to 


213 



214 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Trencin, in the Slovak Republic. He intended to conduct a closing 
inspection of 50 OT-64s. However, upon arrival, he learned that a 
Hungarian team had already inspected and confirmed the reduc¬ 
tion of 44 of the APCs nine days earlier, on September 28, 1993. 
The NATO team had no definite proof that the Slovaks had re¬ 
duced the equipment. This situation had cropped up several times 
earlier in the reduction period. NATO state inspection teams were 
unable to confirm the reduction of TLE because Eastern teams had 
already inspected and confirmed the reductions. The inspected 
nations had scrapped the destroyed TLE. 

This presented a problem because the treaty does not prohibit 
intra-group reduction inspections, nor does it place quotas or 
limits on reduction inspections. Some of the Eastern states in the 
post-Cold War era were just as interested in the military capabili¬ 
ties and holdings of neighboring states as they were of most of the 
NATO states. These inspections, however, ran counter to what the 
NATO states viewed as a basic tenet of the treaty, that each group 
of states would complete its reduction obligations within 40 
months and that members of the opposite group of states could 
confirm all reductions. The NATO states, however, could not 
verify all reductions when Eastern states conducted reduction 
inspections within their group of states. 

NATO allies were concerned about lost inspection opportuni¬ 
ties because Eastern nations were conducting reduction and de¬ 
clared site inspections within their group of states. In an attempt 
to curtail these East-on-East inspections, the VCC sponsored a 
meeting of all CFE states in January 1993 to discuss the intra¬ 
group inspections and to propose a plan for Cooperation Partners. 
Under this plan, the VCC would continue to schedule CFE inspec¬ 
tions for the NATO states but, based on requests from Coopera¬ 
tion Partners for specific inspections, the VCC would also coordi- 


Lt. Colonel Fred E. Busing, USAF, 
confirms serial numbers read by 
Senior Master Sergeant David 
Schmitz during a reduction 
inspection. 







nate the placement of Eastern inspectors on Western-led teams. 
NATO states would open slots on their inspection teams for East¬ 
ern inspectors in return for their cooperation in not leading inspec¬ 
tions within their group of states. This would allow the NATO 
states to conduct as many inspections as possible, while providing 
the Eastern states with inspection opportunities without the ex¬ 
pense of leading an inspection. The NATO states also agreed to 
share all reduction inspection data maintained in a database 
known as VERITY. 

In addition to leading reduction inspection teams, individual 
U.S. inspectors, known as “singletons,” participated in reduction 
inspections led by other NATO nations. This allowed U.S. inspec¬ 
tors to participate in approximately 70 percent of the reduction 
inspections. Their participation in these inspections provided the 
U.S. government a presence and firsthand view of the majority of 
the reduction inspections. 


Declared Site and Challenge Inspections 
Continue 

Declared site and challenge inspections continued through the 
reduction years, although the incidence of those inspections was 
not as frequent. The treaty obliged nations to receive declared site 
inspections based on 10 percent of their declared OOVs during 
each reduction year. By contrast, the baseline period inspection 
rate had been 20 percent over only 120 days. 

OSIA inspectors conducted 16 declared site inspections and 
two challenge inspections during the first reduction year, Novem¬ 
ber 1992 through November 1993. During that period, team 
chiefs declared four ambiguities, site access being the common 
thread in all four. The first ambiguity occurred in Belarus at Ma¬ 
rina Gorka, where Team Fiser inspected the 30th Independent 
Mechanized Brigade. On April 1, 1993, Lt. Colonel Thomas C. 
Fiser, USA, received a site diagram excluding areas of the military 
facility. The Belarus escort team denied the American team access 
to areas that were within the military facility but not on the site 
map. Fiser declared an ambiguity and completed his inspection of 
240 pieces of TLE and 96 pieces of conventional armaments and 
equipment subject to the treaty (CAEST). 12 

Former Major, now Lt. Colonel Keith A. Oatman, USA, 
also declared an ambiguity when he led an inspection team at 
Baranovichi, Belarus, on November 9, 1993. He received the site 
diagram for the 28th Weapon Combat Vehicle Storage Base, which 
excluded areas believed to belong to two colocated missile brigades. 
The Belarussians had not declared the colocated brigades a sensitive 
point, nor had they declared them OOVs. Lt. Colonel Oatman 
requested access to these areas but the Belarus escorts denied the 








216 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


request. As was the case in Marina Gorka, Belarussian officials 
stated that it was the exclusive right of the inspected state to deter¬ 
mine the boundaries of its OOVs and declared sites. Lt. Colonel 
Oatman disagreed, cited the treaty definition of a declared site, 
noted the ambiguity, and continued his inspection of 254 pieces of 
TLE and 57 pieces of other treaty-reportable equipment. 13 

Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert, USAF, declared an ambiguity in 
Ukraine on May 4, 1993, while inspecting Ukrainian army forces 
at Khmelnitskiy. Lt. Colonel Gessert announced the 15th Mecha¬ 
nized Brigade as the OOV for inspection. During the inspection, 
Ukrainian escorts denied Gessert’s team access to three of the 
15th’s four subordinate battalions on the site. Lt. Colonel Gessert 
declared an ambiguity and completed the inspection. 14 

On July 14, 1993, Major Ronald M. Tait, USAF, and his 
team of CFE inspectors arrived at Praslavice, in the Czech Repub¬ 
lic. Before inspecting the 33rd Tank Regiment, he received a site 
diagram that depicted the OOV as being the entire declared site; it 
did not include any other area of the military facility. The Czech 
position was similar to the early Russian position during mock 
inspections and baseline. A fence around the OOV delineated the 
boundary of the declared site, and any other fences beyond that 
fence served a different purpose. The American team chief noted 
the ambiguity and finished the inspection. 15 

The number of declared site and challenge inspections held 
steady during the second reduction year. OSIA teams conducted 17 
inspections, 14 declared site inspections, and 3 challenge inspec¬ 
tions. One of those inspections, led by Lt. Colonel Fiser, offered a 
unique opportunity for a U.S. CFE inspection team. On April 5, 


A Belarussian site diagram is 
displayed during a German-led 
inspection. 



CXEMA 


MECTA C0KDAU1.EHUU 
(CTAHQKOBO, 53°3B'30"C11127°i3'20"BA) 


ycnoBHbit 

0B03HFNEHHq 


t 





































Reduction Years 217 


1994, Fiser’s team conducted a challenge inspection of a specified 
area at Arkhangelsk, Russia. What made the inspection unusual 
was the coastal defense and naval aviation forces stationed within 
the specified area: As naval forces they were not subject to de¬ 
clared site inspections because they were not OOVs; they were, 
however, open to a challenge inspection. 

During the second reduction year, U.S. teams declared only 
two ambiguities. Team Tait declared the first on February 1, 1994, 
at Slutsk, Belarus, when Belarussian escorts once again cited a 
nation’s exclusive right to determine the borders of an OOV. The 
other ambiguity arose on August 22, 1994, when Lt. Colonel Kirk 
E. Murray, USA, led his team to Odessa, Ukraine. Ukrainian es¬ 
corts limited access, citing the same rationale that Belarussian 
escorts had espoused. 16 


American inspection teams conducted 15 declared site inspec¬ 
tions and one challenge inspection during the third reduction year. 
Lt. Colonel James Jubilee, USAF, documented the only ambiguity 
during these inspections at Stryy, Ukraine. On March 22, 1995, 
Team Jubilee inspected the 10th Aviation Base and was denied 
access to a storage area that was within the outermost fenced area 
of the base. The Ukrainian site diagram, however, indicated that 
the declared site stopped at a wire fence that was short of the 
storage area. The escort team chief enforced the declared site as 
depicted in the site diagram. 


Naval forces were not 
OOVs...however, they were 
open to a challenge 
inspection. 


During the reduction years, many OSIA inspectors left the 
European Operations Command for retirement, change of duty 
within the agency, or a change of assignment away from OSIA. To 
offset these losses, new personnel arrived and trained to meet the 
standards required of OSIA inspectors. Despite this turnover, U.S. 
inspection teams continued their operations successfully, inspect¬ 
ing 6 specified areas and conducting 45 declared site inspections 
through the third reduction year. 


Multinational Teams 

During the reduction years, the composition of U.S. inspec¬ 
tion teams changed. Participation by allied inspectors on U.S.-led 
teams increased, and more U.S. inspectors joined allied teams. This 
reflected a U.S. government policy decision to seek more inspec¬ 
tion opportunities. The U.S.-led inspections with allied inspectors 
required some additional preparations to familiarize guest inspec¬ 
tors with U.S. inspection techniques and to train them in specific 
tasks as members of the team. The net benefit of more inspection 
opportunities outweighed the additional preparation requirements. 

A more significant change to team composition developed 
when Eastern inspectors joined NATO nation inspection teams on 
declared sites and challenge inspections. As discussed previously, 




cx. • 


218 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


the NATO states extended the invitations in an attempt to stem an 
increasing number of East-on-East inspections. The first inspection 
to include Cooperative Partners took place on March 16, 1993, 
when inspectors from Poland, Hungary, and Azerbaijan joined an 
Italian-led team in an inspection of a Romanian declared site. The 
first Eastern inspector to join an American team, Lt. Colonel 
Oldrich Lacina of the Czech Republic, deployed with Team Fiser 
on April 28, 1993, on a successful mission to Taszar, Hungary, to 
inspect the 31st Fighter Regiment. 17 

Because the program to incorporate Eastern guest inspectors 
into NATO teams did not eliminate East-on-East inspections, the 
NATO nations chose to send Western inspectors to join Eastern 
inspection teams. The United States government was reluctant to 
participate, fearing that doing so would encourage more East-on- 
East inspections. In May 1994, U.S. policy changed; OSIA would 
send U.S. inspectors to join Eastern teams. This decision allowed 
the U.S. inspectors to take advantage of opportunities that other¬ 
wise would have been lost. The first U.S. inspector to participate 
on an Eastern inspection team, Major Marc Lieber, USMC, joined 
a Bulgarian-led inspection team on May 15, 1994, on a mission to 
inspect Romanian forces. A day later, Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser 
participated in an inspection of Ukrainian forces as a member of a 
Polish-led inspection team. 



ectors from the United Kingdom and Belgium were led by Lt. Colonel Ronald Tait, OSIA Team Chief, 
during an inspection of Czech forces. 



















Reduction Years 



Lt. Colonel Gabor Nagy of Hungary, a Cooperative Partner inspector, served on a U.S. team 
at Trencin, Slovakia, in November 1993. 


One inspection that dramatically portrayed the changes that 
had occurred in Europe and in the implementation of the CFE 
Treaty took place in September 1994. Lt. Colonel Fred E. Busing, 
USAF, led an inspection team to Cazarma Centru Oradea, Roma¬ 
nia, to inspect the 21st Mechanized Battalion. This American-led 
inspection team was a milestone of sorts because it included Rus¬ 
sian guest inspectors Colonel Aleksandr Petrovich Kalinin and 
Colonel Gennadiy Mikhaylovich Savostyuk. The two dominant 
forces of the Cold War thus pooled their resources to conduct an 
arms control treaty inspection. 18 

The United States received only nine declared site inspections 
during the first reduction year. A Bulgarian team conducted the 
only inspection of U.S. facilities outside Germany during a mission 
to a POMCUS (prepositioning of material configured to unit sets) 
site at Grobbendonk, Belgium. The remaining eight inspections all 
took place in Germany. The second year brought nine more in¬ 
spections of U.S. forces, eight in Germany and one in Italy. During 
the third year, OSIA teams escorted seven inspection teams: five in 
Germany and one each in Luxembourg and Italy. The issue of 
ambulances mounted on M-113 chassis arose several times during 
these inspections. Ukrainian inspectors wrote a comment on their 
report concerning this type of ambulance at the U.S. Tactical 
Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany, on June 5, 1993. The U.S. 
escort team chief, Lt. Colonel Jan S. Karcz, USA, denied the Ukrai¬ 
nian inspectors access to the interior of the ambulances. Karcz told 


219 










220 


On-Site Inspection Agency 



Colonel Aleksandr Petrovich Kalinin, a Russian inspector, served on an American team in 
Romania. He signals all’s well after the plane skidded off the runway. 


them that the ambulances were neither armored combat vehicles 
nor look-alikes, and therefore were not subject to the treaty. The 
inspection team chief did not declare an ambiguity, but com¬ 
mented that there was no way to confirm that the vehicles were 
ambulances instead of M-l 13s. 

Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC, encountered a similar 
situation while escorting Hungarian inspectors during an inspec¬ 
tion of the Leghorn Army Depot in Livorno, Italy, on June 21, 
1994. Technicians accidentally had left the doors to the ambu¬ 
lances open, allowing the inspectors to observe the interior of 
ambulances that had not yet been modified. The site commander 
provided the Hungarian inspectors documentation to show that 
conversion kits had been ordered, but had not yet arrived. The 
inspectors ultimately made no comments on the inspection 
report. 19 

During the reduction period, U.S. inspection teams continued 
their policy of strict adherence to the provisions of the CFE Treaty. 
They exercised their inspection rights and protected U.S. interests 
to the fullest. Despite encountering problems, U.S. inspection 
teams maintained a professional relationship with their counter¬ 
parts while attempting to resolve those problems. They incorpo¬ 
rated new team members from different nations and participated 
on teams from other nations. They displayed flexibility in complet¬ 
ing their mission, while maintaining high standards. 






Reduction Years 221 


Residual Levels 

After the 40-month reduction period, how had the situation 
in Europe changed? What remained? Tables 7-3 and 7-4 list the 
holdings of TLE declared by each state at the end of the reduction 
period. They also show the net change in holdings from July 17, 

1992, to November 17, 1995. The change was significant. The 
two groups of states’ combined decrease was 64,854 pieces of 
TLE: the Eastern nations were down by 37,482 pieces while the 
NATO states dropped 27,372 items. 

Both groups were below the treaty’s ceilings in each TLE 
category. Several states, such as Turkey, showed increases in 
equipment because their national ceilings, agreed upon within 

Table 7-3. Residual Levels—NATO States (November 17,1995) 



Tanks 

ACVs 

Artillery 

Aircraft 

Helicopters 

Total 


Declared 

Nov 95 

Decrease 

From EIF 

Declared 

Nov 95 

Decrease 

From EIF 

Declared 

Nov 95 

Decrease 

From EIF 

Declared 

Nov 95 

Decrease 

From EIF 

Declared 

Nov 95 

Decrease 

From EIF 

Declared 

Nov 95 

Decrease 

From EIF 

Belgium 

334 

28 

704 

679 

316 

62 

169 

33 

46 

+38 

1,569 

764 

Canada 

0 

76 

0 

136 

6 

26 

0 

28 

0 

0 

6 

266 

Denmark 

343 

156 

303 

13 

552 

1 

75 

31 

12 

0 

1,285 

201 

France 

1,289 

46 

3,556 

831 

1,251 

185 

667 

28 

317 

49 

7,080 

1,139 

Germany 

3,061 

4,109 

2,679 

6,420 

2,056 

2,679 

578 

462 

225 

31 

8,599 

13,701 

Greece 

1,735 

236 

2,324 

+892 

1,878 

97 

489 

+34 

6 

+6 

6,432 

+599 

Iceland 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

Italy 

1,162 

70 

2,986 

788 

1,939 

74 

524 

18 

137 

39 

6,748 

989 

Luxembourg 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

Netherlands 

734 

179 

1,002 

443 

580 

257 

182 

+6 

0 

90 

2,498 

963 

Norway 

170 

35 

203 

+79 

246 

298 

75 

14 

0 

0 

694 

268 

Portugal 

174 

+28 

367 

+87 

320 

34 

105 

+13 

0 

0 

966 

+94 

Spain 

630 

228 

1,199 

24 

1,210 

158 

188 

+10 

28 

0 

3,255 

400 

Turkey 

2,608 

400 

2,450 

+391 

3,125 

+18 

387 

+27 

20 

+9 

8,590 

+45 

United Kingdom 

662 

497 

2,574 

632 

536 

+2 

640 

117 

342 

47 

4,754 

. 1,291 

United States 

1,254 

3,909 

2,238 

2,725 

854 

1,119 

222 

176 

150 

199 

4,718 

8,128 

TOTAL 

14,156 

9,941 

22,585 

11,242 

14,869 

4,970 

4,301 

817 

1,283 

402 

57,194 

27,372 


Bloc Authorized 

TLE Levels 20,000 30,000 20,000 6,800 2,000 78,800 


Source: “Fact file: Final Weapons Reductions Under the CFE Treaty," Arms Control Today, December 1995/January 1996. 







222 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Table 7-4. Residual Levels—Eastern States (November 17,1995) 

Tanks ACVs Artillery Aircraft Helicopters Total 

Declared Decrease Declared Decrease Declared Decrease Declared Decrease Declared Decrease Declared Decrease 



Nov 95 

From EIF 

Nov 95 

From EIF 

Nov 95 

From EIF 

Nov 95 

From EIF 

Nov 95 

From EIF 

Nov 95 

From EIF 

Armenia 

102 

N/A 

285 

N/A 

225 

N/A 

6 

N/A 

7 

N/A 

625 

N/A 

Azerbaijan 

285 

+151 

835 

+722 

343 

+217 

58 

+43 

18 

+9 

1,539 

+1,142 

Belarus 

2,320 

1,137 

2,984 

840 

1,533 

29 

335 

55 

79 

+3 

7,251 

2,058 

Bulgaria 

1,475 

794 

1,985 

247 

1,750 

404 

235 

100 

44 

0 

5,489 

1,545 

Czech Republic 

953 

850 

1,363 

1,152 

767 

956 

187 

41 

36 

1 

3,306 

3,000 

Georgia 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

N/A 

Hungary 

835 

510 

1,540 

191 

840 

207 

144 

+1 

59 

+20 

3,418 

887 

Kazakstan 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

Moldova 

0 

0 

209 

+111 

155 

+47 

27 

3 

0 

0 

391 

+155 

Poland 

1,720 

1,130 

1,516 

880 

1,581 

734 

400 

109 

92 

+62 

5,309 

2,791 

Romania 

1,375 

1,592 

2,073 

1,098 

1,471 

2,471 

373 

135 

16 

+1 

5,308 

5,295 

Russia 

5,492 

3,846 

10,372 

9,027 

5,680 

2,646 

2,986 

1,638 

826 

179 

25,356 

17,336 

Slovak Republic 

478 

423 

683 

575 

383 

478 

114 

0 

19 

0 

1,677 

1,476 

Ukraine 

4,026 

2,102 

4,919 

1,784 

3,727 

+136 

1,008 

640 

270 

1 

13,950 

4,391 

TOTAL 

19,061 

12,233 

28,764 

14,961 

18,455 

7,525 

5,873 

2,677 

1,466 

86 

73,619 

37,482 

Bloc Authorized 

TLE Levels 

20,000 


30,000 


20,000 


6,800 


2,000 


78,800 



Source: “Fact file: Final Weapons Reductions Under the CFE Treaty,” Arms Control Today , December 1995/January 1996. 


their group of states, were higher than their holdings, allowing 
them to increase their forces through purchases or cascading. 

The total decrease in TLE was not entirely the result of treaty 
reductions or a need to fulfill treaty-obligated reductions. While 
the United States fulfilled its reduction obligations, it also with¬ 
drew many of its forces from Europe for political and economic 
reasons. Some nations—Russia, Poland, Ukraine—reduced TLE 
beyond their required liabilities for economic reasons. Other 
nations exported small quantities of weapons. 

Iceland and Luxembourg were signatories but held no TLE, 
so they reported none. Georgia and Armenia made no declaration 
at entry into force, and Georgia did not make a declaration in 
November 1995. Both were involved in fighting during the period 
and disputed total numbers of items attributed to them from the 
Tashkent agreement. 







Reduction Years 


Notes 

1. Randall Forsberg, Rob Leavitt, and Steve Lilly-Weber, “Conventional 
Forces Treaty Buries Cold War,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , January/ 
February 1991, pp. 32-37; Jim Nichol, “Conventional Forces in Europe 
Treaty: Russian Attitudes and Implications for U.S. Interests.” CRS Report 
for Congress, updated September 15, 1995. 

2. See Appendix B for the text of the pledges. 

3. Arms Control Reporter 1992 , pp. 407.B.463-474. 

4. President George Bush, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control 
Agreements and the President’s Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompli¬ 
ance with Arms Control Agreements , prepared by the U.S. Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency, January 14, 1993. 

5. Arms Control Reporter 1990, p. 407.E.08; Department of Defense, Acting 
Director, Tactical Warfare Programs, “Report on Transfer of Certain CFE 
Treaty-Limited Equipment,” August 30, 1994; OSIA European Operations 
Command, Plans Section, “Summary of Activity at Buccino, Italy,” 
November 1993; Joint Consultative Group, “Revised Report on the Work 
of the JCG Informal Working Group,” December 8, 1992. 

6. Interview with Colonel Stanislaw Malinowski, Chief Inspector, Polish 
Verification Center, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Warsaw, 
Poland, February 3, 1994. 

7. Ibid. 

8. Interview with Lt. Colonel Thomas C. Fiser, USA, Team Chief, OSIA, by 
Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, July 
12, 1993. 

9. Inspection Reports, C92-Blue-034-PL, October 29, 1992; C93-Blue-013- 
HU, March 17, 1993; C93-Blue-051-CZ, November 24, 1993. 

10. Inspection Report, C93-Blue-038-CZ, September 1, 1993. 

11. Inspection Report, C94-Blue-007-CZ, March 30, 1994. 

12. Inspection Report, C93-Blue-014-BO, April 1, 1993. 

13. Inspection Report, C93-Blue-047-BO, November 9, 1993. 

14. Inspection Report, C93-Blue-021-UP, May 4, 1993. 

15. Inspection Report, C93-Blue-034-CZ, July 14, 1993. 

16. Inspection Reports, C94-Blue-003-BO, February 1, 1994; C94-Blue-028- 
UP, August 22, 1994. 

17. Inspection Report, C93-Blue-018-HU, April 28, 1993. 

18. Inspection Report, C94-Blue-033-RO, September 19, 1994. 

19. Escort Mission Report Folders, 93-CFE-030-UP-GE; 94-CFE-021-HU-IT. 


223 





































Chapter 8 




Verification agency leaders gathered at RAF Scampton, England, for a post-baseline conference in December 1992. 


A t the end of the CFE Treaty’s third reduction year in 

November 1995, one could draw six conclusions. First, 
the treaty ratification process had been critical to achieving 
national and international consensus on the detailed treaty provi¬ 
sions and protocols that were so important throughout implemen¬ 
tation. Second, three years into the process of providing data, 
reducing weapons, accepting inspection teams, and adjudicating 
disputes, the 30 signatory states remained committed to the CFE 
Treaty. With some exceptions, the states were meeting their na¬ 
tional reduction quotas in the treaty’s five categories of offensive 
weapons. The treaty specified that 100 percent of each nation’s 
final reduction liability had to be achieved by the end of the third 

























































226 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


reduction year. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, Ukraine, 
and Russia did not meet their treaty-mandated reduction quotas. 1 
Of these states, Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia had informed the 
Joint Consultative Group in Vienna of the special circumstances 
that forced them to postpone the date for completing their treaty 
reductions. No nation indicated that it would withdraw from the 
treaty. Despite the fact that these six nations were not in compli¬ 
ance as of November 1995, collectively, the nations of the NATO 
and WTO alliances had met and even exceeded the CFE Treaty 
reduction quotas. By November 17, 1995, the end of the third 
reduction year, the signatory states had destroyed, converted, 
decommissioned, reclassified, or placed on static display more 
than 19,200 battle tanks, 9,800 artillery pieces, 18,600 armored 
personnel carriers, 2,200 combat aircraft, and 370 attack helicop¬ 
ters. The total—50,170—exceeded the reduction quotas estab¬ 
lished in the treaty. 2 

The third conclusion was that the CFE Treaty’s principal 
verification measure—the use of on-site inspection teams to con¬ 
firm force data and to monitor reductions, recategorizations, and 
suspect sites—was working well. National on-site inspection teams 
had conducted more than 2,500 inspections of declared sites, 
objects of verification (OOVs), specified areas, and reductions of 
treaty-limited equipment (TLE). Disputes arose in fewer than 50 
inspections. Many potentially contentious issues had been resolved 
on-site by the inspectors and escorts acting within the treaty’s 
articles and protocols. 



The Hofburg Palace in Vienna, Austria, was the meeting place for the CFE Treaty’s Joint 
Consultative Group. 












227 


The CFE Treaty: A Durable Structure for Post-Cold War Europe 


Fourth, the CFE Treaty’s Joint Consultative 
Group (JCG) had functioned as an important 
forum throughout treaty ratification and imple¬ 
mentation. The JCG had met almost continually 
in Vienna since the treaty’s signature in Paris on 
November 19, 1990, to consider problems aris¬ 
ing from national force data, on-site inspections, 
notifications, and other treaty requirements. In 
closed joint sessions and committees, representa¬ 
tives of the treaty states discussed and formulated 
solutions and, on many occasions, achieved the 
required consensus on recommended changes to 
treaty issues. Throughout implementation, the 
JCG provided the CFE Treaty process a degree of 
flexibility that was invaluable in a time of rapid 
changes across Europe. 



The fifth conclusion is that the political and 
social upheavals sweeping across post-Cold War 
Europe from 1992 to 1995 had a direct influence 
on the CFE Treaty’s implementation. Within a 
year of the Soviet Union’s collapse in late 1991 The JCG approved Russian modified reduction 
and the creation of the new successor states, procedures. 

Western European governments and peoples 
were interacting, formally and informally, with Eastern European 
nations to a degree not seen for 50 years or more. This 
activity influenced the composition of the CFE Treaty’s national 
inspection teams. In January 1993, just six months after the 
treaty’s entry into force, the NATO nations collectively invited the 
treaty’s Eastern states to join their CFE teams as guest inspectors. 

They accepted. Shortly thereafter, individual inspectors from the 
Eastern states began serving on the NATO nations’ CFE inspection 
teams. These multinational teams conducted inspections of CFE 
sites throughout Eastern Europe and the successor states. Within a 
matter of months in 1993, virtually all the NATO nations’ CFE 
inspection teams had become multinational, with inspectors from 
several nations routinely serving on a single team. 


The rapid thaw after the Cold War was reflected in other 
cooperative efforts. In 1994, the treaty nations agreed to share 
data from on-site inspections and from the annual national force 
data submissions. At that time, the NATO nations expanded VER¬ 
ITY, their computerized database, incorporating information on 
inspections and national force data from almost all treaty states. In 
another development, in 1993 NATO opened its CFE Treaty train¬ 
ing courses to inspectors from the Eastern states and successor 
nations. Further, NATO’s Verification Coordinating Committee 
(VCC) sponsored special seminars each year from 1992 through 
1996 for the directors and senior staffs of the national verification 
agencies from both groups of states. These seminars served as 



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228 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


important informal forums for raising implementation issues, and 
they provided a setting in which the verification directors could 
discuss common issues and approaches. When the CFE Treaty was 
negotiated and signed in 1990, no one had anticipated the form or 
the extent of these joint East-West treaty implementation activities. 

Finally, one could conclude that collectively the 30 CFE 
Treaty states had, in large measure, achieved the treaty’s stated 
objectives of establishing a “secure and stable balance of conven¬ 
tional armed forces in Europe at lower levels” and eliminating “as 
a matter of high priority, the capability for launching a surprise 
attack or for initiating a large-scale offensive action in Europe.” 5 
Certainly, the demise of the Soviet Union and of the Warsaw 
Treaty Organization as a viable military alliance were consequen¬ 
tial events that contributed directly to these all-European treaty 
objectives. Yet, one should not discount the treaty states’ concrete 
actions in carrying out their CFE Treaty commitments. In 1992, 
1993, 1994, and 1995; daily, weekly, yearly; in thousands of dis¬ 
crete actions, the signatory states had met their treaty obligations 
and exercised their treaty rights. 

By the end of the reduction period in November 1995, the 
CFE Treaty was viewed widely across Europe as a valuable, legally 
binding agreement for reducing military armaments and for en¬ 
hancing openness of military forces across national borders. Since 
it entered into force, a durable record had been achieved; that 
record established a context for evaluating the CFE Treaty’s next 
major phase: the residual level validation period. 


RLVP: 

November 17,1995- 
March 16, 1996 


Residual Level Validation Period: 
November 1995 to March 1996 

Following the 40-month reduction period, the treaty provided 
for a brief 120-day phase during which every nation had the right, 
under the group of states quota system, to verify the treaty-limited 
weapons and forces possessed by the nations in the other group of 
states. Based on the number of OOVs in the Eastern group of 
states on November 17, 1995, the end of the reduction period, the 
NATO nations could conduct up to 247 on-site inspections over 
the next 120 days, while the Eastern group of states could conduct 
up to 254 inspections. Designated in the treaty as the residual level 
validation period (RLVP), this phase preceded the treaty’s final 
stage: the residual period. That final period would be of unlimited 
duration, with compliance monitoring by on-site inspections con¬ 
tinuing indefinitely, though always based on a percentage of a 
nation’s OOVs. The RLVP was an important period, because it 
allowed states to verify the accuracy of the other treaty nations’ 
postreduction numbers in order to establish a basis for monitoring 
the national TLE holdings in the residual period. 4 




229 


The CFE Treaty: A Durable Structure for Post-Cold War Europe 


This RLVP phase resembled the treaty’s baseline period in 
both intent and duration. Both were periods of intense inspection 
activities, with the treaty allowing inspections by the group of 
states of up to 20 percent of all declared OOVs. The major differ¬ 
ence between the two periods lay in the length of time for planning 
and preparation. The CFE Treaty’s final ratification developed 
quickly in June-July 1992 as the states decided to implement the 
treaty provisionally. Entry into force came immediately after the 
Helsinki Summit on July 17, 1992; it caught some nations, espe¬ 
cially some of the newer Eastern European republics, by surprise. 
This element of surprise was not part of the treaty’s RLVP phase. 
All treaty nations knew that RLVP would begin on November 17, 
1995, and end on March 16, 1996. 

These dates were known to Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, 

U.S. Army, who assumed command of OSIA’s European Opera¬ 
tions (EO) Command in January 1995. He took over an active, 
experienced, 145-person inspection command. The treaty’s RLVP 
was 10 months away, but he initiated an intensive planning effort 
immediately. Guillory knew that the process of inspecting, escort¬ 
ing, and conducting liaison operations would be the same as dur¬ 
ing the baseline and reduction periods, but he recognized that the 
pace during RLVP would be much faster. The command would be 
called upon to conduct twice as many inspections in 120 days as it 
normally did in an entire year. On the escort side, U.S. vulnerabil¬ 
ity to being inspected would not be as great as during baseline. 



Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, Commander of OSIA’s European Operations Command, leads an OSCE 
inspection in Bosnia. 




230 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Since 1992, thousands of U.S. troops had been withdrawn 
from Europe and dozens of U.S. military bases closed. Conse¬ 
quently, Colonel Guillory expected that the 56 U.S. Army and 5 
U.S. Air Force OOVs in Europe would be inspected 12 times dur¬ 
ing RLVP (20 percent of 61 OOVs). Further, Guillory assumed 
that American liaison officers would be extremely busy during the 
period, since the NATO nations’ passive quota was 254 inspec¬ 
tions. United States policy dictated that a U.S. liaison team travel 
to every site subject to inspection in order to protect U.S. facilities 
and units stationed or deployed there. As he added up numbers of 
inspections, escorts, and liaison missions for the RLVP phase, 
Guillory concluded that the command would be doing twice as 
much work in one-third the time. To ensure the command’s readi¬ 
ness, he initiated an intensive planning effort to nail down every 
aspect of OSIA’s RLVP mission. 5 

In mid-February 1995, Guillory brought the European Op¬ 
erations Command staff together and explained his initial plan¬ 
ning guidance. All RLVP planning and preparations would be a 
joint staff effort involving operations, support, and logistics. Fur¬ 
ther, the effort would involve extensive coordination with Head¬ 
quarters and with OSIA’s operating commands and consultation 
with the staffs of the NATO nations’ verification agencies, other 
foreign verification agencies, and NATO’s VCC. Finally, he di¬ 
rected at this initial meeting that the effort would be coordinated 
by the operations division’s planning cell. In November 1995, just 
as the RLVP operation was getting under way, Colonel Guillory 
recalled his objectives. “We went to work,’’ he explained, “to 
develop an operational concept and four interlocking plans.” 6 This 
work, he said, produced the following 7 : 

• An operational concept as part of the NATO plan. Since the 
beginning of the CFE Treaty, the United States had conducted 
its treaty responsibilities in concert with the NATO nations. 
This would continue during RLVP. 

• An aggressive liaison plan to ensure an American presence at 
any U.S. facility in the NATO nations. 

• An augmentation plan to ensure that OSIA’s EO Command 
had the necessary manpower to conduct the escort and 
inspection missions. 

• A logistics plan to support all EO inspectors, escorts, liaison 
officers, and augmentees. 

• An aggressive training plan to prepare new EO members and 
augmentees for CFE Treaty operations. 

As the planning got under way in the spring of 1995, Briga¬ 
dier General Gregory G. Govan, Director of OSIA, decided that 
the agency would augment the EO Command with people from 
Headquarters and the other operational commands. By mid- 



231 


The CFE Treaty: A Durable Structure for Post-Cold War Europe 


summer the plan called for 41 augmentees. All would be trained 
by September and would deploy to Europe in early November. 
These OSIA people would serve on liaison teams, inspection 
teams, and escort teams. They would also work in communica¬ 
tions, planning, and administration. As the date grew closer, 
Colonel Guillory reevaluated the command’s requirement for 
augmentees. He reduced the required number from 41 to 33, 
largely on the basis of new personnel arriving earlier than antici¬ 
pated and a new estimate of the logistics division’s operational 
capability. At Rhein-Main, three officers—Lt. Colonel Thomas 
Carraway, USA; Lt. Colonel William L. Lefevers, USAF; and Ma¬ 
jor Jon Rebholz, Jr., USMC—played key roles in shepherding 
every aspect of the RLVP planning effort. Just as Colonel 
Lawrence Kelley, USMC, had checked and rechecked every detail 
of the command’s planning prior to baseline, these three officers 
forced every division, section, team, and individual to know and 
understand their role during RLVP. 8 What were the results? 

During the residual level validation period—from November 
17, 1995, to March 16, 1996—NATO nations conducted 246 
inspections of Eastern bloc nations. The United States led 38 in¬ 
spections and provided guest inspectors on 56 other national 
teams. U.S. inspection teams hosted 65 guest inspectors. During 
RLVP, U.S. inspection teams exercised all their treaty rights; when 
appropriate, they wrote comments on the inspection reports. They 
declared 11 ambiguities, which were referred to the JCG in Vienna 
for resolution. As in every other period in the treaty, U.S. inspec¬ 
tion teams and inspectors set high standards in their knowledge of 
the treaty, its protocols, TLE status, and national force data. 9 

From November to March, Eastern nations inspected NATO 
nations 183 times. This tempo was somewhat slower than ex¬ 
pected, although it was at an inspection level of 72 percent of the 
maximum possibility of 254 inspections. Eastern nations used 
sequential inspections to cover as many sites as possible in a single 



Brigadier General Gregory G. 
Govan, USA, Director, OSIA. 


NATO Quota: 247 Inspections 

Unused quota: 1 


Eastern Group Quota: 255 Inspections 



U.S. sites: 11 






















232 


On-Site Inspection Agency 



Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, U.S. Army 

Colonel Ken Guillory, U.S. Army, commanded OSIA’s European 
Operations Command during the RLVP period. A field artillery of¬ 
ficer, he commanded a battalion at Ft. Sill, Oklahoma; fought in 
Operation Desert Storm in Saudi Arabia; and served as a civil-military 
liaison officer to the German army under the US Army’s Pershing II 
command. Capable in German and Russian, Guillory holds a master’s 
degree in Soviet area studies from Georgetown University. 


On the necessity for early planning for the CPE 
Treaty’s RLVP operations: “We started the plan¬ 
ning process in February 1995. We used the basic 
joint operations planning system, which is similar 
to the Army’s system. We did it not because it 
was familiar to me, which it was, but because it 
tends to make you ask the right questions and do 
the kind of planning that you need to do. It’s 
deliberately designed to expose things that may 
be weaknesses, so that you can address them and 
take care of them in your planning. The other 
thing that we did that was important was to 
coordinate all key issues with agencies here in 
Europe, with OSIA Headquarters in Washington, 
and with the Inspection Support Staff. We didn’t 
plan it just as operators, we had logistics people, 
personnel folks, counterintelligence folks; every¬ 
body was involved. It was a total, coordinated 
effort. I think it made a big difference.” 

On the difference between normal operations and 
the tempo during RLVP: “The difference, of 
course, was the intensity of the operation. We 
were doing a greater number of inspections in a 
shorter period. What made the operation differ¬ 
ent was the coordination needed to get people 
briefed, transported to and from the inspection 
site, debriefed, and then having to coordinate 
everything with several other nations simulta¬ 
neously. It was a major coordination problem. 

“The one problem that you try to plan for, but 
there really is nothing you can do about, is the 
weather. RLVP, of course, happened from 
mid-November to mid-March, right in the middle 
of the Russian and East European winter. That 
made it hard. The difficulty was not as great in 
the East European countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Romania, Poland, the Czech Republic, and 
Slovakia. There ground transportation was al¬ 


ways available. In Russia, however, the only entry 
point was Moscow. To get from Moscow to the 
majority of the CFE Treaty sites, the team had to 
fly. That presented us some problems. I expected 
that at least once, if not more, we were going to 
have trouble reaching a Russian site in time to 
conduct the inspection, simply because of the 
weather. And that, of course, was out of our 
hands. The other problem was that it was really 
very difficult to do a CFE inspection after dark. 
You needed daylight. In the winter the days are 
shorter, so you had to plan the inspection to cover 
all the areas you needed to cover and see within 
available daylight. Our inspectors know how to 
do it, and they’re good at it, but it is just more 
difficult inspecting after August or September 
when the days are longer.” 

On the coordination process at NATO’s Verifica¬ 
tion Coordinating Committee: “The process has 
several steps. First, we decide which NATO coun¬ 
tries get what percentage of the available inspec¬ 
tions in the East. Then, we decide which countries 
get what percentage of inspections in Russia, in 
Ukraine, in Poland, Belarus, and all the other 
countries. Then the total period for the inspec¬ 
tions is divided into time blocks. A block is one 
week. Normally we do 52 blocks in a year. The 
RLVP was 18 blocks. Because of a high number 
of inspections we had to do for three countries— 
Russia, Romania, and Ukraine—we had to create 
subordinate blocks. There was not just Block 2, 
there was Block 2 Alpha, Block 2 Bravo, and 
Block 3 Alpha, Block 3 Bravo, and so on. For the 
other nations, each block remained one week, so 
that you could go to Poland, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, or wherever. Once that got settled, 
there was a process at NATO for each of the 
countries to say, ‘Okay, I want to inspect this 
country in this block.’ That was negotiated and 






233 


The CFE Treaty: A Durable Structure for Post-Cold War Europe 


visit to Western Europe. The United States was inspected 11 times, 
with 10 inspections occurring at U.S. facilities in Germany and 1 
in Italy. OSIA’s EO Command deployed full escort teams to each 
site to conduct the foreign inspection teams through the U.S. facili¬ 
ties. During RLVP operations, the U.S. liaison teams deployed on 
163 Eastern nation inspections. They provided invaluable assis¬ 
tance to U.S. military units and personnel, particularly in Turkey, 
Italy, and Germany. 10 

In March 1996, when the RLVP ended, Colonel Guillory 
evaluated the American effort. He developed a method to compare 
the “expected'” level of operations with the “actual” level. Using 
pluses and minuses, he evaluated the strengths and weaknesses in 
the command’s planning, training, operations, logistics, and inter¬ 
national coordination. In early May, Brigadier General Thomas 
E. Kuenning, Director of OSIA, and the senior staff held an all- 
Agency operations conference at which Guillory briefed his analy¬ 
sis of U.S. operations during RLVP. The operation was a success, 
he thought, because the early, intensive planning effort had defined 
the requirements and had produced an operations plan that was 
comprehensive and realistic. The expected and actual levels of 
operations matched up across the board, except for a few minuses 
concerning forecasting efforts that had been unsuccessful in antici- 


deconflicted as each country presented its sched¬ 
ule. Then the VCC put them all together and said, 
‘Okay, here is where there are conflicts,’ and they 
worked them all out. So NATO came up with a 
deconflicted schedule. Once that was done, the 
NATO countries went back and decided who 
would be guest inspectors on their teams. In our 
case, for example, sometimes we had a German 
or a British officer; a Frenchman or a Dutchman; 
a Belgian, Italian, Portuguese, Danish, or Turkish 
officer. Those all got worked out in advance. 

“Some inspections were ‘paired.’ That’s the 
term we use for inspections when we take repre¬ 
sentatives from our Eastern European treaty 
partners. In some cases we will actually have 
Eastern officers on our teams. For example, we 
had some Hungarian officers with us on an in¬ 
spection in Romania. There is no quota for how 
many times we do it. We don’t have to do it at all, 
but it’s good for us. It helps us a lot. Also, it gives 
them exposure and experience in working with 
Allied teams. The United States is not the only 
country that does this.” 


On incorporating an analysis of the CFE Treaty 
baseline experience into RLVP operations: 

“When we did the original plan, we did the 
commander’s estimate portion and one of the 
things we looked at was how we, at EO, had 
handled the baseline operations. What we found 
out was that we had actually handled the inspec¬ 
tions pretty well. We had organized the teams 
properly, we had the right number, and we were 
able to conduct virtually all of the required in¬ 
spections. Remember, the treaty’s baseline period 
was in the summertime, so the weather was a lot 
better. On the escort side, we were well prepared, 
although the Eastern states did not inspect us as 
much as we thought they would. On the liaison 
officer side, where we went to the different 
NATO countries every time there was an inspec¬ 
tion, there were problems. During baseline we 
had LNO teams standing by in several locations, 
and it was a waste of manpower. It wasn’t the 
best way to do things. For the RLVP, because of 
the distance, we are keeping an LNO team in 
place in Turkey, with the rest based here in Ger¬ 
many. We have more flexibility that way.” 


Source: Interview, Col. Kenneth D. Guillory, USA, with Technical Sergeant David Willford, USAF, November 13, and December 1, 1995. 





234 


On-Site Inspection Agency 



Brigadier General Thomas E. 
Kuenning, Jr., USAF, Director, 
OSIA. 


pating other nations’ inspection activity. On the plus side, Guillory 
gave high ratings to NATO’s VCC deconfliction work and its 
coordination of guest inspectors, the continuous dialogue among 
the NATO nations’ verification agencies, the West-to-East dia¬ 
logue between verification agencies planning cooperative missions, 
the work of the augmentees from OSIA Headquarters and opera¬ 
tional commands, the determination of the U.S. liaison officer 
teams, the professionalism of the Inspection Support Staff and its 
coordination efforts with the interagency policy community in 
Washington, and the early planning and standardized packages 
developed by the command’s logistics experts. 11 

In the end, the fact that there were many more pluses than 
minuses was less important than the presence in the command of a 
vigorous planning effort; rigorous training standards; extensive 
NATO nation coordination; thoroughness in inspections, escorts, 
and liaison teams; responsiveness in logistics; and a willingness to 
conduct an honest postoperation evaluation. Measured in this 
way, OSIA’s European Operations Command demonstrated that 
the leadership and professional standards that had been present in 
the execution of the U.S. CFE Treaty on-site inspection mission 
during the baseline and reduction periods had continued during 
RLVP. 


Problems During Treaty Implementation 

In the implementation of any multinational treaty, problems 
arise as a result of changes in the international situation, changes 
in one or more of the signatory nations’ internal conditions, or, 
more commonly, differing national interpretations of treaty rights 
and obligations. A treaty may have unresolved or ambiguous 
issues embedded in the text or protocols that come to the fore only 
during implementation. Implementation of the CFE Treaty cer¬ 
tainly proved these generalizations true. Five problems surfaced 
from July 1992, entry into force, to November 1995, the end of 
the reduction period: 

• Inspector access at declared sites. 

• Cost of treaty-limited equipment (TLE) reductions. 

• Accounting for TLE among the Soviet Union’s successor 
states. 

• Destruction of Russian TLE located east of the Urals. 

• Redefinition of the treaty’s zonal restrictions for stationing 
weapons in the flank areas of Russia and Ukraine. 

Some of these problems, such as the inspectors’ right of ac¬ 
cess at declared sites, resulted from complex compromises in treaty 
definitions during the final weeks of negotiations. Others were the 
direct consequence of the Soviet Union’s collapse and the creation 




235 


The CFE Treaty: A Durable Structure for Post-Cold War Europe 


of eight successor states that subsequently be¬ 
came parties to the treaty. When the Soviet 
Union’s massive holdings of TLE were divided 
among the new nations, some states had diffi¬ 
culty accounting for all the equipment trans¬ 
ferred from the Russian army. Other states had 
problems financing the destruction of their excess 
weapons and equipment under the treaty’s proto¬ 
cols. Finally, in the period following the breakup 
of the Soviet Union, some successor states faced 
severe internal unrest, such as ethnic violence 
in Chechnya and internal disruptions in Georgia, 

Moldova, and Armenia. These internal problems 
placed pressures on the governments, which 
deployed military forces to suppress the unrest. 

The movement of these forces and their weapons 
threatened compliance with the treaty’s zone 
limits. Some nations, specifically Russia, argued 
that key provisions of the treaty should be al¬ 
tered to accommodate these problems. 

to Declared Sites 

The first significant problem, inspector 
access to declared sites, arose shortly after the 
treaty entered into force in July 1992. During the 
initial inspections, Russian escorts routinely 
granted inspectors access to the designated 
OOVs but often denied them access to the entire 
declared site. These denials occurred also, to a lesser degree, in 
Belarus and Ukraine. In mid-August, Russia and all other treaty 
states presented, as required by the treaty, a revised set of data 
charts, listing their declared sites, OOVs, units, and TLE. For most 
of its CFE sites, Russia now stated that all its OOVs and declared 
sites had identical boundary lines. Previously, Russia had stated in 
its treaty data submissions that it had many declared sites (military 
bases, garrisons, or installations) containing five, six, or more 
OOVs (regiments or brigades). The new Russian treaty data charts 
signaled a major change, one that had the potential of limiting the 
CFE inspection team’s access while on site. Also, the Russian data 
charts essentially nullified the treaty’s carefully negotiated compro¬ 
mise on the inspection team’s right of access to inspect both the 
designated OOV and the declared site. 

Among the NATO nations, the United States was most insis¬ 
tent on challenging what it believed was Russia’s unilateral reinter¬ 
pretation of the treaty. It set out to force the issue. The United 
States sent several inspection teams to Russia to conduct Section 
VII Declared Site CFE Treaty inspections. These teams conducted 




Unrest in the Soviet Union led to its breakup and the 
addition of eight new states to the CFE Treaty. 









236 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


A U.S.-led multinational inspection 
in Romania. 



inspections of the OOVs and declared sites, and in the process, 
they insisted on their treaty right to inspect the entire site. 12 
France, Germany, and Great Britain agreed with the United States. 
Their inspection teams raised the issue with Russian military es¬ 
corts and site commanders. Only the United States, however, de¬ 
clared ambiguities. 12 

While inspectors argued and documented the issue of inspec¬ 
tion rights and inspectable sites, diplomatic delegations discussed 
the problem in Moscow, Washington, and major European capi¬ 
tals. The JCG held a series of meetings seeking resolution. In late 
October, Ambassador Lynn M. Hansen, U.S. CFE Treaty Negotia¬ 
tor, flew to Moscow for discussions on the issue with senior Rus¬ 
sian diplomatic and military officials. In those meetings, Russian 
officials declared categorically their intention to return to the 
original treaty interpretation and to comply with the CFE Treaty’s 
definition of a declared site. 14 Four weeks later, in its December 
15, 1992, data update, Russia stated that it had 431 OOVs and 
299 declared sites. Subsequent inspections of Russian CFE sites in 
1993 and 1994 by NATO nation teams revealed that on this is¬ 
sue—the inspection team’s right of access to the declared site and 
the common areas—Russia had, indeed, reverted to the complex 
treaty understanding that had been negotiated and ratified. 15 

It is important to recognize that in the resolution of this 
treaty problem, the process worked. Inspectors raised and docu¬ 
mented the issue on-site; they declared ambiguities, which were 
recorded in the legal process of verifying compliance with the CFE 
Treaty. Once documented, the problem was examined by the re¬ 
spective national verification agency directors and staffs. Then 
senior officials in Moscow, Washington, and other capitals evalu¬ 
ated the issue and prepared government positions. In Vienna, 
national representatives to the JCG presented their views and 





237 


The CFE Treaty: A Durable Structure for Post-Cold War Europe 


worked in committees and joint sessions on a resolution accept¬ 
able to all treaty states. In this case, the treaty problem was caused 
by a change in Russia’s designation of its national force data. It 
was resolved when Russia, challenged by the United States and 
other treaty states, decided to return to the data format used by all 
other signatory states, thus acknowledging the original intent of 
the treaty. Once the data were in the correct format, inspectors 
could confirm, through direct observation on-site, that the site, 
unit, and nation were in compliance with the treaty. 


Cost of TLE Reductions 

A persistent problem of a different nature arose shortly after 
the CFE Treaty entered into force. Several nations complained 
publicly and in treaty forums that the treaty’s reduction protocols 
required destruction methodologies that were too specific and too 
expensive, given the thousands of weapons and pieces of equip¬ 
ment that had to be reduced within the treaty-mandated 40 
months. They suggested less costly, alternative methods. Only one 
month after the treaty entered into force in July 1992, General- 
Lieutenant Ivan Oleynik, Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister for 
Armaments, stated publicly that destroying T-54 tanks was too 
expensive. To destroy one tank, according to General Oleynik, the 
Ukrainian government had to spend over 7,000 rubles. Destruc¬ 
tion of just one armored personnel carrier, he maintained, would 
cost over 4,000 rubles. Under the CFE Treaty, Ukraine was re¬ 
sponsible for the destruction of 2,450 tanks, 2,222 APCs, and 550 



U.S. inspection team recording data on T-54 tank reductions in Ukraine. 




238 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


aircraft. To accomplish this work, the Ukrainian government had 
to set up reduction sites at Zhitomer, Kiev, Lvov, Nikolayev, and 
Kharkov. 16 

Other states with substantial reduction liabilities agreed with 
Ukraine. In December 1992, Germany, Russia, and Belarus joined 
Ukraine in petitioning the CFE Treaty’s Joint Consultative Group 
to consider new, less costly procedures for reducing treaty-limited 
equipment. 17 Russia had 10 reduction sites, Germany 6, and 
Belarus 4. From December through March, the JCG discussed 
Ukraine’s petition. Then in April 1993, Russia invited observers 
from the other treaty nations to witness a demonstration reduction 
of tanks using the new procedures. At a military base outside Saint 
Petersburg, Russian army warrant officers demonstrated how 
disabling one side of a tank’s drive system—rather than two, as 
prescribed in the treaty—would render it militarily ineffective. 

They also demonstrated that making partial rather than complete 
cuts would effectively disable the tank’s major components: the 
turret rings and gun barrels. At this demonstration, representatives 
of the other treaty states observed the recommended modifica¬ 
tions, and in Vienna, following discussions and comments, the 
JCG representatives accepted the Russian proposal. The new pro¬ 
cedures became acceptable ways to reduce tanks under the treaty. 18 
Less than a month later, the JCG agreed to a German proposal for 
modifying the procedures for reducing lightly armored vehicles. 
The German delegates proposed that these weapons be destroyed 
by crushing them in a large compactor. Known as the “cheese 
slicer” or “cookie cutter,” this compactor worked well in field 
demonstrations. After further negotiations in Vienna, the JCG 
approved its use in June 1993. 19 



Poland’s eight-ton ball crushed TLE efficiently and economically. 







239 


The CFE Treaty: A Durable Structure for Post-Cold War Europe 



Reduction costs caused Belarus, 
Ukraine, Russia, and Germany to 
petition the JCG to modify 
reduction procedures. 


Poland had a large reduction liability under the CFE Treaty: 
1,120 tanks, 246 armored combat vehicles, 705 artillery pieces, 
and 49 aircraft. In 1993, Poland recommended and the JCG ap¬ 
proved a modification of the treaty protocol for destroying artil¬ 
lery pieces. According to Colonel Stanislaw Malinowski, Director 
of the Polish Verification Center, the new method called for a very 
large, heavy steel wrecking ball to be lifted high in the air and 
dropped on the weapons, thereby “smashing the gun components 
until they were visibly cracked or bent.” Colonel Malinowski 
added that this method was “not very costly” but was “very 


efficient.” 20 


Even with these procedural changes, the cost of reducing the 
excess TLE was a burden for some of the smaller successor states. 
Belarus is a small nation of 10 million people. At Tashkent it had 
received a large portion of the Soviet Union’s CFE Treaty conven¬ 
tional weapons: 3,457 tanks, 3,824 ACVs, 1,562 artillery pieces, 
and 390 aircraft. Belarus’s total reduction liability was more than 
3,750 weapons. To destroy these treaty weapons within the 40- 
month reduction period, Belarus set up reduction centers at 
Borisov, Lesnaya, Baranovichi, and Stankovo. When its economy 
collapsed in 1992-93, Belarus said that the cost of carrying out 
CFE Treaty reductions was excessive. In December 1992, Belarus 
joined Russia, Ukraine, and Germany in petitioning the JCG to 
modify the treaty’s reduction protocols. In June 1993, Belarussian 
senior officials stated that the government was under such finan¬ 
cial pressure that it might not be able to meet its CFE Treaty re¬ 
duction obligations. General-Major Viktor Vakar, Director of the 
Belarus National Agency for Control and Inspection, raised the 
issue with the NATO Verification Coordinating Committee in 
November 1993. Other Belarussian senior officials took the issue 
before the state parties at the Joint Consultative Group; still others 
raised it in diplomatic exchanges with the United States. In the 
latter instance, Belarus requested that Nunn-Lugar funds be obli- 











240 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Minister of Defense Pavel 
Kozlovskiy of Belarus and U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Les Asp in 
following the signing of a funding 
agreement under the Nunn-Lugar 
program. 



gated to assist it in its CFE Treaty reductions. Here was a new 
problem. Belarus was not requesting further modifications to the 
treaty’s reduction protocols; instead, it was asking for direct for¬ 
eign aid to pay the cost of reducing the weapons. Belarus esti¬ 
mated that it would cost $33 million to reduce its 3,758 pieces of 
CFE Treaty TLE. 21 

When the United States did not respond (to avoid setting a 
precedent of paying for TLE destruction for all the successor 
states), Belarus took another tack. It called for the treaty states to 
set up a voluntary CFE Treaty Support Fund. Among the treaty 
nations, only Russia and Ukraine actively supported establishing 
such a fund. Nevertheless, Belarus kept the concept alive. In 
March 1994, senior government officials said they would be 
forced to declare a force majeure in further treaty reductions if 
economic conditions did not improve. In late March, U.S. Secre¬ 
tary of Defense William S. Perry stated that the United States 
would commit $5 million each to Belarus and Ukraine to support 
their CFE Treaty reduction efforts. At the same time, Perry pointed 
out that Belarus had already been granted $70 million, and 
Ukraine $270 million, under the United States’ Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Program. 22 

This action was sufficient for Belarus to continue its CFE 
reduction program through 1994. Then in February 1995, Presi¬ 
dent Aleksander R. Lukashenko suddenly announced that Belarus 
would suspend all reduction efforts. Declaring that the cost of 
destroying the CFE weapons was “economically unjust,” 
Lukashenko said that he had made a unilateral decision to shut 
down the reduction operations. Here was a direct threat to treaty 
compliance. Lukashenko’s announcement came a few weeks before 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin threatened to pull out of the treaty 














241 


The CFE Treaty: A Durable Structure for Post-Cold War Europe 


if Russia did not receive some relief from the treaty’s flank limit 
restrictions and if NATO expanded into Central Europe. 23 

Lukashenko’s announcement and Yeltsin’s threat had the effect 
of forcing this problem out of treaty forums and into the realm of 
international politics. Resolution of Russia’s flank limit problem 
will be discussed later; resolving Belarus’s financial problem took 
more than 15 months. Within a few days of Lukashenko’s February 
23, 1995, announcement, Deputy Foreign Minister Valeriy Tsepkalo 
explained that Belarus was prepared to resume destruction of 
weapons if sufficient funding was forthcoming immediately. When 
no other nation came forth with funds, Belarus continued its sus¬ 
pension throughout the spring, summer, and into the fall months. 
The CFE Treaty’s November 17, 1995, reduction deadline ap¬ 
proached; nations with excessive TLE would not be in compliance. 
In late August, German Defense Minister Klaus Kinkel flew to 
Minsk and discussed the issue with the Belarussian president and 
his ministers. As he left, the German defense minister made no 
commitments, but he conceded that the Cold War’s termination 
had created great suffering for Belarus and the other successor 
nations. 

In September 1995, Belarus announced that it would resume 
its reduction activities but indicated that for economic reasons it 
would not meet its treaty reduction obligations. The following 
month, James Collins, Advisor to the U.S. Secretary of State, flew 
to Minsk for consultations. No direct action followed until No¬ 
vember, when the deadline came for all treaty states to meet their 
reduction liabilities. On November 17, 1995, all 30 nations issued 
a joint statement from Vienna identifying nations that were not in 
compliance with the treaty. Belarus was not in compliance. Appar¬ 
ently this statement and the promise of the United States and 
Germany to provide financial assistance were sufficient motivation 
for Belarus to commit to a definite plan for completing its TLE 
reductions. Ten days after Belarus was singled out for noncompli- 
ance, its representatives submitted a plan to the JCG for destroy¬ 
ing all of the state’s remaining TLE by April 26, 1996. The plan 
was quickly approved, and the pace of reductions proceeded to 
meet the schedule. Belarus, in fact, did not meet the April 1996 
deadline, which meant that it was still not in full compliance with 
the CFE Treaty’s reduction quotas. 24 


Accounting for TLE Among the 
Successor States 

Eight signatory states—Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, 
Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Kazakstan—did not exist as 
nations during CFE Treaty negotiations. Following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, these states received portions of its vast arsenal 



242 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


in the Tashkent Agreement of May 1992. During ratification, they 
committed to the CFE Treaty’s provisions and protocols. However, 
when it came time for implementation, some of the successor 
states found it difficult to meet their treaty commitments. The 
situation in the Transcaucasian region was chaotic. Nations were 
ensnared in a web of civil wars, revolutions, ethnic conflicts, and 
internal governmental chaos. Implementing the CFE Treaty was 
not a pressing commitment for these states. To complicate matters, 
the Russian army, which had inherited the USSR’s forces and 
equipment before Tashkent, was now withdrawing from some 
parts of the region. Under the Tashkent Agreement, the Russian 
army was responsible for turning over to the other successor states 
their “agreed-upon” portion of the former USSR’s arsenal. Under 
the CFE Treaty, those nations would be responsible for the treaty- 
limited equipment and for destroying excess weapons. However, 
much of the Russian army’s military equipment in the Trans¬ 
caucasian region was old and unusable. When transferred, it was 
rejected. This rejection, which included several hundred tanks, 
ACVs, and artillery pieces, caused problems for the other signa¬ 
tory states monitoring compliance with the CFE Treaty. 

In the Transcaucasian region, all three states—Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia—experienced major difficulties in com¬ 
plying with the CFE Treaty. When the treaty entered into force in 
July 1992, Armenia reported almost no data on its conventional 
equipment, despite having been authorized at Tashkent 258 tanks, 
641 ACVs, 357 artillery pieces, and 7 helicopters. Furthermore, 
Armenia did not admit to the JCG that it had any reduction liabili¬ 
ties in the first or second treaty reduction years. In January 1993, 
Armenia did submit its TLE listings, but it stated that some of the 



Abandoned TLE presented accountability problems in the Transcaucasus nations. 



243 


The CFE Treaty: A Durable Structure for Post-Cold War Europe 



In November 1992, an American team conducted a declared site inspection in Azerbaijan. 


CFE equipment left by the departing Russian army lacked parts, 
critical elements, and functioning units. Armenia implied that it 
would not account for or reduce this unacceptable CFE equip¬ 
ment. Russia, in its CFE Treaty charts, had reported the equipment 
as transferred to Armenia. However, Armenia, on its treaty charts, 
did not report the same numbers. This caused a discrepancy, 
which the JCG discussed but could not resolve. 

Azerbaijan, when the treaty entered into force, submitted its 
TLE data, but they were incomplete and inaccurate. The problem 
with the Azerbaijani data stemmed from the same cause: the de¬ 
parting Russian army had left tanks, ACVs, and artillery that were 
in such poor shape or so stripped down that Azerbaijan refused to 
accept and account for them. In addition, the Azerbaijanis were 
involved in a lengthy ethnic war in Nagorno-Karabakh, and they 
asserted that losses of conventional equipment in that conflict 
could not be accounted for or reported. Azerbaijan did accept one 
U.S. CFE inspection team in November 1992, thus indicating a 
certain willingness to participate in the treaty. But Azerbaijan did 
not report any CFE equipment or weapons reduction liabilities to 
the JCG as required at the end of either the first or the second 
treaty reduction year. Georgia, as a new nation, had major prob¬ 
lems. An intense civil war threatened the existence of the govern¬ 
ment. Under these circumstances, Georgia’s compliance with 
the CFE Treaty was problematical. At the end of the third reduc¬ 
tion year, the JCG issued a statement declaring that Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia were not in compliance with the treaty. 2 ’ 

Ukraine and Russia were also not in compliance with the 
CFE Treaty. They did not meet their quotas for reducing excess 
treaty-limited equipment assigned to the Black Sea Fleet’s naval 
infantry and coastal defense units. This treaty problem was part of 




244 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


a much larger issue: the Black Sea Fleet’s partition by Russia and 
Ukraine. At Tashkent, Russia agreed to cede to Ukraine a certain 
portion of the former Soviet Union’s weapons, units, and sites. 
Since these weapons fell under the numerical and zone restrictions 
of the CFE Treaty, Ukraine agreed in its articles of ratification to 
reduce any excess TLE within 40 months of entry into force. As of 
November 17, 1995, Ukraine was in compliance with all its treaty 
reduction quotas, except for the weapons and units assigned to the 
Black Sea Fleet. In 1995, the fleet had approximately 48,000 naval 
and marine personnel, 14 submarines, 31 surface ships, 43 patrol 
and coastal ships, 125 combat aircraft, and 85 helicopters. Equip¬ 
ment covered by the CFE Treaty included one coastal defense 
division with 175 tanks, 450 armored infantry fighting vehicles, 
and 72 artillery pieces. The fleet also contained a naval infantry 
brigade with 50 tanks, 218 ACVs, and 45 artillery pieces. Based in 
the Odessa Military District in the Crimea, this fleet was manned 
predominantly by Russian sailors and officers. The fleet’s Russian 
commander and its senior officers resisted any partition and trans¬ 
fer to Ukraine. 26 

Partitioning the fleet proved to be to difficult at Tashkent; 
consequently, the issue was left to bilateral Russian-Ukrainian nego¬ 
tiations. In June 1993, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed an agreement that essentially 
split the fleet in half, beginning in September 1993 and reaching 
completion in 1996. No sooner had this agreement been announced 
than it fell apart. Russian naval officers objected to any transfer, and 
Ukrainian military leaders objected to any loss of territory from the 
naval bases slated for transfer. The Black Sea Fleet agreement was 
renegotiated in September 1993, again in April 1994, and once 
again in February 1996. Two months later it fell apart again. Rus¬ 
sian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev stopped the division because of 
controversy over where the Russian fleet would be based. Through- 


U.S. Secretary of Defense William 
S. Perry, NATO Secretary Manfred 
Woerner, and Russian Defense 
Minister Pavel Grachev at NATO 
Headquarters, March 29, 1993. 






245 


The CFE Treaty: A Durable Structure for Post-Cold War Europe 


out these indecisive negotiations and inconclusive agreements, nei¬ 
ther Ukraine nor Russia destroyed any of the weapons or equipment 
assigned to the naval infantry and coastal defense units of the Black 
Sea Fleet. Consequently, the two nations were not in compliance 
with the CFE Treaty, and until the fleet had been divided success¬ 
fully, they would remain in that status.^ 


Destruction Commitments East of 
the Urals 

In 1990, during the final months of CFE Treaty negotiations, 
the Soviet Union transferred more than 50,000 pieces of TLE to 
military bases and depots east of the Ural Mountains. This was a 
legal movement of military equipment, since neither the Soviet 
Union nor any other nation had signed the unfinished treaty. Nev¬ 
ertheless, once the treaty was signed in Paris in November 1990, 
the Soviet Union’s initial TLE figures disturbed the other treaty 
states. They were concerned with the sheer size of the transfers, 
and some observers concluded that the Soviet military might be 
trying to circumvent the treaty, since no other nation had trans¬ 
ferred any conventional weapons or equipment outside its borders. 
At the time of the treaty’s signature in Paris, the Soviet Union’s 
data revealed a transfer of 6,289 CFE Treaty TLE items to units of 
the naval infantry, coastal defense, civil defense, and Strategic 
Rocket Forces. This transfer was considered a serious breach of 
the treaty—so serious that many nations, including the United 
States, suspended ratification actions until the Soviet Union 
pledged to account for and destroy a large portion of the trans¬ 
ferred equipment. 

As explained in Chapter 3, “Ratification Delayed,” intense 
diplomatic negotiations led the Soviet Union to pledge in a legal 
declaration to the Joint Consultative Group in June 1991 that it 
would destroy or convert 6,000 tanks, 7,000 artillery pieces, and 
1,500 ACVs (14,500 total) located east of the Urals by December 
31, 1995. At the same time, the Soviet Union obligated itself to 
remove from the treaty’s territorial zones 1,492 pieces of naval- 
related equipment. This equipment would also be destroyed by the 
end of 1995. None of the reductions would be subject to inspec¬ 
tion; however, Moscow pledged to provide sufficient visible evi¬ 
dence to indicate that the equipment had been destroyed or 
converted. 2S 

During the CFE Treaty’s 40-month reduction period, the 
treaty states individually monitored Russia’s progress in keeping 
its pledge to reduce its TLE east of the Urals. There was little 
reduction activity in 1992-93; only a slight increase in 1993-94; 
and a steady low state in 1994-95. In January 1995, the U.S. 
Congress was informed in a published Arms Control and Disarma- 




246 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


ment Agency (ACDA) report that “serious concern persists over 
the pace and validation of the [Russian] reductions.” In July 1995, 
the agency raised the issue before Congress again, criticizing 
Russia’s slow pace of destruction or conversion. 24 Then, just six 
weeks before the December 31, 1995, deadline, Russian General 
Dmitri Kharchenko announced to the JCG that Russia would be 
unable to meet its commitments, citing the expense of reducing 
such a large number of conventional weapons. He asked for an 
extension to December 1998. General Kharchenko discounted any 
military threat from the massed equipment, stating that weather 
exposure and lack of maintenance had rendered it effectively 
useless. 30 

Russia’s request was discussed in the JCG in Vienna, but 
there was no agreement. However, in May 1996, at the CFE 
Treaty Review Conference, all the signatory states accepted a new 
Russian declaration on the issue. In that conference’s Final Docu¬ 
ment (see Appendix D), Russia declared that it would proceed 
with reductions of all the committed weapons and equipment and 
would provide documentary evidence of its destruction and con¬ 
version. All battle tanks and armored combat vehicles that had 
been exposed to the weather would be displayed with the “hatches 
and covers of engines” opened. A group of experts, at their own 
expense, would be invited to the reduction sites to examine the 
equipment prior to its final disposal through scrapping. Finally, 
Russia established the year 2000 as the new deadline for complet¬ 
ing all reductions east of the Urals. 31 

Redefining the Treaty’s Flank Limits 

The problem of the treaty’s flank limits was both consequen¬ 
tial and controversial. 32 During negotiations the treaty states ac¬ 
cepted a two-part flank zone that contained limits on the number 
of active and stored conventional weapons. In the diplomatic end 
game leading to treaty signature, President Gorbachev and the 
Soviet Union accepted these zone limits and restrictions. The CFE 
Treaty’s Article V stipulated that each group of states could pos¬ 
sess no more than 4,700 tanks, 6,000 artillery pieces, and 5,900 
ACVs in the flank zones. Originally, the flank zones included the 
following national territories: Iceland, Norway, Greece, and parts 
of Turkey (NATO flanks) and Romania, Bulgaria, and four mili¬ 
tary districts in the Soviet Union (WTO flanks). For the Warsaw 
Treaty Organization, these military districts were located on the 
northern and southern flanks of the alliance (see table 8-1). The 
intent of treaty negotiators was to limit, through absolute numeri¬ 
cal ceilings and storage and active sublimits, the number of offen¬ 
sive weapons in these military districts. 


Kharchenko discounted 
military threat...weather 
rendered equipment useless. 




247 


The CFE Treaty: A Durable Structure for Post-Cold War Europe 


Table 8-1. CFE Treaty-Limited Equipment in the WTO Flank Zones 



Tanks 

Artillery 

ACVs 

Total 

Russia (2 military districts) 1 

700 

1,280 

580 

2,560 active 


600 

400 

800 

1,800 storage 

Ukraine (1 military district) 2 

280 

390 

350 

1,020 active 


400 

500 

— 

900 storage 

Moldova (1 military district) 2 

210 

250 

210 

670 active 





0 storage 

Georgia 3 

220 

285 

220 

725 active 





0 storage 

Azerbaijan 3 

220 

285 

220 

725 active 





0 storage 

Armenia 3 

220 

285 

220 

725 active 





0 storage 

Total former USSR 

2,850 

3,675 

2,600 

9,125 active and storage 

Total former USSR 

1,850 

2,775 

1,800 

6,425 active only 

Bulgaria 4 

1,475 

1,750 

2,000 

5,225 active 





0 storage 

Romania 4 

1,375 

1,475 

2,100 

4,950 active 





0 storage 

WTO flank total 5 

4,700 

6,000 

5,900 

16,600 active only 


’The flank zone included the Soviet military districts of Leningrad and Northern Caucasus, part of Russia. 
2 Ukraine contained the Soviet military districts of Kiev, Carpathia, and Odessa, but only Odessa was included in 
the flank zone. The Odessa Military District also contained Moldova. 

3 Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan made up the Soviet Transcaucasus Military District. 

4 Bulgaria and Romania belonged entirely within the WTO Flank Zone. 

5 As determined by Article V of the CFE Treaty. 

Source: Dorn Crawford, “Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE),” ACDA, 1993. 


In 1990, when the Soviet Union accepted these flank zone 
limitations, no one anticipated the nation’s collapse in 1991 and 
the emergence of 15 new states so quickly. During the first six 
months of 1992, Russia agreed to partition the former Soviet 
Union’s military forces and to ratify the CFE Treaty, including its 
flank zone restrictions. The treaty entered into force on July 17, 
1992; on-site inspections began immediately, and all the treaty’s 
provisions were in effect. Under Article V, Russia was allowed to 
have approximately 10 percent of its total treaty entitlements in 
the northern and southern flank zones in active units; more than 
85 percent had to be placed in storage. These treaty restrictions on 






248 


On-Site Inspection Agency 



CFE TREATY FLANK REGIONS 


■ CFE FLANK REGIONS 
° OTHER CFE REGIONS 
a NON-CFE REGIONS 


Russia’s conventional force deployments irritated senior military 
leaders. Only Ukraine had similar restrictions. In June 1993, Rus¬ 
sian Minister of Defense Grachev declared categorically that the 
CFE Treaty’s flank limits had to be revised. Grachev said the Rus¬ 
sian general staff needed to remove 400 tanks, 2,420 ACVs, and 
820 artillery pieces from the flank limits in order to field an addi¬ 
tional mechanized division. 33 

In September 1993, President Boris Yeltsin sent a letter to the 
heads of state of the United States, Germany, France, and Great 
Britain requesting that they recognize the CFE Treaty’s flank limits 
as a serious problem. Yeltsin asked for assistance in Russia’s ef¬ 
forts to modify the treaty. Ten days later, Russian Ambassador 
Vyacheslav Kulebyakin presented a diplomatic demarche to all 
CFE Treaty states. Specifically, Kulebyakin asked that the Joint 
Consultative Group consider raising Russia’s flank sublimits in the 
Leningrad Military District and in the Northern Caucasus Military 
District. In Vienna, Ukraine supported Russia on this issue, since 
the CFE flank rule required the Ukrainian army to base 60 percent 
of its forces on 40 percent of its territory. Ambassador Kulebyakin 
explained that “generally recognized common norms of interna¬ 
tional law provide for a possibility of suspending the effects of 
treaty obligations due to a radical change of circumstances....” He 
argued that the internal situation in the Northern Caucasus region 
warranted altering the CFE Treaty’s flank limits. 34 

The other CFE states did not respond formally to the Russian 
and Ukrainian requests. NATO nations, in the main, preferred the 
status quo. They indicated that while the treaty was being imple¬ 
mented, they would not support any changes in the negotiated and 







249 


The CFE Treaty: A Durable Structure for 


ratified treaty. Two NATO nations, Turkey and Norway, objected 
more strongly. Both nations bordered the Russian military districts 
in question. Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin publicly stated 
that modifying the CFE Treaty would both interrupt its implemen¬ 
tation and open up the possibility of an arms race in the Caucasus. 
Leaders of other NATO nations expressed their concerns about 
reopening the treaty, suggesting that some Eastern European na¬ 
tions—Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic—did not 
like the current treaty-mandated restrictions on stored weapons. 
Given this opposition, no other CFE Treaty state stepped forward in 
the fall and winter of 1993-94 to support the Russian and Ukrai¬ 
nian request to reconsider the CFE Treaty’s flank limits. 35 

Russia, however, did not let the issue die. In February 1994, 
two Russian general staff officers, General Dmitri Kharchenko and 
General Leonid Shevstov, briefed the JCG delegates in Vienna on 
precisely which TLE the Russian army intended to deploy in the 
Leningrad and North Caucasus Military Districts and how that 
equipment would be used. Then, in March 1994, the Russian CFE 
Treaty delegate asked the JCG to consider modifying the CFE 
Treaty provisions on weapons and equipment stored in the two 
military districts. The Russian representative argued that the treaty 
restrictions on the number of CFE weapons a state could remove 
from storage were out of date and militarily cumbersome. The 
JCG took no action on these Russian requests. Throughout the 
remainder of 1994, Russia continued to raise these flank issues in 
Vienna, and Ukraine continued its support. The other CFE Treaty 
states, however, maintained their opposition to considering any 
changes. At the end of the second treaty reduction year, the CFE 
Treaty’s flank limit problem remained unresolved. 36 

On December 10, 1994, Russia launched a military assault 
on rebel forces in Chechnya, in the Northern Caucasus region. The 
Russian military sent personnel, tanks, ACVs, artillery, and other 
conventional equipment into the region to quell the rebellion. 
Within a month, more than 40,000 Russian military and police 
troops had deployed into Chechnya. Under the CFE Treaty, Russia 
was limited to a total of 700 tanks, 580 ACVs, and 1,200 artillery 
pieces in active units in the southern flank zone. By the spring of 
1995, Russian deployments far exceeded these limits. If Russia did 
not reduce its deployments by November 17, 1995, the end of the 
third reduction year, it faced being designated as out of compliance 
with the CFE Treaty. 

Here was a serious, consequential treaty problem. Quickly, 
the issue was elevated above the diplomatic realm into interna¬ 
tional politics. In May 1995, President Clinton discussed the 
flanks issue with President Yeltsin at the Moscow Summit. In late 
May, Turkey threatened to send its military to its northeastern 
border if Russia continued to station excess forces in the southern 


Post-Cold War Europe 



President William J. Clinton. 







250 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


flank zone. Then, on June 1, the Russian High Command an¬ 
nounced that the 58th Army would be organized and stationed in 
the Northern Caucasus Military District. During the summer 
months the rebellion abated as Chechen and Russian leaders 
signed a series of declarations that established cease-fire dates and 
set timetables for limited troop withdrawals. But these declara¬ 
tions proved short-lived, as one side or the other resumed fighting. 
In the fall of 1995, with the approach of the date for ending the 
treaty’s reduction period (November 17), there was a flurry of 
diplomatic activity on the flanks issuer’ 7 



Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr. 


NATO nations presented a plan in mid-September for revis¬ 
ing the treaty’s flank zones. They proposed reducing the areas 
designated as flanks by excluding two military oblasts (districts) 
from Russia’s southern flank and three from its northern flank. 
These exclusions would give the Russian High Command greater 
flexibility in deploying its conventional forces and equipment 
internally. In return for this treaty modification, Russia had to 
agree to remain in the treaty, accept a few additional inspections, 
and provide some additional information, especially on any TLE 
deployed in areas that were formerly located in the flank zones. 
The Russians rejected this proposal categorically. In fact, they 
rejected all offers of compromise in the fall of 1995. In those 
months, President Clinton, Secretary of Defense Perry, and ACDA 
Director John Holum discussed various plans with their Russian 
counterparts. No common ground emerged. In Vienna, JGC repre¬ 
sentatives tried to work out an acceptable compromise that all 
nations could agree to. None worked. Consequently, when the 
November 17, 1995, deadline arrived, the 30 CFE states issued a 
joint statement identifying the states that had not met their treaty 
obligations. Russia, because of the excess TLE stationed in the 
southern flank zone and its failure to resolve the Black Sea Fleet 
issue, was not in compliance. 38 

The next demarcation point for possible resolution was May 
1996. The CFE Treaty contained a provision for a mandatory all¬ 
signatory states conference to be held 46 months after entry into 
force. The CFE First Review Conference was held in Vienna May 
15-31, 1996. The flanks issue dominated the conference. The 
Russian representative, Ambassador Kulebyakin, stated and re¬ 
stated Russia’s rationale for seeking relief from Article V and the 
flank limits. The U.S. delegation, led by Thomas Graham, Jr., 
Special Representative of the President for Arms Control, Nonpro¬ 
liferation, and Disarmament, and Gregory G. Govan, U.S. Chief 
Delegate to the JCG, tried repeatedly to shape a compromise re¬ 
definition of the flanks that was acceptable to all 30 nations. 
Netherlands Ambassador Frank Majoor chaired the conference 
and intervened at key times to facilitate a solution. Negotiations 
on the flanks issue were very, very difficult, but in the final hours 
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Mamedov signaled 







251 


The CFE Treaty: A Durable Structure for Post-Cold War Europe 



Verification agency leaders 
General-Major Yevgeniy Ivanovich 
Nikulin of Belarus, General-Major 
Vycheslav Aleksandrovich 
Romanov of Russia, and General- 
Major Nikolai Tikhonovich 
Honcharenko of Ukraine visit 
OSIA on July 31, 1995. 


Moscow’s acceptance of conference language and the agreement 
went forward. Russia and the other signatory states agreed in the 
Final Document that (1) Russia’s flank zone areas would be re¬ 
drawn, excluding certain military oblasts; (2) the total number of 
CFE equipment allowed in the Russian military districts—battle 
tanks, ACVs, and artillery—would be revised upward; (3) Russia 
would provide the other treaty states with force data more often; 
and (4) Russia would be liable for up to 10 additional declared site 
inspections annually in the flank zones. 39 

During the difficult negotiations, four nations—Ukraine, 
Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan—expressed major concerns 
about Russia’s future security intentions. In one way these nations 
were articulating new regional concerns; in another way they were 
expressing their fears about the possibility of large states’ influenc¬ 
ing small states and the significance of international law. In the 
conference’s Final Document, each of these four nations submitted 
a separate annex statement explaining its concerns (see Appendix 
D). During the conference, some of the NATO nations, particu¬ 
larly France and Great Britain, supported these nations. France 
took the position that every state had to respect the national sover¬ 
eignty of every other state, especially states that were parties to the 
CFE Treaty, the most important, modern, all-European multina¬ 
tional arms control treaty. With the positions of these four nations 
incorporated into the final statement, the delegates moved forward 
with language redefining the treaty’s flank limits. Not all the de¬ 
tails were ironed out. Subsequent diplomatic negotiations on the 
exact territorial demarcations and specific timetables for move¬ 
ment of the forces remained to be worked out in the Joint Consul¬ 
tative Group. 

Changes in Europe Influence CFE Treaty 
Implementation 

Throughout the first CFE Treaty year, 1992-93, considerable 
pressures had developed within the NATO alliance for a program 












252 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


of cooperation with the treaty verification agencies of the Eastern 
European nations—Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and the other succes¬ 
sor states. These pressures had originated as a political and diplo¬ 
matic consequence of the fall of the Berlin Wall; the revolutions in 
Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria; the unification of 
Germany; and, of course, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
creation of the new republics. These continental upheavals influ¬ 
enced how the NATO nations approached implementation of the 
CFE Treaty. Within NATO, Belgium, Netherlands, Great Britain, 
and Germany were the strongest advocates of establishing joint 
inspector training, authorizing joint inspection teams, and sharing 
treaty data among all signatory nations. 

In January 1993, seven months into the CFE Treaty’s imple¬ 
mentation, NATO’s Verification Coordinating Committee invited 
the directors of the national verification agencies, east and west, to 
attend an important meeting at NATO Headquarters. At this 
meeting, the 16 NATO nations, acting through the VCC, formally 
invited the 14 Eastern CFE Treaty nations to have their inspectors 
participate on NATO nations’ joint multinational inspection 
teams. They would be identified as NATO nation teams, but indi¬ 
vidual inspectors from one, two, or more of the Eastern bloc na¬ 
tions, as well as from the other NATO nations, could participate. 
The NATO nation conducting the inspection would lead the team. 



Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev signs the Partnership for Peace Framework Document for Russia at 
NATO Headquarters. 


Germany opened more than 
50 percent of its inspections 
for guest inspectors. 









253 


The CFE Treaty: A Durable Structure for Post-Cold War Europe 


After hearing the concept, the directors of the 
Eastern states’ verification agencies accepted the 
invitation. Within a matter of months, it became 
routine for inspectors from “cooperating part¬ 
ner” nations to serve on NATO-led multinational 
CFE inspection teams conducting reduction 
inspections in Eastern Europe. 40 Brigadier Gen¬ 
eral Heinz Loquai, Director of the German Fed¬ 
eral Armed Forces Verification Center, observed, 

“At first it was not so easy for the inspected 
countries, especially the former Warsaw Pact 
countries, to understand why guest inspectors 
were coming along with the [NATO nation] 
inspection teams. But, in my opinion, the partici¬ 
pation of the guest inspectors is a good develop¬ 
ment. Germany has opened more than 50 percent 
of all its inspections for the guest inspectors.” 41 

In 1993 and up to June 1994, 83 NATO-led multinational 
inspection teams conducted CFE Treaty inspections in Eastern 
Europe. According to Necil Nedimoglu, Director of NATO’s Veri¬ 
fication and Implementation Coordination Section (VICS), the 
cooperative program for guest inspectors worked so well that it 
stimulated other cooperative initiatives. Late in 1993, a few East¬ 
ern European treaty nations invited the NATO nations to send 
guest inspectors to serve on their inspection teams. After consider¬ 
able discussion within the alliance, in June 1994 the VCC issued a 
statement to NATO state verification agencies and staffs. It stated 
that Western inspectors could join Eastern-led CFE inspection 
teams that were conducting East-on-East inspections. During 1994 
and 1995, the United States, France, Holland, and Belgium partici¬ 
pated in many of these joint inspections. 42 

Along with these changes, the VCC also invited the Eastern 
nation treaty agencies to send individual inspectors to participate 
in NATO-conducted CFE Treaty courses. They accepted; and in 
1993 and 1994, 80 inspectors from Eastern nations’ verification 
agencies attended courses for CFE Treaty inspectors and escorts at 
the NATO school at Oberammergau, Germany. Other Eastern 
bloc inspectors participated in a NATO course on monitoring CFE 
reductions held at the Belgian Military Camp at Leopoldville. The 
guest inspectors at this Belgian reduction course even taught a 
portion of the course. They discussed the reduction methods being 
used in their nations, and, in turn, the NATO national inspectors 
explained how they would monitor those reductions. The VCC 
also sponsored seminars for all verification agency directors at 
NATO Headquarters in Brussels. These two-day seminars focused 
on treaty implementation issues and on strengthening director-to- 
director communications, but they should not be construed as a 
substitute for the CFE Treaty’s Joint Consultative Group meeting 



* 

I 

4 

<l> 

<d 

i 

id 

' 

<d 


SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE 


HtK3^ 


THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT 

LTC BROUSSARD Anthony 

HAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED 
THE 8TII CFE REDUCTION COURSE 
LEOPOLDSBURG, BELGIUM 
07-11 MARCH 1994 




NCHCXAS B KLHOE 1 

MAJOfi GENERAL. USAF 
ASSETANT CHEF OF STAFF ||j 


OPERAnONSAOGBTICS ON 


1*6 









254 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


in Vienna. The JCG was the official forum for resolving treaty 
issues and for authorizing any modifications to the treaty. 

Other cooperative initiatives demonstrated the new era of 
West-East European relations associated with implementing the 
CFE Treaty. In November 1993 the NATO nations offered all 
Eastern nations access to the alliance’s computerized CFE Treaty 
database, VERITY. The database contained the NATO nations’ 
annual military force data, information from their treaty inspec¬ 
tion reports, and data extracted from the inspections that moni¬ 
tored TLE reductions. VERITY had an electronic mail feature and 
was on-line 24 hours a day, every day at NATO Headquarters. 
While VERITY had no legal status, most of the NATO nation 
verification agencies found the system useful in preparing for 
inspection missions and monitoring overall reductions. Of the 14 
Eastern verification agencies, all except Armenia and Azerbaijan 
accepted the November 13 invitation to participate in the comput¬ 
erized data system. After a few months to schedule and conduct 
training courses at NATO Headquarters for the verification agen¬ 
cies’ automated data managers, the expanded VERITY system 
went into effect in March 1994. Among the participating nations 
(28 of 30), the system helped verification agency staffs track the 
annual data exchange of national military force holdings; notifica¬ 
tions of reduction events; results of reductions; and inspection 
information regarding the time, place, and type of inspection. By 
mid-1994, the VERITY database included inspection reports from 
all NATO nations, the Eastern European nations, and all but two 
of the new republics. 43 


Evaluating the CFE Treaty: The First 
Review Conference 


Modernizing by lifting the 
group of states concept . 


Incorporated into the treaty was a provision for a review 
conference of all the signatory states to be held 46 months after 
entry into force. Since the CFE Treaty entered into force in mid- 
July 1992, the treaty’s First Review Conference was held in mid- 
May 1996. Representatives from all states parties met in Vienna 
from May 15-31. In 46 months, much had changed. The Warsaw 
Treaty Organization had collapsed, prompting some states, princi¬ 
pally Russia, to advocate “modernizing” the treaty by removing 
the group of states concept from the treaty’s text. This recommen¬ 
dation was opposed by other states, principally the United States, 
citing the conference’s short duration and the opportunity to re¬ 
solve more pressing treaty implementation issues. Specifically, 
those issues were Russia’s commitment to reducing its TLE east of 
the Urals, the demands of Russia and Ukraine for adjusting the 
flank zone limits, the problem of accounting for the TLE transfers 
among the treaty states of the former Soviet Union, and the issue 
of authorizing a review and update of the treaty’s Protocol on 




255 


The CFE Treaty: A Durable Structure for Post-Cold War Europe 


Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment 
(POET). The two major recommendations for the conference 
agenda—treaty modernization and treaty compliance/implementa¬ 
tion issues—were not incompatible. Both were part of the 
conference’s final statement; however, implementation issues domi¬ 
nated the conference agenda. 44 

Because of the meeting’s short two-week duration, the confer¬ 
ence delegates formed working groups to develop recommenda¬ 
tions and textual language for debate and decision. Negotiations 
were conducted by representatives of individual states (or at times 
by groups of states), while decisions were made by consensus of 
all 30 state parties. The U.S. delegation was led by Ambassador 
Thomas Graham, Jr. The U.S. representative to the Joint Consulta¬ 
tive Group, Gregory G. Govan, formerly a Director of OSIA, 
worked closely with the large U.S. delegation. Russia’s representa¬ 
tive to the JCG, Vyacheslav Kulebyakin, worked with Russia’s 
Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Mamedov. Germany was repre¬ 
sented by Ambassador Rudiger Hartmann; France by Ambassador 
Bernard Miget, and Ukraine by Deputy Foreign Minister 
Konstyantyn Gryshchenko. Ambassador Frank Majoor of the 
Netherlands chaired the conference. All discussions and negotia¬ 
tions were conducted in confidence. 



At Criel, France, officials observe a ceremony recognizing Brigadier General Francois Rozec, 
Director, L’Unite Francaise de Verification. (Front row left) Brigadier General Colae 
Corduneanu, Romania; Necil Nedimoglu, Head of the VICS; Brigadier General Thomas E. 
Kuenning, OSIA; Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, OSIA; Brigadier General Peter Von Geyso, 
Germany; Colonel Colin A. Heron and Lt. Colonel Michael Morgan, United Kingdom. 










256 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


When the conference concluded on May 31, the 30 states 
issued a Final Document (see Appendix D). The states resolved the 
thorny issue of redefining the treaty’s flank zones. Russia made a 
specific commitment to reduce its TLE holdings east of the Urals. 
All the treaty states agreed that the JCG should update the POET 
each year. The conference representatives also addressed the future 
of the treaty. In the Final Document, the 30 state parties instructed 
the delegates to the Joint Consultative Group to “expand upon 
their work” in accordance with the treaty’s Article XVI. Since this 
article had established and empowered the JCG, the Review Con¬ 
ference representatives were essentially increasing and redirecting 
the JCG’s responsibilities. They charged the Vienna treaty group 
with creating a process to modernize the treaty and to improve its 
operations. On the subject of treaty modernization, the state repre¬ 
sentatives agreed on 12 topics for the JCG’s consideration (see 
Appendix D, Annex D). These topics included such fundamental 
treaty terms as “groups of states parties,” “area of application,” 
and “designated permanent storage site.” For improving treaty 
operations, the conference representatives developed 15 specific 
recommendations for “further consideration and resolution” by 
the JCG (see Appendix D, Annex E). Finally, the states instructed 
the JCG to develop a progress report and present it at the meeting 
of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 
Lisbon, Portugal, in December 1996. 

One of the most interesting aspect of the First Review 
Conference’s Final Document was the section reviewing the CFE 
Treaty’s operations. In the 46 months that had elapsed since entry 
into force, much had changed in Europe, and much had been 
accomplished under the provisions of the treaty. The document 
summarized some of these accomplishments 45 : 

The states parties note with satisfaction that more than 
58,000 pieces of conventional armaments and equipment 
have been reduced, and that the overall holdings of conven¬ 
tional armaments and equipment within the area of applica¬ 
tion are substantially lower than the limits set in the treaty. 

More than 2,500 inspections have taken place. A permanent 
system for regular and routine exchange of treaty notifica¬ 
tions and other information has been developed. The Joint 
Consultative Group has been firmly established and has 
demonstrated its utility and importance as the ongoing treaty 
forum. 

With regard to the concluding act, the states parties note with 
satisfaction that the personnel strength of conventional armed 
forces in the area of application was reduced by 1.2 million 
persons. 

The states parties note that the treaty established a high de¬ 
gree of transparency in military relations through its compre- 



257 


The CFE Treaty: A Durable Structure for Post-Cold War Europe 


hensive system for exchange of information and for verifica¬ 
tion. Together with the extensive reductions of conventional 
armaments and equipment, this has led to greater predictabil¬ 
ity and confidence in security relations. The treaty has also 
nurtured the development of new patterns of cooperation in 
Europe and provides a basis for stability and enhanced secu¬ 
rity in Europe at substantially lower levels of conventional 
armaments and equipment than heretofore. Although risks 
and challenges still exist in some parts of Europe, the capabil¬ 
ity for launching surprise attack and the danger of large-scale 
offensive action in Europe as a whole have been diminished 
substantially. Nevertheless, the achievement of the goals of 
the treaty in the whole area of its application requires con¬ 
tinuous efforts by the states parties. 


Evaluating the Treaty: Comparing the 
Numbers 

Following the end of the CFE Treaty’s 40-month reduction 
period, all treaty states declared their force levels in the five cat¬ 
egories of offensive weapons. This declaration allowed nations to 
compare the “anticipated” number of tanks, artillery, armored 
combat vehicles (ACVs), combat aircraft, and attack helicopters 
with the “actual” figure at the end of the reduction phase. The 
data were declared by each nation; when aggregated for the group 
of state parties (Western Group and Eastern Group), the figures 
indicated that the actual reductions were well below the CFE 
Treaty’s anticipated ceilings (table 8-2). 


Table 8-2. Comparison of CFE Treaty Reductions by Group of States 



Tanks 

Artillery 

ACVs 

Aircraft 

Helicopters 

Total 

Western Group 

July 1992* 

24,097 

19,839 

33,827 

5,118 

1,685 

84,566 

CFE ceiling 

19,142 

18,286 

29,822 

6,662 

2,000 

75,912 

Nov 1995** 

14,156 

14,869 

22,585 

4,301 

1,283 

57,194 

Eastern Group 

July 1992 

31,269 

25,755 

43,468 

8,544 

1,545 

110,581 

CFE ceiling 

20,000 

20,000 

30,000 

6,800 

2,000 

78,800 

Nov 1995 

19,061 

18,455 

28,764 

5,873 

1,466 

73,619 


*CFE Treaty entry into force. 

**CFE Treaty end of 40-month reduction period. 

Sources: Arms Control Reporter, 407.A.11 (1993); Arms Control Reporter , 407.B.533 (1996). 






258 


On-Site Inspection Agency 



Marry U.S. tanks deployed from U.S. Army units in Western Europe to the Gulf War. 

For a variety of reasons, national reductions of these weapons 
continued after the mid-November 1995 treaty deadline. A few 
nations—such as Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia—had not reduced 
all their TLE as required under the treaty. Other nations—Poland, 
Romania, and others—continued to reduce CFE weapons because 
they were excess to their national force structure. By the time of 
the CFE Treaty’s First Review Conference in May 1996, the state 
parties announced that the total number of reductions had ex¬ 
ceeded 58,000 items. At that conference, Russia pledged to destroy 
by the year 2000 the weapons and equipment located beyond the 
Ural Mountains and in certain naval units. 

A comparison of selected states’ CFE holdings at the begin¬ 
ning of the baseline period (July 1992) and at the end of the reduc¬ 
tion period (November 1995) indicates that the larger nations had 
significantly reduced their conventional weapons in the treaty’s 
territorial zones (table 8-3). 

Not all of these reductions were driven by the CFE Treaty. 

The massive withdrawals of U.S. military forces from Western 
Europe, for example, were caused by the need to deploy combat 
troops to the Middle East for the Gulf War and by reductions in 
the American military services following the Cold War. Russia’s 
large-scale reductions were also caused by historic forces, largely 
economic and political, that were external to the requirements of 
the CFE Treaty. Consequently, one must be cautious in drawing 
conclusions from these numbers alone. Nations did not make 
excess reductions in their military forces and weapons to comply 















The CFE Treaty: A Durable Structure for Post-Cold War Europe 


Table 8-3. Comparison of Selected National Holdings of CFE Treaty TLE 



Tanks 

Artillery 

ACVs 

Aircraft 

Helicopters 

Total 

United States 

July 1992* 

5,163 

1,973 

4,963 

398 

349 

12,846 

Nov 1995** 

1,254 

854 

2,238 

222 

150 

4,718 

Germany 

July 92 

7,170 

4,735 

9,099 

1,040 

256 

22,300 

Nov 95 

3,061 

2,056 

2,679 

578 

225 

8,599 

France 

July 92 

1,335 

1,436 

4,387 

695 

366 

8,219 

Nov 95 

1,289 

1,251 

3,556 

667 

317 

7,080 

Russia 

July 92 

9,338 

8,326 

19,399 

4,624 

1,005 

42,692 

Nov 95 

5,492 

5,680 

10,372 

2,986 

826 

25,356 

Ukraine 

July 92 

6,128 

3,591 

6,703 

1,648 

271 

18,341 

Nov 95 

4,026 

3,727 

4,919 

1,008 

270 

13,950 

Romania 

July 92 

2,967 

3,942 

3,171 

508 

15 

10,603 

Nov 95 

1,375 

1,471 

2,073 

373 

16 

5,308 


*CFE Treaty entry into force. 

**CFE Treaty 40-month reduction period. 

Source: Arms Control Today, December 1995, pp. 29-30. 


with the treaty; rather, they were compelled by economic, strate¬ 
gic, and military reasons to reduce their military forces. 

The numbers, however, do confirm that there have been 
major reductions in national military forces on the European 
continent. The United States, for instance, reduced or withdrew 
8,128 CFE TLE items from its forces stationed in Western Europe. 
This was a 63 percent reduction in its offensive forces on the Euro¬ 
pean continent. Collectively, the states of the former Soviet Union 
possessed 71,080 weapons in July 1992; three years later they had 
reduced these weapons to 39,581 or 55 percent. For Russia, the 
largest of the new republics, the figures indicate that its November 
1995 holdings of tanks, artillery, ACVs, combat aircraft, and 
helicopters west of the Ural Mountains was 25,261. In July 1992, 
Russia had declared 42,692 CFE weapons; three years later it had 
reduced 17,431 items or 41 percent. Germany reduced more CFE 
weapons— 13,701—than any other NATO nation. Certainly 







260 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Table 8-4. Comparison of CFE 1A Military 
Manpower Figures for Selected Nations— 
July 1992 to November 1995 



CFE 1A Ceiling 

July 1992 

Declared Holding 
November 1995 

United States 

250,000 

107,166 

Germany 

345,000 

293,889 

Turkey 

530,000 

527,670 

Russia 

1,450,000 

818,471 

Poland 

234,000 

233,870 

Ukraine 

450,000 

400,686 


Source: Arms Control Reporter, 407.A.11, (1993); Arms Control Reporter, 407.B.533 
(1996). 


German unification in 1990 had skewed these figures, with the 
addition of the former German Democratic Republic’s ground and 
air forces. In July 1992, Germany declared 22,300 CFE items; in 
November 1995, it stated it held 8,599 TLE, a reduction of 
13,701 or 61 percent. 

Reductions of full-time military personnel occurred in virtu¬ 
ally every CFE Treaty state. The CFE 1A Agreement dealt with 
limits on full-time military personnel. When the states parties 
agreed to implement the treaty provisionally in July 1992, they 
declared that 40 months later their military manpower would be 
at or below a specific numerical ceiling. The states, themselves, set 
the ceilings; consequently, they were quite high. When the 40- 
month reduction period ended in November 1995, all nations 
reporting military personnel force data were in compliance with 
the CFE 1A Agreement. Three nations—Armenia, Georgia, and 
Belarus—reported no data. Table 8-4 contains military manpower 
figures for selected nations at the starting and ending periods, July 
1992 and November 1995. 

One should approach these figures with caution. As in other 
comparisons associated with the CFE Treaty, larger forces must be 
considered. Most of the reasons for these manpower reductions lie 
outside the CFE Treaty; the treaty was not the single causal factor 
that forced these manpower reductions. 

There is no comprehensive set of figures listing all on-site 
inspections conducted by every nation under the CFE Treaty. The 
NATO nations recorded on their VERITY database system only 
the inspections for the Group of Western States. Inspections con¬ 
ducted by the Eastern nations, especially inspections on each other, 







261 


The CFE Treaty: A Durable Structure for Post-Cold War Europe 


were not systematically recorded in any central database or reposi¬ 
tory. It was not until June 1994 that most of the CFE Treaty states 
agreed to record their on-site inspections in the VERITY system; 
thus, no comprehensive list exists of inspections by all states be¬ 
fore June 1994. The United States, through the On-Site Inspection 
Agency, did record the number and type of its own CFE Treaty 
inspections. Compiled annually, these figures indicated an intense 
involvement by the United States in monitoring every aspect of the 
CFE Treaty (table 8-5). 


Table 8-5. U.S. On-Site Inspections Under the CFE Treaty 


Treaty Period 

Baseline 1 

1993 2 

1994 2 

1995 2 

1996 3 

Declared site 

43 

16 

12 

14 

31 

Challenge 

1 

2 

5 

1 

7 

Reduction 

5 

49 

47 

41 

— 

Singletons 4 

9 

86 

89 

50 

56 

Totals 

58 

153 

153 

106 

94 


1 July 18, 1992-November 13, 1992. 

2 Annual figures, mid-November-mid-November. 

3 Residual level validation period (RLVP): November 18,1995-March 16, 1996. 

4 U.S. inspectors on teams led by other state parties. 

Source: On-Site Inspection Agency, May 1996. 

Evaluating the Treaty: Final Thoughts 

If one asked in May 1996 why the CFE Treaty had succeeded 
as a continental European arms control treaty, there were many 
answers. On the geopolitical level, Europe had experienced his¬ 
toric changes from 1989 through 1992 that ended the Cold War, 
unified Germany, dissolved the Soviet Union, and created new 
European states. On the military level, Europe had witnessed in 
just five years (1989-1994) the Soviet Union’s and Russia’s with¬ 
drawal of more than 700,000 military personnel from Germany, 
the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Ro¬ 
mania, and the Baltic states. The United States had withdrawn 
220,000 troops from Germany, Italy, Great Britain, Belgium, 
Holland, and other Western European nations. On the economic 
level, Central and Eastern European nations had shifted from 
socialist economies to capitalist market economies, creating a 
broad political consensus for consumer goods over military equip¬ 
ment. In nation after nation, this economic transition proved 
extraordinarily difficult, creating societies racked by inflation and 
unemployment. Arms reduction treaties held a strong appeal for 
the citizens of most European nations, east and west. 






262 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


On the institutional level, some Eastern European nations 
sought entry into the European Union and the established NATO 
alliance. Adherence to the CFE Treaty, one of the NATO alliance’s 
fundamental post-Cold War objectives, furthered the foreign 
policy objectives of these nations. Finally, on the level of interna¬ 
tional law, the 30-nation CFE Treaty represented a fundamental 
legal commitment to a single continental arms control treaty per¬ 
manently limiting five categories of conventional military offensive 
weapons. The treaty contained important provisions for sharing 
force data and for verification by on-site inspection, thus creating 
a legal basis for transparency across national borders on a heavily 
armed continent. All things considered, national compliance with 
the CFE Treaty was the result of a broad European consensus 
constructed on significant changes in geopolitics, military strategy, 
economics, institutional desires, and a determination to establish 
international law across the vast continent. 

These factors were widely known; what was not so well 
known were the contributions of the 30 nations’ verification agen¬ 
cies, the on-site inspectors monitoring the treaty’s provisions and 
protocols, the military forces reducing the weapons, and the Verifi¬ 
cation Coordinating Committee and the Joint Consultative Group 
facilitating implementation. Collectively, these elements had imple¬ 
mented the complex, continent-wide treaty day by day, month by 
month, year by year. 

The people of these organizations were predominantly, but 
not exclusively, military officers and noncommissioned officers. 
They were the closest to treaty operations; they knew whether the 
treaty was meeting its objectives or not. Most believed that the 
CFE Treaty had achieved its objectives: reducing the level of offen¬ 
sive conventional arms on the continent, marking out territorial 
zones for the permanent reduction of forces and weapons, and 
establishing a rule of law for the future of Europe, west and east. 

These achievements were important. The CFE Treaty states 
were constructing the foundations of post-Cold War Europe. 

Trust and verify. 




263 


The CFE Treaty: A Durable Structure for Post-Cold War Europe 


Notes 

1. Statement of the Joint Consultative Group, Vienna, Austria, November 17, 
1995, cited in Arms Control Reporter 1995, pp. 407.B.527-528. 

2. Arms Control Reporter 1995, p. 407.B.528. 

3. “Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,” Preamble, paragraph 

7. 

4. Ibid., Article XIV; Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, USA, Commander, 
European Operations Command, OSIA, Briefing, “RLVP Summary,” May 
9, 1996. 

5. Interview with Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, USA, Commander, European 
Operations Command, OSIA, by Technical Sergeant David Willford, USAF, 
History Office, OSIA, November 13, 1995, and December 1, 1995. 

6. Colonel Kenneth Guillory, “We’re Ready for the Newest Treaty Chal¬ 
lenge,” On-Site Insights, November/December 1995, p. 3. 

7. Ibid., p. 3. 

8. Interview, Guillory; Col. Kenneth Guillory, “We’re Ready for the Newest 
Treaty Challenge,” p. 3; Technical Sergeant David Willford, “Treaty 
Validation Period Begins in Europe: Agency Inspectors Check Destruction 
of Weapons,” On-Site Insights, November/December 1995, pp. 1, 4. 

9. Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, “RLVP Summary,” May 9, 1996. 

10. Ibid.; Interview, Guillory. 

11. Colonel Kenneth D. Guillory, “RLVP Summary,” May 9, 1996. 

12. See this history, Chapter 6, CFE Treaty Baseline. See also Interview with 
Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC, Chief, Operations Division, European 
Operations Command, OSIA, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, 
Washington, D.C., May 18, 1994; Interview, Lt. Colonel Jan S. Karcz, 

USA, Team Chief, OSIA, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Rhein- 
Main Air Base, Germany, December 13, 1993. 

13. Interview, Kelley; Interview with Lt. Colonel David P. Gessert, USAF, Team 
Chief, OSIA, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Rhein-Main Air 
Base, Germany, July 12, 1993; Interview, Karcz. 

14. Interview, Ambassador Lynn M. Hansen, U.S. Government CFE Treaty 
Negotiator, by Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Ramstein Air Base, 
Germany, December 14, 1993. 

15. For a more detailed examination of the issue, see Chapter 6. 

16. Arms Control Reporter 1992, p. 407.B.479. 

17. Ibid., p. 407.B.481. 

18. Arms Control Reporter 1993, pp. 407.B.487, 488-489. 

19. Ibid., p. 407.B.489. 

20. Arms Control Reporter 1994, p. 407.B.503; Interview with Colonel 
Stanislaw Malinowski, Chief Inspector, Polish Verification Center, by 
Joseph P. Harahan, Historian, OSIA, Warsaw, Poland, February 3, 1994. 

21. Arms Control Reporter 1992, p. 407.B.481; Arms Control Reporter 1993, 
p. 407.B.499; Arms Control Reporter 1994, pp. 407.B.506, 508. 

22. Arms Control Reporter 1994, pp. 407.B.505-507. 



264 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


23. “Complying with CFE Suspended for Financial Reasons,” INTERFAX 
(Moscow), February 23, 1995, in FBIS-Soviet Union , February 24, 1995. 

24. Arms Control Reporter 1994, pp. 407.B.516, 519, 525, 527-528, 530; 
Arms Control Reporter 1996 , p. 407.B.537. 

25. Jim Nichol, “Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty: Russian Attitudes and 
Implications for U.S. Interests,” Congressional Research Service Report, 
September 15, 1995; Jack Mendelsohn, “The CFE Treaty: In Retrospect 
and Under Review,” Arms Control Today, April 1996, pp. 7—11. 

26. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1995-96 
(Fondon: Brassey’s Inc., 1995), pp. 71, 100, 105, 118. 

27. Ibid., pp. 71, 100; Arms Control Reporter 1996, pp. 407.B.534-536. 

28. See this history, Chapter 3, Ratification Delayed. 

29. Nichol, “Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.” 

30. Arms Control Reporter 1995, p. 407.B.529. 

31. CFE Treaty Review Conference, Final Document, Appendix D. 

32. For in incisive analysis of this flanks issue, see Richard A. Falkenrath, “The 
CFE Flank Dispute: Waiting in the Wings”; International Security, Spring 
1995, pp. 118-144; and Richard A. Falkenrath, “Resolving the CFE 
‘Flank’ Dispute,” Arms Control Today, May 1995, pp. 15-20. 

33. Falkenrath, “CFE Flank Dispute,” pp. 129-130. 

34. Ibid., pp. 129-133. 

35. Nichol, “Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.” 

36. Arms Control Reporter 1994, pp. 407.B.502-503, 507, 509, 512, 513. 

37. Nichol, “Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty”; Arms Control Reporter 
1994, pp. 407.B.522-523, 526; Falkenrath, “Resolving the CFE ‘Flank’ 
Dispute,” pp. 15-17. 

38. Arms Control Reporter 1995, pp. 407.B.518, 522-523, 525-526; 
Mendelsohn, “The CFE Treaty: In Retrospect and Under Review,” pp. 7— 
11 . 

39. CFE Treaty Review Conference, Final Document, Appendix D. 

40. Necil Nedimoglu, Head of the Verification and Implementation Coordina¬ 
tion Section, NATO Verification Coordinating Committee, “NATO’s Role 
in Verification and Compliance Monitoring for the CFE Treaty and the 
Vienna Document,” speech presented to the United Nations Group of 
Governmental Experts on Verification in All Its Aspects, New York, July 
19, 1994. See also Interview, Kelley. 

41. Interview with Brigadier General Dr. Heinz Foquai, Director, Zentrum Fur 
Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr, by Joseph R Harahan, Historian, 
OSIA, Geilenkirchen, Germany, January 31, 1994. 

42. Nedimoglu, “NATO’s Role in Verification and Compliance Monitoring”; 
Arms Control Reporter 1993, p. 407.B.508. 

43. Arms Control Reporter 1994, p. 407.B.502. 

44. Interview with Ambassador Thomas Graham, Jr., Special Representative of 
the President for Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament, by 
editors of Arms Control Today, April 25, 1996, published in “The CFE 
Treaty Review Conference: Strengthening the 'Cornerstone’ of European 
Security,” Arms Control Today, April 1996, pp. 3-6. 

45. CFE Treaty Review Conference, Final Document, Appendix D. 




Appendix A 



The Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, 
Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the 
Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of 
Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of 
Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Kingdom of 
Spain, the Republic of Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the United States of America, 
hereinafter referred to as the States Parties, 

Guided by the Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe of January 10, 1989, and having 
conducted this negotiation in Vienna beginning on March 9, 
1989, 

Guided by the objectives and the purposes of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, within 
the framework of which the negotiation of this Treaty was 
conducted, 

Recalling their obligation to refrain in their mutual 
relations, as well as in their international relations in 
general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations, 

Conscious of the need to prevent any military conflict in 
Europe, 

Conscious of the common responsibility which they all 
have for seeking to achieve greater stability and security in 
Europe, 

Striving to replace military confrontation with a new 
pattern of security relations among all the States Parties 
based on peaceful cooperation and thereby to contribute to 
overcoming the division of Europe, 

Committed to the objectives of establishing a secure and 
stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at 
lower levels than heretofore, of eliminating disparities 
prejudicial to stability and security and of eliminating, as a 
matter of high priority, the capability for launching surprise 
attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action in 
Europe, 

Recalling that they signed or acceded to the Treaty of 
Brussels of 1948, the Treaty of Washington of 1949 or the 
Treaty of Warsaw of 1955 and that they have the right to be 
or not to be a party to treaties of alliance, 


Committed to the objective of ensuring that the numbers 
of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the 
Treaty within the area of application of this Treaty do not 
exceed 40,000 battle tanks, 60,000 armoured combat 
vehicles, 40,000 pieces of artillery, 13,600 combat aircraft 
and 4,000 attack helicopters, 

Affirming that this Treaty is not intended to affect 
adversely the security interests of any State, 

Affirming their commitment to continue the conventional 
arms control process including negotiations, taking into 
account future requirements for European stability and 
security in the light of political developments in Europe, 

Have agreed as follows: 

Article I 

1. Each State Party shall carry out the obligations set 
forth in this Treaty in accordance with its provisions, 
including those obligations relating to the following five 
categories of conventional armed forces: battle tanks, 
armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and 
combat helicopters. 

2. Each State Party also shall carry out the other 
measures set forth in this Treaty designed to ensure security 
and stability both during the period of reduction of 
conventional armed forces and after the completion of 
reductions. 

3. This Treaty incorporates the Protocol on Existing 
Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment, 
hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Existing Types, 
with an Annex thereto; the Protocol on Procedures 
Governing the Reclassification of Specific Models or 
Versions of Combat-Capable Trainer Aircraft Into Unarmed 
Trainer Aircraft, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on 
Aircraft Reclassification; the Protocol on Procedures 
Governing the Reduction of Conventional Armaments and 
Equipment Limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on 
Reduction; the Protocol on Procedures Governing the 
Categorisation of Combat Helicopters and the 
Recategorisation of Multi-Purpose Attack Helicopters, 
hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Helicopter 
Recategorisation; the Protocol on Notification and Exchange 
of Information, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on 
Information Exchange, with an Annex on the Format for the 
Exchange of Information, hereinafter referred to as the 
Annex on Format; the Protocol on Inspection; the Protocol 
on the Joint Consultative Group; and the Protocol on the 






266 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Provisional Application of Certain Provisions of the Treaty 
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, hereinafter 
referred to as the Protocol on Provisional Application. Each 
of these documents constitutes an integral part of this Treaty. 

Article II 

1. For the purposes of this Treaty: 

(A) The term "group of States Parties" means the group 
of States Parties that signed the Treaty of Warsaw' of 
1955 consisting of the Republic of Bulgaria, the 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of 
Hungary, the Republic of Poland, Romania and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or the group of 
States Parties that signed or acceded to the Treaty of 
Brussels" of 1948 or the Treaty of Washington of 
1949 consisting of the Kingdom of Belgium, Canada, 
the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, 
the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the 
Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the 
Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States 
of America. 

(B) The term “area of application” means the entire land 
territory of the States Parties in Europe from the 
Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains, which 
includes all the European island territories of the 
States Parties, including the Faroe Islands of the 
Kingdom of Denmark, Svalbard including Bear 
Island of the Kingdom of Norway, the islands of 
Azores and Madeira of the Portuguese Republic, the 
Canary Islands of the Kingdom of Spain and Franz 
Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics. In the case of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, the area of application 
includes all territory lying west of the Ural River and 
the Caspian Sea. In the case of the Republic of 
Turkey, the area of application includes the territory 
of the Republic of Turkey north and west of a line 
extending from the point of intersection of the 
Turkish border with the 39th parallel to Muradiye, 
Patnos, Karayazi, Tekman, Kemaliye, Feke, Ceyhan, 
Dogankent, Gozne and thence to the sea. 

(C) The term “battle tank” means a self-propelled 
armoured fighting vehicle, capable of heavy 
firepower, primarily of a high muzzle velocity direct 
fire main gun necessary to engage armoured and 
other targets, with high cross-country mobility, with 
a high level of self-protection, and which is not 


The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance signed in Warsaw, 14 May 1955 

The Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence signed in Brussels, 
17 March 1948 

The North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington, 4 April 
1949 


designed and equipped primarily to transport 
combat troops. Such armoured vehicles serve as the 
principal weapon system of ground-force tank and 
other armoured formations. 

Battle tanks are tracked armoured fighting 
vehicles which weigh at least 16.5 metric tonnes 
unladen weight and which are armed with a 
360-degree traverse gun of at least 75 
millimetres calibre. In addition, any wheeled 
armoured fighting vehicles entering into service 
which meet all the other criteria stated above 
shall also be deemed battle tanks. 

(D) The term “armoured combat vehicle” means a self- 
propelled vehicle with armoured protection and 
cross-country capability. Armoured combat vehicles 
include armoured personnel carriers, armoured 
infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament 
combat vehicles. 

The term “armoured personnel carrier” means 
an armoured combat vehicle which is designed 
and equipped to transport a combat infantry 
squad and which, as a rule, is armed with an 
integral or organic weapon of less than 20 
millimetres calibre. 

The term “armoured infantry fighting vehicle” 
means an armoured combat vehicle which is 
designed and equipped primarily to transport a 
combat infantry squad, which normally 
provides the capability for the troops to deliver 
fire from inside the vehicle under armoured 
protection, and which is armed with an integral 
or organic cannon of at least 20 millimetres 
calibre and sometimes an antitank missile 
launcher. Armoured infantry fighting vehicles 
serve as the principal weapon system of 
armoured infantry or mechanised infantry or 
motorised infantry formations and units of 
ground forces. 

The term “heavy armament combat vehicle” 
means an armoured combat vehicle with an 
integral or organic direct fire gun of at least 75 
millimetres calibre, weighing at least 6.0 metric 
tonnes unladen weight, which does not fall 
within the definitions of an armoured personnel 
carrier, or an armoured infantry fighting vehicle 
or a battle tank. 

(E) The term “unladen weight” means the weight of a 
vehicle excluding the weight of ammunition; fuel, oil 
and lubricants; removable reactive armour; spare 
parts, tools and accessories; removable snorkelling 
equipment; and crew and their personal kit. 

(F) The term “artillery” means large calibre systems 
capable of engaging ground targets by delivering 
primarily indirect fire. Such artillery systems provide 
the essential indirect fire support to combined arms 
formations. 

Large calibre artillery systems are guns, 
howitzers, artillery pieces combining the 
characteristics of guns and howitzers, mortars 





267 


Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 


and multiple launch rocket systems with a 
calibre of 100 millimetres and above. In 
addition, any future large calibre direct fire 
system which has a secondary effective indirect 
fire capability shall be counted against the 
artillery ceilings. 

(G) The term “stationed conventional armed forces” 
means conventional armed forces of a State Party 
that are stationed within the area of application on 
the territory of another State Party. 

(H) The term “designated permanent storage site” means 
a place with a clearly defined physical boundary 
containing conventional armaments and equipment 
limited by the Treaty, which are counted within 
overall ceilings but which are not subject to 
limitations on conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty in active units. 

(I) The term “armoured vehicle launched bridge” means 
a self-propelled armoured transporter-launcher 
vehicle capable of carrying and, through built-in 
mechanisms, of emplacing and retrieving a bridge 
structure. Such a vehicle with a bridge structure 
operates as an integrated system. 

(J) The term “conventional armaments and equipment 
limited by the Treaty” means battle tanks, armoured 
combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack 
helicopters subject to the numerical limitations set 
forth in Articles IV, V and VI. 

(K) The term “combat aircraft” means a fixed-wing or 
variable-geometry wing aircraft armed and equipped 
to engage targets by employing guided missiles, 
unguided rockets, bombs, guns, cannons, or other 
weapons of destruction, as well as any model or 
version of such an aircraft which performs other 
military functions such as reconnaissance or 
electronic warfare. The term “combat aircraft” does 
not include primary trainer aircraft. 

(L) The term “combat helicopter” means a rotary wing 
aircraft armed and equipped to engage targets or 
equipped to perform other military functions. The 
term “combat helicopter” comprises attack 
helicopters and combat support helicopters. The 
term “combat helicopter” does not include unarmed 
transport helicopters. 

(M) The term “attack helicopter” means a combat 
helicopter equipped to employ anti-armour, air-to- 
ground, or air-to-air guided weapons and equipped 
with an integrated fire control and aiming system for 
these weapons. The term “attack helicopter” 
comprises specialised attack helicopters and multi¬ 
purpose attack helicopters. 

(N) The term “specialised attack helicopter” means an 
attack helicopter that is designed primarily to 
employ guided weapons. 

(O) The term “multi-purpose attack helicopter” means 
an attack helicopter designed to perform multiple 
military functions and equipped to employ guided 
weapons. 


(P) The term “combat support helicopter” means a 
combat helicopter which does not fulfill the 
requirements to qualify as an attack helicopter and 
which may be equipped with a variety of self-defence 
and area suppression weapons, such as guns, 
cannons and unguided rockets, bombs or cluster 
bombs, or which may be equipped to perform other 
military functions. 

(Q) The term “conventional armaments and equipment 
subject to the Treaty” means battle tanks, armoured 
combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, primary 
trainer aircraft, unarmed trainer aircraft, combat 
helicopters, unarmed transport helicopters, 
armoured vehicle launched bridges, armoured 
personnel carrier look-alikes and armoured infantry 
fighting vehicle look-alikes subject to information 
exchange in accordance with the Protocol on 
Information Exchange. 

(R) The term “in service,” as it applies to conventional 
armed forces and conventional armaments and 
equipment, means battle tanks, armoured combat 
vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, primary trainer 
aircraft, unarmed trainer aircraft, combat 
helicopters, unarmed transport helicopters, 
armoured vehicle launched bridges, armoured 
personnel carrier look-alikes and armoured infantry 
fighting vehicle look-alikes that are within the area 
of application, except for those that are held by 
organisations designed and structured to perform in 
peacetime internal security functions or that meet 
any of the exceptions set forth in Article III. 

(S) The terms “armoured personnel carrier look-alike” 
and “armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alike” 
mean an armoured vehicle based on the same chassis 
as, and externally similar to, an armoured personnel 
carrier or armoured infantry fighting vehicle, 
respectively, which does not have a cannon or gun of 
20 millimetres calibre or greater and which has been 
constructed or modified in such a way as not to 
permit the transportation of a combat infantry 
squad. Taking into account the provisions of the 
Geneva Convention “For the Amelioration of the 
Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field” of 12 August 1949 that confer a 
special status on ambulances, armoured personnel 
carrier ambulances shall not be deemed armoured 
combat vehicles or armoured personnel carrier look- 
alikes. 

(T) The term “reduction site” means a clearly designated 
location where the reduction of conventional 
armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in 
accordance with Article VIII takes place. 

(U) The term “reduction liability” means the number in 
each category of conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty that a State Party 
commits itself to reduce during the period of 40 
months following the entry into force of this Treaty 
in order to ensure compliance with Article VII. 

2. Existing types of conventional armaments and 
equipment subject to the Treaty are listed in the Protocol on 



268 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Existing Types. The lists of existing types shall be 
periodically updated in accordance with Article XVI, 
paragraph 2, subparagraph (D) and Section IV of the 
Protocol on Existing Types. Such updates to the existing 
types lists shall not be deemed amendments to this Treaty. 

3. The existing types of combat helicopters listed in the 
Protocol on Existing Types shall be categorised in 
accordance with Section I of the Protocol on Helicopter 
Recategorisation. 

Article III 

1. For the purposes of this Treaty, the States Parties 
shall apply the following counting rules: 

All battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, 
combat aircraft and attack helicopters, as defined in Article 
II, within the area of application shall be subject to the 
numerical limitations and other provisions set forth in 
Articles IV, V and VI, with the exception of those which in a 
manner consistent with a State Party’s normal practices: 

(A) are in the process of manufacture, including 
manufacturing-related testing; 

(B) are used exclusively for the purposes of research and 
development; 

(C) belong to historical collections; 

(D) are awaiting disposal, having been decommissioned 
from service in accordance with the provisions of 
Article IX; 

(E) are awaiting, or are being refurbished for, export or 
re-export and are temporarily retained within the 
area of application. Such battle tanks, armoured 
combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack 
helicopters shall be located elsewhere than at sites 
declared under the terms of Section V of the Protocol 
on Information Exchange or at no more than 10 
such declared sites which shall have been notified in 
the previous year’s annual information exchange. In 
the latter case, they shall be separately 
distinguishable from conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty; 

(F) are, in the case of armoured personnel carriers, 
armoured infantry fighting vehicles, heavy armament 
combat vehicles or multi-purpose attack helicopters, 
held by organisations designed and structured to 
perform in peacetime internal security functions; or 

(G) are in transit through the area of application from a 
location outside the area of application to a final 
destination outside the area of application, and are 
in the area of application for no longer than a total 
of seven days. 

2. If, in respect of any such battle tanks, armoured 
combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft or attack 
helicopters, the notification of which is required under 
Section IV of the Protocol on Information Exchange, a State 
Party notifies an unusually high number in more than two 
successive annual information exchanges, it shall explain the 
reasons in the Joint Consultative Group, if so requested. 


Article IV 

1. Within the area of application, as defined in Article 
II, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its 
battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat 
aircraft and attack helicopters so that, 40 months after entry 
into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of 
States Parties to which it belongs, as defined in Article II, the 
aggregate numbers do not exceed: 

(A) 20,000 battle tanks, of which no more than 16,500 
shall be in active units; 

(B) 30,000 armoured combat vehicles, of which no more 
than 27,300 shall be in active units. Of the 30,000 
armoured combat vehicles, no more than 18,000 
shall be armoured infantry fighting vehicles and 
heavy armament combat vehicles; of armoured 
infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament 
combat vehicles, no more than 1,500 shall be heavy 
armament combat vehicles; 

(C) 20,000 pieces of artillery, of which no more than 
17,000 shall be in active units; 

(D) 6,800 combat aircraft; and 

(E) 2,000 attack helicopters. 

Battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery not 
in active units shall be placed in designated permanent 
storage sites, as defined in Article II, and shall be located 
only in the area described in paragraph 2 of this Article. 

Such designated permanent storage sites may also be located 
in that part of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics comprising the Odessa Military District and the 
southern part of the Leningrad Military District. In the 
Odessa Military District, no more than 400 battle tanks and 
no more than 500 pieces of artillery may be thus stored. In 
the southern part of the Leningrad Military District, no 
more than 600 battle tanks, no more than 800 armoured 
combat vehicles, including no more than 300 armoured 
combat vehicles of any type with the remaining number 
consisting of armoured personnel carriers, and no more than 
400 pieces of artillery may be thus stored. The southern part 
of the Leningrad Military District is understood to mean the 
territory within that military district south of the line East- 
West 60 degrees 15 minutes northern latitude. 

2. Within the area consisting of the entire land territory 
in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, 
of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark including the Faroe 
Islands, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Italian Republic, the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese 
Republic including the islands of Azores and Madeira, the 
Kingdom of Spain including the Canary Islands, the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and that 
part of the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics west of the Ural Mountains comprising the Baltic, 
Byelorussian, Carpathian, Kiev, Moscow and Volga-Ural 
Military Districts, each State Party shall limit and, as 
necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles 
and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this 







Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 269 


Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to 
which it belongs the aggregate numbers do not exceed: 

(A) 15,300 battle tanks, of which no more than 11,800 
shall be in active units; 

(B) 24,100 armoured combat vehicles, of which no more 
than 21,400 shall be in active units; and 

(C) 14,000 pieces of artillery, of which no more than 
11,000 shall be in active units. 

3. Within the area consisting of the entire land territory 
in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, 
of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark including the Faroe 
Islands, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Italian Republic, the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, the Republic of Poland, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and that part of the 
territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
comprising the Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian and Kiev 
Military Districts, each State Party shall limit and, as 
necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles 
and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this 
Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to 
which it belongs the aggregate numbers in active units do 
not exceed: 

(A) 10,300 battle tanks; 

(B) 19,260 armoured combat vehicles; and 

(C) 9,100 pieces of artillery; and 

(D) in the Kiev Military District, the aggregate numbers 
in active units and designated permanent storage 
sites together shall not exceed: 

(1) 2,250 battle tanks; 

(2) 2,500 armoured combat vehicles; and 

(3) 1,500 pieces of artillery. 

4. Within the area consisting of the entire land territory 
in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, 
of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of 
Hungary, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands and the Republic of Poland, each State 
Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, 
armoured combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months 
after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the 
group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate 
numbers in active units do not exceed: 

(A) 7,500 battle tanks; * 

(B) 11,250 armoured combat vehicles; and 

(C) 5,000 pieces of artillery. 

5. States Parties belonging to the same group of States 
Parties may locate battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles 
and artillery in active units in each of the areas described in 
this Article and Article V, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A) 
up to the numerical limitations applying in that area, 
consistent with the maximum levels for holdings notified 
pursuant to Article VII and provided that no State Party 


stations conventional armed forces on the territory of 
another State Party without the agreement of that State 
Party. 

6. If a group of States Parties’ aggregate numbers of 
battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery in 
active units within the area described in paragraph 4 of this 
Article are less than the numerical limitations set forth in 
paragraph 4 of this Article, and provided that no State Party 
is thereby prevented from reaching its maximum levels for 
holdings notified in accordance with Article VII, paragraphs 
2, 3 and 5, then amounts equal to the difference between the 
aggregate numbers in each of the categories of battle tanks, 
armoured combat vehicles and artillery and the specified 
numerical limitations for that area may be located by States 
Parties belonging to that group of States Parties in the area 
described in paragraph 3 of this Article, consistent with the 
numerical limitations specified in paragraph 3 of this Article. 

Article V 

1. To ensure that the security of each State Party is not 
affected adversely at any stage: 

(A) within the area consisting of the entire land territory 
in Europe, which includes all the European island 
territories, of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Hellenic 
Republic, the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of 
Norway, Romania, the part of the Republic of 
Turkey within the area of application and that part 
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics comprising 
the Leningrad, Odessa, Transcaucasus and North 
Caucasus Military Districts, each State Party shall 
limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, 
armoured combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 
months after entry into force of this Treaty and 
thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it 
belongs the aggregate numbers in active units do not 
exceed the difference between the overall numerical 
limitations set forth in Article IV, paragraph 1 and 
those in Article IV, paragraph 2, that is: 

(1) 4,700 battle tanks; 

(2) 5,900 armoured combat vehicles; and 

(3) 6,000 pieces of artillery; 

(B) notwithstanding the numerical limitations set forth 
in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, a State Party 
or States Parties may on a temporary basis deploy 
into the territory belonging to the members of the 
same group of States Parties within the area 
described in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph 
additional aggregate numbers in active units for each 
group of States Parties not to exceed: 

(1) 459 battle tanks; 

(2) 723 armoured combat vehicles; and 

(3) 420 pieces of artillery; and 

(C) provided that for each group of States Parties no 
more than one-third of each of these additional aggregate 
numbers shall be deployed to any State Party with territory 
within the area described in subparagraph (A) of this 
paragraph, that is: 




270 On-Site Inspection Agency 


(1) 153 battle tanks; 

(2) 241 armoured combat vehicles; and 

(3) 140 pieces of artillery. 

2. Notification shall be provided to all other States 
Parties no later than at the start of the deployment by the 
State Party or States Parties conducting the deployment and 
by the recipient State Party or States Parties, specifying the 
total number in each category of battle tanks, armoured 
combat vehicles and artillery deployed. Notification also 
shall be provided to all other States Parties by the State Party 
or States Parties conducting the deployment and by the 
recipient State Party or States Parties within 30 days of the 
withdrawal of those battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles 
and artillery that were temporarily deployed. 

Article VI 

With the objective of ensuring that no single State Party 
possesses more than approximately one-third of the 
conventional armaments and equipment limited by the 
Treaty within the area of application, each State Party shall 
limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured 
combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack 
helicopters so that, 40 months after entry into force of this 
Treaty and thereafter, the numbers within the area of 
application for that State Party do not exceed: 

(A) 13,300 battle tanks; 

(B) 20,000 armoured combat vehicles; 

(C) 13,700 pieces of artillery; 

(D) 5,150 combat aircraft; and 

(E) 1,500 attack helicopters. 

Article VII 

1. In order that the limitations set forth in Articles IV, 

V and VI are not exceeded, no State Party shall exceed, from 
40 months after entry into force of this Treaty, the maximum 
levels which it has previously agreed upon within its group 
of States Parties, in accordance with paragraph 7 of this 
Article, for its holdings of conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty and of which it has 
provided notification pursuant to the provisions of this 
Article. 

2. Each State Party shall provide at the signature of this 
Treaty notification to all other States Parties of the 
maximum levels for its holdings of conventional armaments 
and equipment limited by the Treaty. The notification of the 
maximum levels for holdings of conventional armaments 
and equipment limited by the Treaty provided by each State 
Party at the signature of this Treaty shall remain valid until 
the date specified in a subsequent notification pursuant to 
paragraph 3 of this Article. 

3. In accordance with the limitations set forth in 
Articles IV, V and VI, each State Party shall have the right to 
change the maximum levels for its holdings of conventional 
armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. Any change 
in the maximum levels for holdings of a State Party shall be 
notified by that State Party to all other States Parties at least 
90 days in advance of the date, specified in the notification, 


on which such a change takes effect. In order not to exceed 
any of the limitations set forth in Articles IV and V, any 
increase in the maximum levels for holdings of a State Party 
that would otherwise cause those limitations to be exceeded 
shall be preceded or accompanied by a corresponding 
reduction in the previously notified maximum levels for 
holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited 
by the Treaty of one or more States Parties belonging to the 
same group of States Parties. The notification of a change in 
the maximum levels for holdings shall remain valid from the 
date specified in the notification until the date specified in a 
subsequent notification of change pursuant to this 
paragraph. 

4. Each notification required pursuant to paragraph 2 
or 3 of this Article for armoured combat vehicles shall also 
include maximum levels for the holdings of armoured 
infantry fighting vehicles and heavy armament combat 
vehicles of the State Party providing the notification. 

5. Ninety days before expiration of the 40-month 
period of reductions set forth in Article VIII and 
subsequently at the time of any notification of a change 
pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article, each State Party 
shall provide notification of the maximum levels for its 
holdings of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and 
artillery with respect to each of the areas described in Article 
IV, paragraphs 2 to 4 and Article V, paragraph 1, 
subparagraph (A). 

6. A decrease in the numbers of conventional 
armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty held by a 
State Party and subject to notification pursuant to the 
Protocol on Information Exchange shall by itself confer no 
right on any other State Party to increase the maximum 
levels for its holdings subject to notification pursuant to this 
Article. 

7. It shall be the responsibility solely of each individual 
State Party to ensure that the maximum levels for its 
holdings notified pursuant to the provisions of this Article 
are not exceeded. States Parties belonging to the same group 
of States Parties shall consult in order to ensure that the 
maximum levels for holdings notified pursuant to the 
provisions of this Article, taken together as appropriate, do 
not exceed the limitations set forth in Articles IV, V and VI. 

Article VIII 

1. The numerical limitations set forth in Articles IV, V 
and VI shall be achieved only by means of reduction in 
accordance with the Protocol on Reduction, the Protocol on 
Helicopter Recategorisation, the Protocol on Aircraft 
Reclassification, the Footnote to Section I, paragraph 2, 
subparagraph (A) of the Protocol on Existing Types and the 
Protocol on Inspection. 

2. The categories of conventional armaments and 
equipment subject to reductions are battle tanks, armoured 
combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack 
helicopters. The specific types are listed in the Protocol on 
Existing Types. 

(A) Battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles shall be 
reduced by destruction, conversion for non-military 
purposes, placement on static display, use as ground 
targets, or, in the case of armoured personnel 



Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 271 


carriers, modification in accordance with the 
Footnote to Section I, paragraph 2, subparagraph 

(A) of the Protocol on Existing Types. 

(B) Artillery shall be reduced by destruction or 
placement on static display, or, in the case of self- 
propelled artillery, by use as ground targets. 

(C) Combat aircraft shall be reduced by destruction, 
placement on static display, use for ground 
instructional purposes, or, in the case of specific 
models or versions of combat-capable trainer 
aircraft, reclassification into unarmed trainer 
aircraft. 

(D) Specialised attack helicopters shall be reduced by 
destruction, placement on static display, or use for 
ground instructional purposes. 

(E) Multi-purpose attack helicopters shall be reduced by 
destruction, placement on static display, use for 
ground instructional purposes, or recategorisation. 

3. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by 
the Treaty shall be deemed to be reduced upon execution of 
the procedures set forth in the Protocols listed in paragraph 
1 of this Article and upon notification as required by these 
Protocols. Armaments and equipment so reduced shall no 
longer be counted against the numerical limitations set forth 
in Articles IV, V and VI. 

4. Reductions shall be effected in three phases and 
completed no later than 40 months after entry into force of 
this Treaty, so that: 

(A) by the end of the first reduction phase, that is, no 
later than 16 months after entry into force of this 
Treaty, each State Party shall have ensured that at 
least 25 percent of its total reduction liability in each 
of the categories of conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty has been reduced; 

(B) by the end of the second reduction phase, that is, no 
later than 28 months after entry into force of this 
Treaty, each State Party shall have ensured that at 
least 60 percent of its total reduction liability in each 
of the categories of conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty has been reduced; 

(C) by the end of the third reduction phase, that is, no 
later than 40 months after entry into force of this 
Treaty, each State Party shall have reduced its total 
reduction liability in each of the categories of 
conventional armaments and equipment limited by 
the Treaty. States Parties carrying out conversion for 
non-military purposes shall have ensured that the 
conversion of all battle tanks in accordance with 
Section VIII of the Protocol on Reduction shall have 
been completed by the end of the third reduction 
phase; and 

(D) armoured combat vehicles deemed reduced by reason 
of having been partially destroyed in accordance 
with Section VIII, paragraph 6 of the Protocol on 
Reduction shall have been fully converted for non¬ 
military purposes, or destroyed in accordance with 
Section IV of the Protocol on Reduction, no later 
than 64 months after entry into force of this Treaty. 


5. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by 
the Treaty to be reduced shall have been declared present 
within the area of application in the exchange of 
information at signature of this Treaty. 

6. No later than 30 days after entry into force of this 
Treaty, each State Party shall provide notification to all 
other States Parties of its reduction liability. 

7. Except as provided for in paragraph 8 of this 
Article, a State Party’s reduction liability in each category 
shall be no less than the difference between its holdings 
notified, in accordance with the Protocol on Information 
Exchange, at signature or effective upon entry into force of 
this Treaty, whichever is the greater, and the maximum 
levels for holdings it notified pursuant to Article VII. 

8. Any subsequent revision of a State Party’s holdings 
notified pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange 
or of its maximum levels for holdings notified pursuant to 
Article VII shall be reflected by a notified adjustment to its 
reduction liability. Any notification of a decrease in a State 
Party’s reduction liability shall be preceded or accompanied 
by either a notification of a corresponding increase in 
holdings not exceeding the maximum levels for holdings 
notified pursuant to Article VII by one or more States 
Parties belonging to the same group of States Parties, or a 
notification of a corresponding increase in the reduction 
liability of one or more such States Parties. 

9. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, each State 
Party shall notify all other States Parties, in accordance 
with the Protocol on Information Exchange, of the 
locations of its reduction sites, including those where the 
final conversion of battle tanks and armoured combat 
vehicles for non-military purposes will be carried out. 

10. Each State Party shall have the right to designate as 
many reduction sites as it wishes, to revise without 
restriction its designation of such sites and to carry out 
reduction and final conversion simultaneously at a 
maximum of 20 sites. States Parties shall have the right to 
share or co-locate reduction sites by mutual agreement. 

11. Notwithstanding paragraph 10 of this Article, 
during the baseline validation period, that is, the interval 
between entry into force of this Treaty and 120 days after 
entry into force of this Treaty, reduction shall be carried 
out simultaneously at no more than two reduction sites for 
each State Party. 

12. Reduction of conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty shall be carried out at 
reduction sites, unless otherwise specified in the Protocols 
listed in paragraph 1 of this Article, within the area of 
application. 

13. The reduction process, including the results of the 
conversion of conventional armaments and equipment 
limited by the Treaty for non-military purposes both during 
the reduction period and in the 24 months following the 
reduction period, shall be subject to inspection, without 
right of refusal, in accordance with the Protocol on 
Inspection. 





272 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Article IX 

1. Other than removal from service in accordance with 
the provisions of Article VIII, battle tanks, armoured combat 
vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters 
within the area of application shall be removed from service 
only by decommissioning, provided that: 

(A) such conventional armaments and equipment limited 
by the Treaty are decommissioned and awaiting 
disposal at no more than eight sites which shall be 
notified as declared sites in accordance with the 
Protocol on Information Exchange and shall be 
identified in such notifications as holding areas for 
decommissioned conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty. If sites containing 
conventional armaments and equipment limited by 
the Treaty decommissioned from service also contain 
any other conventional armaments and equipment 
subject to the Treaty, the decommissioned 
conventional armaments and equipment limited by 
the Treaty shall be separately distinguishable; and 

(B) the numbers of such decommissioned conventional 
armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty do 
not exceed, in the case of any individual State Party, 
one percent of its notified holdings of conventional 
armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, or a 
total of 250, whichever is greater, of which no more 
than 200 shall be battle tanks, armoured combat 
vehicles and pieces of artillery, and no more than 50 
shall be attack helicopters and combat aircraft. 

2. Notification of decommissioning shall include the 
number and type of conventional armaments and equipment 
limited by the Treaty decommissioned and the location of 
decommissioning and shall be provided to all other States 
Parties in accordance with Section IX, paragraph 1, 
subparagraph (B) of the Protocol on Information Exchange. 

Article X 

1. Designated permanent storage sites shall be notified 
in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange to 
all other States Parties by the State Party to which the 
conventional armaments and equipment limited by the 
Treaty contained at designated permanent storage sites 
belong. The notification shall include the designation and 
location, including geographic coordinates, of designated 
permanent storage sites and the numbers by type of each 
category of its conventional armaments and equipment 
limited by the Treaty at each such storage site. 

2. Designated permanent storage sites shall contain 
only facilities appropriate for the storage and maintenance 
of armaments and equipment (e.g., warehouses, garages, 
workshops and associated stores as well as other support 
accommodation). Designated permanent storage sites shall 
not contain firing ranges or training areas associated with 
conventional armaments and equipment limited by the 
Treaty. Designated permanent storage sites shall contain only 
armaments and equipment belonging to the conventional 
armed forces of a State Party. 

3. Each designated permanent storage site shall have a 
clearly defined physical boundary that shall consist of a 
continuous perimeter fence at least 1.5 metres in height. The 


perimeter fence shall have no more than three gates 
providing the sole means of entrance and exit for armaments 
and equipment. 

4. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by 
the Treaty located within designated permanent storage sites 
shall be counted as conventional armaments and equipment 
limited by the Treaty not in active units, including when they 
are temporarily removed in accordance with paragraphs 7, 

8, 9 and 10 of this Article. Conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty in storage other than in 
designated permanent storage sites shall be counted as 
conventional armaments and equipment limited by the 
Treaty in active units. 

5. Active units or formations shall not be located 
within designated permanent storage sites, except as 
provided for in paragraph 6 of this Article. 

6. Only personnel associated with the security or 
operation of designated permanent storage sites, or the 
maintenance of the armaments and equipment stored 
therein, shall be located within the designated permanent 
storage sites. 

7. For the purpose of maintenance, repair or 
modification of conventional armaments and equipment 
limited by the Treaty located within designated permanent 
storage sites, each State Party shall have the right, without 
prior notification, to remove from and retain outside 
designated permanent storage sites simultaneously up to 10 
percent, rounded up to the nearest even whole number, of 
the notified holdings of each category of conventional 
armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in each 
designated permanent storage site, or 10 items of the 
conventional armaments and equipment limited by the 
Treaty in each category in each designated permanent 
storage site, whichever is less. 

8. Except as provided for in paragraph 7 of this Article, 
no State Party shall remove conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty from designated permanent 
storage sites unless notification has been provided to all 
other States Parties at least 42 days in advance of such 
removal. Notification shall be given by the State Party to 
which the conventional armaments and equipment limited 
by the Treaty belong. Such notification shall specify: 

(A) the location of the designated permanent storage site 
from which conventional armaments and equipment 
limited by the Treaty are to be removed and the 
numbers by type of conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty of each category to 
be removed; 

(B) the dates of removal and return of conventional 
armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty; and 

(C) the intended location and use of conventional 
armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty 
while outside the designated permanent storage site. 

9. Except as provided for in paragraph 7 of this Article, 
the aggregate numbers of conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty removed from and retained 
outside designated permanent storage sites by States Parties 
belonging to the same group of States Parties shall at no time 
exceed the following levels: 



-Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 273 


(A) 550 battle tanks; 

(B) 1,000 armoured combat vehicles; and 

(C) 300 pieces of artillery. 

10. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by 
the Treaty removed from designated permanent storage sites 
pursuant to paragraphs 8 and 9 of this Article shall be 
returned to designated permanent storage sites no later than 
42 days after their removal, except for those items of 
conventional armaments and equipment limited by the 
Treaty removed for industrial rebuild. Such items shall be 
returned to designated permanent storage sites immediately 
on completion of the rebuild. 

11. Each State Party shall have the right to replace 
conventional armaments and equipment limited by the 
Treaty located in designated permanent storage sites. Each 
State Party shall notify all other States Parties, at the 
beginning of replacement, of the number, location, type and 
disposition of conventional armaments and equipment 
limited by the Treaty being replaced. 

Article XI 

1. Each State Party shall limit its armoured vehicle 
launched bridges so that, 40 months after entry into force of 
this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to 
which it belongs the aggregate number of armoured vehicle 
launched bridges in active units within the area of 
application does not exceed 740. 

2. All armoured vehicle launched bridges within the 
area of application in excess of the aggregate number 
specified in paragraph 1 of this Article for each group of 
States Parties shall be placed in designated permanent 
storage sites, as defined in Article II. When armoured vehicle 
launched bridges are placed in a designated permanent 
storage site, either on their own or together with 
conventional armaments and equipment limited by the 
Treaty, Article X, paragraphs 1 to 6 shall apply to armoured 
vehicle launched bridges as well as to conventional 
armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. Armoured 
vehicle launched bridges placed in designated permanent 
storage sites shall not be considered as being in active units. 

3. Except as provided for in paragraph 6 of this Article, 
armoured vehicle launched bridges may be removed, subject 
to the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article, from 
designated permanent storage sites only after notification 
has been provided to all other States Parties at least 42 days 
prior to such removal. This notification shall specify: 

(A) the locations of the designated permanent storage 
sites from which armoured vehicle launched bridges 
are to be removed and the numbers of armoured 
vehicle launched bridges to be removed from each 
such site; 

(B) the dates of removal of armoured vehicle launched 
bridges from and return to designated permanent 
storage sites; and 

(C) the intended use of armoured vehicle launched 
bridges during the period of their removal from 
designated permanent storage sites. 


4. Except as provided for in paragraph 6 of this Article, 
armoured vehicle launched bridges removed from designated 
permanent storage sites shall be returned to them no later 
than 42 days after the actual date of removal. 

5. The aggregate number of armoured vehicle launched 
bridges removed from and retained outside of designated 
permanent storage sites by each group of States Parties shall 
not exceed 50 at any one time. 

6. States Parties shall have the right, for the purpose of 
maintenance or modification, to remove and have outside of 
designated permanent storage sites simultaneously up to 10 
percent, rounded up to the nearest even whole number, of 
their notified holdings of armoured vehicle launched bridges 
in each designated permanent storage site, or 10 armoured 
vehicle launched bridges from each designated permanent 
storage site, whichever is less. 

7. In the event of natural disasters involving flooding or 
damage to permanent bridges, States Parties shall have the 
right to withdraw armoured vehicle launched bridges from 
designated permanent storage sites. Notification to all other 
States Parties of such withdrawals shall be given at the time 
of withdrawal. 

Article XII 

1. Armoured infantry fighting vehicles held by 
organisations of a State Party designed and structured to 
perform in peacetime internal security functions, which are 
not structured and organised for ground combat against an 
external enemy, are not limited by this Treaty. The foregoing 
notwithstanding, in order to enhance the implementation of 
this Treaty and to provide assurance that the number of such 
armaments held by such organisations shall not be used to 
circumvent the provisions of this Treaty, any such 
armaments in excess of 1,000 armoured infantry fighting 
vehicles assigned by a State Party to organisations designed 
and structured to perform in peacetime internal security 
functions shall constitute a portion of the permitted levels 
specified in Articles IV, V and VI. No more than 600 such 
armoured infantry fighting vehicles of a State Party, assigned 
to such organisations, may be located in that part of the area 
of application described in Article V, paragraph 1, 
subparagraph (A). Each State Party shall further ensure that 
such organisations refrain from the acquisition of combat 
capabilities in excess of those necessary for meeting internal 
security requirements. 

2. A State Party that intends to reassign battle tanks, 
armoured infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, combat 
aircraft, attack helicopters and armoured vehicle launched 
bridges in service with its conventional armed forces to any 
organisation of that State Party not a part of its conventional 
armed forces shall notify all other States Parties no later than 
the date such reassignment takes effect. Such notification 
shall specify the effective date of the reassignment, the date 
such equipment is physically transferred, as well as the 
numbers, by type, of the conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty being reassigned. 

Article XIII 

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of 
compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each State 





274 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Party shall provide notifications and exchange information 
pertaining to its conventional armaments and equipment in 
accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange. 

2. Such notifications and exchange of information shall 
be provided in accordance with Article XVII. 

3. Each State Party shall be responsible for its own 
information; receipt of such information and of notifications 
shall not imply validation or acceptance of the information 
provided. 

Article XIV 

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of 
compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each State 
Party shall have the right to conduct, and the obligation to 
accept, within the area of application, inspections in 
accordance with the provisions of the Protocol on 
Inspection. 

2. The purpose of such inspections shall be: 

(A) to verify, on the basis of the information provided 
pursuant to the Protocol on Information Exchange, 
the compliance of States Parties with the numerical 
limitations set forth in Articles IV, V and VI; 

(B) to monitor the process of reduction of battle tanks, 
armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft 
and attack helicopters carried out at reduction sites 
in accordance with Article VIII and the Protocol on 
Reduction; and 

(C) to monitor the certification of recategorised multi¬ 
purpose attack helicopters and reclassified combat- 
capable trainer aircraft carried out in accordance 
with the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation 
and the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification, 
respectively. 

3. No State Party shall exercise the rights set forth in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article in respect of States Parties 
which belong to the group of States Parties to which it 
belongs in order to elude the objectives of the verification 
regime. 

4. In the case of an inspection conducted jointly by 
more than one State Party, one of them shall be responsible 
for the execution of the provisions of this Treaty. 

5. The number of inspections pursuant to Sections VII 
and VIII of the Protocol on Inspection which each State 
Party shall have the right to conduct and the obligation to 
accept during each specified time period shall be determined 
in accordance with the provisions of Section II of that 
Protocol. 

6. Upon completion of the 120-day residual level 
validation period, each State Party shall have the right to 
conduct, and each State Party with territory within the area 
of application shall have the obligation to accept, an agreed 
number of aerial inspections within the area of application. 
Such agreed numbers and other applicable provisions shall 
be developed during negotiations referred to in Article 
XVIII. 


Article XV 

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of 
compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, a State Party 
shall have the right to use, in addition to the procedures 
referred to in Article XIV, national or multinational 
technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner 
consistent with generally recognised principles of 
international law. 

2. A State Party shall not interfere with national or 
multinational technical means of verification of another 
State Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this 
Article. 

3. A State Party shall not use concealment measures 
that impede verification of compliance with the provisions of 
this Treaty by national or multinational technical means of 
verification of another State Party operating in accordance 
with paragraph 1 of this Article. This obligation does not 
apply to cover or concealment practices associated with 
normal personnel training, maintenance or operations 
involving conventional armaments and equipment limited by 
the Treaty. 

Article XVI 

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the 
provisions of this Treaty, the States Parties hereby establish a 
Joint Consultative Group. 

2. Within the framework of the Joint Consultative 
Group, the States Parties shall: 

(A) address questions relating to compliance with or 
possible circumvention of the provisions of this 
Treaty; 

(B) seek to resolve ambiguities and differences of 
interpretation that may become apparent in the way 
this Treaty is implemented; 

(C) consider and, if possible, agree on measures to 
enhance the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty; 

(D) update the lists contained in the Protocol on Existing 
Types, as required by Article II, paragraph 2; 

(E) resolve technical questions in order to seek common 
practices among the States Parties in the way this 
Treaty is implemented; 

(F) work out or revise, as necessary, rules of procedure, 
working methods, the scale of distribution of 
expenses of the Joint Consultative Group and of 
conferences convened under this Treaty and the 
distribution of costs of inspections between or 
among States Parties; 

(G) consider and work out appropriate measures to 
ensure that information obtained through exchanges 
of information among the States Parties or as a result 
of inspections pursuant to this Treaty is used solely 
for the purposes of this Treaty, taking into account 
the particular requirements of each State Party in 
respect of safeguarding information which that State 
Party specifies as being sensitive; 



Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 275 


(H) consider, upon the request of any State Party, any 
matter that a State Party wishes to propose for 
examination by any conference to be convened in 
accordance with Article XXI; such consideration 
shall not prejudice the right of any State Party to 
resort to the procedures set forth in Article XXI; and 

(I) consider matters of dispute arising out of the 
implementation of this Treaty. 

3. Each State Party shall have the right to raise before 
the Joint Consultative Group, and have placed on its agenda, 
any issue relating to this Treaty. 

4. The Joint Consultative Group shall take decisions or 
make recommendations by consensus. Consensus shall be 
understood to mean the absence of any objection by any 
representative of a State Party to the taking of a decision or 
the making of a recommendation. 

5. The Joint Consultative Group may propose 
amendments to this Treaty for consideration and 
confirmation in accordance with Article XX. The Joint 
Consultative Group may also agree on improvements to the 
viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, consistent with its 
provisions. Unless such improvements relate only to minor 
matters of an administrative or technical nature, they shall 
be subject to consideration and confirmation in accordance 
with Article XX before they can take effect. 

6. Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to prohibit or 
restrict any State Party from requesting information from or 
undertaking consultations with other States Parties on 
matters relating to this Treaty and its implementation in 
channels or fora other than the Joint Consultative Group. 

7. The Joint Consultative Group shall follow the 
procedures set forth in the Protocol on the Joint 
Consultative Group. 

Article XVII 

The States Parties shall transmit information and 
notifications required by this Treaty in written form. They 
shall use diplomatic channels or other official channels 
designated by them, including in particular a 
communications network to be established by a separate 
arrangement. 

Article XVIII 

1. The States Parties, after signature of this Treaty, shall 
continue the negotiations on conventional armed forces with 
the same Mandate and with the goal of building on this 
Treaty. 

2. The objective for these negotiations shall be to 
conclude an agreement on additional measures aimed at 
further strengthening security and stability in Europe, and 
pursuant to the Mandate, including measures to limit the 
personnel strength of their conventional armed forces within 
the area of application. 

3. The States Parties shall seek to conclude these 
negotiations no later than the follow-up meeting of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to be 
held in Helsinki in 1992. 


Article XIX 

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. It may be 
supplemented by a further treaty. 

2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national 
sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it 
decides that extraordinary events related to the subject 
matter of this Treaty have jeopardised its supreme interests. 

A State Party intending to withdraw shall give notice of its 
decision to do so to the Depositary and to all other States 
Parties. Such notice shall be given at least 150 days prior to 
the intended withdrawal from this Treaty. It shall include a 
statement of the extraordinary events the State Party regards 
as having jeopardised its supreme interests. 

3. Each State Party shall, in particular, in exercising its 
national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this 
Treaty if another State Party increases its holdings in battle 
tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft 
or attack helicopters, as defined in Article II, which are 
outside the scope of the limitations of this Treaty, in such 
proportions as to pose an obvious threat to the balance of 
forces within the area of application. 

Article XX 

1. Any State Party may propose amendments to this 
Treaty. The text of a proposed amendment shall be 
submitted to the Depositary, which shall circulate it to all 
the States Parties. 

2. If an amendment is approved by all the States 
Parties, it shall enter into force in accordance with the 
procedures set forth in Article XXII governing the entry into 
force of this Treaty. 

Article XXI 

1. Forty-six months after entry into force of this Treaty, 
and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Depositary shall 
convene a conference of the States Parties to conduct a 
review of the operation of this Treaty. 

2. The Depositary shall convene an extraordinary 
conference of the States Parties, if requested to do so by any 
State Party which considers that exceptional circumstances 
relating to this Treaty have arisen, in particular, in the event 
that a State Party has announced its intention to leave its 
group of States Parties or to join the other group of States 
Parties, as defined in Article II, paragraph 1, subparagraph 
(A). In order to enable the other States Parties to prepare for 
this conference, the request shall include the reason why that 
State Party deems an extraordinary conference to be 
necessary. The conference shall consider the circumstances 
set forth in the request and their effect on the operation of 
this Treaty. The conference shall open no later than 15 days 
after receipt of the request and, unless it decides otherwise, 
shall last no longer than three weeks. 

3. The Depositary shall convene a conference of the 
States Parties to consider an amendment proposed pursuant 
to Article XX, if requested to do so by three or more States 
Parties. Such a conference shall open no later than 21 days 
after receipt of the necessary requests. 



276 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


4. In the event that a State Party gives notice of its 
decision to withdraw from this Treaty pursuant to Article 
XIX, the Depositary shall convene a conference of the States 
Parties which shall open no later than 21 days after receipt 
of the notice of withdrawal in order to consider questions 
relating to the withdrawal from this Treaty. 

Article XXII 

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by each 
State Party in accordance with its constitutional procedures. 
Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the 
Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, hereby 
designated the Depositary. 

2. This Treaty shall enter into force 10 days after 
instruments of ratification have been deposited by all States 
Parties listed in the Preamble. 

3. The Depositary shall promptly inform all States 
Parties of: 

(A) the deposit of each instrument of ratification; 

(B) the entry into force of this Treaty; 

(C) any withdrawal in accordance with Article XIX and 
its effective date; 

(D) the text of any amendment proposed in accordance 
with Article XX; 

(E) the entry into force of any amendment to this Treaty; 

(F) any request to convene a conference in accordance 
with Article XXI; 

(G) the convening of a conference pursuant to Article 
XXI; and 

(H) any other matter of which the Depositary is required 
by this Treaty to inform the States Parties. 

4. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary 
pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 

Article XXIII 

The original of this Treaty, of which the English, French, 
German, Italian, Russian and Spanish texts are equally 
authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the 
Depositary. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be 
transmitted by the Depositary to all the States Parties. 

PROTOCOL ON NOTIFICATION AND 
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION 

The States Parties hereby agree on procedures and 
provisions regarding notification and exchange of 
information pursuant to Article XIII of the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 
1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty. 

SECTION I. INFORMATION ON THE STRUCTURE 
OF EACH STATE PARTY’S LAND FORCES AND AIR 
AND AIR DEFENCE AVIATION FORCES WITHIN 
THE AREA OF APPLICATION 


1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States 
Parties the following information about the structure of its 
land forces and air and air defence aviation forces within the 
area of application: 

(A) the command organization of its land forces, 
specifying the designation and subordination of all 
combat, combat support and combat service support 
formations and units at each level of command down 
to the level of brigade/regiment or equivalent level, 
including air defence formations and units 
subordinated at or below the military district or 
equivalent level. Independent units at the next level 
of command below the brigade/regiment level 
directly subordinate to formations above the brigade/ 
regiment level (i.e., independent battalions) shall be 
identified, with the information indicating the 
formation or unit to which such units are 
subordinated; and 

(B) the command organisation of its air and air defence 
aviation forces, specifying the designation and 
subordination of formations and units at each level 
of command down to wing/air regiment or 
equivalent level. Independent units at the next level 
of command below the wing/air regiment level 
directly subordinate to formations above the wing/ 
air regiment level (i.e., independent squadrons) shall 
be identified, with the information indicating the 
formation or unit to which such units are 
subordinated. 

SECTION II. INFORMATION ON THE OVERALL 
HOLDINGS IN EACH CATEGORY OF 
CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT 
LIMITED BY THE TREATY 

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States 
Parties information on: 

(A) overall numbers and numbers by type of its holdings 
in each category of conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty; and 

(B) overall numbers and numbers by type of its holdings 
of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and 
artillery limited by the Treaty in each of the areas 
described in Articles IV and V of the Treaty. 

SECTION III. INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, 
NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL 
ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT IN SERVICE WITH 
THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES OF THE 
STATES PARTIES 

1. For each of its formations and units notified 
pursuant to Section I, paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and 
(B) of this Protocol, as well as separately located battalions/ 
squadrons or equivalents subordinate to those formations 
and units, each State Party shall provide to all other States 
Parties the following information: 

(A) the designation and peacetime location of its 
formations and units at which conventional 
armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in 
the following categories are held, including 



Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 277 


headquarters, specifying the geographic name and 
coordinates: 

(1) battle tanks; 

(2) armoured combat vehicles; 

(3) artillery; 

(4) combat aircraft; and 

(5) attack helicopters; 

(B) the holdings of its formations and units notified 
pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, 
giving numbers (by type in the case of formations 
and units at the level of division or equivalent and 
below) of the conventional armaments and 
equipment listed in subparagraph (A) of this 
paragraph, and of: 

(1) combat support helicopters; 

(2) unarmed transport helicopters; 

(3) armoured vehicle launched bridges, specifying 
those in active units; 

(4) armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes; 

(5) armoured personnel carrier look-alikes; 

(6) primary trainer aircraft; 

(7) reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft; and 

(8) Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters not subject to 
the numerical limitations set forth in Article IV, 
paragraph 1 and Article VI of the Treaty 1 ; 

(C) the designation and peacetime location of its 
formations and units, other than those notified 
pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, at 
which the following categories of conventional 
armaments and equipment, as defined in Article II of 
the Treaty, specified in the Protocol on Existing 
Types, or enumerated in the Protocol on Aircraft 
Reclassification, are held, including headquarters, 
specifying the geographic name and coordinates: 

(1) combat support helicopters; 

(2) unarmed transport helicopters; 

(3) armoured vehicle launched bridges; 

(4) armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes; 

(5) armoured personnel carrier look-alikes; 

(6) primary trainer aircraft; 

(7) reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft; and 

(8) Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters not subject to 
the numerical limitations set forth in Article IV, 
paragraph 1 and Article VI of the Treaty 2 ; and 


1 Pursuant to Section I, paragraph 3 of the Protocol on 
Helicopter Recategorisation. 


(D) the holdings of its formations and units notified 
pursuant to subparagraph (C) of this paragraph 
giving numbers (by type in the case of formations 
and units at the level of division or equivalent and 
below) in each category specified above; and, in the 
case of armoured vehicle launched bridges, those 
which are in active units. 

2. Each State Party shall provide to all other States 
Parties information on conventional armaments and 
equipment in service with its conventional armed forces but 
not held by its land forces or air or air defence aviation 
forces, specifying: 

(A) the designation and peacetime location of its 
formations and units down to the level of brigade/ 
regiment, wing/air regiment or equivalent as well as 
units at the next level of command below the 
brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment level which are 
separately located or are independent (i.e., 
battalions/squadrons or equivalent) at which 
conventional armaments and equipment limited by 
the Treaty in the following categories are held, 
including headquarters, specifying the geographic 
name and coordinates: 

(1) battle tanks; 

(2) armoured combat vehicles; 

(3) artillery; 

(4) combat aircraft; and 

(5) attack helicopters; and 

(B) the holdings of its formations and units notified 
pursuant to subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, 
giving numbers (by type in the case of formations 
and units at the level of division or equivalent and 
below) of conventional armaments and equipment 
listed in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, and of: 

(1) combat support helicopters; 

(2) unarmed transport helicopters; 

(3) armoured vehicle launched bridges, specifying 
those in active units; 

(4) armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes; 

(5) armoured personnel carrier look-alikes; 

(6) primary trainer aircraft; 

(7) reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft; and 

(8) Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters not subject to 
the numerical limitations set forth in Article IV, 
paragraph 1 and Article VI of the Treaty 3 

3. Each State Party shall provide to all other States 
Parties the following information: 


2 Pursuant to Section I, paragraph 3 of the Protocol on 
Helicopter Recategorisation. 

3 Pursuant to Section I, paragraph 3 of the Protocol on 
Helicopter Recategorisation. 






278 On-Site Inspection Agency 


(A) the location of its designated permanent storage 
sites, specifying geographic name and coordinates, 
and the numbers and types of conventional 
armaments and equipment in the categories listed in 
paragraph 1, subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this 
Section held at such sites; 

(B) the location of its military storage sites not organic 
to formations and units identified as objects of 
verification, independent repair and maintenance 
units, military training establishments and military 
airfields, specifying geographic name and 
coordinates, at which conventional armaments and 
equipment in the categories listed in paragraph 1, 
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this Section are held or 
routinely present, giving the holdings by type in each 
category at such locations; and 

(C) the location of its sites at which the reduction of 
conventional armaments and equipment limited by 
the Treaty will be undertaken pursuant to the 
Protocol on Reduction, specifying the location by 
geographic name and coordinates, the holdings by 
type in each category of conventional armaments 
and equipment limited by the Treaty awaiting 
reduction at such locations, and indicating that it is a 
reduction site. 

SECTION IV. INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION 
AND NUMBERS OF BATTLE TANKS, ARMOURED 
COMBAT VEHICLES, ARTILLERY, COMBAT 
AIRCRAFT AND ATTACK HELICOPTERS WITHIN 
THE AREA OF APPLICATION BUT NOT IN SERVICE 
WITH CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES 

1. Each State Party shall provide information to all 
other States Parties on the location and numbers of its battle 
tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft 
and attack helicopters within the area of application not in 
service with its conventional armed forces but of potential 
military significance. 

(A) Accordingly, each State Party shall provide the 
following information: 

(1) in respect of its battle tanks, artillery, combat 
aircraft and specialised attack helicopters, as 
well as armoured infantry fighting vehicles as 
specified in Article XII of the Treaty, held by 
organisations down to the independent or 
separately located battalion or equivalent level 
designed and structured to perform in peacetime 
internal security functions, the location, 
including geographic name and coordinates, of 
sites at which such armaments and equipment 
are held and the numbers and types of 
conventional armaments and equipment in these 
categories held by each such organisation; 

(2) in respect of its armoured personnel carriers, 
heavy armament combat vehicles and multi¬ 
purpose attack helicopters held by organisations 
designed and structured to perform in peacetime 
internal security functions, the aggregate 
numbers in each category of such armaments 


and equipment in each administrative region or 
division; 

(3) in respect of its battle tanks, armoured combat 
vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack 
helicopters awaiting disposal having been 
decommissioned in accordance with the 
provisions of Article IX of the Treaty, the 
location, including geographic name and 
coordinates, of sites at which such armaments 
and equipment are held and the numbers and 
types at each site; 

(4) in respect of its battle tanks, armoured combat 
vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack 
helicopters, each State Party shall provide to all 
other States Parties, following entry into force of 
the Treaty and coincident with each annual 
exchange of information pursuant to Section 
VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C) of this 
Protocol, an identifiable location of each site at 
which there are normally more than a total of 
15 battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and 
pieces of artillery or more than five combat 
aircraft or more than 10 attack helicopters 
which are, pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1, 
subparagraph (E) of the Treaty, awaiting or are 
being refurbished for export or re-export and 
are temporarily retained within the area of 
application. Each State Party shall provide to all 
other States Parties, following entry into force of 
the Treaty and coincident with each annual 
exchange of information pursuant to Section 
VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C) of this 
Protocol, the numbers of such battle tanks, 
armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat 
aircraft and attack helicopters. The States 
Parties shall, within the framework of the Joint 
Consultative Group, agree as to the form in 
which the information on the numbers shall be 
provided pursuant to this provision; 

(5) in respect of its battle tanks and armoured 
combat vehicles which have been reduced and 
are awaiting conversion pursuant to Section VIII 
of the Protocol on Reduction, the location, 
including geographic name and coordinates, of 
each site at which such armaments and 
equipment are held and the numbers and types 
at each site; and 

(6) in respect of its battle tanks, armoured combat 
vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack 
helicopters used exclusively for the purpose of 
research and development pursuant to Article 
III, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B) of the Treaty, 
each State Party shall provide to all other States 
Parties following entry into force of the Treaty 
and coincident with each annual exchange of 
information pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 
1, subparagraph (C) of this Protocol the 
aggregate numbers in each category of such 
conventional armaments and equipment. 



Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 279 


SECTION V. INFORMATION ON OBJECTS OF 
VERIFICATION AND DECLARED SITES 

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States 
Parties information specifying its objects of verification, 
including the total number and the designation of each 
object of verification, and enumerating its declared sites, as 
defined in Section I of the Protocol on Inspection, providing 
the following information on each site: 

(A) the site’s designation and location, including 
geographic name and coordinates; 

(B) the designation of all objects of verification, as 
specified in Section I, paragraph 1, subparagraph (J) 
of the Protocol on Inspection, at that site, it being 
understood that subordinate elements at the next 
level of command below the brigade/regiment or 
wing/air regiment level located in the vicinity of each 
other or of the headquarters immediately superior to 
such elements may be deemed as not separately 
located, if the distance between such separately 
located battalions/squadrons or equivalent or to their 
headquarters does not exceed 15 kilometres; 

(C) the overall numbers by type of conventional 
armaments and equipment in each category specified 
in Section III of this Protocol held at that site and by 
each object of verification, as well as those belonging 
to any object of verification located at another 
declared site, specifying the designation of each such 
object of verification; 

(D) in addition, for each such declared site, the number 
of conventional armaments and equipment not in 
service with its conventional armed forces, indicating 
those that are: 

(1) battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, 
artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters 
awaiting disposal having been decommissioned 
in accordance with the provisions of Article IX 
of the Treaty or reduced and awaiting 
conversion pursuant to the Protocol on 
Reduction; and 

(2) battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, 
artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters 
held by organisations designed and structured to 
perform in peacetime internal security functions; 

(E) declared sites that hold battle tanks, armoured 
combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft or attack 
helicopters awaiting or being refurbished for export 
or re-export and temporarily retained within the area 
of application or used exclusively for research and 
development shall be identified as such, and the 
aggregate numbers in each category at that site shall 
be provided; and 

(F) point(s) of entry/exit associated with each declared 
site, including geographic name and coordinates. 


SECTION VI. INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF 
SITES FROM WHICH CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS 
AND EQUIPMENT HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN 

1. Each State Party shall provide annually to all other 
States Parties, coincident with the annual exchange of 
information provided pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, 
subparagraph (C) of this Protocol, information about the 
locations of sites which have been notified previously as 
declared sites from which all conventional armaments and 
equipment in the categories listed in Section III, paragraph 1 
of this Protocol have been withdrawn since the signature of 
the Treaty if such sites continue to be used by the 
conventional armed forces of that State Party. The locations 
of these sites shall be notified for three years following such 
withdrawal. 

SECTION VII. TIMETABLE FOR THE PROVISION OF 
INFORMATION IN SECTIONS I TO V OF THIS 
PROTOCOL 

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States 
Parties the information pursuant to Sections I to V of this 
Protocol as follows: 

(A) upon signature of the Treaty, with information 
effective as of that date; and, no later than 90 days 
after signature of the Treaty, each State Party shall 
provide to all other States Parties within the 
framework of the Joint Consultative Group any 
necessary corrections to its information reported 
pursuant to Sections III, IV and V of this Protocol. 
Such corrected information shall be deemed 
information provided at Treaty signature and valid 
as of that date; 

(B) 30 days following entry into force of the Treaty, with 
information effective as of the date of entry into 
force; 

(C) on the 15th day of December of the year in which 
the Treaty comes into force (unless entry into force 
occurs within 60 days of the 15th day of December), 
and on the 15th day of December of every year 
thereafter, with the information effective as of the 
first day of January of the following year; and 

(D) following completion of the 40-month reduction 
period specified in Article VIII of the Treaty, with 
information effective as of that date. 

SECTION vm. INFORMATION ON CHANGES IN 
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES OR FORCE LEVELS 

1. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties 
of: 

(A) any permanent change in the organisational structure 
of its conventional armed forces within the area of 
application as notified pursuant to Section I of this 
Protocol at least 42 days in advance of that change; 
and 

(B) any change of 10 percent or more in any one of the 
categories of conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty assigned to any of 
its combat, combat support or combat service 



280 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


support formations and units down to the brigade/ 
regiment, wing/air regiment, independent or 
separately located battalion/squadron or equivalent 
level as notified in Section III, paragraph 1, 
subparagraphs (A) and (B) and paragraph 2, 
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this Protocol since the 
last annual exchange of information. Such 
notification shall be given no later than five days 
after such change occurs, indicating actual holdings 
after the notified change. 

SECTION IX. INFORMATION ON THE ENTRY INTO 
AND REMOVAL FROM SERVICE WITH THE 
CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES OF A STATE 
PARTY" OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND 
EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY 

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States 
Parties following entry into force of the Treaty coincident 
with each annual exchange of information provided 
pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (C) of 
this Protocol: 

(A) aggregate information on the numbers and types of 
conventional armaments and equipment limited by 
the Treaty which entered into service with its 
conventional armed forces within the area of 
application during the previous 12 months; and 

(B) aggregate information on the numbers and types of 
conventional armaments and equipment limited by 
the Treaty which have been removed from service 
with its conventional armed forces within the area of 
application during the previous 12 months. 

SECTION X. INFORMATION ON ENTRY INTO AND 
EXIT FROM THE AREA OF APPLICATION OF 
CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT 
LIMITED BY THE TREATY IN SERVICE WITH THE 
CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES OF THE STATES 
PARTIES 

1. Each State Party shall provide annually to all other 
States Parties following entry into force of the Treaty and 
coincident with each annual exchange of information 
provided pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 1, 
subparagraph (C) of this Protocol: 

(A) aggregate information on the numbers and types of 
each category of conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty in service with its 
conventional armed forces that have entered the area 
of application within the last 12 months and whether 
any of these armaments and equipment were 
organised in a formation or unit; 

(B) aggregate information on the numbers and types of 
each category of conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty in service with its 
conventional armed forces that have been removed 
from, and remain outside of, the area of application 
within the last 12 months and the last reported 
locations within the area of application of such 
conventional armaments and equipment; and 


(C) conventional armaments and equipment limited by 
the Treaty in service with its conventional armed 
forces within the area of application which exit and 
re-enter the area of application, including for 
purposes such as training or military activities, 
within a seven-day period shall not be subject to the 
reporting provisions in this Section. 

SECTION XI. CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND 
EQUIPMENT IN TRANSIT THROUGH THE AREA OF 
APPLICATION 

1. The provisions of this Protocol shall not apply to 
conventional armaments and equipment that are in transit 
through the area of application from a location outside the 
area of application to a final destination outside the area of 
application. Conventional armaments and equipment in the 
categories specified in Section III of this Protocol which 
entered the area of application in transit shall be reported 
pursuant to this Protocol if they remain within the area of 
application for a period longer than seven days. 

SECTION XII. FORMAT FOR THE PROVISION OF 
INFORMATION 

1. Each State Party shall provide to all other States 
Parties the information specified in this Protocol in 
accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII of 
the Treaty and the Annex on Format. In accordance with 
Article XVI, paragraph 5 of the Treaty, changes to the 
Annex on Format shall be deemed improvements to the 
viability and effectiveness of the Treaty relating only to 
minor matters of a technical nature. 

SECTION XIII. OTHER NOTIFICATIONS PURSUANT 
TO THE TREATY 

1. After signature of the Treaty and prior to its entry 
into force, the Joint Consultative Group shall develop a 
document relating to notifications required by the Treaty. 
Such document shall list all such notifications, specifying 
those that shall be made in accordance with Article XVII of 
the Treaty, and shall include appropriate formats, as 
necessary, for such notifications. In accordance with Article 
XVI, paragraph 5 of the Treaty, changes to this document, 
including any formats, shall be deemed to be improvements 
to the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty relating only 
to minor matters of a technical nature. 

ANNEX ON THE FORMAT FOR THE 
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION 

1. Each State Party 7 shall provide to all other States 
Parties information pursuant to the Protocol on Information 
Exchange, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol, in 
accordance with the formats specified in this Annex. The 
information in each data listing shall be provided in 
mechanically or electronically printed form and in one of the 
six official languages of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. In each table (column a), each data 
entry shall be assigned a sequential line number. 

2. Each set of listings shall begin with a cover page 
showing the name of the State Party 7 providing the listings, 



Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 281 


the language in which the listings are being provided, the 
date on which the listings are to be exchanged and the 
effective date of the information set forth in the listings. 

SECTION I. INFORMATION ON THE STRUCTURE OF 
LAND FORCES AND AIR AND AIR DEFENCE 
AVIATION FORCES WITHIN THE AREA OF 
APPLICATION 

1. Pursuant to Section I of the Protocol, each State 
Party shall provide information on the command 
organisation of its land forces, including air defence 
formations and units subordinated at or below the military 
district or equivalent level, and air and air defence aviation 
forces in the form of two separate hierarchical data listings 
as set forth in Chart I. 

2. The data listings shall be provided beginning at the 
highest level and proceeding through each level of command 
down to the level of brigade/regiment, independent 
battalion, and wing/air regiment, independent squadron or 
their equivalent. For example, a military district/army/corps 
would be followed by any subordinate independent 
regiments, independent battalions, depots, training 
establishments, then each subordinate division with its 
regiments/independent battalions. After all the subordinate 
organisations are listed, entries shall begin for the next 
military district/army/corps. An identical procedure shall be 
followed for air and air defence aviation forces. 

(A) Each organisation shall be identified (column b) 

by a unique designator (i.e., formation or unit record 
number) which shall be used on subsequent listings 
with that organisation and for all subsequent 
information exchanges; its national designation (i.e., 
name) (column c); and, in the case of divisions, 
brigades/regiments, independent battalions, and 
wings/air regiments, independent squadrons or 
equivalent organisations, where appropriate, the 
formation or unit type (e.g., infantry, tank, artillery, 
fighter, bomber, supply); and 

(B) for each organisation, the two levels of command 
within the area of application immediately superior 
to that organization shall be designated (columns d 
and e). 

Chart I: COMMAND ORGANISATION OF THE LAND 
FORCES AND AIR AND AIR DEFENCE AVIATION 
FORCES OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (date) 

SECTION II. INFORMATION ON OVERALL 
HOLDINGS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND 
EQUIPMENT SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL 
LIMITATIONS PURSUANT TO ARTICLES IV AND V OF 
THE TREATY 

1. Pursuant to Section II of the Protocol, each State 
Party shall provide data on its overall holdings by type of 
battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery (Chart 
IIA) subject to the numerical limitations set forth in Articles 
IV and V of the Treaty (column b), and on its overall 
holdings by type of combat aircraft and attack helicopters 
(Chart IIB) subject to the numerical limitations set forth in 
Article IV of the Treaty (column b). 


2. Data on armoured combat vehicles shall include the 
total numbers of heavy armament combat vehicles, 
armoured infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel 
carriers, and their number (column f/e) and type (column e/ 
d) in each of these subcategories (column d/c). 

3. In the case of battle tanks, armoured combat 
vehicles, artillery and armoured vehicle launched bridges, 
stored in accordance with Article X of the Treaty, the total 
of such equipment in designated permanent storage sites 
shall be specified (column g). 

Chart IIA: OVERALL HOLDINGS OF BATTLE TANKS, 
ARMOURED COMBAT VEHICLES AND ARTILLERY 
SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF (State 
Party) VALID AS OF (date) 

Chart IIB: OVERALL HOLDINGS OF COMBAT 
AIRCRAFT AND ATTACK HELICOPTERS SUBJECT TO 
NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF (State Party) 

VALID AS OF (date) 

SECTION III. INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, 
NUMBERS, AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL 
ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT IN SERVICE WITH 
THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES 

1. Each State Party shall provide a hierarchical data 
listing of ail its land forces’ and air and air defence aviation 
forces’ organisations reported pursuant to Section III, 
paragraph 1 of the Protocol, formations and units reported 
pursuant to Section III, paragraph 2 of the Protocol and 
installations at which conventional armaments and 
equipment are held as specified in Section III, paragraph 3 of 
the Protocol. 

2. For each organisation and installation, the 
information shall reflect: 

(A) the formation or unit record number (column b) 
and designation of the organisation (column c) 
reported in Chart I. Separately located battalions/ 
squadrons specified pursuant to paragraph 1 of this 
Section, formations and units reported pursuant to 
Section III, paragraph 2 of the Protocol and 
installations listed in accordance with Section III, 
paragraph 3 of the Protocol shall also be given a 
unique formation or unit record number (column b), 
and their national designation (i.e., name), (column 
c) shall be provided. Their position on the listing 
shall reflect their subordination with the exception of 
formations and units reported pursuant to Section 
III, paragraph 2 of the Protocol, which shall be 
specified together at the conclusion of the listing: 

(1) designated permanent storage sites shall be 
identified with the notation “DPSS” following 
the national designation; and 

(2) reduction sites shall be identified with the 
notation “reduction” following the national 
designation; 

(B) location (column d), including the geographic name 
and coordinates accurate to the nearest 10 seconds. 




282 On-Site Inspection Agency 


For locations containing stationed forces, the host 
State Party shall also be included; 

(C) for each level of command from the highest down to 
the division/air division level, the overall total of 
conventional armaments and equipment in each 
category (columns f to m/1). For example, the overall 
total held by a division would be the sum of the 
holdings of all its subordinate organisations; and 

(D) for each level of command at the division level and 
below as specified in paragraph 1 of this Section, the 
number of conventional armaments and equipment 
by type under the headings specified in Charts IIIA 
and IIIB (columns f to m/1). In the armoured combat 
vehicle column in Chart IIIA (column g), the 
subcategories (i.e., armoured personnel carriers, 
armoured infantry fighting vehicles, heavy armament 
combat vehicles) shall be presented separately. In the 
attack helicopter column (column k/i), the 
subcategories (i.e., specialised attack, multi-purpose 
attack) shall be presented separately. The column (1) 
labelled “other” in Chart IIIB shall include battle 
tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, armoured 
personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry 
fighting vehicle look-alikes, and armoured vehicle 
launched bridges, if any, in service with the air and 
air defence aviation forces. 

Chart IIIA: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, 
NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL 
ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED 
PURSUANT TO SECTION III OF THE PROTOCOL ON 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party) 

VALID AS OF (date) 

Chart IIIB: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION, 
NUMBERS AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL 
ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED 
PURSUANT TO SECTION III OF THE PROTOCOL ON 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State Party) 

VALID AS OF (date) 

SECTION IV. INFORMATION ON CONVENTIONAL 
ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT NOT IN SERVICE 
WITH THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES 
PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION IV OF THE 
PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE 

1. Pursuant to Section IV of the Protocol, each State 
Party shall provide information on the location, number and 
type of its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, 
combat aircraft and attack helicopters within the area of 
application but not in service with its conventional armed 
forces. 

2. For each location, the information shall reflect: 

(A) the provision of Section IV of the Protocol pursuant 
to which the information is being provided (column 

b); 

(B) the location (column c): 

(1) in respect of conventional armaments and 
equipment reported pursuant to Section IV, 


paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), sub¬ 
subparagraphs (1), (3) and (5) of the Protocol, 
the geographic name and coordinates accurate 
to the nearest 10 seconds of sites containing 
such equipment; and 

(2) in respect of conventional armaments and 
equipment reported pursuant to Section IV, 
paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), sub¬ 
subparagraph (2) of the Protocol, the national 
designation of the administrative region or 
division containing such equipment; 

(C) in respect of conventional armaments and equipment 
reported pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1, 
subparagraph (A), sub-subparagraphs (1) and (2) of 
the Protocol, the national-level designation of 
organisations holding the equipment specified 
(column c); and 

(D) for each location, the number by type under the 
headings specified in Chart IV (columns d to h), 
except as follows: 

in respect of conventional armaments and 
equipment reported pursuant to Section IV, 
paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), sub¬ 
subparagraph (2) of the Protocol, only the 
numbers in each category shall be provided 
solely for the administrative region or division 
specified (column c). 

Chart IV: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF 
CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT 
PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION IV OF THE 
PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State 
Party) VALID AS OF (date) 

SECTION V. INFORMATION ON OBJECTS OF 
VERIFICATION AND DECLARED SITES 

1. Pursuant to Section V of the Protocol, each State 
Party shall provide a listing of its objects of verification and 
declared sites, as defined in Section I of the Protocol on 
Inspection. Declared sites (Chart V) shall be listed in 
alphabetical order. 

2. Information about each declared site shall include: 

(A) a unique designator (i.e., declared site record 
number) (column b) which shall be used with that 
site for all subsequent information exchanges; 

(B) the site’s name and location using geographic name 
and coordinates accurate to the nearest 10 seconds 
(column c). For locations containing objects of 
verification of stationed forces, the host State Party 
shall also be included; 

(C) the point(s) of entry/exit associated with the declared 
site (column d); 

(D) a unique sequential number and the designation and 
formation or unit record number of all objects of 
verification stationed at the declared site as specified 
in Section III of this Annex (column e). Unique 
sequential numbers shall be assigned such that the 



Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 283 


number assigned to the last object of verification 
appearing in the listing shall equal the State Party’s 
total number of objects of verification; and 

(E) the overall number of conventional armaments and 
equipment in each category specified in Section III of 
the Protocol held at the declared site and by each 
object of verification (columns f to p) and specifying, 
in addition: 

(1) conventional armaments and equipment held in 
each category on the declared site belonging to 
an object of verification located at another 
declared site, specifying the designation and 
formation or unit record number of each such 
object of verification (column e); and 

(2) conventional armaments and equipment not 
belonging to an object of verification shall be 
identified with the following notations 
immediately following/below each such entry in 
columns f to p: 

(a) equipment held by organisations designed 
and structured to perform in peacetime 
internal security functions, with the 
notation “security”; 

(b) decommissioned equipment, with the 
notation “decommissioned”; 


(c) equipment awaiting or being refurbished 
for export or re-export, with the notation 
“export”; 

(d) reduced equipment awaiting conversion, 
with the notation “reduced”; and 

(e) equipment used exclusively for research and 
development, with the notation “research.” 

Chart V: INFORMATION ON OBJECTS OF 
VERIFICATION AND DECLARED SITES OF (State Party) 
VALID AS OF (date) 

3. Each State Party shall provide a listing of points of 
entry/exit (Chart VI). The listing shall assign a unique 
sequential numerical designator (column b) which shall be 
used to indicate the point(s) of entry/exit for each site 
provided pursuant to paragraph 2, subparagraph (C) of this 
Section. The location shall include the geographic name 
(column c) and coordinates accurate to the nearest 10 
seconds (column d). The type(s) of transportation 
acceptable—”air,” “sea,” “ground”—for each point of 
entry/exit also shall be specified (column e). 

Chart VI: POINTS OF ENTRY/EXIT (POE) OF (State 
Party) VALID AS OF (date) 



284 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Chart I: COMMAND ORGANISATION OF THE LAND FORCES AND AIR AND AIR DEFENCE AVIATION 
FORCES OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (Date) 


Line 

Number 

Formation or 

Unit Record Number 

Designation of 
Formation of Unit 

Subordination 

1st Higher Echelon 

2nd Higher Echelon 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 







Chart 11 A: OVERALL HOLDINGS OF BATTLE TANKS, ARMOURED COMBAT VEHICLES AND ARTILLERY 
SUBJECT TO NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (Date) 


Line Number 

Area 

Category 

Sub-Category 

Type(s) 

Overall Number 
(including in 
DPSSs) 

Number in 
DPSSs 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

(f) 

(g) 









Chart MB: OVERALL HOLDINGS OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND ATTACK HELICOPTERS SUBJECT TO 
NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (Date) 


Line Number 

Category 

Sub-Category 

Type 

Overall Number 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 
































285 


Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 


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286 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


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Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 287 


CHART IV: INFORMATION ON THE LOCATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT 
PROVIDED PURSUANT TO SECTION IV OF THE PROTOCOL ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE OF (State 
Party) VALID AS OF (Date) 


Line Number 

Protocol 

Reference 

Location 

Battle Tanks 

Armoured 

Combat 

Vehicles 

Artillery 

Attack 

Helicopters 

Combat 

Aircraft 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 

(f) 

(g) 

(h) 







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288 On-Site Inspection Agency 


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Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 289 


Chart VI: POINTS OF ENTRY/EXIT (POE) OF (State Party) VALID AS OF (Date) 


Line Number 

POE Record Number 

Name of POE 

Location 

Type(s) 

(a) 

(b) 

(c) 

(d) 

(e) 















290 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


PROTOCOL ON EXISTING TYPES OF 
CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND 
EQUIPMENT 

The States Parties hereby agree upon: (a) lists, valid as of 
the date of Treaty signature, of existing types of 
conventional armaments and equipment subject to the 
measures of limitation, reduction, information exchange and 
verification; (b) procedures for the provision of technical 
data and photographs relevant to such existing types of 
conventional armaments and equipment; and (c) procedures 
for updating the lists of such existing types of conventional 
armaments and equipment, in accordance with Article II of 
the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 
November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty. 

SECTION I. EXISTING TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL 
ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE 
TREATY 

1. Existing types of battle tanks are: 

M-l T-34 

M-60 T-54 

M-48 T-55 

M-47 1-62 

Leopard 1 T-64 

Leopard 2 T-72 

AMX-30 T-80 

Challenger TR-85 

Chieftain TR-580 

Centurion 

M-41 

NM-116 

T-54 

T-55 

T-72 

All models and versions of an existing type of battle tank 
listed above shall be deemed to be battle tanks of that type. 

2. Existing types of armoured combat vehicles are: 


EBR-ETT 
M3A1 
YP 408 
BLR 
VIB 

LVTP-7 

6614/G 

BTR-152 

BTR-50 

BTR-60 

BTR-70 

MT-LB* 

All models and versions of an existing type of armoured 
personnel carrier listed above shall be deemed to be 
armoured personnel carriers of that type, unless such models 
and versions are included in the armoured personnel carrier 
look-alike list in Section II, paragraph 1 of this Protocol. 

* This multi-purpose lightly armoured vehicle may be 
exceptionally modified within 40 months of entry into force 
of the Treaty into an armoured personnel carrier look-alike 
listed in Section II, paragraph 1 of this Protocol as MT-LB- 
AT by alteration of the interior of the vehicle through the 
removal of the left-hand combat infantry squad seating and 
the welding of the ammunition racking to the side and the 
floor at a minimum of six points so that the vehicle is not 
capable of transporting a combat infantry squad. Such 
modifications may be accomplished at locations other than 
reduction sites. MT-LB armoured personnel carriers that 
have not been modified shall be reported in accordance with 
the Protocol on Information Exchange as armoured 
personnel carriers. 

(B) Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles: 


YPR-765 (25mm) 
Marder 
AMX-10P 
Warrior 

M2/M3 Bradley 
AFV 432 Rarden 
NM-135 


BMP-l/BRM-1 

BMP-2 

BMP-23 

MLI-84 

BMD-1 

BMD-2 

BMP-3 


(A) Armoured Personnel Carriers: 

BMP-l/BRM-1 




BMP-2 


YPR-765 

BTR-40 



AMX-13 VTT 

BTR-152 

All models and versions of an existing type of an 

M113 

BTR-50 

armoured infantry fighting vehicle listed above shall be 

M75 

BTR-60 

deemed to be armoured infantry fighting vehicles of that 

Spartan 

OT-62 (TOPAS) 

type, unless such models and versions are included in the 

Grizzly 

OT-64 (SKOT) 

armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alike list in Section 

TPz-1 Fuchs 

OT-90 

II, paragraph 2 of this Protocol. 

VAB 

FUG D-442 



M59 

BTR-70 

(C) Heavy Armament Combat Vehicles: 

Leonidas 

BTR-80 

AMX-10RC 

PT-76 

VCC1 

BTR-D 

ERC 90 Sagaye 

SU-76 

VCC2 

TAB-77 

BMR-625-90 

SU-100 

Saxon 

OT-810 

Commando VI50 

ISU-152 

AFV 432 

PSZH D-944 

Scorpion 


Saracen 

TABC-79 

Saladin 


Humber 

TAB-71 

JPK-90 


BDX 

MLVM 

M-24 


BMR-600 

MT-LB"' 

AMX-13 


Chaimite V200 


EBR-75 Panhard 


V150S 


PT-76 




Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 291 


All models and versions of an existing type of heavy 
armament combat vehicle listed above shall be deemed to be 
heavy armament combat vehicles of that type. 

3. Existing types of artillery are: 

(A) Guns, Howitzers and Artillery Pieces Combining the 
Characteristics of Guns and Howitzers: 


105mm: 

105 Light Gun 

100mm: 

BS-3 Field Gun 


M18 


Model 53 Field Gun 


105 Krupp Gun 


Skoda How (Model 


105 R Metal Gun 


1914/1934, 1930, 1934) 


105 Pack How 

M 56 Pack How 


Skoda How (Model 1939) 


M 101 Towed How 

105mm: 

Schneider Field Gun 


Ml02 Towed How 
Abbot SP Gun 


(Model 1936) 


M108 SP How 

120mm: 

2B16 How 


M52 SP How 


2S9 SP How 


105 HM-2 How 

M-38 Gun (Skoda) 

122mm: 

D30 How 


105 AU 50 How 


M-30 How 


R58/M26 Towed How 


D74 How 

2S1 SP How 

122mm: 

122/46 Field Gun 


A19 Gun (Model 31/37) 


D30 How 


Model 89 SP How 


M 30 How 

2S1 SP How 

130mm: 

Gun 82 

M-46 Gun 

130mm: 

M 46 Gun 

150mm: 

Skoda How (Model 1934) 

140mm: 

5.5" (139.7mm) 


Ceh How (Model 1937) 


Towed How 

152mm: 

D1 How 

150mm: 

150 Skoda Gun 


2S3 SP How 

2A65 How 

152mm: 

D20 Gun-How 


ML20 How-Gun 


2S3 SP How 


D20 Gun-How 

Gun 81 

155mm: 

Ml 14 Towed How 


2A36 Gun 


Ml 14/39 (M-139) 


Dana SP Gun-How M77 


Towed How 


2S5 SP Gun 


FH-70 Towed How 


2S19 SP How 


M109 SP How 


Gun-How 85 


Ml98 Towed How 


How Model 1938 


155 TRF1 Gun 


How 81 


155 AUF1 Gun 

155 AMF3 Gun 

203mm: 

B4 How 


155 BF50 Gun 

M44 SP How 

M59 Towed Gun 

SP70 SP How 

Ml07 SP Gun 


2S7 SP Gun 

175mm: 

Ml 15 Towed How 



203mm: 

Ml 10 SP How 

M55 SP How 



(B) 

Mortars: 



107mm: 

4.2" (ground mounted 

107mm: 

Mortar M-1938 


or on Ml06 armoured 



vehicle) 

120mm: 

2B11 (2S12) 

120mm: 

Brandt (M60, 


M 120 Model 38/43 


M-120-60; 


Tundzha/Tundzha Sani SP 


SLM-120-AM-50) 


Mortar (mounted on 


M120 RTF 1 


MT-LB) 


M120 M51 
Soltam/Tampella 


Mortar Model 1982 


(ground mounted 


B-24 


or on Ml 13 armored 
vehicle) 160mm: 

Ecia Mod L (ground 
mounted M-L or 240mm: 

mounted on either the 
BMR-600 or Ml 13 
armoured vehicle) 

HY12 (Tosam) 

2B11 (2S12) 

(C) Multiple Launch Rocket Systems: 


110mm: 

LARS 

122mm: BM-21 (BM-21-1.BM-21V) 


BM-21 

RM-70 

122mm: 

RM-70 

APR-21 

APR-40 

140mm: 

Teruel MLAS 

130mm: M-51 

227mm: 

MLRS 

RM-130 


BM-13 

R.2 


BM-14 

140mm: BM-22/27 
220mm: BM-24 
240mm: Uragan 9P140 
280mm: Smerch 
300mm: 

All models and versions of an existing type of artillery 
listed above shall be deemed to be artillery of that type. 


4. Existing types of combat aircraft 

A-7 

IAR-93 

A-10 

IL-28 

Alpha Jet A 

MiG-15 

AM-X 

MiG-17 

Buccaneer 

MiG-21 

Canberra 

MiG-23 

Draken 

MiG-25 

F-4 

MiG-27 

F-5 

MiG-29 

F-15 

MiG-31 

F-16 

SU-7 

F-18 

SU-15 

F-84 

SU-17 

F-102 

SU-20 

F-104 

SU-22 

F-lll 

SU-24 

G-91 

SU-25 

Harrier 

SU-27 

Hunter 

TU-16 

Jaguar 

TU-22 

Lightning 

TU-22M 

MiG-21 

TU-128 

MiG-23 

MiG-29 

MB-339 

Mirage FI 

Mirage III 

Mirage IV 

Mirage V 

Mirage 2000 
SU-22 

Tornado 

Yak-28 


M160 

M240 

2S4 SP Mortar 




292 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


All models or versions of an existing type of combat 
aircraft listed above shall be deemed to be combat aircraft of 
that type. 

5. Existing types of attack helicopters are: 

(A) Specialised Attack Helicopters: 

A-129 Mangusta Mi-24 

AH-1 Cobra 
AH-64 Apache 
Mi-24 

Subject to the provisions in Section I, paragraph 3 of the 
Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation, all models or 
versions of an existing type of specialised attack helicopter 
listed above shall be deemed to be specialised attack 
helicopters of that type. 

(B) Multi-Purpose Attack Helicopters: 

A-109 Hirundo IAR-316 

Alouette III Mi-8/Mi-17 

BO-105/PAH-1 

Fennec AS 550 C-2 

Gazelle 

Lynx 

Mi-8 

OH-58 Kiowa/AB-206/CH-136 

Scout 

Wessex 

Subject to the provisions in Section I, paragraphs 4 and 5 
of the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation, all models oi 
versions of an existing type of multi-purpose attack 
helicopter listed above shall be deemed to be multi-purpose 
attack helicopters of that type. 

SECTION II. EXISTING TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL 
ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT NOT LIMITED BY 
THE TREATY 

1. Existing types of armoured personnel carrier look- 
alikes are: 


YPR-765 MILAN 

CP 

BTR-40 

CP 

PRCOC1 

BTR-50 

PU 

PRCOC2 


PUM 

PRCOC4 


P 

PRCOC5 


PUR 82 

PRMR 


PK (MRF) 
UR-67 

AMX-13 VTT MILAN 

PK (B) 


PC 


MTP-1 

Ml 13 MILAN 

BTR-152 

CP 

A1/A2 (ATGW) 

BTR-60 

PU 

E/WTOW 


PU-12/PA PL 

ARTFC 


PAU 

ARTOBS 


BBS 

FACONT 


ABS 

MORTFC 


R-137B 

A1E 


R-140 BM 

Mortar Carrier 


R-145 

SIG 


R-156 

HFTRSM 


R-409 BM 

CP 


P-238BT 


CPSVC 


P-240BT 

A1CP 


P-241BT 

A1ECP 


E-351BR 

4.27M106 A1 4.2" 


R-975 

Ml06 81mm 


MTP-2 

M-125 81mm 


1V18, 1V19 

M125 A1 81mm 


1VI18 

M125 A2 81mm 


B 

NM-125 81mm 

BTR-70 

KShM 

TPz-1 FUCHS HFTRSM 


SPR-2 

AD CP 


BREM 

CP 


ZS-88 

ENGRCP 


Kh 

ELOKA 

NBC 

BTR-80 

1V119 

RASIT 


RCHM-4 

M59 CP 

BTR-D 

ZD 



RD 

LEONIDAS 1 

OT-62 (TOPAS) 

CP 

VAB PC 


WPT/DPT-62 



BREM 

BMR-600 SIG 


R-2M 

PC 


R-3M 

81mm 


R-3MT 

R-4MT 

SPARTAN STRIKER 



SAMSON 

OT-64 (SKOT) 

CP 

CP 


R-3Z 

JAVELIN 


R-2M 

MILAN 


R-3MT 

R-4 

SAXON AD 


R-4MT 

CP 


R-2AM 

MAINT 


PROPAGANDA 

R-4M 

AFV432 CP/RA 


R-6 

81mm 


WPT/DR-64 

CYMB 


BREM 

AFV 435 


S-260 inz. 

AFV 436 


S-260 art. 

AFV 439 

OT-810 

OT-810/R-112 

HUMBER SQUIRT 

OT 90 

VP 90 

SARACEN SQUIRT 



CP 

FUG D-442 

VS 

ADR 


MRP 

OT-65/R-112 

YP 408 PWMR 


OT-65 DP 

PWCO 

PWAT 


OT-65 CH 

PWRDR 

PSZH D-944 

CP 

PWV 

MT-LB 

AT 

BTR-50 PU 


KShM-R-81 

PK(MRF) 


R-80 

PK(B) 


9S743 

PI 

BTR-60 PU- 12/PA PU-12 


1W-13-16 

BBS 


1W-21-25 

ABS 


1W-12 

R-137B 


MP-21-25 

R-140BM 


AFMS 

R-145 


R-381T 

R-156 


R-330P 

R-409 BM 


Beta 3M 

P-238 BT 


SPR-1 




293 


Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 


P-240 BT 


WPT/DTP 

P-241 BT 


BREM 

B 


TRI 

MTP-LB 

MT-LB PI 


BRM Sova/ 

MP-21-25 


BRM 30 

1W-13-16 

AFMS 

TAB-71 

A 

R-381 T 


TERA-71-L 

R-330P 


AR 

Beta 3M 

MTP-LB- 

TAB-77 

A 

TERA-77-L 

RCH-84 

PCOMA 

AR 


TABC-79 

A-POMA 


TAB 

TCG-80 


MLVM 

AR 


2. Existing types of armoured infantry fighting vehicle look 

alikes are: 

WARRIOR RA 

BMP-l 

KSh 

REP 


9S743 

REC 


PRP-3, -4 

MP-31 

BMP-1 MTP 


B 

MP-31 


SVO 



DTB-80 

VPV 

IRM 

MTP 

BREM-4, -2, -D 


BMD-1 

KSh 


BRM-1 

KSh 

3. Existing types of primary trainer aircraft which are 
designed and constructed for primary flying training and 
which may possess only limited armament capability 

necessary for basic training 

in weapon delivery techniques 

are: 



Alpha Jet E 


1-22 

C-101 Aviojet 


IAR-99 

Fouga 


L-29 

Hawk 


L-39 

Jet Provost 

L-39 

MB-326 

PD-808 

T-2 

T-33/CT-133 

T-37 

T-38 


TS-11 

4. Existing types of combat support helicopters are: 

A-109 Hirundo 


IAR-316 

AB-412 


IAR-330 

Alouette II 


Mi-2 

Alouette III 


Mi-6 

Blackhawk 

Bell 47/AB 47/Sioux 
BO-105 

CH53 

Chinook 

Fennec AS 555 A 


Mi-8/Mi-17 

Hughes 300 

Hughes 500/OH-6 




Mi-8 

OH-58 Kiowa/AB-206/CH-136 

Puma 

Sea King 

UH-1A/1B/AB-204 
UH-1 D/1 H/AB-205 
UH-1N/AB-212 
Wessex 

5. Existing types of unarmed transport helicopters 
which are not equipped for the employment of weapons are: 

AB 47 
AB-412 
Alouette II 
CH53 
Chinook 

Cougar AS 532 U 
Dauphin AS 365 N1 
Hughes 300 
NH 500 
Puma 

Sea King/H-3F/HAR 3 
SH-3D 

UH-1 D/1 H/AB-205 
UH-1N/AB-212 

6. Existing types of armoured vehicle launched bridges 
are: 


M47 AVLB 

MTU 

M48 AVLB 

MT-20 

M60 AVLB 

MT-55A 

Centurion AVLB 

MTU-72 

Chieftain AVLB 

BLG-60 

Brueckenlegepanzer Biber/ 

BLG-67M 

Leopard 1 AVLB 

BLG-67M2 


SECTION III. TECHNICAL DATA AND PHOTOGRAPHS 

1. Technical data, in accordance with the agreed 
categories in the Annex to this Protocol, together with 
photographs presenting the right or left side, top and front 
views for each of its existing types of conventional 
armaments and equipment listed in Sections I and II of this 
Protocol shall be provided by each State Party to all other 
States Parties at the signature of the Treaty. In addition, 
photographs of armoured personnel carrier look-alikes and 
armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes shall include a 
view of such vehicles so as to show clearly their internal 
configuration illustrating the specific characteristic which 
distinguishes this particular vehicle as a look-alike. 
Photographs in addition to those required by this paragraph 
may be provided at the discretion of each State Party. 

2. Each existing type of conventional armaments and 
equipment listed in Sections I and II of this Protocol shall 
have a model or version of that type designated as an 
exemplar. Photographs shall be provided for each such 
designated exemplar pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section. 
Photographs shall not be required of models and versions of 
a type that have no significant externally observable 
differences from the exemplar of that type. The photographs 
of each exemplar of a type shall contain an annotation of the 
existing type designation and national nomenclature for all 
models and versions of the type that the photographs of the 


Mi-2 

Mi-26 

SA-365N Dauphin 
W-3 Sokol 






294 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


exemplar represent. The photographs of each exemplar of a 
type shall contain an annotation of the technical data for 
that type in accordance with the agreed categories in the 
Annex to this Protocol. In addition, the annotation shall 
indicate all models and versions of the type that the 
photographs of the exemplar represent. Such technical data 
shall be annotated on the side view photograph. 

SECTION IV. UPDATES OF EXISTING TYPES LISTS 
AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE STATES PARTIES 

1. This Protocol constitutes agreement by the States 
Parties only with respect to existing types of conventional 
armaments and equipment as well as with respect to the 
categories of technical data set forth in Sections I and II of 
the Annex to this Protocol. 

2. Each State Party shall be responsible for the accuracy 
of technical data for only its own conventional armaments 
and equipment provided in accordance with Section III of 
this Protocol. 

3. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties, 
upon the entry into service with the armed forces of that 
State Party within the area of application, of: (a) any new 
type of conventional armaments and equipment which meets 
one of the definitions in Article II of the Treaty or which 
falls under a category listed in this Protocol, and (b) any 
new model or version of a type listed in this Protocol. At the 
same time, each State Party shall provide all other States 
Parties with the technical data and photographs required by 
Section III of this Protocol. 

4. As soon as possible, and in any case no later than 60 
days following a notification pursuant to paragraph 3 of this 
Section, the States Parties shall initiate update actions, in 
accordance with the provisions set forth in Article XVI of 
the Treaty and the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group, 
for the lists of existing types of conventional armaments and 
equipment in Sections I and II of this Protocol. 

ANNEX TO THE PROTOCOL ON EXISTING 
TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS 
AND EQUIPMENT 

SECTION I. AGREED CATEGORIES OF TECHNICAL 
DATA 

The following are agreed categories of technical data for 
each model and version of existing types of conventional 
armaments and equipment: 

1. Battle Tanks 

Existing Type 
National Nomenclature 
Main Gun Calibre 
Unladen Weight 

2. Armoured Combat Vehicles 

Armoured Personnel Carriers 

Existing Type 

National Nomenclature 

Type and Calibre of Armaments, if any 


Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicles 
Existing Type 
National Nomenclature 
Type and Calibre of Armaments 

Heavy Armament Combat Vehicles 
Existing Type 
National Nomenclature 
Main Gun Calibre 
Unladen Weight 

3. Artillery 

Guns, Howitzers and Artillery Pieces Combining the 
Characteristics of Guns and Howitzers 
Existing Type 
National Nomenclature 
Calibre 

Mortars 
Existing Type 
National Nomenclature 
Calibre 

Multiple Launch Rocket Systems 
Existing Type 
National Nomenclature 
Calibre 

4. Combat Aircraft 

Existing Type 
National Nomenclature 

5. Attack Helicopters 

Existing Type 
National Nomenclature 

6. Armoured Personnel Carrier Look-Alikes 

Existing Type 

National Nomenclature 

Type and Calibre of Armaments, if any 

7. Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle Look-Alikes 

Existing Type 

National Nomenclature 

Type and Calibre of Armaments, if any 

8. Primary Trainer Aircraft 

Existing Type 
National Nomenclature 
Type of Armaments, if any 

9. Combat Support Helicopters 

Existing Type 
National Nomenclature 

10. Unarmed Transport Helicopters 

Existing Type 
National Nomenclature 



295 


Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 


11. Armoured Vehicle Launched Bridges 

Existing Type 
National Nomenclature 

SECTION II. SPECIFICATIONS FOR PHOTOGRAPHS 

Photographs provided pursuant to Section III of this 
Protocol shall be in black and white. The use of flash and 
lighting equipment shall be allowed. The object being 
photographed shall contrast with the background of the 
photograph. All photographs shall be of high definition, 
with continuous tone and in sharp focus. Photographs 
measuring 13 centimetres by 18 centimetres, not including a 
border, shall be provided. For aspects other than overhead, 
all photographs shall be taken from the same level as the 
equipment being photographed, with the camera placed 
along or perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the object 
being photographed; for the top view, photographs shall 
show the top and may show the rear aspects of the 
equipment. The object being photographed shall fill at least 
80 percent of the photograph in either horizontal or vertical 
aspect. A reference gauge shall be included in each 
photograph together with the object. The gauge shall have 
alternating half-metre sections in black and white. It shall be 
long enough to provide accurate scaling and shall be placed 
on or against the object or in close proximity to it. Each 
photograph shall be labelled to provide the information 
required by Section III, paragraph 2 of this Protocol as well 
as the date when the photograph was taken. 

PROTOCOL ON INSPECTION 

The States Parties hereby agree on procedures and other 
provisions governing the conduct of inspections as provided 
for in Article XIV of the Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred 
to as the Treaty. 

SECTION I. DEFINITIONS 

1. For the purposes of the Treaty: 

(A) The term “inspected State Party” means a State Party 
on whose territory an inspection is carried out in 
compliance with Article XIV of the Treaty: 

(1) in the case of inspection sites where only a 
stationing State Party’s conventional armaments 
and equipment limited by the Treaty are present, 
such a stationing State Party shall exercise, in 
compliance with the provisions of this Protocol, 
the rights and obligations of the inspected State 
Party as set forth in this Protocol for the 
duration of the inspection within that inspection 
site where its conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty are located; and 

(2) in the case of inspection sites containing 
conventional armaments and equipment limited 
by the Treaty of more than one State Party, each 
such State Party shall exercise, in compliance 
with the provisions of this Protocol, each in 
respect of its own conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty, the rights and 


obligations of the inspected State Party as set 
forth in this Protocol for the duration of the 
inspection within that inspection site where its 
conventional armaments and equipment limited 
by the Treaty are located. 

(B) The term “stationing State Party” means a State 
Party stationing conventional armaments and 
equipment in service with its conventional armed 
forces outside its own territory and within the area 
of application. 

(C) The term “host State Party” means a State Party 
receiving on its territory within the area of 
application conventional armaments and equipment 
in service with the conventional armed forces of 
another State Party stationed by that State Party. 

(D) The term “inspecting State Party” means a State 
Party which requests and is therefore responsible for 
carrying out an inspection. 

(E) The term “inspector” means an individual 
designated by one of the States Parties to carry out 
an inspection and who is included on that State 
Party’s accepted list of inspectors in accordance with 
the provisions of Section III of this Protocol. 

(F) The term “transport crew member” means an 
individual who performs duties related to the 
operation of a transportation means and who is 
included on a State Party’s accepted list of transport 
crew members in accordance with the provisions of 
Section III of this Protocol. 

(G) The term “inspection team” means a group of 
inspectors designated by an inspecting State Party to 
conduct a particular inspection. 

(H) The term “escort team” means a group of 
individuals assigned by an inspected State Party to 
accompany and to assist inspectors conducting a 
particular inspection, as well as to assume other 
responsibilities as set forth in this Protocol. In the 
case of inspection of a stationing State Party’s 
conventional armaments and equipment limited by 
the Treaty, an escort team shall include individuals 
assigned by both the host and stationing States 
Parties, unless otherwise agreed between them. 

(I) The term “inspection site” means an area, location 
or facility where an inspection is carried out. 

(J) The term “object of verification” means: 

(1) any formation or unit at the organizational 
level of brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment, 
independent battalion/artillery battalion, 
independent squadron or equivalent as well as 
any separately located battalion/squadron or 
equivalent unit at the next level of command 
below the brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment 
level holding conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty at a location 
notified pursuant to Section III, paragraph 1, 
subparagraph (A) of the Protocol on 
Information Exchange; 



296 On-Site Inspection Agency 


(2) any designated permanent storage site, military 
storage site not organic to formations and units 
referred to in sub-subparagraph (1) of this 
subparagraph, independent repair or 
maintenance unit, military training 
establishment or military airfield at which 
conventional armaments and equipment limited 
by the Treaty are notified pursuant to Section 
III, paragraph 3, subparagraphs (A) and (B) of 
the Protocol on Information Exchange as being 
permanently or routinely present; 

(3) a reduction site for conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty as notified 
pursuant to Section III, paragraph 3, 
subparagraph (C) of the Protocol on 
Information Exchange; 

(4) in the case of units below the level of battalion 
holding conventional armaments and equipment 
limited by the Treaty that are directly 
subordinate to a unit or formation above the 
level of brigade/regiment or equivalent, that unit 
or formation to which the units below the level 
of battalion are subordinated shall be 
considered an object of verification, if it has no 
subordinate unit or formation at the level of 
brigade/regiment or equivalent; and 

(5) a formation or unit holding conventional 
armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty, 
but not in service with the conventional armed 
forces of a State Party shall not be considered an 
object of verification. 

(K) The term “military airfield” means a permanent 
military complex, not otherwise containing an object 
of verification, at which the frequent operation, i.e., 
launch and recovery, of at least six combat aircraft 
or combat helicopters limited by the Treaty or 
subject to internal inspection is routinely performed. 

(L) The term “military training establishment” means a 
facility, not otherwise containing an object of 
verification, at which a military unit or subunit using 
at least 30 conventional armaments and equipment 
limited by the Treaty or more than 12 of any single 
category of conventional armaments and equipment 
limited by the Treaty is organised to train military 
personnel. 

(M) The term “military storage site” not organic to 
formations and units identified as objects of 
verification means any storage site, other than 
designated permanent storage sites or sites 
subordinate to organisations designed and structured 
for internal security purposes, holding conventional 
armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty 
without respect to organisational or operational 
status. Conventional armaments and equipment 
limited by the Treaty contained in such sites shall 
constitute a portion of the permitted holdings 
counted in active units pursuant to Article IV of the 
Treaty. 

(N) The term “declared site” means a facility or precisely 
delineated geographic location which contains one or 


more objects of verification. A declared site shall 
consist of all territory within its man-made or 
natural outer boundary or boundaries as well as 
associated territory comprising firing ranges, training 
areas, maintenance and storage areas, helicopter 
airfields and railroad loading facilities at which 
battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, 
combat helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified 
combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel 
carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting 
vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched 
bridges are permanently or routinely present. 

(O) The term “specified area” means an area anywhere 
on the territory of a State Party within the area of 
application other than a site inspected pursuant to 
Section VII, IX or X of this Protocol within which a 
challenge inspection is conducted pursuant to Section 
VIII of this Protocol. A specified area shall not 
exceed 65 square kilometres. No straight line 
between any two points in that area shall exceed 16 
kilometres. 

(P) The term “sensitive point” means any equipment, 
structure or location which has been designated to be 
sensitive by the inspected State Party or the State 
Party exercising the rights and obligations of the 
inspected State Party through the escort team and to 
which access or overflight may be delayed, limited or 
refused. 

(Q) The term “point of entry/exit” means a point 
designated by a State Party on whose territory an 
inspection is to be carried out, through which 
inspection teams and transport crews arrive on the 
territory of that State Party and through which they 
depart from the territory of that State Party. 

(R) The term “in-country period” means the total time 
spent continuously on the territory of the State Party 
where an inspection is carried out by an inspection 
team for inspections pursuant to Sections VII and 
VIII of this Protocol from arrival of the inspection 
team at the point of entry/exit until the return of the 
inspection team to a point of entry/exit after 
completion of that inspection team’s last inspection. 

(S) The term “baseline validation period” means, for the 
purpose of calculating inspection quotas, the 
specified time period consisting of the first 120 days 
following entry into force of the Treaty. 

(T) The term “reduction period” means, for the purpose 
of calculating inspection quotas, the specified time 
period consisting of the three years following the 
120-day baseline validation period. 

(U) The term “residual level validation period” means, 
for the purpose of calculating inspection quotas, the 
specified time period consisting of the 120 days 
following the three-year reduction period. 

(V) The term “residual period” means, for the purpose 
of calculating inspection quotas, the specified time 
period following the 120-day residual level 
validation period for the duration of the Treaty. 



Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 297 


(W) The term “passive declared site inspection quota” 
means the total number of inspections of objects of 
verification pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol 
that each State Party shall be obliged to receive 
within a specified time period at inspection sites 
where its objects of verification are located. 

(X) The term “passive challenge inspection quota” 
means the maximum number of challenge 
inspections within specified areas pursuant to Section 
VIII of this Protocol that each State Party with 
territory within the area of application shall be 
obliged to receive within a specified time period. 

(Y) The term “active inspection quota” means the total 
number of inspections pursuant to Sections VII and 
VIII of this Protocol that each State Party shall be 
entitled to conduct within a specified time period. 

(Z) The term “certification site” means a clearly 
designated location where the certification of 
recategorised multi-purpose attack helicopters and 
reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft in 
accordance with the Protocol on Helicopter 
Recategorisation and the Protocol on Aircraft 
Reclassification takes place. 

(AA) The term “calendar reporting period” means a 
period of time defined in days during which the 
intended reduction of the planned number of items 
of conventional armaments and equipment limited 
by the Treaty in accordance with Article VIII of the 
Treaty is to be carried out. 

SECTION D. GENERAL OBLIGATIONS 

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of 
compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, each State 
Party shall facilitate inspections pursuant to this Protocol. 

2. In the case of conventional armaments and 
equipment in service with the conventional armed forces of a 
State Party stationed in the area of application outside 
national territory, the host State Party and the stationing 
State Party shall, in fulfillment of their respective 
responsibilities, cooperatively ensure compliance with the 
relevant provisions of this Protocol. The stationing State 
Party shall be fully responsible for compliance with the 
Treaty obligations in respect of its conventional armaments 
and equipment in service with its conventional armed forces 
stationed on the territory of the host State Party. 

3. The escort team shall be placed under the 
responsibility of the inspected State Party: 

(A) in the case of inspection sites at which only a 
stationing State Party’s conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty are present and are 
under this State Party’s command, the escort team 
shall be placed under the responsibility of a 
representative of the stationing State Party for the 
duration of the inspection within that inspection site 
where the stationing State Party’s conventional 
armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are 
located; and 

(B) in the case of inspection sites containing 
conventional armaments and equipment limited by 


the Treaty of both the host State Party and the 
stationing State Party, the escort team shall be 
composed of representatives from both States Parties 
when conventional armaments and equipment 
limited by the Treaty of the stationing State Party are 
actually inspected. During the inspection within that 
inspection site, the host State Party shall exercise the 
rights and obligations of the inspected State Party 
with the exception of those rights and obligations 
related to the inspection of the conventional 
armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty of 
the stationing State Party, which shall be exercised 
by this stationing State Party. 

4. If an inspection team requests access to a structure or 
premises utilised by another State Party by agreement with 
the inspected State Party, such other State Party shall, in 
cooperation with the inspected State Party and to the extent 
consistent with the agreement on utilisation, exercise the 
rights and obligations set forth in this Protocol with respect 
to inspections involving equipment or materiel of the State 
Party utilising the structure or premises. 

5. Structures or premises utilised by another State Party 
by agreement with the inspected State Party shall be subject 
to inspection only when that other State Party’s 
representative is on the escort team. 

6. Inspection teams and sub-teams shall be under the 
control and responsibility of the inspecting State Party. 

7. No more than one inspection team conducting an 
inspection pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol 
may be present at the same time at any one inspection site. 

8. Subject to the other provisions of this Protocol, the 
inspecting State Party shall decide for how long each 
inspection team will stay on the territory of the State Party 
where an inspection is to be carried out, and at how many 
and at which inspection sites it will conduct inspections 
during the in-country period. 

9. Travel expenses of an inspection team to the point of 
entry/exit prior to conducting an inspection and from the 
point of entry/exit after completion of the last inspection 
shall be borne by the inspecting State Party. 

10. Each State Party shall be obliged to receive a number 
of inspections pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this 
Protocol not to exceed its passive declared site inspection 
quota for each specified time period: a 120-day baseline 
validation period, a three-year reduction period, a 120-day 
residual level validation period and a residual period for the 
duration of the Treaty. The passive declared site inspection 
quota shall be determined for each specified time period as a 
percentage of that State Party’s objects of verification, 
excluding reduction sites and certification sites, located 
within the area of application of the Treaty: 

(A) during the first 120 days after entry into force of the 
Treaty, the passive declared site inspection quota 
shall be equal to 20 percent of a State Party’s objects 
of verification notified pursuant to Section V of the 
Protocol on Information Exchange; 

(B) during each year of the reduction period, after 
completion of the initial 120-day period, the passive 
declared site inspection quota shall be equal to 10 




298 On-Site Inspection Agency 


percent of a State Party’s objects of verification 
notified pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on 
Information Exchange; 

(C) during the first 120 days after completion of the 
three-year reduction period, the passive declared site 
inspection quota shall be equal to 20 percent of a 
State Party’s objects of verification notified pursuant 
to Section V of the Protocol on Information 
Exchange; and 

(D) each year, commencing after completion of the 120- 
day residual level validation period, for the duration 
of the Treaty, the passive declared site inspection 
quota shall be equal to 15 percent of a State Party’s 
objects of verification notified pursuant to Section V 
of the Protocol on Information Exchange. 

11. Each State Party with territory within the area of 
application shall be obliged to accept challenge inspections 
as follows: 

(A) during the baseline validation period, during each 
year of the reduction period and during the residual 
level validation period, up to 15 percent of the 
number of inspections of declared sites which that 
State Party is obliged to receive on its territory of its 
own objects of verification as well as of objects of 
verification belonging to stationing States Parties; 
and 

(B) during each year of the residual period, up to 23 
percent of the number of inspections of declared sites 
which that State Party is obliged to receive on its 
territory of its own objects of verification and of 
objects of verification belonging to stationing States 
Parties. 

12. Notwithstanding any other limitations in this 
Section, each State Party shall be obliged to accept a 
minimum of one inspection each year of its objects of 
verification pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol, and 
each State Party with territory within the area of application 
shall be obliged to accept a minimum of one inspection each 
year within a specified area pursuant to Section VIII of this 
Protocol. 

13. Inspection pursuant to Section VII of this Protocol of 
one object of verification at an inspection site shall count as 
one inspection against the passive declared site inspection 
quota of that State Party whose object of verification is 
inspected. 

14. The proportion of inspections pursuant to Section 
VII of this Protocol on the territory of a host State Party 
within a specified time period used to inspect objects of 
verification belonging to a stationing State Party shall be no 
greater than the proportion which that stationing State 
Party’s objects of verification constitute of the total number 
of objects of verification located on the territory of that host 
State Party. 

15. The number of inspections pursuant to Section VII of 
this Protocol of objects of verification within a specified time 
period on any State Party’s territory shall be calculated as a 
percentage of the total number of objects of verification 
present on that State Party’s territory. 


16. Inspection pursuant to Section VIII of this Protocol 
within one specified area shall count as one inspection 
against the passive challenge inspection quota and one 
inspection against the passive declared site inspection quota 
of the State Party on whose territory the inspection is 
conducted. 

17. Unless otherwise agreed between the escort team and 
the inspection team, an inspection team’s in-country period 
shall, up to a total of 10 days, not exceed the total number 
of hours calculated according to the following formula: 

(A) 48 hours for the first inspection of an object of 
verification or within a specified area; plus 

(B) 36 hours for each sequential inspection of an object 
of verification or within a specified area. 

18. Subject to the limitations in paragraph 17 of this 
Section, an inspection team conducting an inspection 
pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol shall spend 
no more than 48 hours at a declared site and no more than 
24 hours in inspection within a specified area. 

19. The inspected State Party shall ensure that the 
inspection team travels to a sequential inspection site by the 
most expeditious means available. If the time between 
completion of one inspection and arrival of the inspection 
team at a sequential inspection site exceeds nine hours, or if 
the time between completion of the last inspection 
conducted by an inspection team on the territory of the State 
Party where an inspection is carried out and the arrival of 
that inspection team at the point of entry/exit exceeds nine 
hours, such excess time shall not count against that 
inspection team’s in-country period. 

20. Each State Party shall be obliged to accept on its 
territory within the area of application simultaneously no 
more than either two inspection teams conducting 
inspections pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol 
or a number of inspection teams conducting inspections 
pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol equal to 
two percent of the total number of objects of verification 
that are to be inspected during a specified time period on the 
territory of that State Party, whichever number is greater. 

21. Each State Party shall be obliged to accept 
simultaneously no more than either two inspection teams 
conducting inspections of its conventional armed forces 
pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this Protocol or a number 
of inspection teams conducting inspections of its 
conventional armed forces pursuant to Section VII or VIII of 
this Protocol equal to two percent of the total number of its 
objects of verification that are to be inspected during a 
specified time period, whichever number is greater. 

22. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 20 
and 21 of this Section, each State Party with military 
districts specified in Articles IV and V of the Treaty shall be 
obliged to accept on its territory within the area of 
application simultaneously no more than two inspection 
teams conducting inspections pursuant to Sections VII and 
VIII of this Protocol within any one of those military 
districts. 

23. No State Party shall be obliged to accept inspections 
pursuant to Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol 



Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 299 


representing more than 50 percent of its passive declared site 
inspection quota in a calendar year from the same State 
Party. 

24. Each State Party shall have the right to conduct 
inspections within the area of application on the territory of 
other States Parties. However, no State Party shall conduct 
more than five inspections annually pursuant to Sections VII 
and VIII of this Protocol of another State Party belonging to 
the same group of States Parties. Any such inspections shall 
count against the passive declared site inspection quota of 
the State Party being inspected. It shall otherwise be the 
responsibility solely of each group of States Parties to 
determine the allocation of inspections for each State Party 
within its group of States Parties. Each State Party shall 
notify to all other States Parties its active inspection quota: 

(A) for the baseline validation period, no later than 120 
days after signature of the Treaty; 

(B) for the first year of the reduction period, no later 
than 60 days after entry into force of the Treaty; and 

(C) for each subsequent year of the reduction period, for 
the residual level validation period and for each year 
of the residual period, no later than the 15th day of 
January preceding each such specified time period. 

SECTION in. PRE-INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS 

1. Inspections conducted pursuant to the Treaty shall 
be carried out by inspectors designated in accordance with 
paragraphs 3 to 7 of this Section. 

2. Inspectors shall be nationals of the inspecting State 
Party or other States Parties. 

3. Within 90 days after signature of the Treaty, each 
State Party shall provide to all other States Parties a list of its 
proposed inspectors and a list of its proposed transport crew 
members, containing the full names of inspectors and 
transport crew members, their gender, date of birth, place of 
birth and passport number. No list of proposed inspectors 
provided by a State Party shall contain at any time more 
than 400 individuals, and no list of proposed transport crew 
members provided by a State Party shall contain at any time 
more than 600 individuals. 

4. Each State Party shall review the lists of inspectors 
and transport crew members provided to it by other States 
Parties and, within 30 days after receipt of each list, shall 
provide notification to the State Party providing that list of 
any individual whose name it wishes to be deleted from that 
list. 

5. Subject to paragraph 7 of this Section, inspectors and 
transport crew members for whom deletion has not been 
requested within the time interval specified in paragraph 4 of 
this Section shall be considered as accepted for the purposes 
of issuing visas and any other documents in accordance with 
paragraph 8 of this Section. 

6. Each State Party shall have the right to amend its 
lists within one month after entry into force of the Treaty. 
Thereafter, each State Party may once every six months 
propose additions to or deletions from its lists of inspectors 
and transport crew members, provided that such amended 


lists do not exceed the numbers specified in paragraph 3 of 
this Section. Proposed additions shall be reviewed in 
accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Section. 

7. A State Party may request, without right of refusal, 
deletion of any individual it wishes from lists of inspectors 
and transport crew members provided by any other State 
Party. 

8. The State Party on whose territory an inspection is 
conducted shall provide to the inspectors and transport crew 
members accepted in accordance with paragraph 5 of this 
Section visas and any other documents as required to ensure 
that these inspectors and transport crew members may enter 
and remain in the territory of that State Party for the 
purpose of carrying out inspection activities in accordance 
with the provisions of this Protocol. Such visas and any 
other necessary documents shall be provided either: 

(A) within 30 days after the acceptance of the lists or 
subsequent changes in such lists, in which case the 
visa shall be valid for a period of no less than 24 
months; or 

(B) within one hour after the arrival of the inspection 
team and transport crew members at the point of 
entry/exit, in which case the visa shall be valid for 
the duration of their inspection activities. 

9. Within 90 days after signature of the Treaty, each 
State Party shall provide notification to all other States 
Parties of the standing diplomatic clearance number for the 
transportation means of that State Party transporting 
inspectors and equipment necessary for an inspection into 
and out of the territory of the State Party in which such an 
inspection is conducted. Routings to and from the 
designated point(s) of entry/exit shall be along established 
international airways or other routes that are agreed upon 
by the States Parties concerned as the basis for such 
diplomatic clearance. Inspectors may use commercial flights 
for travel to those points of entry/exit that are served by 
airlines. The provisions of this paragraph relating to 
diplomatic clearance numbers shall not apply to such flights. 

10. Each State Party shall indicate in the notification 
provided pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on 
Information Exchange a point or points of entry/exit in 
respect of each declared site with its objects of verification. 
Such points of entry/exit may be ground border crossing 
points, airports or seaports which must have the capacity to 
receive the transportation means of the inspecting State 
Party. At least one airport shall be notified as a point of 
entry/exit associated with each declared site. The location of 
any point of entry/exit notified as associated with a declared 
site shall be such as to allow access to that declared site 
within the time specified in Section VII, paragraph 8 of this 
Protocol. 

11. Each State Party shall have the right to change the 
point or points of entry/exit to its territory by notifying all 
other States Parties no less than 90 days before such a 
change becomes effective. 

12. Within 90 days after signature of the Treaty, each 
State Party shall provide notification to all other States 
Parties of the official language or languages of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to be 




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used by inspection teams conducting inspections of its 
conventional armed forces. 

SECTION IV. NOTIFICATION OF INTENT TO 
INSPECT 

1. The inspecting State Party shall notify the inspected 
State Party of its intention to carry out an inspection 
provided for in Article XIV of the Treaty. In the case of 
inspection of stationed conventional armed forces, the 
inspecting State Party shall simultaneously notify the host 
and stationing States Parties. In the case of inspection of 
certification or reduction procedures carried out by a 
stationing State Party, the inspecting State Party shall 
simultaneously notify the host and stationing States Parties. 

2. For inspections conducted pursuant to Sections VII 
and VIII of this Protocol, such notifications shall be made in 
accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty no less than 36 
hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the 
inspection team at the point of entry/exit on the territory of 
the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out and 
shall include: 

(A) the point of entry/exit to be used; 

(B) the estimated time of arrival at the point of entry/ 
exit; 

(C) the means of arrival at the point of entry/exit; 

(D) a statement of whether the first inspection shall be 
conducted pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this 
Protocol and whether the inspection will be 
conducted on foot, by cross-country vehicle, by 
helicopter or by any combination of these; 

(E) the time interval between the arrival at the point of 
entry/exit and the designation of the first inspection 
site; 

(F) the language to be used by the inspection team, 
which shall be a language designated in accordance 
with Section III, paragraph 12 of this Protocol; 

(G) the language to be used for the inspection report 
prepared in accordance with Section XII of this 
Protocol; 

(H) the full names of inspectors and transport crew 
members, their gender, date of birth, place of birth 
and passport number; and 

(I) the likely number of sequential inspections. 

3. For inspections conducted pursuant to Sections IX 
and X of this Protocol, such notifications shall be made in 
accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty no less than 96 
hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the 
inspection team at the designated point of entry/exit on the 
territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be 
carried out and shall include: 

(A) the point of entry/exit to be used; 

(B) the estimated time of arrival at the point of entry/ 
exit; 

(C) the means of arrival at the point of entry/exit; 


(D) for each inspection at a reduction or certification 
site, reference to the notification provided pursuant 
to Section IX, paragraph 3 or Section X, paragraph 5 
of this Protocol; 

(E) the language to be used by the inspection team, 
which shall be a language designated in accordance 
with Section III, paragraph 12 of this Protocol; 

(F) the language to be used for the inspection report 
prepared in accordance with Section XII of this 
Protocol; and 

(G) the full names of inspectors and transport crew 
members, their gender, date of birth, place of birth 
and passport number. 

4. The States Parties notified pursuant to paragraph 1 
of this Section shall acknowledge in accordance with Article 
XVII of the Treaty receipt of notification within three hours. 
Subject to the provisions set forth in this Section, the 
inspection team shall be permitted to arrive at the point of 
entry/exit at the estimated time of arrival notified pursuant 
to paragraph 2, subparagraph (B) or paragraph 3, 
subparagraph (B) of this Section. 

5. An inspected State Party receiving a notification of 
intent to inspect shall immediately upon its receipt send 
copies of such notification to all other States Parties in 
accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty. 

6. If the State Party on whose territory an inspection is 
to be carried out is unable to allow the entry of the 
inspection team at the estimated time of arrival, the 
inspection team shall be permitted to enter the territory of 
that State Party within two hours before or after the notified 
estimated time of arrival. In such a case, the State Party on 
whose territory an inspection is to be carried out shall notify 
the inspecting State Party of the new time of arrival no later 
than 24 hours following the issuance of the original 
notification. 

7. If the inspection team finds itself delayed more than 
two hours beyond the notified estimated time of arrival or 
beyond the new time of arrival communicated pursuant to 
paragraph 6 of this Section, the inspecting State Party shall 
inform the States Parties notified pursuant to paragraph 1 of 
this Section of: 

(A) a new estimated time of arrival, which in no case 
shall be more than six hours beyond the initial 
estimated time of arrival or beyond the new time of 
arrival communicated pursuant to paragraph 6 of 
this Section; and 

(B) if the inspecting State Party desires, a new time 
interval between arrival at the point of entry/exit and 
the designation of the first inspection site. 

8. In the event non-commercial flights are used to 
transport the inspection team to the point of entry/exit, no 
less than 10 hours before the planned time of entry into the 
air space of the State Party on whose territory the inspection 
is to be carried out, the inspecting State Party shall provide 
that State Party with a flight plan in accordance with Article 
XVII of the Treaty. The flight plan shall be filed in 
accordance with the procedures of the International Civil 




— Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 


301 


Aviation Organisation applicable to civil aircraft. The 
inspecting State Party shall include in the remarks section of 
each flight plan the standing diplomatic clearance number 
and the notation: “CFE inspection aircraft. Priority 
clearance processing required.” 

9. No more than three hours following the receipt of a 
flight plan that has been filed in accordance with paragraph 
8 of this Section, the State Party on whose territory an 
inspection is to be carried out shall ensure that the flight 
plan is approved so that the inspection team may arrive at 
the point of entry/exit at the estimated time of arrival. 

SECTION V. PROCEDURES UPON ARRIVAL AT POINT 
OF ENTRY/EXIT 

1. The escort team shall meet the inspection team and 
transport crew members at the point of entry/exit upon their 
arrival. 

2. A State Party which utilises structures or premises 
by agreement with the inspected State Party will designate a 
liaison officer to the escort team who will be available as 
needed at the point of entry/exit to accompany the 
inspection team at any time as agreed with the escort team. 

3. Times of arrival at and return to a point of entry/ 
exit shall be agreed and recorded by both the inspection 
team and the escort team. 

4. The State Party on whose territory an inspection is 
to be carried out shall ensure that luggage, equipment and 
supplies of the inspection team are exempt from all customs 
duties and are expeditiously processed at the point of entry/ 
exit. 

5. Equipment and supplies that the inspecting State 
Party brings into the territory of the State Party where an 
inspection is to be carried out shall be subject to 
examination each time they are brought into that territory. 
This examination shall be completed prior to the departure 
of the inspection team from the point of entry/exit to the 
inspection site. Such equipment and supplies shall be 
examined by the escort team in the presence of the 
inspection team members. 

6. If the escort team determines upon examination that 
an item of equipment or supplies brought by inspectors is 
capable of performing functions inconsistent with the 
inspection requirements of this Protocol or does not meet 
the requirements set forth in Section VI, paragraph 15 of 
this Protocol, then the escort team shall have the right to 
deny permission to use that item and to impound it at the 
point of entry/exit. The inspecting State Party shall remove 
such impounded equipment or supplies from the territory of 
the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out at 
the earliest opportunity at its own discretion, but no later 
than the time when the inspection team which brought that 
impounded equipment or supplies leaves the country. 

7. If a State Party has not participated during 
examination of equipment of an inspection team at the 
point of entry/exit, that State Party shall be entitled to 
exercise the rights of the escort team pursuant to paragraphs 
5 and 6 of this Section prior to inspection at a declared site 
at which its conventional armed forces are present or of a 


structure or premises it utilises by agreement with the 
inspected State Party. 

8. Throughout the period in which the inspection team 
and transport crew remain on the territory of the State Party 
where the inspection site is located, the inspected State Party 
shall provide or arrange for the provision of meals, lodging, 
work space, transportation and, as necessary, medical care 
or any other emergency assistance. 

9. The State Party on whose territory an inspection is 
carried out shall provide accommodation, security 
protection, servicing and fuel for the transportation means 
of the inspecting State Party at the point of entry/exit. 

SECTION VI. GENERAL RULES FOR CONDUCTING 
INSPECTIONS 

1. An inspection team may include inspectors from 
States Parties other than the inspecting State Party. 

2. For inspections conducted in accordance with 
Sections VII, VIII, IX and X of this Protocol, an inspection 
team shall consist of up to nine inspectors and may divide 
itself into up to three sub-teams. In the case of simultaneous 
inspections on the territory of States Parties that do not have 
military districts specified in Articles IV and V of the Treaty 
or within a single military district of a State Party with such 
military districts, only one inspection team may divide itself 
at the inspection site into three sub- teams, the others into 
two sub-teams. 

3. Inspectors and escort team members shall wear some 
clear identification of their respective roles. 

4. An inspector shall be deemed to have assumed his or 
her duties upon arrival at the point of entry/exit on the 
territory of the State Party where an inspection is to be 
carried out and shall be deemed to have ceased performing 
those duties after leaving the territory of that State Party 
through the point of entry/exit. 

5. The number of transport crew members shall not 
exceed 10. 

6. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, 
inspectors and transport crew members shall respect the 
laws and regulations of the State Party on whose territory an 
inspection is carried out and shall not interfere in the 
internal affairs of that State Party. Inspectors and transport 
crew members shall also respect regulations at an inspection 
site, including safety and administrative procedures. In the 
event that the inspected State Party determines that an 
inspector or transport crew member has violated such laws 
and regulations or other conditions governing the inspection 
activities set forth in this Protocol, it shall so notify the 
inspecting State Party, which upon the request of the 
inspected State Party shall immediately delete the name of 
the individual from the list of inspectors or transport crew 
members. If the individual is on the territory of the State 
Party where an inspection is carried out, the inspecting State 
Party shall promptly remove that individual from that 
territory. 

7. The inspected State Party shall be responsible for 
ensuring the safety of the inspection team and transport 
crew members from the time they arrive at the point of 


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entry/exit until the time they leave the point of entry/exit to 
depart the territory of that State Party. 

8. The escort team shall assist the inspection team in 
carrying out its functions. At its discretion, the escort team 
may exercise its right to accompany the inspection team 
from the time it enters the territory of the State Party where 
an inspection is to be carried out until the time it departs 
that territory. 

9. The inspecting State Party shall ensure that the 
inspection team and each sub-team have the necessary 
linguistic ability to communicate freely with the escort team 
in the language notified in accordance with Section IV, 
paragraph 2, subparagraph (F) and paragraph 3, 
subparagraph (E) of this Protocol. The inspected State Party 
shall ensure that the escort team has the necessary linguistic 
ability to communicate freely in this language with the 
inspection team and each sub-team. Inspectors and members 
of the escort team may also communicate in other languages. 

10. No information obtained during inspections shall be 
publicly disclosed without the express consent of the 
inspecting State Party. 

11. Throughout their presence on the territory of the 
State Party where an inspection is to be carried out, 
inspectors shall have the right to communicate with the 
embassy or consulate of the inspecting State Party located on 
that territory, using appropriate telecommunications means 
provided by the inspected State Party. The inspected State 
Party shall also provide means of communication between 
the sub-teams of an inspection team. 

12. The inspected State Party shall transport the 
inspection team to, from and between inspection sites by a 
means and route selected by the inspected State Party. The 
inspecting State Party may request a variation in the selected 
route. The inspected State Party shall if possible grant such a 
request. Whenever mutually agreed, the inspecting State 
Party will be permitted to use its own land vehicles. 

13. If an emergency arises that necessitates travel of 
inspectors from an inspection site to a point of entry/exit or 
to the embassy or consulate of the inspecting State Party on 
the territory of the State Party where an inspection is carried 
out, the inspection team shall so notify the escort team, 
which shall promptly arrange such travel, and if necessary, 
shall provide appropriate means of transportation. 

14. The inspected State Party shall provide for use by the 
inspection team at the inspection site an administrative area 
for storage of equipment and supplies, report writing, rest 
breaks and meals. 

15. The inspection team shall be permitted to bring such 
documents as needed to conduct the inspection, in particular 
its own maps and charts. Inspectors shall be permitted to 
bring and use portable passive night vision devices, 
binoculars, video and still cameras, dictaphones, tape 
measures, flashlights, magnetic compasses and lap-top 
computers. The inspectors shall be permitted to use other 
equipment, subject to the approval of the inspected State 
Party. Throughout the in-country period, the escort team 
shall have the right to observe the equipment brought by 
inspectors, but shall not interfere with the use of equipment 


that has been approved by the escort team in accordance 
with Section V, paragraphs 5 to 7 of this Protocol. 

16. In the case of an inspection conducted pursuant to 
Section VII or VIII of this Protocol, the inspection team shall 
specify on each occasion it designates the inspection site to 
be inspected whether the inspection will be conducted on 
foot, by cross-country vehicle, by helicopter or by any 
combination of these. Unless otherwise agreed, the inspected 
State Party shall provide and operate the appropriate cross¬ 
country vehicles at the inspection site. 

17. Whenever possible, subject to the safety 
requirements and flight regulations of the inspected State 
Party and subject to the provisions of paragraphs 18 to 21 of 
this Section, the inspection team shall have the right to 
conduct helicopter overflights of the inspection site, using a 
helicopter provided and operated by the inspected State 
Party, during inspections conducted pursuant to Sections VII 
and VIII of this Protocol. 

18. The inspected State Party shall not be obliged to 
provide a helicopter at any inspection site that is less than 20 
square kilometres in area. 

19. The inspected State Party shall have the right to 
delay, limit or refuse helicopter overflights above sensitive 
points, but the presence of sensitive points shall not prevent 
helicopter overflight of the remaining areas of the inspection 
site. Photography of or above sensitive points during 
helicopter overflights shall be permitted only with the 
approval of the escort team. 

20. The duration of such helicopter overflights at an 
inspection site shall not exceed a cumulative total of one 
hour, unless otherwise agreed between the inspection team 
and the escort team. 

21. Any helicopter provided by the inspected State Party 
shall be large enough to carry at least two members of the 
inspection team and at least one member of the escort team. 
Inspectors shall be allowed to take and use on overflights of 
the inspection site any of the equipment specified in 
paragraph 15 of this Section. The inspection team shall 
advise the escort team during inspection flights whenever it 
intends to take photographs. A helicopter shall afford the 
inspectors a constant and unobstructed view of the ground. 

22. In discharging their functions, inspectors shall not 
interfere directly with ongoing activities at the inspection site 
and shall avoid unnecessarily hampering or delaying 
operations at the inspection site or taking actions affecting 
safe operation. 

23. Except as provided for in paragraphs 24 to 29 of this 
Section, during an inspection of an object of verification or 
within a specified area, inspectors shall be permitted access, 
entry and unobstructed inspection: 

(A) in the case of a specified area, within the entire 
specified area; or 

(B) in the case of an object of verification, within the 
entire territory of the declared site except within 
those areas delineated on the site diagram as 
belonging exclusively to another object of 
verification which the inspection team has not 
designated for inspection. 



Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 303 


24. During an inspection of an object of verification or 
within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this 
Protocol and subject to the provisions of paragraph 25 of 
this Section, inspectors shall have the right, within the areas 
cited in paragraph 23 of this Section, to enter any location, 
structure or area within a structure in which battle tanks, 
armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, 
combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, 
armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry 
fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched 
bridges are permanently or routinely present. Inspectors 
shall not have the right to enter other structures or areas 
within structures the entry points to which are physically 
accessible only by personnel doors not exceeding two metres 
in width and to which access is denied by the escort team. 

25. During an inspection of an object of verification or 
within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this 
Protocol, inspectors shall have the right to look into a 
hardened aircraft shelter to confirm visually whether any 
battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat 
helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable 
trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, 
armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured 
vehicle launched bridges are present and, if so, their number 
and type, model or version. Notwithstanding the provisions 
of paragraph 24 of this Section, inspectors shall enter the 
interior of such hardened aircraft shelters only with the 
approval of the escort team. If such approval is denied and if 
the inspectors so request, any battle tanks, armoured combat 
vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, 
reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, armoured 
personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting 
vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges in 
such hardened aircraft shelters shall be displayed outside. 

26. During an inspection of an object of verification or 
within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of this 
Protocol, except as provided in paragraphs 27 to 33 of this 
Section, inspectors shall have the right to have access to 
conventional armaments and equipment only in so far as is 
necessary to confirm visually their number and type, model 
or version. 

27. The inspected State Party shall have the right to 
shroud individual sensitive items of equipment. 

28. The escort team shall have the right to deny access to 
sensitive points, the number and extent of which should be 
as limited as possible, to shrouded objects and to containers 
any dimension (width, height, length or diameter) of which 
is less than two metres. Whenever a sensitive point is 
designated, or shrouded objects or containers are present, 
the escort team shall declare whether the sensitive point, 
shrouded object or container holds any battle tanks, 
armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat helicopters, 
combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, 
armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured infantry 
fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured vehicle launched 
bridges and, if so, their number and type, model or version. 

29. If the escort team declares that a sensitive point, 
shrouded object or container does contain any of the 
conventional armaments and equipment specified in 
paragraph 28 of this Section, then the escort team shall 


display or declare such conventional armaments and 
equipment to the inspection team and shall take steps to 
satisfy the inspection team that no more than the declared 
number of such conventional armaments and equipment are 
present. 

30. If, during an inspection of an object of verification 
or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of 
this Protocol, a helicopter of a type that is or has been on 
the multi-purpose attack helicopter list in the Protocol on 
Existing Types is present at an inspection site and is 
declared by the escort team to be a combat support 
helicopter, or if an Mi-24R or Mi-24K helicopter is present 
at an inspection site and is declared by the escort team to be 
limited pursuant to Section I, paragraph 3 of the Protocol 
on Helicopter Recategorisation, such a helicopter shall be 
subject to internal inspection in accordance with Section IX, 
paragraphs 4 to 6 of this Protocol. 

31. If, during an inspection of an object of verification 
or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of 
this Protocol, an aircraft of a specific model or version of 
combat-capable trainer aircraft listed in Section II of the 
Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification is present at an 
inspection site and is declared by the escort team to have 
been certified as unarmed in accordance with the Protocol 
on Aircraft Reclassification, such an aircraft shall be subject 
to internal inspection in accordance with Section IX, 
paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Protocol. 

32. If, during an inspection of an object of verification 
or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of 
this Protocol, an armoured vehicle declared by the escort 
team to be an armoured personnel carrier look-alike or an 
armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alike is present at 
an inspection site, the inspection team shall have the right to 
determine that such vehicle cannot permit the transport of a 
combat infantry squad. Inspectors shall have the right to 
require the doors and/or hatches of the vehicle to be opened 
so that the interior can be visually inspected from outside 
the vehicle. Sensitive equipment in or on the vehicle may be 
shrouded. 

33. If, during an inspection of an object of verification 
or within a specified area pursuant to Section VII or VIII of 
this Protocol, items of equipment declared by the escort 
team to have been reduced in accordance with the 
provisions in the Protocol on Reduction are present at an 
inspection site, the inspection team shall have the right to 
inspect such items of equipment to confirm that they have 
been reduced in accordance with the procedures specified in 
Sections III to XII of the Protocol on Reduction. 

34. Inspectors shall have the right to take photographs, 
including video, for the purpose of recording the presence of 
conventional armaments and equipment subject to the 
Treaty, including within designated permanent storage sites, 
or other storage sites containing more than 50 such 
conventional armaments and equipment. Still cameras shall 
be limited to 35mm cameras and to cameras capable of 
producing instantly developed photographic prints. The 
inspection team shall advise the escort team in advance 
whether it plans to take photographs. The escort team shall 
cooperate with the inspection team’s taking of photographs. 



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35. Photography of sensitive points shall be permitted 
only with the approval of the escort team. 

36. Except as provided for in paragraph 38 of this 
Section, photography of interiors of structures other than 
storage sites specified in paragraph 34 of this Section shall 
be permitted only with the approval of the escort team. 

37. Inspectors shall have the right to take measurements 
to resolve ambiguities that might arise during inspections. 
Such measurements recorded during inspections shall be 
confirmed by a member of the inspection team and a 
member of the escort team immediately after they are taken. 
Such confirmed data shall be included in the inspection 
report. 

38. States Parties shall, whenever possible, resolve during 
an inspection any ambiguities that arise regarding factual 
information. Whenever inspectors request the escort team to 
clarify such an ambiguity, the escort team shall promptly 
provide the inspection team with clarifications. If inspectors 
decide to document an unresolved ambiguity with 
photographs, the escort team shall, subject to the provision 
in paragraph 35 of this Section, cooperate with the 
inspection team’s taking of appropriate photographs using a 
camera capable of producing instantly developed 
photographic prints. If an ambiguity cannot be resolved 
during the inspection, then the question, relevant 
clarifications and any pertinent photographs shall be 
included in the inspection report in accordance with Section 
XII of this Protocol. 

39. For inspections conducted pursuant to Sections VII 
and VIII of this Protocol, the inspection shall be deemed to 
have been completed once the inspection report has been 
signed and countersigned. 

40. No later than completion of an inspection at a 
declared site or within a specified area, the inspection team 
shall inform the escort team whether the inspection team 
intends to conduct a sequential inspection. If the inspection 
team intends to conduct a sequential inspection, the 
inspection team shall designate at that time the next 
inspection site. In such cases, subject to the provisions in 
Section VII, paragraphs 6 and 17 and Section VIII, 
paragraph 6, subparagraph (A) of this Protocol, the 
inspected State Party shall ensure that the inspection team 
arrives at the sequential inspection site as soon as possible 
after completion of the previous inspection. If the inspection 
team does not intend to conduct a sequential inspection, 
then the provisions in paragraphs 42 and 43 of this Section 
shall apply. 

41. An inspection team shall have the right to conduct a 
sequential inspection, subject to the provisions of Sections 
VII and VIII of this Protocol, on the territory of the State 
Party on which that inspection team has conducted the 
preceding inspection: 

(A) at any declared site associated with the same point of 
entry/exit as the preceding inspection site or the same 
point of entry/exit at which the inspection team 
arrived; or 

(B) within any specified area for which the point of 
entry/exit at which the inspection team arrived is the 
nearest point of entry/exit notified pursuant to 


Section V of the Protocol on Information Exchange; 
or 

(C) at any location within 200 kilometres of the 
preceding inspection site within the same military 
district; or 

(D) at the location which the inspected State Party 
claims, pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 11, 
subparagraph (A) of this Protocol, is the temporary 
location of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, 
artillery, combat helicopters, combat aircraft or 
armoured vehicle launched bridges which were 
absent during inspection of an object of verification 
at the preceding inspection site, if such conventional 
armaments and equipment constitute more than 15 
percent of the number of such conventional 
armaments and equipment notified in the most 
recent notification pursuant to the Protocol on 
Information Exchange; or 

(E) at the declared site which the inspected State Party 
claims, pursuant to Section VII, paragraph 11, 
subparagraph (B) of this Protocol, is the site of origin 
for battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, 
combat helicopters, combat aircraft or armoured 
vehicle launched bridges at the preceding inspection 
site which are in excess of the number provided in 
the most recent notification pursuant to the Protocol 
on Information Exchange as being present at that 
preceding inspection site, if such conventional 
armaments and equipment exceed by 15 percent the 
number of such conventional armaments and 
equipment so notified. 

42. After completion of an inspection at a declared site 
or within a specified area, if no sequential inspection has 
been declared, then the inspection team shall be transported 
to the appropriate point of entry/exit as soon as possible and 
shall depart the territory of the State Party where the 
inspection was carried out within 24 hours. 

43. The inspection team shall leave the territory of the 
State Party where it has been conducting inspections from 
the same point of entry/exit at which it entered, unless 
otherwise agreed. If an inspection team chooses to proceed 
to a point of entry/exit on the territory of another State 
Party for the purpose of conducting inspections, it shall have 
the right to do so provided that the inspecting State Party 
has provided the necessary notification in accordance with 
Section IV, paragraph 1 of this Protocol. 

SECTION VII. DECLARED SITE INSPECTION 

1. Inspection of a declared site pursuant to this 
Protocol shall not be refused. Such inspections may be 
delayed only in cases of force majeure or in accordance with 
Section II, paragraphs 7 and 20 to 22 of this Protocol. 

2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3 of this 
Section, an inspection team shall arrive on the territory of 
the State Party where an inspection is to be carried out 
through a point of entry/exit associated under Section V of 
the Protocol on Information Exchange with the declared site 
it plans to designate as the first inspection site pursuant to 
paragraph 7 of this Section. 



Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 305 


3. If an inspecting State Party desires to use a ground 
border crossing point or seaport as a point of entry/exit and 
the inspected State Party has not previously notified a 
ground border crossing point or seaport as a point of entry/ 
exit pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information 
Exchange as associated with the declared site the inspecting 
State Party desires to designate as the first inspection site 
pursuant to paragraph 7 of this Section, the inspecting State 
Party shall indicate in the notification provided pursuant to 
Section IV, paragraph 2 of this Protocol the desired ground 
border crossing point or seaport as point of entry/exit. The 
inspected State Party shall indicate in its acknowledgement 
of receipt of notification, as provided for in Section IV, 
paragraph 4 of this Protocol, whether this point of entry/exit 
is acceptable or not. In the latter case, the inspected State 
Party shall notify the inspecting State Party of another point 
of entry/exit which shall be as near as possible to the desired 
point of entry/exit and which may be an airport notified 
pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Information 
Exchange, a seaport or a ground border crossing point 
through which the inspection team and transport crew 
members may arrive on its territory. 

4. If an inspecting State Party notifies its desire to use a 
ground border crossing point or seaport as a point of entry/ 
exit pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Section, it shall 
determine prior to such notification that there is reasonable 
certainty that its inspection team can reach the first declared 
site where that State Party desires to carry out an inspection 
within the time specified in paragraph 8 of this Section using 
ground transportation means. 

5. If an inspection team and transport crew arrive 
pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Section on the territory of 
the State Party on which an inspection is to be carried out 
through a point of entry/exit other than a point of entry/exit 
that was notified pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on 
Information Exchange as being associated with the declared 
site it desires to designate as the first inspection site, the 
inspected State Party shall facilitate access to this declared 
site as expeditiously as possible, but shall be permitted to 
exceed, if necessary, the time limit specified in paragraph 8 
of this Section. 

6. The inspected State Party shall have the right to 
utilise up to six hours after designation of a declared site to 
prepare for the arrival of the inspection team at that site. 

7. At the number of hours after arrival at the point of 
entry/exit notified pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 2, 
subparagraph (E) of this Protocol, which shall be no less 
than one hour and no more than 16 hours after arrival at the 
point of entry/exit, the inspection team shall designate the 
first declared site to be inspected. 

8. The inspected State Party shall ensure that the 
inspection team travels to the first declared site by the most 
expeditious means available and arrives as soon as possible 
but no later than nine hours after the designation of the site 
to be inspected, unless otherwise agreed between the 
inspection team and the escort team, or unless the inspection 
site is located in mountainous terrain or terrain to which 
access is difficult. In such case, the inspection team shall be 
transported to the inspection site no later than 15 hours 
after designation of that inspection site. Travel time in excess 


of nine hours shall not count against that inspection team’s 
in-country period. 

9. Immediately upon arrival at the declared site, the 
inspection team shall be escorted to a briefing facility where 
it shall be provided with a diagram of the declared site, 
unless such a diagram has been provided in a previous 
exchange of site diagrams. The declared site diagram, 
provided upon arrival at the declared site, shall contain an 
accurate depiction of the: 

(A) geographic coordinates of a point within the 
inspection site, to the nearest 10 seconds, with 
indication of that point and of true north; 

(B) scale used in the site diagram; 

(C) perimeter of the declared site; 

(D) precisely delineated boundaries of those areas 
belonging exclusively to each object of verification, 
indicating the formation or unit record number of 
each object of verification to which each such area 
belongs and including those separately located areas 
where battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, 
artillery, combat aircraft, combat helicopters, 
reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, 
armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured 
infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured 
vehicle launched bridges belonging to each object of 
verification are permanently assigned; 

(E) major buildings and roads on the declared site; 

(F) entrances to the declared site; and 

(G) location of an administrative area for the inspection 
team provided in accordance with Section VI, 
paragraph 14 of this Protocol. 

10. Within one-half hour after receiving the diagram of 
the declared site, the inspection team shall designate the 
object of verification to be inspected. The inspection team 
shall then be given a pre-inspection briefing which shall last 
no more than one hour and shall include the following 
elements: 

(A) safety and administrative procedures at the 
inspection site; 

(B) modalities of transportation and communication for 
inspectors at the inspection site; and 

(C) holdings and locations at the inspection site, 
including within the common areas of the declared 
site, of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, 
artillery, combat aircraft, combat helicopters, 
reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft, 
armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, armoured 
infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes and armoured 
vehicle launched bridges, including those belonging 
to separately located subordinate elements belonging 
to the same object of verification to be inspected. 

11. The pre-inspection briefing shall include an 
explanation of any differences between the numbers of battle 
tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, 
combat helicopters or armoured vehicle launched bridges 
present at the inspection site and the corresponding numbers 




306 


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provided in the most recent notification pursuant to the 
Protocol on Information Exchange, in accordance with the 
following provisions: 

(A) if the numbers of such conventional armaments and 
equipment present at the inspection site are less than 
the numbers provided in that most recent 
notification, such explanation shall include the 
temporary location of such conventional armaments 
and equipment; and 

(B) if the numbers of such armaments and equipment 
present at the inspection site exceed the numbers 
provided in that most recent notification, such 
explanation shall include specific information on the 
origin, departure times from origin, time of arrival 
and projected stay at the inspection site of such 
additional conventional armaments and equipment. 

12. When an inspection team designates an object of 
verification to be inspected, the inspection team shall have 
the right, as part of the same inspection of that object of 
verification, to inspect all territory delineated on the site 
diagram as belonging to that object of verification, including 
those separately located areas on the territory of the same 
State Party where conventional armaments and equipment 
belonging to that object of verification are permanently 
assigned. 

13. The inspection of one object of verification at a 
declared site shall permit the inspection team access, entry 
and unobstructed inspection within the entire territory of the 
declared site except within those areas delineated on the site 
diagram as belonging exclusively to another object of 
verification which the inspection team has not designated for 
inspection. During such inspections, the provisions of 
Section VI of this Protocol shall apply. 

14. If the escort team informs the inspection team that 
battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat 
helicopters, combat aircraft, reclassified combat-capable 
trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier look-alikes, 
armoured infantry fighting vehicle look-alikes or armoured 
vehicle launched bridges that have been notified as being 
held by one object of verification at a declared site are 
present within an area delineated on the site diagram as 
belonging exclusively to another object of verification, then 
the escort team shall ensure that the inspection team, as part 
of the same inspection, has access to such conventional 
armaments and equipment. 

15. If conventional armaments and equipment limited by 
the Treaty or armoured vehicle launched bridges are present 
within areas of a declared site not delineated on the site 
diagram as belonging exclusively to one object of 
verification, the escort team shall inform the inspection team 
to which object of verification such conventional armaments 
and equipment belong. 

16. Each State Party shall be obliged to account for the 
aggregate total of any category of conventional armaments 
and equipment limited by the Treaty notified pursuant to 
Section III of the Protocol on Information Exchange, at the 
organisational level above brigade/regiment or equivalent, if 
such an accounting is requested by another State Party. 


17. If, during an inspection at a declared site, the 
inspection team decides to conduct at the same declared site 
an inspection of an object of verification that had not been 
previously designated, the inspection team shall have the 
right to commence such inspection within three hours of that 
designation. In such case, the inspection team shall be given 
a briefing on the object of verification designated for the 
next inspection in accordance with paragraphs 10 and 11 of 
this Section. 

SECTION VIII. CHALLENGE INSPECTION WITHIN 
SPECIFIED AREAS 

1. Each State Party shall have the right to conduct 
challenge inspections within specified areas in accordance 
with this Protocol. 

2. If the inspecting State Party intends to conduct a 
challenge inspection within a specified area as the 
first inspection after arrival at a point of entry/exit: 

(A) it shall include in its notification pursuant to Section 
IV of this Protocol the designated point of entry/exit 
nearest to or within that specified area capable of 
receiving the inspecting State Party’s chosen means of 
transportation; and 

(B) at the number of hours after arrival at the point of 
entry/exit notified pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 
2, subparagraph (E)of this Protocol, which shall be 
no less than one hour and no more than 16 hours 
after arrival at the point of entry/exit, the inspection 
team shall designate the first specified area it wishes 
to inspect. Whenever a specified area is designated, 
the inspection team shall, as part of its inspection 
request, provide to the escort team a geographic 
description delineating the outer boundaries of that 
area. The inspection team shall have the right, as 
part of that request, to identify any structure or 
facility it wishes to inspect. 

3. The State Party on whose territory a challenge 
inspection is requested shall, immediately upon receiving a 
designation of a specified area, inform other States Parties 
which utilise structures or premises by agreement with the 
inspected State Party of that specified area, including its 
geographic description delineating the outer boundaries. 

4. The inspected State Party shall have the right to 
refuse challenge inspections within specified areas. 

5. The inspected State Party shall inform the inspection 
team within two hours after the designation of a specified 
area whether the inspection request will be granted. 

6. If access to a specified area is granted: 

(A) the inspected State Party shall have the right to use 
up to six hours after it accepts the inspection to 
prepare for the arrival of the inspection team at the 
specified area; 

(B) the inspected State Party shall ensure that the 
inspection team travels to the first specified area by 
the most expeditious means available and arrives as 
soon as possible after the designation of the site to be 
inspected, but no later than nine hours from the time 



Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 307 


such an inspection is accepted, unless otherwise 
agreed between the inspection team and the escort 
team, or unless the inspection site is located in 
mountainous terrain or terrain to which access is 
difficult. In such case, the inspection team shall be 
transported to the inspection site no later than 15 
hours after such an inspection is accepted. Travel 
time in excess of nine hours shall not count against 
that inspection team’s in-country period; and 

(C) the provisions of Section VI of this Protocol shall 
apply. Within such specified area the escort team 
may delay access to or overflight of particular parts 
of that specified area. If the delay exceeds more than 
four hours the inspection team shall have the right to 
cancel the inspection. The period of delay shall not 
count against the in-country period or the maximum 
time allowed within a specified area. 

7. If an inspection team requests access to a structure or 
premises which another State Party utilises by agreement 
with the inspected State Party, the inspected State Party shall 
immediately inform that State Party of such a request. The 
escort team shall inform the inspection team that the other 
State Party, by agreement with the inspected State Party, 
shall, in cooperation with the inspected State Party and to 
the extent consistent with the agreement on utilisation, 
exercise the rights and obligations set forth in this Protocol 
with respect to inspections involving equipment or materiel 
of the State Party utilising the structure or premises. 

8. If the inspected State Party so wishes, the inspection 
team may be briefed on arrival at the specified area. This 
briefing is to last no more than one hour. Safety procedures 
and administrative arrangements may also be covered in this 
briefing. 

9. If access to a specified area is denied: 

(A) the inspected State Party or the State Party exercising 
the rights and obligations of the inspected State Party 
shall provide all reasonable assurance that the 
specified area does not contain conventional 
armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. If 
such armaments and equipment are present and 
assigned to organisations designed and structured to 
perform in peacetime internal security functions in 
the area defined in Article V of the Treaty, the 
inspected State Party or the State Party exercising the 
rights and obligations of the inspected State Party 
shall allow visual confirmation of their presence, 
unless precluded from so doing by force majeure, in 
which case visual confirmation shall be allowed as 
soon as practicable; and 

(B) no inspection quota shall be counted, and the time 
between the designation of the specified area and its 
subsequent refusal shall not count against the in¬ 
country period. The inspection team shall have the 
right to designate another specified area or declared 
site for inspection or to declare the inspection 
concluded. 

SECTION IX. INSPECTION OF CERTIFICATION 

1. Each State Party shall have the right to inspect, 
without right of refusal, the certification of recategorised 


multi-purpose attack helicopters and reclassified combat- 
capable trainer aircraft in accordance with the provisions of 
this Section, the Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation 
and the Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification. Such 
inspections shall not count against the quotas established in 
Section II of this Protocol. Inspection teams conducting such 
inspections may be composed of representatives of different 
States Parties. The inspected State Party shall not be obliged 
to accept more than one inspection team at a time at each 
certification site. 

2. In conducting an inspection of certification in 
accordance with this Section, an inspection team shall have 
the right to spend up to two days at a certification site, 
unless otherwise agreed. 

3. No less than 15 days before the certification of 
recategorised multi-purpose attack helicopters or reclassified 
combat-capable trainer aircraft, the State Party conducting 
the certification shall provide to all other States Parties 
notification of: 

(A) the site at which the certification is to take place, 
including geographic coordinates; 

(B) the scheduled dates of the certification process; 

(C) the estimated number and type, model or version of 
helicopters or aircraft to be certified; 

(D) the manufacturer’s serial number for each helicopter 
or aircraft; 

(E) the unit or location to which the helicopters or 
aircraft were previously assigned; 

(F) the unit or location to which the certified helicopters 
or aircraft will be assigned in the future; 

(G) the point of entry/exit to be used by an inspection 
team; and 

(H) the date and time by which an inspection team shall 
arrive at the point of entry/exit in order to inspect 
the certification. 

4. Inspectors shall have the right to enter and inspect 
visually the helicopter or aircraft cockpit and interior to 
include checking the manufacturer’s serial number, without 
right of refusal on the part of the State Party conducting the 
certification. 

5. If requested by the inspection team, the escort team 
shall remove, without right of refusal, any access panels 
covering the position from which components and wiring 
were removed in accordance with the provisions of the 
Protocol on Helicopter Recategorisation or the Protocol on 
Aircraft Reclassification. 

6. Inspectors shall have the right to request and 
observe, with the right of refusal on the part of the State 
Party conducting the certification, the activation of any 
weapon system component in multi-purpose attack 
helicopters being certified or declared to have been 
recategorised. 

7. At the conclusion of each inspection of certification, 
the inspection team shall complete an inspection report in 
accordance with the provisions of Section XII of this 
Protocol. 



308 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


8. Upon completion of an inspection at a certification 
site, the inspection team shall have the right to depart the 
territory of the inspected State Party or to conduct a 
sequential inspection at another certification site or at a 
reduction site if the appropriate notification has been 
provided by the inspection team in accordance with Section 
IV, paragraph 3 of this Protocol. The inspection team shall 
notify the escort team of its intended departure from the 
certification site and, if appropriate, of its intention to 
proceed to another certification site or to a reduction site at 
least 24 hours before the intended departure time. 

9. Within seven days after completion of the 
certification, the State Party responsible for the certification 
shall notify all other States Parties of the completion of the 
certification. Such notification shall specify the number, 
types, models or versions and manufacturer’s serial numbers 
of certified helicopters or aircraft, the certification site 
involved, the actual dates of the certification, and the units 
or locations to which the recategorised helicopters or 
reclassified aircraft will be assigned. 

SECTION X. INSPECTION OF REDUCTION 

1. Each State Party shall have the right to conduct 
inspections, without the right of refusal by the inspected 
State Party, of the process of reduction carried out pursuant 
to Sections I to VIII and X to XII of the Protocol on 
Reduction in accordance with the provisions of this Section. 
Such inspections shall not count against the quotas 
established in Section II of this Protocol. Inspection teams 
conducting such inspections may be composed of 
representatives of different States Parties. The inspected State 
Party shall not be obliged to accept more than one 
inspection team at a time at each reduction site. 

2. The inspected State Party shall have the right to 
organise and implement the process of reduction subject 
only to the provisions set forth in Article VIII of the Treaty 
and in the Protocol on Reduction. Inspections of the process 
of reduction shall be conducted in a manner that does not 
interfere with the ongoing activities at the reduction site or 
unnecessarily hamper, delay or complicate the 
implementation of the process of reduction. 

3. If a reduction site notified pursuant to Section III of 
the Protocol on Information Exchange is used by more than 
one State Party, inspections of the reduction process shall be 
conducted in accordance with schedules of such use 
provided by each State Party using the reduction site. 

4. Each State Party that intends to reduce conventional 
armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty shall notify 
all other States Parties which conventional armaments and 
equipment are to be reduced at each reduction site during a 
calendar reporting period. Each such calendar reporting 
period shall have a duration of no more than 90 days and no 
less than 30 days. This provision shall apply whenever 
reduction is carried out at a reduction site, without regard to 
whether the reduction process is to be carried out on a 
continuous or intermittent basis. 

5. No less than 15 days before the initiation of 
reduction for a calendar reporting period, the State Party 
intending to implement reduction procedures shall provide 
to all other States Parties the calendar reporting period 


notification. Such notification shall include the designation 
of the reduction site with geographic coordinates, the 
scheduled date for initiation of reduction and the scheduled 
date for completion of the reduction of conventional 
armaments and equipment identified for reduction during 
the calendar reporting period. In addition, the notification 
shall identify: 

(A) the estimated number and type of conventional 
armaments and equipment to be reduced; 

(B) the object or objects of verification from which the 
items to be reduced have been withdrawn; 

(C) the reduction procedures to be used, pursuant to 
Sections III to VIII and Sections X to XII of the 
Protocol on Reduction, for each type of conventional 
armaments and equipment to be reduced; 

(D) the point of entry/exit to be used by an inspection 
team conducting an inspection of reduction notified 
for that calendar reporting period; and 

(E) the date and time by which an inspection team must 
arrive at the point of entry/exit in order to inspect 
the conventional armaments and equipment before 
the initiation of their reduction. 

6. Except as specified in paragraph 11 of this Section, 
an inspection team shall have the right to arrive at or depart 
from a reduction site at any time during the calendar 
reporting period, including three days beyond the end of a 
notified calendar reporting period. In addition, the 
inspection team shall have the right to remain at the 
reduction site throughout one or more calendar reporting 
periods provided that these periods are not separated by 
more than three days. Throughout the period that the 
inspection team remains at the reduction site, it shall have 
the right to observe all the reduction procedures carried out 
in accordance with the Protocol on Reduction. 

7. In accordance with the provisions set forth in this 
Section, the inspection team shall have the right to freely 
record factory serial numbers from the conventional 
armaments and equipment to be reduced or to place special 
marks on such equipment before reduction and to record 
subsequently such numbers or marks at the completion of 
the reduction process. Parts and elements of reduced 
conventional armaments and equipment as specified in 
Section II, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Protocol on Reduction 
or, in the case of conversion, the vehicles converted for non¬ 
military purposes shall be available for inspection for at least 
three days after the end of the notified calendar reporting 
period, unless inspection of those reduced elements has been 
completed earlier. 

8. The State Party engaged in the process of reducing 
conventional armaments and equipment limited by the 
Treaty shall establish at each reduction site a working 
register in which it shall record the factory serial numbers of 
each item undergoing reduction as well as the dates on 
which the reduction procedures were initiated and 
completed. This register shall also include aggregate data for 
each calendar reporting period. The register shall be made 
available to the inspection team for the period of inspection. 



Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 309 


9. At the conclusion of each inspection of the reduction 
process, the inspection team shall complete a standardised 
report which shall be signed by the inspection team leader 
and a representative of the inspected State Party. The 
provisions of Section XII of this Protocol shall apply. 

10. Upon completion of an inspection at a reduction site, 
the inspection team shall have the right to depart the 
territory of the inspected State Party or to conduct a 
sequential inspection at another reduction site or at a 
certification site if the appropriate notification has been 
provided in accordance with Section IV, paragraph 3 of this 
Protocol. The inspection team shall notify the escort team of 
its intended departure from the reduction site and, if 
appropriate, of its intention to proceed to another reduction 
site or to a certification site at least 24 hours before the 
intended departure time. 

11. Each State Party shall be obliged to accept up to 10 
inspections each year to validate the completion of 
conversion of conventional armaments and equipment into 
vehicles for non-military purposes pursuant to Section VIII of 
the Protocol on Reduction. Such inspections shall be 
conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Section 
with the following exceptions: 

(A) the notification pursuant to paragraph 5, 
subparagraph (E) of this Section shall identify only 
the date and time by which an inspection team must 
arrive at the point of entry/exit in order to inspect the 
items of equipment at the completion of their 
conversion into vehicles for non-military purposes; 
and 

(B) the inspection team shall have the right to arrive at or 
depart from the reduction site only during the three 
days beyond the end of the notified completion date 
of conversion. 

12. Within seven days after the completion of the process 
of reduction for a calendar reporting period, the State Party 
responsible for reductions shall notify all other States Parties 
of the completion of reduction for that period. Such 
notification shall specify the number and types of 
conventional armaments and equipment reduced, the 
reduction site involved, the reduction procedures employed 
and the actual dates of the initiation and completion of the 
reduction process for that calendar reporting period. For 
conventional armaments and equipment reduced pursuant to 
Sections X, XI and XII of the Protocol on Reduction, the 
notification shall also specify the location at which such 
conventional armaments and equipment will be permanently 
located. For conventional armaments and equipment reduced 
pursuant to Section VIII of the Protocol on Reduction, the 
notification shall specify the reduction site at which final 
conversion will be carried out or the storage site to which 
each item designated for conversion will be transferred. 

SECTION XI. CANCELLATION OF INSPECTIONS 

1. If an inspection team finds itself unable to arrive at 
the point of entry/exit within six hours after the initial 
estimated time of arrival or after the new time of arrival 
communicated pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 6 of this 
Protocol, the inspecting State Party shall so inform the States 
Parties notified pursuant to Section IV, paragraph 1 of this 


Protocol. In such a case, the notification of intent to inspect 
shall lapse and the inspection shall be cancelled. 

2. In the case of delay, due to circumstances beyond the 
control of the inspecting State Party, occurring after the 
inspection team has arrived at the point of entry/exit and 
which has prevented the inspection team from arriving at the 
first designated inspection site within the time specified in 
Section VII, paragraph 8 or Section VIII, paragraph 6, 
subparagraph (B) of this Protocol, the inspecting State Party 
shall have the right to cancel the inspection. If an inspection 
is cancelled under such circumstances, it shall not be counted 
against any quotas provided for in the Treaty. 

SECTION XII. INSPECTION REPORTS 

1. In order to complete an inspection carried out in 
accordance with Section VII, VIII, IX or X of this Protocol, 
and before leaving the inspection site: 

(A) the inspection team shall provide the escort team 
with a written report; and 

(B) the escort team shall have the right to include its 
written comments in the inspection report and shall 
countersign the report within one hour after having 
received the report from the inspection team, unless 
an extension has been agreed between the inspection 
team and the escort team. 

2. The report shall be signed by the inspection team 
leader and receipt acknowledged in writing by the leader of 
the escort team. 

3. The report shall be factual and standardised. Formats 
for each type of inspection shall be agreed by the Joint 
Consultative Group prior to entry into force of the Treaty, 
taking into account paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Section. 

4. Reports of inspections conducted pursuant to 
Sections VII and VIII of this Protocol shall include: 

(A) the inspection site; 

(B) the date and time of arrival of the inspection team at 
the inspection site; 

(C) the date and time of departure of the inspection team 
from the inspection site; and 

(D) the number and type, model or version of any battle 
tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat 
aircraft, combat helicopters, reclassified combat- 
capable trainer aircraft, armoured personnel carrier 
look-alikes, armoured infantry fighting vehicle look- 
alikes or armoured vehicle launched bridges that 
were observed during the inspection, including, if 
appropriate, an indication of the object of 
verification to which they belonged. 

5. Reports of inspections conducted pursuant to 
Sections IX and X of this Protocol shall include: 

(A) the reduction or certification site at which the 
reduction or certification procedures were carried 
out; 

(B) the dates the inspection team was present at the site; 




310 On-Site Inspection Agency 


(C) the number and type, model or version of 
conventional armaments and equipment for which 
the reduction or certification procedures were 
observed; 

(D) a list of any serial numbers recorded during the 
inspections; 

(E) in the case of reductions, the particular reduction 
procedures applied or observed; and 

(F) in the case of reductions, if an inspection team was 
present at the reduction site throughout the calendar 
reporting period, the actual dates on which the 
reduction procedures were initiated and completed. 

6. The inspection report shall be written in the official 
language of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe designated by the inspecting State Party in 
accordance with Section IV, paragraph 2, subparagraph (G) 
or paragraph 3, subparagraph (F) of this Protocol. 

7. The inspecting State Party and the inspected State 
Party shall each retain one copy of the report. At the 
discretion of either State Party, the inspection report may be 
forwarded to other States Parties and, as a rule, made 
available to the Joint Consultative Group. 

8. The stationing State Party shall in particular: 

(A) have the right to include written comments related 
to the inspection of its stationed conventional armed 
forces; and 

(B) retain one copy of the inspection report in the case 
of inspection of its stationed conventional armed 
forces. 

SECTION XIII. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF 
INSPECTORS AND TRANSPORT CREW MEMBERS 

1. To exercise their functions effectively, for the 
purpose of implementing the Treaty and not for their 
personal benefit, inspectors and transport crew members 
shall be accorded the privileges and immunities enjoyed by 
diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29; Article 30, 
paragraph 2; Article 31, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3; and Articles 
34 and 35 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations of April 18, 1961. 

2. In addition, inspectors and transport crew members 
shall be accorded the privileges enjoyed by diplomatic agents 
pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of 
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 
1961. They shall not be permitted to bring into the territory 
of the State Party where the inspection is to be carried out 
articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law 
or controlled by quarantine regulations of that State Party. 

3. The transportation means of the inspection team 
shall be inviolable, except as otherwise provided for in the 
Treaty. 

4. The inspecting State Party may waive the immunity 
from jurisdiction of any of its inspectors or transport crew 
members in those cases when it is of the opinion that 
immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can 
be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the 


provisions of the Treaty. The immunity of inspectors and 
transport crew members who are not nationals of the 
inspecting State Party may be waived only by the States 
Parties of which those inspectors are nationals. Waiver must 
always be express. 

5. The privileges and immunities provided for in this 
Section shall be accorded to inspectors and transport crew 
members: 

(A) while transiting through the territory of any State 
Party for the purpose of conducting an inspection on 
the territory of another State Party; 

(B) throughout their presence on the territory of the 
State Party where the inspection is carried out; and 

(C) thereafter with respect to acts previously performed 
in the exercise of official functions as an inspector or 
transport crew member. 

6. If the inspected State Party considers that an 
inspector or transport crew member has abused his or her 
privileges and immunities, then the provisions set forth in 
Section VI, paragraph 6 of this Protocol shall apply. At the 
request of any of the States Parties concerned, consultations 
shall be held between them in order to prevent a repetition 
of such an abuse. 

PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES 
GOVERNING THE REDUCTION OF 
CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND 
EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY ON 
CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN 
EUROPE 

The States Parties hereby agree upon procedures 
governing the reduction of conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty as set forth in Article VIII of 
the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 
November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty. 

SECTION I. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 
REDUCTION 

1. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by 
the Treaty shall be reduced in accordance with the 
procedures set forth in this Protocol and the other protocols 
listed in Article VIII, paragraph 1 of the Treaty. Any one of 
such procedures shall be deemed sufficient, when conducted 
in accordance with the provisions of Article VIII of the 
Treaty or this Protocol, to carry out reduction. 

2. Each State Party shall have the right to use any 
technological means it deems appropriate to implement the 
procedures for reducing conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty. 

3. Each State Party shall have the right to remove, 
retain and use those components and parts of conventional 
armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty which are 
not themselves subject to reduction in accordance with the 
provisions of Section II of this Protocol, and to dispose of 
debris. 



Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 311 


4. Unless otherwise provided for in this Protocol, 
conventional armaments and equipment limited by the 
Treaty shall be reduced so as to preclude their further use or 
restoration for military purposes. 

5. After entry into force of the Treaty, additional 
procedures for reduction may be proposed by any State 
Party. Such proposals shall be communicated to all other 
States Parties and shall provide the details of such 
procedures in the same format as the procedures set forth in 
this Protocol. Any such procedures shall be deemed 
sufficient to carry out the reduction of conventional 
armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty upon a 
decision to that effect by the Joint Consultative Group. 

SECTION II. STANDARDS FOR PRESENTATION AT 
REDUCTION SITES 

1. Each item of conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty which is to be reduced shall 
be presented at a reduction site. Each such item shall 
consist, at a minimum, of the following parts and elements: 

(A) for battle tanks: the hull, turret and integral main 
armament. For the purposes of this Protocol, an 
integral main armament of a battle tank shall be 
deemed to include the gun tube, breech system, 
trunnions and trunnion mounts; 

(B) for armoured combat vehicles: the hull, turret and 
integral main armament, if any. For the purposes of 
this Protocol, an integral main armament of an 
armoured combat vehicle shall be deemed to include 
the gun tube, breech system, trunnions and trunnion 
mounts. For the purposes of this Protocol, an 
integral main armament shall be deemed not to 
include machine guns of less than 20 millimetre 
calibre, all of which may be salvaged; 

(C) for artillery: the tube, breech system, cradle 
including trunnions and trunnion mounts, trails, if 
any; or launcher tubes or launcher rails and their 
bases; or mortar tubes and their base plates. In the 
case of self-propelled pieces of artillery, the vehicle 
hull and turret, if any, shall also be presented; 

(D) for combat aircraft: the fuselage; and 

(E) for attack helicopters: the fuselage, including the 
transmission mounting area. 

2. In each case, the item presented at the reduction site 
in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Section shall consist 
of a complete assembly. 

3. Parts and elements of conventional armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty not specified in paragraph 
1 of this Section, as well as parts and elements which are 
not affected by reduction under the procedures of this 
Protocol, including the turrets of armoured personnel 
carriers equipped only with machine guns, may be disposed 
of as the State Party undertaking the reduction decides. 


SECTION III. PROCEDURES FOR REDUCTION OF 
BATTLE TANKS BY DESTRUCTION 

1. Each State Party shall have the right to choose any 
one of the following sets of procedures each time it carries 
out the destruction of battle tanks at reduction sites. 

2. Procedure for destruction by severing: 

(A) removal of special equipment from the chassis, 
including detachable equipment, that ensures the 
operation of on-board armament systems; 

(B) removal of the turret, if any; 

(C) for the gun breech system, either: 

(1) welding the breech block to the breech ring in 
at least two places; or 

(2) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring 
along the long axis of the cavity that receives 
the breech block; 

(D) severing of the gun tube into two parts at a distance 
of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech 
ring; 

(E) severing of either of the gun trunnions and its 
trunnion mount in the turret; 

(F) severing of two sections from the perimeter of the 
hull turret aperture, each constituting a portion of a 
sector with an angle of no less than 60 degrees and, 
at a minimum, 200 millimetres in radial axis, 
centred on the longitudinal axis of the vehicle; and 

(G) severing of sections from both sides of the hull 
which include the final drive apertures, by vertical 
and horizontal cuts in the side plates and diagonal 
cuts in the deck or belly plates and front or rear 
plates, so that, the final drive apertures are 
contained in the severed portions. 

3. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition: 

(A) hull, hatches and cornerplates shall be open to 
maximise venting; 

(B) an explosive charge shall be placed inside the gun 
tube where the trunnions connect to the gun mount 
or cradle; 

(C) an explosive charge shall be placed on the outside of 
the hull between the second and third road wheels, 
or between the third and fourth road wheels in a six 
road wheel configuration, avoiding natural 
weaknesses such as welds or escape hatches. The 
charge must be located within the radius of the 
turret casting. A second charge shall be placed on 
the inside of the hull on the same side of the tank, 
offset and opposite to the external charge; 

(D) an explosive charge shall be placed on the inside of 
the turret casting in the area of the main armament 
mounting; and 

(E) all charges shall be fired simultaneously so that the 
main hull and turret are cracked and distorted; the 
breech block is stripped from the gun tube, fused or 



312 On-Site Inspection Agency 


deformed; the gun tube is split or longitudinally cut; 
the gun mount or cradle is ruptured so as to be 
unable to mount a gun tube; and damage is caused 
to the running gear so that at least one of the road 
wheel stations is destroyed. 

4. Procedure for destruction by deformation: 

(A) removal of special equipment from the chassis, 
including detachable equipment, that ensures the 
operation of on-board armament systems; 

(B) removal of the turret, if any; 

(C) for the gun breech system, either: 

(1) welding the breech block to the breech ring in at 
least two places; or 

(2) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring 
along the long axis of the cavity that receives the 
breech block; 

(D) severing of the gun tube into two parts at a distance 
of no more than 100 millimetres from the breech 
ring; 

(E) severing of either of the gun trunnions; and 

(F) the hull and turret shall be deformed so that their 
widths are each reduced by at least 20 percent. 

5. Procedure for destruction by smashing: 

(A) a heavy steel wrecking ball, or the equivalent, shall 
be dropped repeatedly onto the hull and turret until 
the hull is cracked in at least three separate places 
and the turret in at least one place; 

(B) the hits of the ball on the turret shall render either of 
the gun trunnions and its trunnion mount 
inoperative, and deform visibly the breech ring; and 

(C) the gun tube shall be visibly cracked or bent. 

SECTION IV. PROCEDURES FOR THE REDUCTION OF 
ARMOURED COMBAT VEHICLES BY DESTRUCTION 

1. Each State Party shall have the right to choose any of 
the following sets of procedures each time it carries out the 
destruction of armoured combat vehicles at reduction sites. 

2. Procedure for destruction by severing: 

(A) for all armoured combat vehicles, removal of special 
equipment from the chassis, including detachable 
equipment, that ensures the operation of on-board 
armament systems; 

(B) for tracked armoured combat vehicles, severing of 
sections from both sides of the hull which include the 
final drive apertures, by vertical and horizontal cuts 
in the side plates and diagonal cuts in the deck or 
belly plates and front or rear plates, so that the final 
drive apertures are contained in the severed portions; 

(C) for wheeled armoured combat vehicles, severing of 
sections from both sides of the hull which include the 
front wheel final gearbox mounting areas by vertical, 
horizontal and irregular cuts in the side, front, deck 
and belly plates so that the front wheel final gearbox 


mounting areas are included in the severed portions 
at a distance of no less than 100 millimetres from the 
cuts; and 

(D) in addition, for armoured infantry fighting vehicles 
and heavy armament combat vehicles: 

(1) removal of the turret; 

(2) severing of either of the gun trunnions and its 
trunnion mount in the turret; 

(3) for the gun breech system: 

(a) welding the breech block to the breech ring 
in at least two places; 

(b) cutting of at least one side of the breech 
ring along the long axis of the cavity that 
receives the breech block; or 

(c) severing of the breech casing into two 
approximately equal parts; 

(4) severing of the gun tube into two parts at a 
distance of no more than 100 millimetres from 
the breech ring; and 

(5) severing of two sections from the perimeter of 
the hull turret aperture, each constituting a 
portion of a sector with an angle of no less than 
60 degrees and, at a minimum, 200 millimetres 
in radial axis, centred on the longitudinal axis of 
the vehicle. 

3. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition: 

(A) an explosive charge shall be placed on the interior 
floor at the mid-point of the vehicle; 

(B) a second explosive charge shall be placed as follows: 

(1) for heavy armament combat vehicles, inside the 
gun where the trunnions connect to the gun 
mount or cradle; 

(2) for armoured infantry fighting vehicles, on the 
exterior of the receiver/breech area and lower 
barrel group; 

(C) all hatches shall be secured; and 

(D) the charges shall be detonated simultaneously so as 
to split the sides and top of the hull. For heavy 
armament combat vehicles and armoured infantry 
fighting vehicles, damage to the gun system shall be 
equivalent to that specified in paragraph 2, 
subparagraph (D) of this Section. 

4. Procedure for destruction by smashing: 

(A) a heavy steel wrecking ball, or the equivalent, shall 
be dropped repeatedly onto the hull and the turret, if 
any, until the hull is cracked in at least three separate 
places and the turret, if any, in one place; 

(B) in addition, for heavy armament combat vehicles: 

(1) the hits of the ball on the turret shall render 
either of the gun trunnions and its trunnion 
mount inoperative, and shall deform visibly the 
breech ring; and 




Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 313 


(2) the gun tube shall be visibly cracked or bent. 

SECTION V. PROCEDURES FOR THE REDUCTION OF 
ARTILLERY BY DESTRUCTION 

1. Each State Party shall have the right to choose any 
one of the following sets of procedures each time it carries 
out the destruction of guns, howitzers, artillery pieces 
combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers, 
multiple launch rocket systems or mortars at reduction sites. 

2. Procedure for destruction by severing of guns, 
howitzers, artillery pieces combining the characteristics of 
guns and howitzers, or mortars, that are not self-propelled: 

(A) removal of special equipment, including detachable 
equipment, that ensures the operation of the gun, 
howitzer, artillery piece combining the characteristics 
of guns and howitzers or mortar; 

(B) for the breech system, if any, of the gun, howitzer, 
artillery piece combining the characteristics of guns 
and howitzers or mortar, either: 

(1) welding the breech block to the breech ring in at 
least two places; or 

(2) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring 
along the long axis of the cavity that receives the 
breech block; 

(C) severing of the tube into two parts at a distance of 
no more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring; 

(D) severing of the left trunnion of the cradle and the 
mounting area of that trunnion in the upper carriage; 
and 

(E) severing of the trails, or the base plate of the mortar, 
into two approximately equal parts. 

3. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition of 
guns, howitzers, or artillery pieces combining the 
characteristics of guns and howitzers that are not self- 
propelled: 

(A) explosive charges shall be placed in the tube, on one 
cradle mount in the upper carriage and on the trails, 
and detonated so that: 

(1) the tube is split or longitudinally torn within 1.5 
metres of the breech; 

(2) the breech block is torn off, deformed or 
partially melted; 

(3) the attachments between the tube and the 
breech ring and between one of the trunnions of 
the cradle and the upper carriage are destroyed 
or sufficiently damaged to make them further 
inoperative; and 

(4) the trails are separated into two approximately 
equal parts or sufficiently damaged to make 
them further inoperative. 

4. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition of 
mortars that are not self-propelled: 

explosive charges shall be placed in the mortar tube 
and on the base plate so that, when the charges are 


detonated, the mortar tube is ruptured in its lower 
half and the base plate is severed into two 
approximately equal parts. 

5. Procedure for destruction by deformation of mortars 
that are not self-propelled: 

(A) the mortar tube shall be visibly bent approximately 
at its mid-point; and 

(B) the base plate shall be bent approximately on the 
centerline at an angle of at least 45 degrees. 

6. Procedure for destruction by severing of self- 
propelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the 
characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortars: 

(A) removal of special equipment, including detachable 
equipment, that ensures the operation of the gun, 
howitzer, artillery piece combining the characteristics 
of guns and howitzers or mortar; 

(B) for the breech system, if any, of the gun, howitzer, 
artillery piece combining the characteristics of guns 
and howitzers or mortar, either: 

(1) welding the breech block to the breech ring in at 
least two places; or 

(2) cutting of at least one side of the breech ring 
along the long axis of the cavity that receives the 
breech block; 

(C) severing of the tube into two parts at a distance of no 
more than 100 millimetres from the breech ring; 

(D) severing of the left trunnion and trunnion mount; 
and 

(E) severing of sections of both sides from the hull which 
include the final drive apertures, by vertical and 
horizontal cuts in the side plates and diagonal cuts in 
the deck or belly plates and front or rear plates, so 
that the final drive apertures are contained in the 
severed portions. 

7. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition of 
self-propelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the 
characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortars: 

(A) for self-propelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces 
combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers 
or mortars with a turret: the method specified for 
battle tanks in Section III, paragraph 3 of this 
Protocol shall be applied in order to achieve results 
equivalent to those specified in that provision; and 

(B) for self-propelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces 
combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers 
or mortars without a turret: an explosive charge shall 
be placed in the hull under the forward edge of the 
traversing deck that supports the tube, and detonated 
so as to separate the deck plate from the hull. For the 
destruction of the weapon system, the method 
specified for guns, howitzers, or artillery pieces 
combining the characteristics of guns and howitzers 
in paragraph 3 of this Section shall be applied in 
order to achieve results equivalent to those specified 
in that provision. 





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On-Site Inspection Agency 


8. Procedure for destruction by smashing of self- 
propelled guns, howitzers, artillery pieces combining the 
characteristics of guns and howitzers or mortars: 

(A) a heavy steel wrecking ball, or the equivalent, shall be 
dropped repeatedly onto the hull and turret, if any, 
until the hull is cracked in at least three separate 
places and the turret in at least one place; 

(B) the hits of the ball on the turret shall render either of 
the trunnions and its trunnion mount inoperative, 
and deform visibly the breech ring; and 

(C) the tube shall be visibly cracked or bent at 
approximately its mid-point. 

9. Procedure for destruction by severing of multiple 
launch rocket systems: 

(A) removal of special equipment from the multiple 
launch rocket system, including detachable 
equipment, that ensures the operation of its combat 
systems; and 

(B) removal of tubes or launch rails, screws (gears) of 
elevation mechanism sectors, tube bases or launch 
rail bases and their rotatable parts and severing them 
into two approximately equal parts in areas that are 
not assembly joints. 

10. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition of 
multiple launch rocket systems: 

a linear shaped charge shall be placed across the 
tubes or launcher rails, and tube or launcher rail 
bases. When detonated, the charge shall sever the 
tubes or launcher rails, tube or launcher rail bases 
and their rotatable parts, into two approximately 
equal parts in areas that are not assembly joints. 

11. Procedure for destruction by deformation of multiple 
launch rocket systems: 

all tubes or launcher rails, tube or launcher rail bases 
and the sighting system shall be visibly bent at 
approximately the mid-point. 

SECTION VI. PROCEDURES FOR THE REDUCTION OF 
COMBAT AIRCRAFT BY DESTRUCTION 

1. Each State Party shall have the right to choose any 
one of the following sets of procedures each time it carries 
out the destruction of combat aircraft at reduction sites. 

2. Procedure for destruction by severing: 

the fuselage of the aircraft shall be divided into three 
parts not on assembly joints by severing its nose 
immediately forward of the cockpit and its tail in the 
central wing section area so that assembly joints, if 
there are any in the areas to be severed, shall be 
contained in the severed portions. 

3. Procedure for destruction by deformation: 

the fuselage shall be deformed throughout by 
compression, so that its height, width or length is 
reduced by at least 30 percent. 

4. Procedure for destruction by use as target drones: 


(A) each State Party shall have the right to reduce by use 
as target drones no more than 200 combat aircraft 
during the 40-month reduction period; 

(B) the target drone shall be destroyed in flight by 
munitions fired by the armed forces of the State Party 
owning the target drone; 

(C) if the attempt to shoot down the target drone fails 
and it is subsequently destroyed by a self-destruct 
mechanism, the procedures of this paragraph shall 
continue to apply. Otherwise the target drone may be 
recovered or may be claimed destroyed by accident in 
accordance with Section IX of this Protocol, 
depending on the circumstances; and 

(D) notification of destruction shall be made to all other 
States Parties. Such notification shall include the type 
of the destroyed target drone and the location where 
it was destroyed. Within 90 days of the notification, 
the State Party claiming such reduction shall send 
documentary evidence, such as a report of the 
investigation, to all other States Parties. In the event 
of ambiguities relating to the destruction of a 
particular target drone, reduction shall not be 
considered complete until final resolution of the 
matter. 

SECTION VII. PROCEDURES FOR THE REDUCTION 
OF ATTACK HELICOPTERS BY DESTRUCTION 

1. Each State Party shall have the right to choose any 
one of the following sets of procedures each time it carries 
out the destruction of attack helicopters at reduction sites. 

2. Procedure for destruction by severing: 

(A) the tail boom or tail part shall be severed from the 
fuselage so that the assembly joint is contained in the 
severed portion; and 

(B) at least two transmission mounts on the fuselage shall 
be severed, fused or deformed. 

3. Procedure for destruction by explosive demolition: 
any type and number of explosives may be used so that, at a 
minimum, after detonation the fuselage is cut into two pieces 
through that section of the fuselage that contains the 
transmission mounting area. 

4. Procedure for destruction by deformation: the 
fuselage shall be deformed throughout by compression so 
that its height, width or length is reduced by at least 30 
percent. 

SECTION VIII. RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR 
REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS 
AND EQUIPMENT LIMITED BY THE TREATY BY 
CONVERSION FOR NON-MILITARY PURPOSES 

1. Each State Party shall have the right to reduce a 
certain number of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles 
by conversion. The types of vehicles that may be converted 
are listed in paragraph 3 of this Section and the specific non¬ 
military purposes for which they may be converted are listed 
in paragraph 4 of this Section. Converted vehicles shall not 
be placed in service with the conventional armed forces of a 
State Party. 



315 


Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 


2. Each State Party shall determine the number of battle 
tanks and armoured combat vehicles it will convert. This 
number shall not exceed: 

(A) for battle tanks, 5.7 percent (not to exceed 750 
battle tanks) of the maximum level for holdings of 
battle tanks it notified at the signature of the Treaty 
pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty, or 150 items 
whichever is the greater; and 

(B) for armoured combat vehicles, 15 percent (not to 
exceed 3,000 armoured combat vehicles) of the 
maximum level for holdings of armoured combat 
vehicles it notified at the signature of the Treaty 
pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty, or 150 items 
whichever is the greater. 

3. The following vehicles may be converted for non¬ 
military purposes: T-54, T-55, T-62, T-64, T-72, Leopard 1, 
BMP-1, BTR-60, OT-64. The States Parties, within the 
framework of the Joint Consultative Group, may make 
changes to the list of vehicles which may be converted to 
non-military purposes. Such changes, pursuant to Article 
XVI, paragraph 5 of the Treaty shall be deemed 
improvements to the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty 
relating only to minor matters of a technical nature. 

4. Such vehicles shall be converted for the following 
specific non- military purposes: 

(A) general purpose prime movers; 

(B) bulldozers; 

(C) fire fighting vehicles; 

(D) cranes; 

(E) power unit vehicles; 

(F) mineral fine crushing vehicles; 

(G) quarry vehicles; 

(H) rescue vehicles; 

(I) casualty evacuation vehicles; 

(J) transportation vehicles; 

(K) oil rig vehicles; 

(L) oil and chemical product spill cleaning vehicles; 

(M) tracked ice breaking prime movers; 

(N) environmental vehicles. 

The States Parties, within the framework of the Joint 
Consultative Group, may make changes to the list of specific 
non-military purposes. Such changes, pursuant to Article 
XVI, paragraph 5 of the Treaty shall be deemed 
improvements to the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty 
relating only to minor matters of a technical nature. 

5. On entry into force of the Treaty, each State Party 
shall notify to all other States Parties the number of battle 
tanks and armoured combat vehicles that it plans to convert 
in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. Notification 
of a State Party’s intention to carry out conversion in 
accordance with this Section shall be given to all other States 


Parties at least 15 days in advance in accordance with 
Section X, paragraph 5 of the Protocol on Inspection. It shall 
specify the number and types of vehicles to be converted, the 
starting date and completion date of conversion, as well as 
the specific non-military purpose vehicles to emerge after 
conversion. 

6. The following procedures shall be carried out before 
conversion of battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles at 
reduction sites: 

(A) for battle tanks: 

(1) removal of special equipment from the chassis, 
including detachable equipment, that ensures 
the operation of on-board armament systems; 

(2) removal of the turret, if any; 

(3) for the gun breech system, either: 

(a) welding the breech block to the breech ring 
in at least two places; or 

(b) cutting of at least one side of the breech 
ring along the long axis of the cavity that 
receives the breech block; 

(4) severing of the gun tube into two parts at a 
distance of no more than 100 millimetres from 
the breech ring; 

(5) severing of either of the gun trunnions and its 
trunnion mount in the turret; and 

(6) cutting out and removal of a portion of the hull 
top armour beginning from the front glacis to 
the middle of the hull turret aperture, together 
with the associated portions of the side armour 
at a height of no less than 200 millimetres (for 
the T-64 and T-72, no less than 100 millimetres) 
below the level of the hull top armour, as well as 
the associated portion of the front glacis plate 
severed at the same height. The severed portion 
of this front glacis plate shall consist of no less 
than the upper third; and 

(B) for armoured combat vehicles: 

(1) for all armoured combat vehicles, removal of 
special equipment from the chassis, including 
detachable equipment, that ensures the 
operation of on- board armament systems; 

(2) for rear-engined vehicles, cutting out and 
removal of a portion of the hull top armour 
from the front glacis to the bulkhead of the 
engine-transmission compartment, together with 
the associated portions of the side and front 
armour at a height of no less than 300 
millimetres below the level of the top of the 
assault crew compartment; 

(3) for front-engined vehicles, cutting out and 
removal of a portion of the hull top armour 
plate from the bulkhead of the engine- 
transmission compartment to the rear of the 
vehicle, together with the associated portions of 
the side armour at a height of no less than 300 





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On-Site Inspection Agency 


millimetres below the level of the top of the 
assault crew compartment; and 

(4) in addition, for armoured infantry fighting 
vehicles and heavy armament combat vehicles: 

(a) removal of the turret; 

(b) severing of either of the gun trunnions and 
its trunnion mount in the turret; 

(c) for the gun breech system: 

(i) welding the breech block to the breech 
ring in at least two places; 

(ii) cutting of at least one side of the 
breech ring along the long axis of the 
cavity that receives the breech block; 
or 

(iii) severing of the breech casing into two 
approximately equal parts; and 

(d) severing of the gun tube into two parts at a 
distance of no more than 100 millimetres 
from the breech ring. 

7. Battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles being 
reduced pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Section shall be 
subject to inspection, without right of refusal, in accordance 
with Section X of the Protocol on Inspection. Battle tanks 
and armoured combat vehicles shall be deemed reduced 
upon completion of the procedures specified in paragraph 6 
of this Section and notification in accordance with Section X 
of the Protocol on Inspection. 

8. Vehicles reduced pursuant to paragraph 7 of this 
Section shall remain subject to notification pursuant to 
Section IV of the Protocol on Information Exchange until 
final conversion for non-military purposes has been 
completed and notification has been made in accordance 
with Section X, paragraph 12 of the Protocol on Inspection. 

9. Vehicles undergoing final conversion for non¬ 
military purposes shall also be subject to inspection in 
accordance with Section X of the Protocol on Inspection, 
with the following changes: 

(A) the process of final conversion at a reduction site 
shall not be subject to inspection; and 

(B) all other States Parties shall have the right to inspect 
fully converted vehicles, without right of refusal, 
upon receipt of a notification from the State Party 
conducting final conversion specifying when final 
conversion procedures will be completed. 

10. If, having completed the procedures specified in 
paragraph 6 of this Section on a given vehicle, it is decided 
not to proceed with final conversion, then the vehicle shall 
be destroyed within the time limits for conversion set forth 
in Article VIII of the Treaty in accordance with the 
appropriate procedures set forth elsewhere in this Protocol. 


SECTION IX. PROCEDURE IN THE EVENT OF 
DESTRUCTION BY ACCIDENT 

1. Each State Party shall have the right to reduce its 
reduction liability for each category of conventional 
armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty in the event 
of destruction by accident by an amount no greater than 1.5 
percent of the maximum levels for holdings it notified at the 
signature of the Treaty for that category. 

2. An item of conventional armaments and equipment 
limited by the Treaty shall be deemed reduced, in accordance 
with Article VIII of the Treaty, if the accident in which it was 
destroyed is notified to all other States Parties within seven 
days of its occurrence. Notification shall include the type of 
the destroyed item, the date of the accident, the approximate 
location of the accident and the circumstances related to the 
accident. 

3. Within 90 days of the notification, the State Party 
claiming such reduction shall provide documentary evidence, 
such as a report of the investigation, to all other States 
Parties in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty. In the 
event of ambiguities relating to the accident, such reduction 
shall not be considered complete until final resolution of the 
matter. 

SECTION X. PROCEDURE FOR REDUCTION BY 
MEANS OF STATIC DISPLAY 

1. Each State Party shall have the right to reduce by 
means of static display a certain number of conventional 
armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. 

2. No State Party shall use static display to reduce more 
than one percent or eight items, whichever is the greater 
number, of its maximum levels for holdings it declared at the 
signature of the Treaty for each category of conventional 
armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty. 

3. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Section, 
each State Party also shall have the right to retain in working 
order two items of each existing type of conventional 
armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty for the 
purpose of static display. Such conventional armaments and 
equipment shall be displayed at museums or other similar 
sites. 

4. Conventional armaments and equipment placed on 
static display or in museums prior to the signature of the 
Treaty shall not be subject to any numerical limitations set 
forth in the Treaty, including the numerical limitations set 
forth in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Section. 

5. Such items to be reduced by means of static display 
shall undergo the following procedures at reduction sites: 

(A) all items to be displayed that are powered by self- 
contained engines shall have their fuel tanks 
rendered incapable of holding fuel and: 

(1) have their engine(s) and transmission removed 
and their mounts damaged so that these pieces 
cannot be refitted; or 

(2) have their engine compartment filled with 
concrete or a polymer resin; 



Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 317 


(B) all items to be displayed equipped with 75 millimetre 
or larger guns with permanently fixed elevation and 
traversing mechanisms shall have their elevation and 
traversing mechanisms welded so that the tube can 
be neither traversed nor elevated. In addition, those 
items to be displayed which use pinion and rack or 
pinion and ring mechanisms for traversing or 
elevating shall have three consecutive gear teeth cut 
off from the rack or ring on each side of the pinion 
of the gun tube; 

(C) all items to be displayed which are equipped with 
weapon systems that do not meet the criteria set 
forth in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph shall 
have their barrel and receiver group filled with either 
concrete or a polymer resin, beginning at the face of 
the bolt/breech and ending within 100 millimetres of 
the muzzle. 

SECTION XI. PROCEDURE FOR REDUCTION BY USE 
AS GROUND TARGETS 

1. Each State Party shall have the right to reduce by use 
as ground targets a certain number of battle tanks, armoured 
combat vehicles and self-propelled pieces of artillery. 

2. No State Party shall reduce by use as ground targets 
numbers of battle tanks or armoured combat vehicles greater 
than 2.5 percent of its maximum level for holdings in each 
of those two categories as notified at the signature of the 
Treaty pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty. In addition, no 
State Party shall have the right to reduce by use as ground 
targets more than 50 self-propelled pieces of artillery. 

3. Conventional armaments and equipment in use as 
ground targets prior to the signature of the Treaty shall not 
be subject to any numerical limitations set forth in Articles 
IV, V or VI of the Treaty, or to the numerical limitations set 
forth in paragraph 2 of this Section. 

4. Such items to be reduced by use as ground targets 
shall undergo the following procedures at reduction sites: 

(A) for battle tanks and self-propelled pieces of artillery: 

(1) for the breech system, either: 

(a) welding the breech block to the breech ring 
in at least two places; or 

(b) cutting of at least one side of the breech 
ring along the long axis of the cavity that 
receives the breech block; 

(2) severing of either of the trunnions and its 
trunnion mount in the turret; and 

(3) severing of sections from both sides of the hull 
which include the final drive apertures, by 
vertical and horizontal cuts in the side plates 
and diagonal cuts in the deck or belly plates and 
front or rear plates, such that the final drive 
apertures are contained in the severed portions; 
and 

(B) for armoured combat vehicles: 

(1) for the gun breech system: 


(a) welding the breech block to the breech ring 
in at least two places; 

(b) cutting of at least one side of the breech 
ring along the axis of the cavity that 
receives the breech block; or 

(c) severing of the breech casing into two 
approximately equal parts; 

(2) severing of either of the gun trunnions and its 
trunnion mount in the turret; 

(3) for tracked armoured combat vehicles, severing 
of sections from both sides of the hull which 
include the final drive apertures, by vertical and 
horizontal cuts in the side plates and diagonal 
cuts in the deck or belly plates and front or rear 
plates, so that the final drive apertures are 
contained in the severed portions; and 

(4) for wheeled armoured combat vehicles, severing 
of sections from both sides of the hull which 
include the front wheel final gearbox mounting 
areas by vertical, horizontal and irregular cuts in 
the side, front, deck and belly plates so that the 
front wheel final gear box mounting areas are 
included in the severed portions at a distance of 
no less than 100 millimetres from the cuts. 

SECTION XII. PROCEDURE FOR REDUCTION BY USE 
FOR GROUND INSTRUCTIONAL PURPOSES 

1. Each State Party shall have the right to reduce by use 
for ground instructional purposes a certain number of 
combat aircraft and attack helicopters. 

2. No State Party shall reduce by use for ground 
instructional purposes numbers of combat aircraft or attack 
helicopters greater than five percent of its maximum level for 
holdings in each of those two categories as notified at the 
signature of the Treaty pursuant to Article VII of the Treaty. 

3. Conventional armaments and equipment limited by 
the Treaty in use for ground instructional purposes prior to 
the signature of the Treaty shall not be subject to any 
numerical limitations set forth in Article IV, V or VI of the 
Treaty, or the numerical limitations set forth in paragraph 2 
of this Section. 

4. Such items to be reduced by use for ground 
instructional purposes shall undergo the following 
procedures at reduction sites: 

(A) for combat aircraft: 

(1) severing of the fuselage into two parts in the 
central wing area; 

(2) removal of engines, mutilation of engine 
mounting points and either filling of all fuel 
tanks with concrete, polymer or resin setting 
compounds or removal of the fuel tanks and 
mutilation of the fuel tank mounting points; or 

(3) removal of all internal, external and removable 
armament and armament systems equipment, 
removal of the tail fin and mutilation of the tail 



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On-Site Inspection Agency 


fin mounting points, and filling of all but one 
fuel tank with concrete, polymer or resin setting 
compounds; and 

(B) for attack helicopters: 

severing of the tail boom or tail part from the 
fuselage so that the assembly joint is contained 
in the severed portion. 

PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES 
GOVERNING THE RECLASSIFICATION OF 
SPECIFIC MODELS OR VERSIONS OF 
COMBAT-CAPABLE TRAINER AIRCRAFT 
INTO UNARMED TRAINER AIRCRAFT 

The States Parties hereby agree upon procedures and 
provisions governing total disarming and certification of the 
unarmed status of specific models or versions of combat- 
capable trainer aircraft in accordance with Article VIII of the 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 
November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty. 

SECTION I. GENERAL PROVISIONS 

1. Each State Party shall have the right to remove from 
the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Articles IV 
and VI of the Treaty only those specific models or versions 
of combat-capable trainer aircraft listed in Section II, 
paragraph 1 of this Protocol in accordance with the 
procedures set forth in this Protocol. 

(A) Each State Party shall have the right to remove from 
the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in 
Articles IV and VI of the Treaty individual aircraft of 
the specific models or versions listed in Section II, 
paragraph 1 of this Protocol that have any of the 
components set forth in Section III, paragraphs 1 and 
2 of this Protocol only by total disarming and 
certification. 

(B) Each State Party shall have the right to remove from 
the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in 
Articles IV and VI of the Treaty individual aircraft of 
the specific models or versions listed in Section II, 
paragraph 1 of this Protocol that do not have any of 
the components set forth in Section III, paragraphs 1 
and 2 of this Protocol by certification alone. 

2. Models or versions of combat-capable trainer 
aircraft listed in Section II of this Protocol may be disarmed 
and certified, or certified alone, within 40 months after entry 
into force of the Treaty. Such aircraft shall count against the 
numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Articles IV and 
VI of the Treaty until such aircraft have been certified as 
unarmed in accordance with the procedures set forth in 
Section IV of this Protocol. Each State Party shall have the 
right to remove from the numerical limitations on combat 
aircraft in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty no more than 550 
such aircraft, of which no more than 130 shall be of the 
MiG-25U model or version. 

3. No later than entry into force of the Treaty, each 
State Party shall notify all other States Parties of: 


(A) the total number of each specific model or version of 
combat-capable trainer aircraft that the State Party 
intends to disarm and certify in accordance with 
Section I, paragraph 1, subparagraph (A), Section III 
and Section IV of this Protocol; and 

(B) the total number of each specific model or version of 
combat-capable trainer aircraft that the State Party 
intends to certify alone, in accordance with Section I, 
paragraph 1, subparagraph (B) and Section IV of 
this Protocol. 

4. Each State Party shall use whatever technological 
means it deems necessary to implement the total disarming 
procedures set forth in Section III of this Protocol. 

SECTION II. MODELS OR VERSIONS OF COMBAT- 
CAPABLE TRAINER AIRCRAFT ELIGIBLE FOR TOTAL 
DISARMING AND CERTIFICATION 

1. Each State Party shall have the right to remove from 
the numerical limitations on combat aircraft in Articles IV 
and VI of the Treaty in accordance with the provisions of 
this Protocol only the following specific models or versions 
of combat-capable trainer aircraft: 

SU-15U 

SU-17U 

MiG-15U 

MiG-21U 

MiG-23U 

MiG-25U 

UIL-28 

2. The foregoing list of specific models or versions of 
combat-capable trainer aircraft is final and not subject to 
revision. 

SECTION III. PROCEDURES FOR TOTAL DISARMING 

1. Models or versions of combat-capable trainer 
aircraft being totally disarmed shall be rendered incapable of 
further employment of any type of weapon system as well as 
further operation of electronic warfare and reconnaissance 
systems by the removal of the following components: 

(A) provisions specifically for the attachment of weapon 
systems, such as special hardpoints, launching 
devices, or weapon mounting areas; 

(B) units and panels of weapon control systems 
including weapon selection, arming and firing or 
launching systems; 

(C) units of aiming equipment and weapon guidance 
systems not integral to navigation and flight control 
systems; and 

(D) units and panels of electronic warfare and 
reconnaissance systems including associated 
antennae. 

2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Section, any 
special hardpoints which are integral to the aircraft, as well 
as any special elements of general purpose hardpoints which 



Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 319 


are designed for use only with the components described in 
paragraph 1 of this Section, shall be rendered incapable of 
further employment with such systems. Electrical circuits of 
the weapon, electronic warfare, and reconnaissance systems 
described in paragraph 1 of this Section shall be rendered 
incapable of further employment by removal of the wiring 
or, if that is not technically practicable, by cutting out 
sections of the wiring in accessible areas. 

3. Each State Party shall provide to all other States 
Parties the following information, no less than 42 days in 
advance of the total disarming of the first aircraft of each 
model or version of combat-capable trainer aircraft listed in 
Section II of this Protocol: 

(A) a basic block diagram portraying all major 
components of weapon systems including aiming 
equipment and weapon guidance systems, provisions 
designed for the attachment of weapons as well as 
components of electronic warfare and 
reconnaissance systems, the basic function of the 
components described in paragraph 1 of this Section, 
and the functional connections of such components 
to each other; 

(B) a general description of the disarming process 
including a list of components to be removed; and 

(C) a photograph of each component to be removed 
illustrating its position in the aircraft prior to its 
removal, and a photograph of the same position 
after the corresponding component has been 
removed. 

SECTION IV. PROCEDURES FOR CERTIFICATION 

1. Each State Party that intends to disarm and certify, 
or certify alone, models or versions of combat-capable 
trainer aircraft shall comply with the following certification 
procedures in order to ensure that such aircraft do not 
possess any of the components listed in Section III, 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Protocol. 

2. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties 
in accordance with Section IX, paragraph 3 of the Protocol 
on Inspection of each certification. In the event of the first 
certification of an aircraft that does not require total 
disarming, the State Party that intends to conduct the 
certification shall provide to all other States Parties the 
information required in Section III, paragraph 3, 
subparagraphs (A), (B) and (C) of this Protocol for an armed 
model or version of the same aircraft type. 

3. Each State Party shall have the right to inspect the 
certification of combat-capable trainer aircraft in accordance 
with Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection. 

4. The process of total disarming and certification, or 
certification alone, shall be deemed completed when the 
certification procedures set forth in this Section have been 
completed regardless of whether any State Party exercises 
the certification inspection rights described in paragraph 3 of 
this Section and Section IX of the Protocol on Inspection, 
provided that within 30 days of receipt of the notification of 
completion of the certification and reclassification provided 
pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Section no State Party has 
notified all other States Parties that it considers that there is 


an ambiguity relating to the certification and reclassification 
process. In the event of such an ambiguity being raised, such 
reclassification shall not be deemed complete until the matter 
relating to the ambiguity is resolved. 

5. The State Party conducting the certification shall 
notify all other States Parties in accordance with Section IX 
of the Protocol on Inspection of completion of the 
certification. 

6. Certification shall be conducted in the area of 
application. States Parties belonging to the same group of 
States Parties shall have the right to share locations for 
certification. 

SECTION V. PROCEDURES FOR INFORMATION 
EXCHANGE AND VERIFICATION 

All models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft 
certified as unarmed shall be subject to information 
exchange, in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol 
on Information Exchange, and verification, including 
inspection, in accordance with the Protocol on Inspection. 

PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING 
THE CATEGORISATION OF COMBAT 
HELICOPTERS AND THE 
RECATEGORISATION OF MULTI-PURPOSE 
ATTACK HELICOPTERS 

The States Parties hereby agree upon procedures and 
provisions governing the categorisation of combat 
helicopters and recategorisation of multi-purpose attack 
helicopters as provided for in Article VIII of the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 
1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty. 

SECTION I. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 
CATEGORISATION OF COMBAT HELICOPTERS 

1. Combat helicopters shall be categorised as specialised 
attack, multi-purpose attack or combat support helicopters 
and shall be listed as such in the Protocol on Existing Types. 

2. All models or versions of a specialised attack 
helicopter type shall be categorised as specialised attack 
helicopters. 

3. Notwithstanding the provisions in paragraph 2 of 
this Section and as a unique exception to that paragraph, the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may hold an aggregate 
total not to exceed 100 Mi-24R and Mi-24K helicopters 
equipped for reconnaissance, spotting, or chemical/biological 
/radiological sampling which shall not be subject to the 
limitations on attack helicopters in Articles IV and VI of the 
Treaty. Such helicopters shall be subject to exchange of 
information in accordance with the Protocol on Information 
Exchange and to internal inspection in accordance with 
Section VI, paragraph 30 of the Protocol on Inspection. Mi- 
24R and Mi-24K helicopters in excess of this limit shall be 
categorised as specialised attack helicopters regardless of 
how they are equipped and shall count against the 
limitations on attack helicopters in Articles IV and VI of the 
Treaty. 



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4. Each State Party that holds both combat support and 
multi-purpose attack models or versions of a helicopter type 
shall categorise as attack helicopters all helicopters which 
have any of the features listed in Section III, paragraph 1 of 
this Protocol and shall have the right to categorise as combat 
support helicopters any helicopters that have none of the 
features listed in Section III, paragraph 1 of this Protocol. 

5. Each State Party that holds only combat support 
models or versions of a helicopter type included on both the 
Multi-Purpose Attack Helicopter and the Combat Support 
Helicopter lists in the Protocol on Existing Types shall have 
the right to categorise such helicopters as combat support 
helicopters. 

SECTION n. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 
RECATEGORISATION 

1. Only combat helicopters that are categorised as 
multi-purpose attack helicopters in accordance with the 
categorisation requirements set forth in this Protocol shall be 
eligible for recategorisation as combat support helicopters. 

2. Each State Party shall have the right to recategorise 
individual multi-purpose attack helicopters that have any of 
the features set forth in Section III, paragraph 1 of this 
Protocol only by conversion and certification. Each State 
Party shall have the right to recategorise individual multi¬ 
purpose attack helicopters that do not have any of the 
features set forth in Section III, paragraph 1 of this Protocol 
by certification alone. 

3. Each State Party shall use whatever technological 
means it deems necessary to implement the conversion 
procedures set forth in Section III of this Protocol. 

4. Each combat helicopter subject to the 
recategorisation procedure shall bear the original 
manufacturer’s serial number permanently stamped in a 
main airframe structural member. 

SECTION III. PROCEDURES FOR CONVERSION 

1. Multi-purpose attack helicopters being converted 
shall be rendered incapable of further employment of guided 
weapons by the removal of the following components: 

(A) provisions specifically for the attachment of guided 
weapons, such as special hardpoints or launching 
devices. Any such special hardpoints which are 
integral to the helicopter, as well as any special 
elements of general purpose hardpoints which are 
designed for use only by guided weapons, shall be 
rendered incapable of further employment with 
guided weapons; and 

(B) all integrated fire control and aiming systems for 
guided weapons, including wiring. 

2. A State Party shall provide to all other States Parties 
the following information, either at least 42 days in advance 
of the conversion of the first helicopter of a type or at entry 
into force of the Treaty in the event that a State Party 
declares both multi-purpose attack helicopters and combat 
support helicopters of the same type: 


(A) a basic block diagram portraying all major 
components of guided weapon integrated fire control 
and aiming systems as well as components of 
equipment designed for the attachment of guided 
weapons, the basic function of the components 
described in paragraph 1 of this Section, and the 
functional connections of such components to each 
other; 

(B) a general description of the conversion process, 
including a list of components to be removed; and 

(C) a photograph of each component to be removed, 
illustrating its position in the helicopter prior to its 
removal, and a photograph of the same position 
after the corresponding component has been 
removed. 

SECTION IV. PROCEDURES FOR CERTIFICATION 

1. Each State Party that is recategorising multi-purpose 
attack helicopters shall comply with the following 
certification procedures, in order to ensure that such 
helicopters do not possess any of the features listed in 
Section III, paragraph 1 of this Protocol. 

2. Each State Party shall notify all other States Parties 
of each certification in accordance with Section IX, 
paragraph 3 of the Protocol on Inspection. 

3. Each State Party shall have the right to inspect the 
certification of helicopters in accordance with Section IX of 
the Protocol on Inspection. 

4. The process of recategorisation shall be deemed 
complete when the certification procedures set forth in this 
Section have been completed regardless of whether any State 
Party exercises the certification inspection rights described in 
paragraph 3 of this Section and Section IX of the Protocol 
on Inspection, provided that within 30 days of receipt of the 
notification of completion of the certification and 
recategorisation provided pursuant to paragraph 5 of this 
Section no State Party has notified all other States Parties 
that it considers that there is an ambiguity relating to the 
certification and recategorisation process. In the event of 
such an ambiguity being raised, such recategorisation shall 
not be deemed complete until the matter relating to the 
ambiguity is resolved. 

5. The State Party conducting the certification shall 
notify all other States Parties in accordance with Section IX 
of the Protocol on Inspection of completion of the 
certification and recategorisation. 

6. Certification shall be conducted within the area of 
application. States Parties belonging to the same group of 
States Parties shall have the right to share locations for 
certification. 

SECTION V. PROCEDURES FOR INFORMATION 
EXCHANGE AND VERIFICATION 

All combat helicopters within the area of application 
shall be subject to information exchange in accordance with 
the provisions of the Protocol on Information Exchange and 
verification, including inspection, in accordance with the 
Protocol on Inspection. 



Appendix A: Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 321 


PROTOCOL ON THE JOINT 
CONSULTATIVE GROUP 

The States Parties hereby agree upon procedures and 
other provisions relating to the Joint Consultative Group 
established by Article XVI of the Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter 
referred to as the Treaty. 

1. The Joint Consultative Group shall be composed of 
representatives designated by each State Party. Alternates, 
advisers and experts of a State Party may take part in the 
proceedings of the Joint Consultative Group as deemed 
necessary by that State Party. 

2. The first session of the Joint Consultative Group 
shall open no later than 60 days after the signing of the 
Treaty. The Chairman of the opening meeting shall be the 
representative of the Kingdom of Norway. 

3. The Joint Consultative Group shall meet for regular 
sessions to be held two times per year. 

4. Additional sessions shall be convened at the request 
of one or more States Parties by the Chairman of the Joint 
Consultative Group, who shall promptly inform all other 
States Parties of the request. Such sessions shall open no 
later than 15 days after receipt of such a request by the 
Chairman. 

5. Sessions of the Joint Consultative Group shall last 
no longer than four weeks, unless it decides otherwise. 

6. States Parties shall assume in rotation, determined 
by alphabetical order in the French language, the 
Chairmanship of the Joint Consultative Group. 

7. The Joint Consultative Group shall meet in Vienna, 
unless it decides otherwise. 

8. Representatives at meetings shall be seated in 
alphabetical order of the States Parties in the French 
language. 

9. The official languages of the Joint Consultative 
Group shall be English, French, German, Italian, Russian 
and Spanish. 

10. The proceedings of the Joint Consultative Group 
shall be confidential, unless it decides otherwise. 

11. The scale of distribution for the common expenses 
associated with the operation of the Joint Consultative 
Group shall be applied, unless otherwise decided by the 
Joint Consultative Group, as follows: 

10.35% for the French Republic, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Italian Republic, the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the United States of America; 

6.50% for Canada; 

5.20% for the Kingdom of Spain; 

4.00% for the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands and the Republic of Poland; 


2.34% for the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, 
the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Hungary 
and the Kingdom of Norway; 

0.88% for the Hellenic Republic, Romania and the 
Republic of Turkey; 

0.68% for the Republic of Bulgaria, the Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg and the Portuguese Republic; 
and 

0.16% for the Republic of Iceland. 

12. During the period that this Protocol is applied 
provisionally in accordance with the Protocol on Provisional 
Application, the Joint Consultative Group shall: 

(A) work out or revise, as necessary, rules of procedure, 
working methods, the scale of distribution of 
expenses of the Joint Consultative Group and of 
conferences, and the distribution of the costs of 
inspections between or among States Parties, in 
accordance with Article XVI, paragraph 2, 
subparagraph (F) of the Treaty; and 

(B) consider, upon the request of any State Party, issues 
relating to the provisions of the Treaty that are 
applied provisionally. 

PROTOCOL ON THE PROVISIONAL 
APPLICATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF 
THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED 
FORCES IN EUROPE 

To promote the implementation of the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 
1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the States Parties 
hereby agree to the provisional application of certain 
provisions of the Treaty. 

1. Without detriment to the provisions of Article XXII 
of the Treaty, the States Parties shall apply provisionally the 
following provisions of the Treaty: 

(A) Article VII, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4; 

(B) Article VIII, paragraphs 5, 6 and 8; 

(C) Article IX; 

(D) Article XIII; 

(E) Article XVI, paragraphs 1, 2(F), 2(G), 4, 6 and 7; 

(F) Article XVII; 

(G) Article XVIII; 

(H) Article XXI, paragraph 2; 

(I) Protocol on Existing Types, Sections III and IV; 

(J) Protocol on Information Exchange, Sections VII, XII 
and XIII; 

(K) Protocol on Inspection, Section II paragraph 24, 
subparagraph (A) and Section III, paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 
7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12; 

(L) Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group; and 



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On-Site Inspection Agency 


(M) Protocol on Reduction, Section IX. 

2. The States Parties shall apply provisionally the 
provisions listed in paragraph 1 of this Protocol in the light 
of and in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty. 

3. This Protocol shall enter into force at the signature 
of the Treaty. It shall remain in force for 12 months, but 
shall terminate earlier if: 

(A) the Treaty enters into force before the period of 12 
months expires; or 

(B) a State Party notifies all other States Parties that it 
does not intend to become a party to the Treaty. 

The period of application of this Protocol may be 
extended if all the States Parties so decide. 

DECLARATION OF THE STATES PARTIES 
TO THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL 
ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE WITH 
RESPECT TO LAND-BASED NAVAL 
AIRCRAFT 

To promote the implementation of the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the States Parties to 
the Treaty undertake the following political commitments 
outside the framework of the Treaty. 

1. No one State will have in the area of application of 
the Treaty more that 400 permanently land-based combat 
naval aircraft. It is understood that this commitment applies 
to combat aircraft armed and equipped to engage surface or 
air targets and excludes types designed as maritime patrol 
aircraft. 

2. The aggregate number of such permanently land- 
based combat naval aircraft held by either of the two groups 
of States defined under the terms of the Treaty will not 
exceed 430. 

3. No one State will hold in its naval forces within the 
area of application any permanently land-based attack 
helicopters. 

4. The limitations provided for in this Declaration will 
apply beginning 40 months after entry into force of the 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. 


5. This Declaration will become effective as of entry 
into force of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe. 

DECLARATION OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE 
TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN 
EUROPE WITH RESPECT TO PERSONNEL STRENGTH 

In connection with the signature of the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 
1990, and with a view to the follow-on negotiations referred 
to in Article XVIII of that Treaty, the States Parties to that 
Treaty declare that, for the period of these negotiations, they 
will not increase the total peacetime authorized personnel 
strength of their conventional armed forces pursuant to the 
Mandate in the area of application. 

DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF 
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
ON THE PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF 
GERMAN ARMED FORCES 

In connection with the signature of the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the Government of 
the Federal Republic of Germany confirms the declaration 
made by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs on 30 
August 1990 in the plenary session of the Negotiations on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which reads as 
follows: 

“The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany 
undertakes to reduce the personnel strength of the armed 
forces of the united Germany to 370,000 (ground, air and 
naval forces) within three to four years. This reduction will 
commence on the entry into force of the first CFE 
agreement. 

Within the scope of this overall ceiling no more than 
345,000 will belong to the ground and air forces which, 
pursuant to the agreed mandate, alone are the subject of the 
Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. 

The Federal Government regards its commitment to 
reduce ground and air forces as a significant German 
contribution to the reduction of conventional armed forces 
in Europe. It assumes that in follow-on negotiations the 
other participants in the negotiations, too, will render their 
contribution to enhancing security and stability in Europe, 
including measures to limit personnel strengths.” 



Appendix B 

CFE Statements 


Statement by the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

In order to promote the implementation of the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 
1990 (the Treaty), the Government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics states that it assumes the following 
obligations outside the framework of the Treaty. 

I 

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall hold within 
the area of application of the Treaty conventional armaments 
and equipment in the Treaty-limited categories not to exceed: 
in Coastal Defence forces — 813 battle tanks, 972 armoured 
combat vehicles and 846 pieces of artillery; in Naval Infantry 
— 120 battle tanks, 753 armoured combat vehicles and 234 
pieces of artillery; in the Strategic Rocket Forces — 1,701 
armoured combat vehicles, each being an armoured personnel 
carrier as that term is defined in the Treaty. 

II 

Forty months after entry into force of the Treaty and 
thereafter, within the levels and sublevels that ensue from the 
obligations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under 
the Treaty, the holdings of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and 
pieces of artillery shall be less than its maximum level for 
holdings, as notified in accordance with Article VII of the 
Treaty, by the number it will have in Coastal Defence forces 
and Naval Infantry within the area of application of the 
Treaty. For example, with regard to battle tanks, unless the 
maximum levels for holdings for the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics are revised in accordance with Article VII 
of the Treaty, the numbers for the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics within the area of application of the Treaty, 
including battle tanks in Coastal Defence forces and Naval 
Infantry, will not exceed: 13,150 overall; 10,500 in active 
units overall; 7,150 in active units within the region 
described in Article IV, paragraph 3 of the Treaty; and 1,850 
in active units within the area described in Article V, 
paragraph 1, subparagraph (A) of the Treaty. 

III 

1. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall 
reduce, in addition to the reduction liability established for 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Treaty on 
the basis of information it supplied, its holding of 
conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty- 
limited categories within the area of application of the 
Treaty by the number which it had as of the date of 
signature of the Treaty in Coastal Defense forces and Naval 
Infantry, that is, by 933 battle tanks, 1,725 armoured 
combat vehicles, and 1,080 pieces of artillery. 


2. Such additional reduction shall be carried out by 
means of destruction or conversion into civilian equipment 
of 933 battle tanks and destruction of 1,080 pieces of 
artillery. Of the 1,725 armoured combat vehicles to be 
additionally reduced, 972 armoured combat vehicles shall be 
destroyed or converted into civilian equipment and 753 
armoured combat vehicles of the MT-LB type, included in 
the armoured combat vehicle category and belonging to the 
number declared as of the date of signature of the Treaty, 
shall be modified, in accordance with the Protocol on 
Existing Types, into armoured personnel carrier look-alikes 
of the MT-LB-AT type, which are not limited by the Treaty. 

3. Fifty percent of the 933 battle tanks and 972 
armoured combat vehicles shall be destroyed or converted 
within the area of application of the Treaty and 50 percent 
of the 1,080 pieces of artillery shall be destroyed within the 
area of application of the Treaty, within the time limits and 
in accordance with the procedures established by the Treaty. 
The remainder of these conventional armaments and 
equipment shall be withdrawn from the area of application 
of the Treaty; an equivalent number of conventional 
armaments and equipment shall be destroyed or converted 
outside of the area of application of the Treaty within the 
time limits established by the Treaty and in accordance with 
procedures which provide sufficient visible evidence that the 
conventional armaments and equipment have been destroyed 
or rendered militarily unusable. The States Parties to the 
Treaty shall be notified in advance, giving the location, 
number and types of conventional armaments and 
equipment to be destroyed or converted. 

IV 

The holdings of armoured combat vehicles in the Strategic 
Rocket Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall 
not be subject to the numerical limitations of the Treaty, in 
accordance with Article III, paragraph 1, subparagraph (F) of 
the Treaty. These forces shall not be equipped with 
conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty-limited 
categories, other than armoured personnel carriers. 

V 

The conventional armaments and equipment of Coastal 
Defence forces and Naval Infantry in the categories subject 
to the Treaty within the area of application of the Treaty 
shall be subject to challenge inspections in accordance with 
the provisions of the Protocol on Inspection. Effective 
verification of such armaments and equipment shall be 
ensured. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall 
provide separate information to all States Parties on such 
armaments and equipment of the same scope and with the 
same degree of detail as provided for in Section III, 
paragraph 2 of the Protocol on Information Exchange, and 
under the same timetable for the provision of information as 
provided for in Section VII of that Protocol. 





324 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


VI 

Unless otherwise specified (a) in this Statement, (b) in the 
Treaty, or (c) in the Declaration on Land-Based Naval 
Aircraft, all conventional armaments and equipment in the 
Treaty-limited categories, based on land within the area of 
application of the Treaty, irrespective of assignment, shall be 
subject to all numerical limitations of the Treaty. 

VII 

This Statement of the Government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics regarding the aforementioned obligations 
assumed outside the framework of the Treaty shall enter into 
force simultaneously with the Treaty, shall be legally binding 
and shall have the same duration as the Treaty. 

June 14, 1991. 

Statement of the Government of the United States of 
America and Statements Identical in Content of the Other 
20 Signatory States 

Statement of the Government of the United States of America 

The Government of the United States of America hereby 
agrees that the Statement of the Government of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics of today’s date provides a 
satisfactory basis for proceeding toward ratification and 
implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990 (the Treaty). 

The aforementioned Statement of the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and this Statement of the 
Government of the United States of America shall be equally 
legally binding; they shall enter into force simultaneously 
with the Treaty, and shall have the same duration as the 
Treaty. 

June 14, 1991. 

Statement of the Representative of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics in the Joint Consultative Group 

In order to promote the implementation of the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 
1990, (the Treaty) I have been instructed by the Government 
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to state the 
following: 

1. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will, during 
1991-1995, destroy or convert into civilian equipment no 
less than 6,000 battle tanks, 1,500 armoured combat 
vehicles and 7,000 pieces of artillery from among the 
conventional armaments and equipment in the Treaty- 
limited categories beyond the Urals, in addition to the 
numbers of armaments subject to destruction and conversion 
specified in the Statement of the Government of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics of June 14, 1991 concerning 
obligations outside the framework of the Treaty. 

The armaments will be destroyed or converted under the 
procedures that will provide sufficient visible evidence, 
which confirms that they have been destroyed or rendered 
militarily unusable. Advance notification and information 
will be provided to the States Parties to the Treaty regarding 


the locations and numbers of battle tanks, armoured combat 
vehicles and pieces of artillery undergoing destruction or 
conversion. 

Elimination of armaments in the Treaty-limited categories 
will also be carried out subsequently as their operational and 
service life is expended. 

2. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in the 
period between January 1989 and signature of the Treaty on 
November 19, 1990, in connection with activities related to 
unilateral reductions of the Soviet armed forces, the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from countries of Eastern 
Europe and adaption of the armed forces to the new 
defensive doctrine, withdrew beyond the Urals the following 
numbers of conventional armaments and equipment in the 
Treaty-limited categories: 16,400 battle tanks, 15,900 
armoured combat vehicles and 25,000 pieces of artillery. 

Of these numbers of armaments and equipment, 8,000 
battle tanks, 11,200 armoured combat vehicles and 1,600 
pieces of artillery have been turned over to military units and 
subunits in the eastern Soviet Union for the purpose of 
reequipping them and supplementing their armaments. 

Another part of the conventional armaments and 
equipment in the Treaty-limited categories which have been 
transferred beyond the Urals (8,400 battle tanks, 4,700 
armoured combat vehicles and 16,400 pieces of artillery), 
has been placed in storage. In addition, 7,000 pieces of 
artillery are being used for replacement and repair. 

These stored conventional armaments and equipment 
withdrawn beyond the Urals will be used up in the process 
of replacing obsolete armaments and equipment that have 
expended their established operational and service life and, 
in the eastern Soviet Union, also in supplementing units. 

With respect to the armaments and equipment transferred 
beyond the Urals before signature of the Treaty that have 
been placed in storage or are used for replacement and 
repair beyond the Urals, upon entry into force of the Treaty, 
information will be provided to all States Parties about the 
location and numbers of battle tanks, armoured combat 
vehicles and pieces of artillery at such locations as of July 1, 
1991. Armaments in each of these categories (battle tanks, 
armoured combat vehicles and pieces of artillery) will be 
stored separately. 

3. The conventional armaments and equipment in the 
Treaty-limited categories withdrawn beyond the Urals prior 
to signature of the Treaty will not be used to create a 
strategic reserve or operational groupings, and will not be 
stored in any way permitting their rapid return to the area of 
application of the Treaty, that is, such armaments and 
equipment withdrawn beyond the Urals will not be stored in 
sets for military formations. 

Military formations and units deployed within the 
area of application of the Treaty will be organized in line 
with the Soviet defensive doctrine and taking into account 
the sufficiency levels of armaments established by the Treaty 
for a single state. 

June 14, 1991. 



Appendix C 

Concluding Act of the Negotiation on 
Personnel Strength of Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE1A) 


The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the 
Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic 
of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, 
the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Republic 
of Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic 
Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, 
the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the 
Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the 
Russian Federation, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of 
Turkey, Ukraine, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, 
hereinafter referred to as the Participating States. 

Recalling the obligations undertaken in the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 
1990, hereinafter referred to as the CFE Treaty, and the 
important achievements attained in that treaty, 

In accordance with the obligation in Article XVIII of the 
CFE Treaty to continue the negotiations on conventional 
armed forces with the same mandate and with the goal of 
building on the CFE Treaty and with the objective of 
concluding an agreement, no later than the 1992 follow-up 
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE), on additional measures aimed at further 
strengthening security and stability in Europe, 

Guided by the mandate for negotiation on conventional 
armed forces in Europe of January 10, 1989, and having 
conducted negotiations in Vienna, 

Having decided to limit and, if applicable, reduce, on a 
national basis, the personnel strength of their conventional 
armed forces within the area of application, 1 

Guided by the objectives and the purposes of the CSCE, 
within the framework of which these negotiations were 
conducted, 

Looking forward to a more structured cooperation 
among all CSCE Participating States on security matters and 
to new negotiations on disarmament and confidence and 


1 The area of application of the measures adopted in this Act 
is the area of application of the CFE Treaty as defined in 
Paragraph 1, Subparagraph (B) of Article II of the CFE 
Treaty, taking into account the understanding specified in 
Paragraph 5 of Annex A of the final document of the 
extraordinary conference of the States Parties to the Treaty 
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of June 5, 1992. 


security building in accordance with their commitment in the 
Charter of Paris for a New Europe, and, accordingly, to the 
possibility, within the context of those new negotiations, for 
all CSCE Participating States to subscribe to a common 
regime based upon the measures adopted in this Concluding 
Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, 

Taking into account the principle of sufficiency, and 
recalling the undertaking of the Participating States to 
maintain only such military capabilities as are necessary to 
prevent war and provide for effective defence, bearing in 
mind the relationship between military capabilities and 
doctrines, 

Recognising the freedom of each Participating State to 
choose its own security arrangements, 

Have adopted the following: 

SECTION 1. SCOPE OF LIMITATION 

1. Each Participating State will limit, as specified in 
Section II of this Act, its personnel based on land within the 
area of application in the following categories of 
conventional armed forces: 

(A) All full-time military personnel serving with land 
forces, including air defence formations and units 
subordinated at or below the military district or 
equivalent level, as specified in Section I of the 
Protocol on Information Exchange of the CFE 
Treaty; 

(B) All full-time military personnel serving with air and 
air defence aviation forces, including long-range 
aviation forces reported pursuant to Section I of the 
Protocol on Information Exchange of the CFE 
Treaty, as well as military transport aviation forces; 

(C) All full-time military personnel serving with air and 
air defence forces other than those specified in 
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph; 

(D) All full-time military personnel, excluding naval 
personnel, serving with all central headquarters, 
command and staff elements 

(E) All full-time military personnel, excluding naval 
personnel, serving with all centrally-controlled 
formations, units and other organisations, including 
those of rear services; 

(F) All full-time military personnel serving with all land- 
based naval formations and units which hold battle 






326 On-Site Inspection Agency 


tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, armoured 
vehicle launched bridges, armoured infantry fighting 
vehicle look-alikes, or armoured personnel carrier 
look-alikes as defined in Article II of the CFE Treaty 
or which hold land-based naval combat aircraft 
referred to in the Declaration of the States Parties to 
the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
with respect to land-based naval aircraft of 
November 19, 1990; 

(G) All full-time military personnel serving with all other 
formations, units and other organisations which hold 
battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, 
combat aircraft or attack helicopters in service with 
its conventional armed forces, as defined in Article II 
of the CFE Treaty; and 

(H) All reserve personnel who have completed their 
initial military service or training and who are called 
up or report voluntarily for full-time military service 
or training in conventional armed forces for a 
continuous period of more than 90 days. 

2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 1 of 
this section, the following categories of personnel are not 
included within the scope of limitation specified in this Act: 

(A) Personnel serving with organisations designed and 
structured to perform in peacetime internal security 
functions; 

(B) Personnel in transit from a location outside the area 
of application to a final destination outside the area 
of application who are in the area of application for 
no longer than seven days; and 

(C) Personnel serving under the command of the United 
Nations. 

3. If, after the date on which this Act comes into effect, 
any land-based formations or units are formed within the 
area of application which, according to their structure and 
armaments, have a capability for ground combat outside 
national borders against an external enemy, a Participating 
State may raise in the Joint Consultative Group any issue 
regarding personnel serving with such formations and units. 
The Joint Consultative Group will consider any such issue 
on the basis of all available information, including 
information provided by the Participating States concerned, 
with a view to deciding whether the above-mentioned 
criteria are applicable to such formations and units; if such 
criteria are deemed to apply, the personnel serving with such 
formations and units will be included within the scope of 
limitation specified in this Act. 

SECTION n. NATIONAL PERSONNEL LIMITS 

1. Each Participating State will limit its military 
personnel based on land within the area of application in the 
categories of conventional armed forces specified in Section 
I, Paragraph 1 of this Act so that, 40 months after entry into 
force of the CFE Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate number 
of such personnel will not exceed the number representing 
its national personnel limitation as specified in this 
paragraph: 


The Republic of Armenia. 

The Republic of Azerbaijan . 

The Republic of Belarus. 100,000 

The Kingdom of Belgium. 70,000 

The Republic of Bulgaria. 104,000 

Canada. 10,660 

The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. 140,000 

The Kingdom of Denmark. 39,000 

The French Republic. 325,000 

The Republic of Georgia. 

The Federal Republic of Germany. 345,000 

The Hellenic Republic. 158,621 

The Republic of Hungary. 100,000 

The Republic of Iceland. 0 

The Italian Republic. 315,000 

The Republic of Kazakhstan. 0 

The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. 900 

The Republic of Moldova. 

The Kingdom of the Netherlands. 80,000 

The Kingdom of Norway. 32,000 

The Republic of Poland . 234,000 

The Portuguese Republic. 75,000 

Romania. 230,248 

The Russian Federation . 1,450,000 

The Kingdom of Spain. 300,000 

The Republic of Turkey. 530,000 

Ukraine. 450,000 

The United Kingdom of Great Britain 

and Northern Ireland. 260,000 

The United States of America. 250,000 


2. For the purpose of recording changes to the 
information specified in Paragraph 1 of this Section, the 
Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands will 
distribute to all the Participating States a revised version of 
the information in that paragraph. 

3. Each Participating State may revise its national 
personnel limit in accordance with Section IV of this Act. 

SECTION III. REVISION PROCEDURES 

1. A Participating State may revise downward its 
national personnel limit by providing a notification of its 
revised limit to all other Participating States. Such 
notification will specify the date on which the revised limit 
will become effective. 
































Appendix C: Concluding Act of the Negotiation 327 


2. A Participating State intending to revise upward its 
national personnel limit will provide notification of such 
intended revision to all other Participating States. Such 
notification will include an explanation of the reasons for 
such a revision. Any Participating State may raise any 
question concerning the intended revision. A revised national 
personnel limit will become effective 42 days after 
notification has been provided, unless a Participating State 
raises an objection to such revision by providing notification 
of its objection to all other Participating States. 

3. If an objection is raised, any Participating State may 
request the convening of an extraordinary conference which 
will examine the intended revision in the light of the 
explanations provided and seek to decide on a future 
national personnel limit. The extraordinary conference will 
open no later than 15 days after receipt of the request and, 
unless it decides otherwise, will last no longer than three 
weeks. 

SECTION IV. INFORMATION EXCHANGE 

1. Each Participating State will provide to all other 
Participating States, in accordance with the provisions of this 
section, the following information in respect of its personnel 
based on land within the area of application: 

(A) In respect of all personnel specified in Section I, 
Paragraph I of this Act, the aggregate number; 

(B) In respect of all full-time military personnel serving 
with land forces, including air defence formations 
and units subordinated at or below the military 
district or equivalent level, as specified in Section I of 
the Protocol on Information Exchange of the CFE 
Treaty, the aggregate number and the number in each 
formation, unit and other organisation down to the 
brigade/regiment or equivalent level, specifying the 
command organisation, designation, subordination 
and peacetime location, including the geographic 
name and coordinates, for each such formation, unit 
and organisation; 

(C) In respect of all full-time military personnel serving 
with air and air defence aviation forces, including 
long-range aviation forces reported pursuant to 
Section I of the Protocol on Information Exchange of 
the CFE Treaty, as well as military transport aviation 
forces, the aggregate number and the number in each 
formation, unit and other organisation of 
conventional armed forces down to the wing/air 
regiment or equivalent level, specifying the command 
organisation, designation, subordination and 
peacetime location, including the geographic name 
and coordinates, for each such formation, unit and 
organisation; 

(D) In respect of all full-time military personnel serving 
with air defence forces other than those specified in 
Subparagraphs (B) and (C) of this paragraph, the 
aggregate number and the number in each formation 
and other organisation down to the next level of 
command above division or equivalent level (i.e., air 
defence army or equivalent), specifying the command 
organisation, designation, subordination and 
peacetime location, including the geographic name 


and coordinates, for each such formation and 
organisation; 

(E) In respect of all full-time military personnel of 
conventional armed forces, excluding naval 
personnel, serving with all central headquarters, 
command and staff elements, the aggregate number; 

(F) In respect of all full-time military personnel of 
conventional armed forces, excluding naval 
personnel, serving with all centrally-controlled 
formations, units and other organisations, including 
those of rear services, the aggregate number and the 
number in each formation, unit and other 
organisation down to the brigade/regiment, wing/air 
regiment or equivalent level, specifying the command 
organisation, designation, subordination and 
peacetime location, including the geographic name 
and coordinates, for each such formation, unit and 
organisation; 

(G) In respect of all full-time military personnel serving 
with all land-based naval formations and units which 
hold conventional armaments and equipment in the 
categories specified in Section III of the Protocol on 
Information Exchange of the CFE Treaty or which 
hold land-based naval combat aircraft referred to in 
the Declaration of the States Parties to the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe with respect 
to land-based naval aircraft of November 19, 1990, 
the aggregate number and the number in each 
formation and unit down to the brigade/regiment, 
wing/air regiment or equivalent level, as well as units 
at the next level of command below the brigade/ 
regiment, wing/air regiment level which are 
separately located or independent (i.e., battalions/ 
squadrons or equivalent), specifying the designation 
and peacetime location, including the geographic 
name and coordinates, for each such formation and 
unit; 

(H) In respect of all full-time military personnel serving 
with all formations, units and other organisations of 
conventional armed forces specified in Section III of 
the Protocol on Information Exchange of the CFE 
Treaty, the number in each such formation, unit and 
organisation down to the brigade/regiment, wing/air 
regiment or equivalent level, as well as units at the 
next level of command below the brigade/regiment, 
wing/air regiment level which are separately located 
or independent (i.e., battalions/squadrons or 
equivalent), specifying the designation and peacetime 
location, including the geographic name and 
coordinates, for each such formation, unit and 
organisation; 

(I) In respect of all personnel serving with all formations 
and units down to the independent or separately 
located battalion or equivalent level which hold 
battle tanks, artillery, combat aircraft or specialised 
attack helicopters as well as armoured infantry 
fighting vehicles as specified in Article XII of the 
CFE Treaty, in organisations designed and structured 
to perform in peacetime internal security functions, 
the number in each such formation and unit at each 
site at which such armaments and equipment are 
held, specifying the national-level designation of each 



328 On-Site Inspection Agency 


such organisation and the location, including the 
geographic name and coordinates, of each site at 
which such armaments and equipment are held; 

(J) In respect of all personnel serving with all formations 
and units in organisations designed and structured to 
perform in peacetime internal security functions, 
excluding unarmed or lightly armed civil police 
forces and protective services, the aggregate number 
and the aggregate number in each administrative 
region or equivalent; 

(K) In respect of all reserve personnel who have 
completed their military service or training and who 
have been called up or have reported voluntarily for 
military service or training in conventional armed 
forces since the most recent exchange of information 
provided in accordance with this section, the 
aggregate number, specifying the number, if any, of 
those who have been called up or have reported 
voluntarily for full-time military service or training 
in conventional armed forces for a continuous period 
of more than 90 days; 

(L) In respect of all military personnel serving under the 
command of the United Nations, the aggregate 
number; and 

(M) In respect of all military personnel serving with all 
other formations, units and other organisations of 
conventional armed forces, the aggregate number, 
specifying the designation of such formations, units 
and organisations. 

2. In providing information on personnel strengths in 
accordance with this section, each Participating State will 
provide the peacetime authorized personnel strength, which 
will approximate the number of personnel serving within the 
area of application with each of the formations, units and 
other organisations specified in Paragraph 1 of this section. 

3. The provisions of this section will not apply to 
personnel who are in transit through the area of application 
from a location outside the area of application to a final 
destination outside the area of application. Personnel in the 
categories specified in Paragraph 1 of this section who 
entered the area of application in transit will be subject to 
the provisions of this section if they remain within the area 
of application for a period longer than seven days. 

4. Each Participating State will be responsible for its 
own information; receipt of such information will not imply 
validation or acceptance of the information provided. 

5. The Participating States will provide the information 
specified in this section in accordance with the formats and 
procedures to be agreed in the Joint Consultative Group. 

6. Prior to the date on which national personnel limits 
become effective in accordance with Section II of this Act, 
each Participating State will provide to all other 
Participating States the information specified in Paragraph 1, 
Subparagraphs (A), (D), (E) and(G) to (K) of this section, as 
well as the information on aggregate numbers of personnel 
in the categories specified in Subparagraphs (B), (C) and (F) 
of that paragraph, in written form, in one of the official 
CSCE languages, using diplomatic channels or other official 


channels designated by them in accordance with the 
following timetable: 

(A) No later than 30 days following entry into force of 
the CFE Treaty, with the information effective as of 
the date of entry into force of that Treaty; and 

(B) On the 15th day of December of the year in which 
the CFE Treaty comes into force (unless entry into 
force of that Treaty occurs within 60 days of the 1st 
day of December), and on the 15th day of December 
of every year thereafter, with the information 
effective as of the first day of January of the 
following year. 

7. Beginning with the date on which national personnel 
limits become effective in accordance with Section II of this 
Act, each Participating State will provide to all other 
Participating States all the information specified in 
Paragraph 1 of this section in written form, in one of the 
official CSCE languages, using diplomatic channels or other 
official channels designated by them, in accordance with the 
following timetable: 

(A) On the date on which national personnel limits 
become effective in accordance with Section II of this 
Act, with the information effective as of that date; 
and 

(B) On the 15th day of December of the year in which 
the national personnel limits become effective in 
accordance with Section II of this Act, and on the 
15th day of December of every year thereafter, with 
the information effective as of the first day of 
January of the following year 

8. The Participating States will, at the first review of the 
operation of this Act in accordance with Paragraph 3 of 
Section VII of this Act, consider issues relating to the 
adequacy and effectiveness of the disaggregation of the 
information specified in Paragraph 1, Subparagraphs (B), (C) 
and (F) of this section. 

SECTION V. STABILISING MEASURES 

Notification Of Increases In Unit Strengths 

1. Each Participating State will notify all other 
Participating States at least 42 days in advance of any 
permanent increase in the personnel strength of any 
formation, unit or other organisation which was reported in 
the most recent exchange of information at the brigade/ 
regiment, wing/air regiment or equivalent level in accordance 
with Section IV of this Act when such increase equals 1,000 
or more at the brigade/regiment level, or 500 or more at the 
wing/air regiment level, or equivalent levels. 

Notification Of Call-Up Of Reserve Personnel 

2. Any Participating State intending to call up reserve 
personnel of its conventional armed forces based on land 
within the area of application will notify all other 
Participating States whenever the cumulative total of the 
personnel called up and retained on full-time military service 
will exceed a threshold of 35,000. 



329 


Appendix C: Concluding Act of the Negotiation 


3. Such notification will be provided at least 42 days in 
advance of such threshold being exceeded. As an exception, 
in the case of emergency situations where advance 
notification is not practical, notification will be provided as 
soon as possible and, in any event, no later than the date 
such threshold is exceeded. 

4. Such notification will include the following 
information: 

(A) The total number of reserve personnel to be called 
up, specifying the number to be called up for more 
than 90 days; 

(B) A general description of the purpose of the call-up; 

(C) The planned start and end dates of the period during 
which such threshold will be exceeded; and 

(D) The designation and location of any formation in 
which more than 7,000 at the division or equivalent 
level or more than 9,000 at the army/army corps or 
equivalent level of the personnel so called up will 
serve. 

Resubordination Of Units 

5. After the first exchange of information in accordance 
with Section IV of this Act, a Participating State intending to 
resubordinate formations, units or other organisations 
whose personnel are subject to limitation in accordance with 
Section I of this Act to a formation, unit or other 
organisation whose personnel would not otherwise be 
subject to limitation will notify all other Participating States 
of the planned resubordination no later than the date on 
which such resubordination will become effective. 

6. Such notification will include the following 
information: 

(A) The date on which such resubordination will become 
effective; 

(B) The subordination, designation and peacetime 
location of each formation, unit and organisation to 
be resubordinated, both before and after such 
resubordination will become effective; 

(C) The peacetime authorized personnel strength for 
each formation, unit and organisation to be 
resubordinated, both before and after such 
resubordination will become effective; and 

(D) The number, if any, of battle tanks, armoured 
infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, 
attack helicopters and armoured vehicle launched 
bridges as defined in Article II of the CFE Treaty 
held by each formation, unit and organisation to be 
resubordinated, both before and after such 
resubordination will become effective. 

7. Personnel serving with formations, units or other 
organisations resubordinated after the date on which 
national personnel limits become effective in accordance 
with Section II of this Act will remain subject to limitation in 
accordance with Section I of this Act until the date of the 
exchange of information in accordance with Section IV of 
this Act one year subsequent to the year in which such 


resubordination becomes effective, after which time the 
procedure specified in Paragraph 8 of this section will apply. 

8. Forty-two days prior to the end of the one-year 
period specified in Paragraph 7 of this section, the 
Participating State resubordinating such formations, units or 
other organisations will provide to all other Participating 
States notification of the planned exclusion. Upon the 
request of any other Participating State, the Participating 
State resubordinating such formations, units or other 
organisations will provide all relevant information 
supporting such exclusion. ^ 

SECTION VI. VERIFICATION/EVALUATION 

1. For the purpose of evaluating observance of national 
personnel limits and the other provisions of this Act, 
Participating States will apply Section VII and Section VIII of 
the Protocol on Inspection of the CFE Treaty and other 
relevant provisions of that Treaty, together with the 
provisions set out in this section. 

2. In the case of an inspection pursuant to Section VII 
of the Protocol on Inspection of the CFE Treaty, the 
preinspection briefing will include information on the 
number of personnel serving with any formation, unit or 
other organisation which was notified in the most recent 
exchange of information in accordance with Section IV of 
this Act and which is located at that inspection site. If the 
number of such personnel differs from the number of 
personnel noted in that most recent exchange of 
information, the inspection team will be provided with an 
explanation of such difference. The preinspection briefing 
will also include information on the number of personnel 
serving with any other formation or unit down to the 
brigade/regiment, wing/air regiment or equivalent level, as 
well as independent units at the battalion/squadron or 
equivalent level, in the categories specified in Paragraph 1, 
Subparagraphs (B), (C) and (F) of Section IV of this Act, 
which is located at that inspection site. 

3. In the case of an inspection pursuant to Section VIII 
of the Protocol on Inspection of the CFE Treaty, the escort 
team will provide, if requested by the inspection team, 
information on the number of personnel serving with any 
formation, unit or other organisation which was notified in 
the most recent exchange of information in accordance with 
Section IV of this Act, which is located at that inspection site 
and whose facilities are being inspected. If the number of 
such personnel differs from the number of personnel notified 
in that most recent exchange of information, the inspection 
team will be provided with an explanation of such 
difference. 

4. During an inspection pursuant to Section VII or 
Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection of the CFE Treaty, 
inspectors may have access, consistent with the provisions of 
that Protocol, to all facilities subject to inspection at the 
inspection site, including those used by all formations, units 
and other organisations located at that inspection site. 
During such an inspection, the escort team will specify, if 
requested by the inspection team, whether a particular 
building on the inspection site is a personnel barracks or 
messing facility. 



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5. Inspectors will include in the inspection report 
prepared pursuant to Section XII of the Protocol on 
Inspection of the CFE Treaty information provided to the 
inspection team in accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3 of 
this section in a format to be agreed in the Joint Consultative 
Group. Inspectors may also include in that report written 
comments pertaining to the evaluation of personnel 
strengths. 

6. Evaluation of observance of the provisions of this Act 
will be further facilitated through confidence and security 
building measures that have hfen developed and that may be 
developed in the context of the new negotiations on 
disarmament and confidence and security building following 
the Helsinki follow-up meeting. In this context, Participating 
States are prepared to join in considering ways and means to 
refine the evaluation provisions specified in the Vienna 
Document 1992. 

SECTION VII. REVIEW MECHANISMS 

1. The Participating States will review the 
implementation of this Act in accordance with the 
procedures set out in this section, using the relevant bodies 
and channels within the framework of the CSCE process. 

2. In particular, any Participating State may at any time 
raise and clarify questions relating to the implementation of 
this Act within the framework, as appropriate, of the Joint 
Consultative Group. The Participating States will consider in 
the context of the new negotiations on disarmament and 
confidence and security building which will be conducted 
following the Helsinki follow-up meeting, the role of the 
conflict prevention centre in this regard, as appropriate. 

3. Six months after the date on which national 
personnel limits become effective in accordance with Section 
II of this Act and at five-year intervals thereafter, the 
Participating States will conduct a review of the operation of 
this Act. 


4. The Participating States will meet in an 
extraordinary conference if requested to do so by any 
Participating State which considers that exceptional 
circumstances relating to this Act have arisen. Such a request 
will be transmitted to all other Participating States and will 
include an explanation of exceptional circumstances relating 
to this Act, e.g., an increase in the number of military 
personnel in categories listed in Section I of this Act in a 
manner or proportion which the Participating State 
requesting such an extraordinary conference deems to be 
prejudicial to security and stability within the area of 
application. The conference will open no later than 15 days 
after receipt of the request and, unless it decides otherwise, 
will last no longer than three weeks. 

SECTION VIII. CLOSING PROVISIONS 

1. The measures adopted in this Act are politically 
binding. Accordingly, this Act is not eligible for registration 
under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. This 
Act will come into effect simultaneously with the entry into 
force of the CFE Treaty. 

2. This Act will have the same duration as the CFE 
Treaty and may be supplemented, modified or superseded. 

3. The government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
will transmit true copies of this Act, the original of which is 
in English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish, to 
all Participating States, and bring this Act to the attention of 
the Secretariat of the CSCE and the Secretary General of the 
United Nations. 

4. Wherefore, we have subscribed our signatures below: 

Done at Helsinki on 10 July 1992, at the meeting of the 
Heads of State or Government of the Participating States. 



Appendix D 


Final Document of the First 
Conference to Review the Operation 
of the Treaty on Conventional Armed 

Forces in Europe and the 
Concluding Act of the Negotiation 
on Personnel Strength 


VIENNA, 15-31 MAY 1996 

The Republic of Armenia, the Azerbaijan Republic, the 
Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic 
of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, the Kingdom of 
Denmark, the French Republic, Georgia, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of 
Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the 
Republic of Kazakstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 
the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 
the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the 
Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the 
Slovak Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of 
Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the United States of America, which 
are the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe of 19 November 1990, hereinafter referred 
to as the States Parties, 

Fulfilling the obligation set forth in Article XXI, paragraph 
1, of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 
hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, to conduct a review of 
the operation of the Treaty, and thereby taking into account 
the Final Documents of the Extraordinary Conferences of 
the States Parties of 10 July 1992 in Helsinki and 13 
November 1992 in Vienna, 

Acting in accordance with the provision of Section VII, 
paragraph 3, of the Concluding Act of the Negotiation of 
Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
of 10 July 1992, hereinafter referred to as the Concluding 
Act, 

Recalling the results of the Extraordinary Conferences held 
thus far, 

Reaffirming all the decisions of the Joint Consultative Group 
made thus far, 

Having met at the First Review Conference, chaired by the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, from 15 to 31 May 1996 in 
Vienna, 


Have adopted the following: 

I. INTRODUCTION 

1. The States Parties reaffirm the fundamental role of 
the Treaty as a cornerstone of European security and their 
adherence to its goals and objectives. It is their common 
interest to preserve the integrity of the Treaty and the 
Concluding Act as well as the predictability and 
transparency they have created. The States Parties reaffirm 
their determination to fulfill in good faith all obligations and 
commitments arising from the Treaty and its associated 
documents. Bearing that in mind, they commit themselves to 
enhance the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. 

2. The negotiation, conclusion and implementation of 
the Treaty and the Concluding Act, as well as the ratification 
of the Treaty, took place in times of change during which the 
European security environment evolved significantly. The 
Warsaw Treaty Organization has ceased to exist. New states 
have emerged and became States Parties to the Treaty. At the 
same time, new risks and challenges to security have come to 
the fore. As a result of common efforts of the States Parties, 
the Treaty and the Concluding Act have remained vital 
stabilizing factors in this period of transition and 
contributed to its peaceful unfolding. 

3. The States Parties stress that security and stability in 
Europe are vitally underpinned by the continuation and 
enhancement of robust arms control measures. Recognizing 
the evolution of the European political and security 
environment, the States Parties are resolved to continue the 
conventional arms control process, including through the 
enhancement of the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. 
They see this as a common responsibility. 

4. The States Parties recognize that the Treaty and the 
Concluding Act are essential contributions to the 
achievement of the goals and purposes of the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), in 
particular the promotion of confidence, stability and security 
in an undivided Europe. In that context, they stress the 






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importance of the development of a common and 
comprehensive security model for Europe for the twenty-first 
century, of the implementation of the Treaty on Open Skies 
and of the ongoing security dialogue and negotiations in the 
Forum for Security Co-operation. 

II. REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY 
AND THE CONCLUDING ACT 

5. The States Parties note with satisfaction that more 
than 58,000 pieces of conventional armaments and 
equipment have been reduced, and that the overall holdings 
of conventional armaments and equipment within the area 
of application are substantially lower than the limits set in 
the Treaty. 

More than 2,500 inspections have taken place. A 
permanent system for regular and routine exchange of 
Treaty notifications and other information has been 
developed. The Joint Consultative Group has been firmly 
established and has demonstrated its utility and importance 
as the ongoing Treaty forum. 

With regard to the Concluding Act, the States Parties 
note with satisfaction that the personnel strength of 
conventional armed forces in the area of application was 
reduced by 1.2 million persons. 

6. The States Parties note that the Treaty established a 
high degree of transparency in military relations through its 
comprehensive system for exchange of information and for 
verification. Together with the extensive reductions of 
conventional armaments and equipment, this has led to 
greater predictability and confidence in security relations. 

The Treaty has also nurtured the development of new 
patterns of co-operation in Europe and provides a basis for 
stability and enhanced security in Europe at substantially 
lower levels of conventional armaments and equipment than 
heretofore. Although risks and challenges still exist in some 
parts of Europe, the capability for launching surprise attack 
and the danger of large-scale offensive action in Europe as a 
whole have been diminished substantially. Nevertheless, the 
achievement of the goals of the Treaty in the whole area of 
its application requires continuous efforts by the States 
Parties. 

7. The States Parties reaffirm the continued relevance of 
the basic structures of the Treaty including the principle of 
zonal limitations, as embodied in Articles IV and V of the 
Treaty. In this respect, and in line with the decision of the 
Joint Consultative Group of 17 November 1995, the States 
Parties have agreed on a document, which is contained in 
Annex A, reflecting a combination of measures agreed in 
cooperative fashion and acceptable to all parties to the 
Treaty. 

8. States Parties regret that not all reduction obligations 
pursuant to the Treaty have been met. They stress the 
necessity to complete as soon as possible reductions of 
conventional armaments and equipment limited by the 
Treaty (TLE) in accordance with obligations under the 
Treaty. They note with satisfaction the reiterated 
commitment of those States Parties which still have to 
complete reductions to comply with the provisions of the 
Treaty and associated documents. All States Parties express 


their readiness to follow this process to its completion in 
accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. In this context, 
being aware of difficulties which have delayed the 
completion of reductions, they take positive note of efforts 
undertaken in order to meet fully obligations under the 
Treaty. 

9. States Parties express their concern with serious 
difficulties of some States Parties to comply fully within their 
territory with the provisions of the Treaty and its related 
documents due to TLE unaccounted for and uncontrolled 
within the Treaty. This situation adversely affects the 
operation of the Treaty and complicates its implementation. 

They stress the need to reach as soon as possible relevant 
political solutions and to elaborate necessary measures to 
enable the implementation of the Treaty in accordance with 
its provisions. 

They express their readiness to address the issue of this 
TLE in the Joint Consultative Group, including the ways and 
means to facilitate the resolution of this issue. 

10. The States Parties have adopted the understandings 
and agreed interpretations with regard to implementation 
and ways and means to improve the viability and 
effectiveness of the Treaty as specified in Annex B of this 
Final Document. 

11. The States Parties have agreed that the 
implementation issues contained in Annex C of this Final 
Document require further consideration and resolution in 
the Joint Consultative Group. 

12. The States Parties reaffirm the arrangements of 
Article XII reached at the Extraordinary Conferences in Oslo 
in 1992. 

They understand that for successor states that had 
become States Parties by 1992, paragraph 2 of the Article 
XII part of the Oslo arrangement should be read as: “In 
particular, no State Party will increase within the area of 
application its holdings of armoured infantry fighting 
vehicles held by organizations designed and structured to 
perform in peacetime internal security functions above that 
aggregate number held by such organizations at the time of 
signature of the Treaty, as notified on their territory 
pursuant to the information exchange as of November 19, 
1990.” 

They agree to work further on this issue of Article XII in 
the Joint Consultative Group, taking into account the 
proposals made at the Review Conference. 

13. States Parties stressed the importance of full and 
continuous respect for the provisions of Article IV, 
paragraph 5, in the context of maintaining the viability of 
the Treaty, as well as for the sovereignty of the States Parties 
involved. 

States Parties noted that, in certain instances, bilateral 
agreements are under negotiation—or in the process of 
ratification or implementation —which relate to the 
provisions of Article IV, paragraph 5. States Parties— 
expressed their support for early and positive results of the 
ongoing processes. 



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Appendix D: Final Document oe the First CFE Review Conference 


States Parties consider that the importance of the Article 
IV provisions on stationing forces should be recognised in 
the context of the process foreseen in Section III of this Final 
Document. 

14. In the context of the process foreseen in Section III of 
this Final Document, States Parties will examine different 
interpretations of temporary deployments so as to ensure 
that these temporary deployments do not become indefinite. 

15. The States Parties recall that according to Article II, 
paragraph 2 of the Treaty, the lists of existing types 
contained in Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional 
Armaments and Equipment (POET) shall be updated 
periodically by the Joint Consultative Group in accordance 
with Section IV of the POET. However, it has not been 
updated since the Treaty’s conclusion. 

The States Parties instruct their delegations to the Joint 
Consultative Group to update the POET. They further 
agreed that: 

• any inaccuracies should be corrected; including by 
removal of types, models and versions of 
conventional armaments and equipment that do not 
meet Treaty criteria; 

• the Joint Consultative Group should consider if a 
yearly update of the lists would be appropriate; 

• the Joint Consultative Group should consider an 
electronic version of the lists in all official languages. 

16. The States Parties also discussed the topics contained 
in Annex D of this Final Document. 

17. The States Parties welcome the statement of the 
representative of the Russian Federation to promote the 
implementation of the statement of the representative of the 
Union of Soviet Socialists Republics in the Joint Consultative 
Group on 14 June 1991 in Vienna. The text of the Russian 
statement is laid down in Annex E of this Final Document. 

18. The States Parties recommend that in view of the 
issues that have been referred to the Joint Consultative 
Group, most effective use is made of the provisions of 
Article XVI and the Protocol on the Joint Consultative 
Group, in order to allow the Joint Consultative Group to 
address all those issues in a proper manner. 

m. FUTURE WORK ON THE TREATY 

19. In view of Sections I and II of this Final Document, 
the States Parties instruct their delegations to the Joint 
Consultative Group to expand upon their work in 
accordance with Article XVI of the Treaty. Taking fresh 
impetus from this Review Conference, they will immediately 
start a thorough process aimed at improving the operation 
of the Treaty in a changing environment and, through that, 
the security of each State Party, irrespective of whether it 
belongs to a politico-military alliance. As part of this 
process, the States Parties will consider measures and 
adaptations with the aim of promoting the objectives of the 
Treaty and of enhancing its viability and effectiveness, 
including but not limited to the consideration of proposals 
already made to that effect. The character of this process 
should be such as to permit the Treaty to sustain its key role 


in the European security architecture. Its scope and 
parameters should be defined as a matter of priority. 

20. Until the entry into force of such measures and 
adaptations, the States Parties will observe all provisions of 
the Treaty and its associated documents. 

21. The States Parties will consider a progress report on 
the intermediate results of this process at the time of the 
OSCE Lisbon Summit. This report will inter alia include 
recommendations on the way ahead. 

In accordance with Article XXI, paragraph 1, the States 
Parties look forward to gathering again in five years time to 
conduct the second review of the operation of the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. 

This Final Document, together with its Annexes A, B, C, 
D, and E, which are integral to it, having been drawn up in 
all the official languages of the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe, shall be deposited with the 
government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands as the 
designated depositary for the Treaty, which shall circulate 
copies of this Final Document to all the States Parties. 

ANNEX A: 

Document agreed among the States Parties to the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 
1990. 

The 30 States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred 
to as the Treaty, have agreed as follows: 

I 

1. Each State Party shall, taking into account the 
clarification set forth in this Document relating to the area 
described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A), of the Treaty and 
taking into account the understandings on flexibility set 
forth in this Document, comply fully with the numerical 
limitations set forth in the Treaty, including Article V 
thereof, no later than 31 May 1999. 

2. Paragraph 1 of this Section shall be understood as 
not giving any State Party, which was in compliance with the 
numerical limitations set forth in the Treaty, including 
Article V thereof, as of 1 January 1996, the right to exceed 
any of the numerical limitations set forth in the Treaty. 

3. Pursuant to the decision of the Joint Consultative 
Group of 17 November 1995, the States Parties shall 
cooperate to the maximum extent possible to ensure the full 
implementation of the provisions of this Document. 

II 

1. Within the area described in Article V, subparagraph 
1(A), of the Treaty, as understood by the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics at the time the Treaty was signed, the 
Russian Federation shall limit its battle tanks, armoured 
combat vehicles, and artillery so that, no later than 31 May 
1999 and thereafter, the aggregate numbers do not exceed: 

(A) 1,800 battle tanks; 



334 On-Site Inspection Agency 


(B) 3,700 armoured combat vehicles, of which no more 
than 552 shall be located within the Astrakhan 
Oblast; no more than 552 shall be located within the 
Volgograd Oblast; no more than 310 shall be located 
within the eastern part of the Rostov Oblast 
described in Section III, paragraph I, of this 
Document; and no more than 600 shall be located 
within the Pskov Oblast; and 

(C) 2,400 pieces of artillery. 

2. Within the Odessa Oblast, Ukraine shall limit its 
battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and artillery so that, 
upon provisional application of this Document and 
thereafter, the aggregate numbers do not exceed: 

(A) 400 battle tanks; 

(B) 400 armoured combat vehicles; and 

(C) 350 pieces of artillery. 

3. Upon provisional application of this document and 
until 31 May 1999, the Russian Federation shall limit its 
battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and artillery, within 
the area described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A), of the 
Treaty, as understood by the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics at the time the Treaty was signed, so that the 
aggregate numbers do not exceed: 

(A) 1,897 battle tanks; 

(B) 4,397 armoured combat vehicles; and 

(C) 2,422 pieces of artillery. 

HI 

1. For the purposes of this Document and the Treaty, 
the following territory, as constituted on 1 January 1996, of 
the Russian Federation shall be deemed to be located in the 
area described in Article IV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty 
rather than in the area described in Article V, subparagraph 
1(A), of the Treaty: the Pskov Oblast; the Volgograd Oblast; 
the Astrakhan Oblast; that part of the Rostov Oblast east of 
the line extending from Kushchevskaya to Volgodonsk to the 
Volgograd Oblast border, including Volgodonsk; and 
Kushchevskaya and a narrow corridor in Krasnodar Kray 
leading to Kushchevskaya. 

2. For the purposes of this Document and the Treaty, 
the territory of the Odessa Oblast, as constituted on 1 
January 1996, of Ukraine shall be deemed to be located in 
the area described in Article IV, paragraph 3, of the Treaty 
rather than in the area described in Article V, subparagraph 
1(A), of the Treaty. 

IV 

1. The States Parties shall, during the period before 31 
May 1999, examine the Treaty provisions on designated 
permanent storage sites so as to allow all battle tanks, 
armoured combat vehicles, and artillery in designated 
permanent storage sites, including those subject to regional 
numerical limitations, to be located with active units. 

2. The Russian Federation shall have the right to utilize 
to the maximum extent possible the provisions of the Treaty 


on temporary deployment of battle tanks, armoured 
combat vehicles, and artillery within its territory and 
outside its territory. Such temporary deployments on the 
territory of other States Parties shall be achieved by means 
of free negotiations and with full respect for the sovereignty 
of the States Parties involved. 

3. The Russian Federation shall have the right to 
utilize to the maximum extent possible reallocation, in 
accordance with existing agreements, of the current quotas 
for battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and artillery 
established by the Agreement on the Principles and 
Procedures for the Implementation of the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, done at Tashkent, 
on 15 May 1992. Such reallocations shall be achieved by 
means of free negotiations and with full respect for the 
sovereignty of the States Parties involved. 

4. The Russian Federation shall count against the 
numerical limitations established in the Treaty and 
paragraph 1 of Section II of this Document any armoured 
combat vehicles listed as “to be removed” in its 
information exchange of 1 January 1996 that are not so 
removed by 31 May 1999. 

V 

1. In addition to the annual information exchange 
provided pursuant to Section VII, subparagraph 1(C), of 
the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, 
the Russian Federation shall provide information equal to 
that reported in the annual information exchange on the 
area described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A), of the 
Treaty, as understood by the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics at the time the Treaty was signed, upon 
provisional application of this Document and every six 
months after the annual information exchange. In the case 
of Kushchevskaya, the Russian Federation shall provide 
such additional information every three months after the 
annual information exchange. 

2. Upon provisional application of this Document, 
Ukraine shall provide “F21” notifications for its holdings 
within the Odessa Oblast on the basis of changes of five, 
rather than ten, percent or more in assigned holdings. 

3. Subject to paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Section, the 
Russian Federation shall, upon provisional application of 
this Document, accept each year, in addition to its passive 
declared site inspection quota established pursuant to 
Section II, subparagraph 10(D), of the Protocol on 
Inspection, up to a total of 10 supplementary declared site 
inspections, conducted in accordance with the Protocol on 
Inspection, at objects of verification: 

(A) Focated within the Pskov Oblast; the Volgograd 
Oblast; the Astrakhan Oblast; that part of the 
Rostov Oblast east of the line extending from 
Kushchevskaya to Volgodonsk to the Volgograd 
Oblast border, including Volgodonsk; and 
Kushchevskaya and a narrow corridor in Krasnodar 
Kray leading to Kushchevskaya; 

(B) Containing conventional armaments and equipment 
limited by the Treaty designated by the Russian 
Federation in its annual information exchange of 1 



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Appendix D: Final Document of the First CFE Review Conference 


January 1996 as “to be removed,” until such time 
that a declared site inspection confirms that such 
equipment has been removed. 

4. Subject to paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Section, 
Ukraine shall, upon provisional application of this 
Document, accept each year, in addition to its passive 
declared site inspection quota established pursuant to 
Section II, subparagraph 10(D), of the Protocol on 
Inspection, up to a total of one supplementary declared site 
inspection, conducted in accordance with the Protocol on 
Inspection, at objects of verification located within the 
Odessa Oblast. 

5. The number of supplementary declared site 
inspections conducted at objects of verification pursuant to 
paragraph 3 or 4 of this Section shall not exceed the number 
of declared site passive quota inspections, established in 
accordance with Section II, subparagraph 10(D) of the 
Protocol on Inspection, conducted at those objects of 
verification in the course of the same year. 

6. All supplementary declared site inspections 
conducted pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4 of this Section: 

(A) Shall be carried out at the cost of the inspecting State 
Party, consistent with prevailing commercial rates; 
and 

(B) At the discretion of the inspecting State Party, shall 
be conducted either as a sequential inspection or as a 
separate inspection. 

VI 

1. This document shall enter into force upon receipt by 
the Depositary of notification of confirmation of approval 
by all States Parties. Section II, paragraphs 2 and 3, Section 
IV, and Section V of this Document are hereby provisionally 
applied as of 31 May 1996 through 15 December 1996. If 
this Document does not enter into force by 15 December 
1996, then it shall be reviewed by the States Parties. 

2. This Document, in all six official languages of the 
Treaty, shall be deposited with the Government of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, as the designated Depositary 
for the Treaty, which shall circulate copies of this document 
to all States Parties. 

ANNEX B: UNDERSTANDINGS AND 
AGREED INTERPRETATIONS WITH 
REGARD TO IMPLEMENTATION AND 
WAYS AND MEANS TO IMPROVE THE 
VIABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE 

TREATY 

1. The States Parties stress the need to ensure that 
relevant Government authorities charged with Treaty 
implementation fulfill all the obligations of the Decision of 
the Joint Consultative Group on the cost of inspection dated 
23 May 1995. 

2. The States Parties agree that pursuant to the Protocol 
on Inspection, Section VII, paragraph 1, 


(A) In case an inspected State Party or the State Party 
exercising the rights and obligations of the inspected 
State Party delays an inspection on grounds of force 
majeure, it shall, in written form, explain the reasons 
for this delay in detail; 

This should take place as follows: 

• If force majeure is declared prior to the arrival of the 
inspection team, through the answer to the relevant 
notifications; 

• If force majeure is declared after the arrival of the 
inspection team at the point of entry, the explanation 
should be presented as soon as possible, through 
diplomatic channels or other official channels. 

(B) In case of such a delay due to force majeure, the 
provisions of Section XI, paragraph 2 of the Protocol 
on Inspection shall apply. 

3. Each State Party shall provide to all other States 
Parties annually, but not later than 15 December, the 
complete updated list of inspectors and transport crew 
members. In case of additions to the list of inspectors and 
transport crew members, the State Party shall provide the 
complete updated list highlighting the additions. 

4. Each State Party with territory in the area of 
application shall provide to all other States Parties during 
the annual exchange of information the standing diplomatic 
clearance numbers for their aviation transportation means 
for the subsequent calendar year. 

5. Each State Party shall provide to all other States 
Parties during the annual exchange of information the list of 
its officially recognized holidays for the subsequent calendar 
year. 

6. The State Party whose inspection team intends to 
transit the territory of another State Party prior to 
conducting the inspection should inform the transited 
State(s) Party (Parties) about the estimated time of transit, 
cross-border points and transportation means to be used by 
the inspection team, as well as a list of inspectors and drivers 
with passport numbers. 

7. States Parties agree that a specified area may contain 
declared sites of their own and stationed forces; but all 
declared sites within a specified area are excluded from an 
inspection of the specified area (inspections in accordance 
with Section VIII of the Protocol on Inspection) as they can 
be inspected only in accordance with Section VII of the 
Protocol on Inspection. 

8. States Parties agree to send the notification of the 
intent to inspect simultaneously to the host and the 
stationing States Parties, if the inspecting State intends to 
conduct a sequential inspection which involves stationed 
forces. 

9. Where appropriate and with the agreement of the 
State Party on whose territory an inspection is to be carried 
out in respect of conventional armaments and equipment 
limited by the Treaty of a stationing State Party, the 
stationing State Party shall assist the host nation in the 
provision of security protection to both the inspection team 
and the escort team for the duration of the inspection. 



336 On-Site Inspection Agency 


10. Notifications of changes of 10 per cent of holdings: 

• The States Parties agree that, pursuant to Section 
VIII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B) of the Protocol 
on Notification and Exchange of Information, the 
most recent update of information on holdings will 
always constitute the basis for any subsequent 
change to be notified under this paragraph. 

• The notification of any change of 10 per cent or 
more shall be given no later than five days after such 
change occurs. The time period of five days is 
understood as being five working days. 

11. States Parties agree to notify: 

• Any changes in the designation of formations or 
units pursuant to Section I, III, and V of the Protocol 
on Notification and Exchange of Information at least 
42 days in advance; 

• Any closures of objects of verification within the last 
month pursuant to Section V, on the fifteenth of each 
month; 

• Any creation or move to another location of an 
object of verification at least 42 days in advance. 

12. The States Parties agree that, in addition to the 
requirements for the submission of information and 
notifications as prescribed in Article XVII of the Treaty and 
in paragraph 1 of the Annex on the Format for the Exchange 
of Information to the Protocol on Notification and 
Exchange of Information, they will endeavour to supplement 
the annual exchange of information pursuant to the 
aforementioned Protocol in written form by an electronic 
data version on diskette in the agreed format; the written 
form remaining the official version. 

13. Each State Party should notify to all other States 
Parties its passive declared site inspection quota coincident 
with each annual exchange of information provided 
pursuant to the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of 
Information, Section VII, paragraph 1(C). 

ANNEX C: IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
REQUIRING FURTHER CONSIDERATION 
AND RESOLUTION IN THE JOINT 
CONSULTATIVE GROUP 

1. Introducing common procedures concerning flights 
of the aviation transportation means with the inspection 
team. 

2. Point of entry/exit. 

3. Immunity of the transportation means of an 
inspection team. 

4. Formulation of principles for the elaboration of 
declared site diagrams including the possibility of a more 
precise formulation/interpretation of the term “routinely.” 

5. Equipment to be used during inspections. 

6. Rules on photography. 


7. Calendar year/possibility of synchronization with 
implementation year. 

8. Financing of the inspections. 

9. Common understanding of the obligation pursuant 
to the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of 
Information, Section VIII, paragraph 1, subparagraph (B). 

10. Review and updating of the Treaty Notification 
Formats to ensure their continued viability. 

11. The issue of TLE which has left, on a temporary 
basis, without re-assignment, the normal peacetime location, 
for commitments under the auspices of the United Nations 
or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe. 

12. A question whether, with reference to the Protocol 
on Notification and Exchange of Information, Section I, 
paragraph 1, all units and formations holding equipment 
subject to the Treaty, including depots, bases, and 
Designated Permanent Storage Sites, should be notified in 
both Charts I and III. 

13. Disposal of TLE in excess of reduction liabilities and 
disposal of decommissioned TLE. 

14. Rounding of passive inspection quotas. 

15. Enhanced transparency measures on ambulances 
built on the chassis of ACVs or APC look-alikes as listed in 
the Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments 
and Equipment. 

ANNEX D: TOPICS THAT HAVE BEEN 
DISCUSSED DURING THE REVIEW 
CONFERENCE OF THE TREATY ON 
CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN 
EUROPE 

1. Article II: definitions of; 

“group of States Parties”; 

“area of application”; 

“accession of other OSCE States Parties”; 
“designated permanent storage site”; 

“armoured vehicle launched bridge”; 

“combat aircraft”, 

And the Protocol on Existing Types of 
Conventional Armaments and Equipment 

2. Article III: 

Export of equipment; 

Transparency concerning TLE assigned to 
Internal Security Forces; 

United peacekeeping force proposal. 



337 


Appendix D: Final Document of the First CFE Review Conference 


3. Article IV: 

Approach to limitations and maximum levels of 
holdings; 

Stationing forces on the territory of another 
State Party. 

4. Article V: 

Implementation; 

Temporary deployment; 

Stationed forces. 

5. Article VI: 

Sufficiency rule. 

6. Article X: 

Removal from DPSS. 

7. Article XI: 

Implementation; 

Limits; 

Removal from storage. 

8. Article XII: 

Armoured infantry fighting vehicles held by 
internal security forces (pursuant to Oslo Final 
Document, 5 June 1992); 

Transparency; 

Need of those states which joined the Treaty in 
1992; 

Criteria concerning internal security force levels. 

9. Article XIV: 

Aerial inspections. 

10. Article XVI: 

Future role of the Joint Consultative Group; 

Duration of sessions of the Joint Consultative 
Group. 

11. Article XVIII: 

Follow-up negotiations; 

Modalities; 

Proposal for a Supplementary Agreement. 

12. Miscellaneous 

United peacekeeping force proposal; 

Exceptional circumstances; 

Joint Consultative Group dialogue on Treaty 
support fund. 


ANNEX E: STATEMENT OF THE 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION 

To promote the implementation of the Statement of the 
Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to 
the Joint Consultative Group of 14 June 1991 (the Statement 
of the Soviet Representative), I have been instructed by the 
Government of the Russian Federation to state the 
following. 

1. It is understood that conventional armaments and 
equipment in the three Treaty limited categories referred to 
in paragraph 1 of the Statement of the Soviet Representative 
(battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery) will be 
deemed destroyed or rendered militarily unusable, in 
accordance with that statement, upon the application of any 
of the following methods: 

(A) Destruction or conversion of conventional 
armaments and equipment under procedures that 
provide sufficient visible evidence, which confirms 
that they have been destroyed or rendered militarily 
unusable; 

(B) Provision of satisfactory documentary evidence as 
meeting requirements of sufficient visible evidence, 
only in case of such armaments and equipment 
destroyed prior to the promulgation of this 
statement. The Russian Federation intends to 
provide such documentary evidence with regard to 
armaments and equipment destroyed in the area of 
application of the Treaty after 17 November 1995; 

(C) Segregation of battle tanks and armoured combat 
vehicles exposed to the influence of atmospheric 
factors, with hatches and covers of engine 
compartments opened, with the invitation of a group 
of experts to conduct—at its own expense—an 
examination of a random sample representative of 
those conventional armaments and equipment, prior 
to their removal from a display site for final disposal 
(scrapping), and notification of such removal; 

(D) Visit of group of experts, at its own expense and 
upon invitation, to count already derelict 
conventional armaments and equipment; 

(E) Notification preceding or accompanying each 
transfer of conventional armaments and equipment 
to other States Parties within the area of application 
of the Treaty, with equivalent relevant notification 
from the recipient State Party. Such transfers will be 
done in line with Treaty provisions and will be 
compatible with the objectives and terms of the 
Statement of the Soviet Representative. 

2. Continuing its efforts aimed at the implementation 
of the statement of the Soviet representative, the Russian 
Federation will apply methods referred to in paragraph 1 of 
this statement to conventional armaments and equipment 
located on its territory. It will co-operate with the Republic 
of Kazakstan and the Republic of Uzbekistan in applying 
those methods to conventional armaments and equipment 
located on their territories. The Russian Federation will 
negotiate the necessary arrangements with those states for 




338 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


the purpose of completing by joint efforts the process 
referred to in paragraph 1 of the Statement of the Soviet 
Representative by the year 2000. 

3. If, despite good faith efforts, the quota of 6000 
battle tanks subject to elimination is not fully met, the 
shortfall of not more than 2300 battle tanks will be covered 
by applying methods referred to in paragraph 1 of this 
statement to an equal number of armoured combat vehicles 
in excess of the quota of 1500 pieces; and thus the overall 
process referred to in paragraph 1 of the Statement of the 
Soviet Representative will be in general deemed completed. 
Notwithstanding that, a number of battle tanks equal to the 
above-mentioned shortfall will be subsequently eliminated. 
The envisaged date for the completion of the process of their 
elimination will depend on the duration of their operational 
and service life and on the availability of financial resources. 
That elimination will be carried out in line with paragraph 1 
of this statement. 

4. Upon completion of initial visits referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this statement, the Russian Federation will be 
ready to discuss in the JCG their results and in the light of 
these to make arrangements, as necessary, for further visits, 
as well as to discuss possible modalities for further visits. In 
general, relevant practices established in the process of 
Treaty implementation will be followed as much as 
applicable in the organization and conduct of the visits. 

STATEMENTS OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE FIRST 
CONFERENCE TO REVIEW THE OPERATION OF THE 
TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN 
EUROPE AND THE CONCLUDING ACT OF THE 
NEGOTIATION ON PERSONNEL STRENGTH: 

• Notwithstanding the rights of each state as stated in 
Article XIV of the Treaty, each State Party should 
attempt to avoid conducting inspections during the 
officially recognized holidays of the other State 
Party. 

• With regard to the phrase “on the availability of 
financial resources” in the Statement of the 
Representative of the Russian Federation as 
contained in Annex E of the Final Document of the 
Review Conference of the Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe, it is understood that this 
phrase is without prejudice to other arms control 
obligations. 

• Temporary deployment and reallocation of quotas 
referred to in Section IV, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the 
Document will not be used in the context of the 
Azerbaijan Republic. 

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION AT THE CFE REVIEW CONFERENCE 

31 MAY 1996 

Unless flexibilities listed in the agreement on the flank issue 
are realized by 31 May 1999 the Russian Federation retains 
the right to use other Treaty flexibilities discussed but not 
mentioned in the above agreement. 


STATEMENT OF UKRAINE AT THE CONFERENCE TO 
REVIEW THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY ON 
CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE 

31 MAY 1996 

In connection with the decision of the CFE Review 
Conference of 31 May 1996 to adopt the “Document 
Agreed by the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990,” Ukraine 
gives consent to such a decision, with the understanding 
that, in implementing its provisions, the States Parties will 
proceed from the following: 

1. The rights and obligations of the Russian Federation 
set forth in Section II, paragraphs 1 and 3, and Section V, 
paragraph 1, of the Document, in relation to “the area 
described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A), of the Treaty, as 
understood by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the 
time the Treaty was signed,” do not cover the territory of 
Ukraine, namely the autonomous Republic of the Crimea, 
Nikolayev Oblast, Zaporozhskaya Oblast and Kherson 
Oblast. 

2. Section II, paragraphs 1 and 3, and Section IV, 
paragraph 2, of the Document, do not cover that portion of 
the TLE of the naval infantry and coastal defence forces 
which, as a result of the Black Sea Fleet division between 
Ukraine and the Russian Federation, will be assigned to the 
Russian Federation and subject to their withdrawal from the 
territory of Ukraine with the agreed timeframes. 

3. The provisions of Section IV, paragraph 2, of the 
Document, shall in no way restrict the right and possibilities 
of Ukraine to deploy on a temporary basis, under Article V, 
paragraph 1, of the Treaty, combat tanks, armoured combat 
vehicles and artillery within the “new” flank area. 

4. The provisions of Section IV, paragraph 3, of the 
Document, shall in no way bear upon the rights and 
obligations of Ukraine under the Agreement on the 
Principles and Procedures for the Implementation of the 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 15 May 
1992. 

The delegation of Ukraine requests to distribute this 
Statement as an Annex to the Final Document of the 
Conference. 

STATEMENT OF THE DELEGATION OF MOLDOVA 
TO THE REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE CFE TREATY 
ON 31 MAY 1996 

In relation to paragraph 7 Section 2 of the Final Document, 
the Republic of Moldova would like to make the following 
statement: 

The early entry into force of the bilateral agreement on 
the withdrawal of Russian troops, signed between the 
Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation on 21 
October 1994 shall contribute to full implementation of the 
Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. 

In relation to Section IV, paragraph 2 of the Document 
Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty on 



339 


Appendix D: Final Document of the First CFE Review Conference 


Conventional Armed Forces in Europe contained in the 
Annex A of the Final Document, the Republic of Moldova 
would like to make the following interpretative statement: 

The constitution of the Republic of Moldova has 
proclaimed the permanent neutrality of the country, 
prohibiting the stationing of foreign troops on the territory 
of the Republic. In view of these constitutional provisions, 
the Republic of Moldova cannot allow even temporary 
deployment of conventional armaments belonging to other 
countries on its territory. 

I would like to ask you Mr. Chairman to annex this 
statement to the Final Document with the translation into all 
official languages. 

THE STATEMENT OF THE TURKISH DELEGATION 
ON THE “DOCUMENT AGREED AMONG THE 
STATES PARTIES TO THE CFE TREATY OF 
NOVEMBER 19, 1990.” 

On the occasion of the adoption of the Final Document of 
the First Review Conference, the Turkish delegation registers 
the following understanding: 

1. The Document in question does not change in any 
way the legally binding character of the CFE Treaty and its 
associated documents, nor the obligations of individual 
States Parties to the Treaty. 

2. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section IV of the Document 
cannot be interpreted in a manner which may prejudice the 
provision contained in Article IV, paragraph 5 of the CFE 
Treaty, nor the principle of free consent enshrined in the 
OSCE documents in the use of such rights. 

3. The “flexibilities” contained in the Treaty consist of 
those mentioned in the above paragraphs and can only be 
used in full respect of the relevant Treaty provisions and on 
the basis of agreements concluded and implemented with 
free consent of the States Parties involved. 

4. While the Turkish delegation accepts an examination 
of the DPSS provisions, it makes it clear that it can accept 
eventual modifications only if they do not result in force 
concentrations prejudicial to regional balances and provided 


that a similar examination is carried out for the clarification 
of the question of “temporary deployments,” in particular 
with regard to their duration. 

5. In view of the continued relevance of the regional 
sublimits even under changing conditions, the Turkish 
government will not enter into any negotiation prejudicial to 
the principle of regional sub-limits, nor accept any force 
limits which would not take due consideration of the size of 
its territory, population and the security environment in 
adjacent regions not subject to Treaty limitations. 

I request that this statement be attached to the Final 
Document. 

STATEMENT OF THE DELEGATION OF GEORGIA 

The Georgian delegation has considered paragraphs 2 and 3 
of Section IV of the Document Amongst the States Parties on 
the flank issue very carefully. We still have some very serious 
concerns about the future implementation of their content. 

In this context we would like to make the following 
statement: 

Any agreement on temporary deployment of conventional 
armed forces on the territory of Georgia or for the 
reallocation of equipment quotas established by the 
Tashkent Agreement must be the result of free negotiation 
and must be taken with full respect for the sovereignty of 
Georgia and for its constitution. All parties must implement 
all the provisions of any such agreements in good faith and 
in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. 

STATEMENT BY THE NETHERLANDS 

THE NETHERLANDS 

31 MAY 1996 

It is the view of the 16 members of the Atlantic Alliance that 
any future flexibility must be consistent with the legal 
framework of the Treaty, as agreed by all 30 States Parties. 

I request that this statement will be attached to the Final 
Document. 









































Appendix E 



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 
ORGANIZATION 

BELGIUM 

AGENCY: Ministere de la Defense Nationale, Verification 
Unit (JSO-D/WV) 

LOCATION: Brussels, Belgium 
CFE TREATY TLE: 2,333* 

*Note: All CFE Treaty TLE figures were drawn from the 
August 1992, data exchange 

CANADA 

AGENCY: J3 Arms Control Verification Directorate, 
National Defense Headquarters 
LOCATION: Ottawa, Canada 
CFE TREATY TLE: 272 

DENMARK 

AGENCY: Headquarters, Chief of Defense Arms Control 
Section 

LOCATION: Copenhagen, Denmark 
CFE TREATY TLE: 1,486 

FRANCE 

AGENCY: L’Unite Fran^aise de Verification 
LOCATION: Creil Cedex, France 
CFE TREATY TLE: 8,219 

GERMANY 

AGENCY: Federal Armed Forces Verification Center 
LOCATION: Geilenkirchen, Germany 
CFE TREATY TLE: 22,300 

GREECE 

AGENCY: Hellenic National Defence General Staff, Arms 
Control Directorate 
LOCATION: Athens, Greece 
CFE TREATY TLE: 5,833 

ICELAND 

AGENCY: Defense Department Ministry for Foreign Affairs 

LOCATION: Reykjavik, Iceland 

CFE TREATY TLE: No Treaty Limited Equipment 


ITALY 

AGENCY: Joint Armaments Verification Center 
LOCATION: Rome, Italy 
CFE TREATY TLE: 7,737 

LUXEMBOURG 

AGENCY: Inspection, Verification and Observation Group 
LOCATION: Luxembourg 

CFE TREATY TLE: No Treaty Limited Equipment 

NETHERLANDS 

AGENCY: Defence Staff, Arms Control Branch 
LOCATION: The Hague, Netherlands 
CFE TREATY TLE: 3,461 

NORWAY 

AGENCY: Headquarters Defense Command Norway 
LOCATION: Oslo, Norway 
CFE TREATY TLE: 962 

PORTUGAL 

AGENCY: Unidade Nacional De Verificacoes 
LOCATION: Lisbon, Portugal 
CFE TREATY TLE: 872 

SPAIN 

AGENCY: Unidad De Verificacion Espanola 
LOCATION: Madrid, Spain 
CFE TREATY TLE: 3, 655 

TURKEY 

AGENCY: International Security Affairs Division 
Verification and Implementation Branch 
LOCATION: Ankara, Turkey 
CFE TREATY TLE: 8,545 

UNITED KINGDOM 

AGENCY: Joint Arms Control Implementation Group 
LOCATION: RAF Henlow, United Kingdom (moved in 
May 1996 from RAF Scampton) 

CFE TREATY TLE: 6,025 




342 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


UNITED STATES 

AGENCY: On-Site Inspection Agency, European Operations 
LOCATION: Frankfurt, Germany 
CFE TREATY TLE: 12,846 

WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION 

Note: In November 1990, the Budapest Group (Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak 
Republic) superseded the WTO and accepted all CFE Treaty 
responsibilities. 

BULGARIA 

AGENCY: Director of Disarmament 
LOCATION: Sofia, Bulgaria 
CFE TREATY TLE: 7,034 

CZECH REPUBLIC 

AGENCY: Disarmament Control Office 
LOCATION: Prague, Czech Republic 
CFE TREATY TLE: 6,306 

HUNGARY 

AGENCY: Arms Control and Verification Center 
LOCATION: Budapest, Hungary 
CFE TREATY TLE: 4,305 

POLAND 

AGENCY: Polish Verification Center 
LOCATION: Warsaw, Poland 
CFE TREATY TLE: 8,100 

ROMANIA 

AGENCY: Directorate for International Relations and 
Treaties 

LOCATION: Bucharest, Romania 
CFE TREATY TLE: 10,603 

SLOVAK REPUBLIC (SLOVAKIA) 

AGENCY: Verification Centre, Ministry of Defense 
LOCATION: Bratislava, Slovak Republic 
CFE TREATY TLE: 3,153 

FORMER SOVIET UNION 

"'Note: In May 1992, at Tashkent, Uzbekistan, the successor 
states to the Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine) formally 
accepted all CFE Treaty responsibilities. The Tashkent 
Group divided the former Soviet Union’s treaty limited 
equipment. 


ARMENIA 

AGENCY: Unit of International Treaties Realization 
LOCATION: Yerevan, Republic of Armenia 
CFE TREATY TLE: Data Not Available 

AZERBAIJAN 

AGENCY: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
LOCATION: Baku, Azerbaijan 
CFE TREATY TLE: 397 

BELARUS 

AGENCY: National Agency for Verification and Inspections 
LOCATION: Minsk, Belarus 
CFE TREATY TLE: 9,254 

GEORGIA 

AGENCY: Department of Foreign Affairs and Disarmament 
LOCATION: Tbilisi, Georgia 
CFE TREATY TLE: 105 

KAZAKSTAN 

AGENCY: Treaty Implementation Section, International 

Department, Ministry of Defense 

LOCATION: Almaty, Kazakstan 

CFE TREATY TLE: No Treaty Limited Equipment 

MOLDOVA 

AGENCY: Department for International Treaty Compliance 
LOCATION: Chisinau (Kishinev), Moldova 
CFE TREATY TLE: 236 

RUSSIA 

AGENCY: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
LOCATION: Moscow, Russian Federation 
CFE TREATY TLE: 42,692 

UKRAINE 

AGENCY: Verification Center Armed Forces of Ukraine 
LOCATION: Kiev, Ukraine 
CFE TREATY TLE: 18,341 



Appendix F 


OSIA European Operations 
Command: Personnel 
Strength 1990-1992 


OSIA European Operations Personnel Assigned by Service 




42 % 


□ AIR FORCE 

□ ARMY 

□ MARINE 
■ CIVILIAN 



49 % 


January 1991 



October 1990 








































344 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


120 

100 

80 

60 

40 

20 

0 



TOTAL PERSONNEL 
ASSIGNED 


□ Oct-90 

□ Jan-91 

□ Jan-92 





















Appendix G 

Chronology: CFE Treaty 
Negotiations and 
Implementahon s 1972-1996 


1972 May 24. President Richard M. Nixon and General 
Secretary Leonid Brezhnev reached a compromise 
agreement to hold separate political and military 
negotiations. The Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) would deal with 
political issues, and Mutual Balanced Force Reduc¬ 
tions (MBFR) in Europe with actual force reduc¬ 
tions. Detente in Europe began. 

November 22. The CSCE process formally began in 
Helsinki, Finland. These preliminary negotiations 
of the 35 CSCE member nations involved setting up 
a framework to negotiate confidence and security 
building measures. 

1973 July 3. CSCE negotiations began after six months 
of preparatory meetings. The 35 nations of the 
CSCE met to begin the process of negotiating 
confidence and security building measures in 
Europe. 

October 30. Negotiations on MBFR began. The 
object of negotiations was to reduce conventional 
forces in the zone of Central Europe surrounding 
East and West Germany and to provide a stable 
military balance in Central Europe. 

1975 August 1. The CSCE resulted in 35 nations signing 
the concluding document. The Helsinki Final Act 
was primarily designed to build confidence within 
Europe. Confidence-building measures included 
notification of major military maneuvers involving 
more than 25,000 troops. 

1977 October 4. A first CSCE review conference on 
implementation of the Helsinki Final Act began in 
Belgrade, Yugoslavia. 

1978 March 9. The Belgrade CSCE review conference 
closed, with no conclusions reached. 

May 25. French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing 
proposed a two-stage security conference during a 
UN meeting. 


1979 December. Negotiations for MBFR stalled because 
of the NATO decision to deploy new intermediate- 
range nuclear weapons in Europe. 

December. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. 

1980 November 11. The second CSCE review conference 
began in Madrid, Spain. These negotiations would 
continue for almost three years, leading to the 
adoption of the Madrid Mandate. 

1983 September 6-9. The Madrid CSCE conference 
ended after almost three years of negotiations. The 
35 CSCE states signed the Madrid Concluding 
Document, or Madrid Mandate, which established 
the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and 
Security Building Measures. The mandate called 
for member nations to negotiate treaties reducing 
the size of their armed forces in Europe, in addition 
to continuing work to develop confidence and 
security building measures. 

1984 January 17. The CSCE Stockholm Conference on 
Confidence and Security Building Measures and 
Disarmament in Europe (CDE) began. 

1985 March 10. Mikhail Gorbachev became General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union. 

March 13. President Ronald Reagan reversed his 
position on holding high-level talks with leaders of 
the Soviet Union. 

November 19-20. President Reagan and General 
Secretary Gorbachev held their first summit 
meeting. 

1986 April 18. General Secretary Gorbachev proposed in 
MBFR negotiations to reduce ground and air forces, 
and to include conventional and nuclear weapons 
from the Atlantic to the Urals. Gorbachev recog¬ 
nized the presence of significant asymmetries of 
conventional forces and proposed large-scale force 
reductions to be verified by on-site inspection. 







346 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


June 11. Gorbachev’s proposals were formalized 
during a Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) 
meeting in Budapest, with the proposals later 
known as the Budapest Appeal or Budapest 
Communique. 

September 22. In Stockholm, 35 CSCE nations, 
meeting as the Conference on Confidence and 
Security Building and Disarmament in Europe, 
adopted an accord, the Stockholm Document, 
designed to increase transparency of military activi¬ 
ties and to reduce the risk of war in Europe. The 
agreement required notification of military exercises 
of 13,000 troops or more, and allowed on-site 
inspections of field activities of more than 17,000 
ground troops or 5,000 airborne troops. 

October 11-12. A summit between President 
Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev was held 
at Reykjavik, Iceland. It created a positive context 
for further negotiations. 

November 4. The third CSCE review conference 
began in Vienna. 

December 12. NATO’s North Atlantic Council of 
foreign ministers issued the Brussels Declaration on 
Conventional Arms Control. The declaration called 
for two distinct sets of negotiations: one to build on 
the CSBM results of the Stockholm Conference and 
the other to establish conventional stability in 
Europe through negotiations on conventional arms 
control from the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU). 

1987 January 7. The Stockholm Document entered into 
force. The agreement for the first time provided for 
a negotiated right to conduct on-site inspections of 
military forces in the field. 

February 17. Informal talks between the 16 NATO 
and the 7 Warsaw Pact nations began in Vienna on 
a mandate for conventional negotiations in Europe, 
which would set out treaty negotiating guidelines. 

July 27. NATO presented a draft mandate during 
the 23-nation conference in Vienna. The mandate 
called for elimination of force disparities, capability 
for surprise attack, and large-scale offensive opera¬ 
tions, and the establishment of an effective verifica¬ 
tion system. 

December 8. The INF treaty was signed in Wash¬ 
ington, D.C., between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. 

1988 January 26. The Secretary of Defense established 
the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) as a Depart¬ 
ment of Defense agency responsible for conducting 
on-site inspection, monitoring, and escort opera¬ 
tions under the INF Treaty. 

May 29-June 2. At the Moscow Summit, President 
Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev empha¬ 


sized the importance of stability and security in 
Europe, specifically calling for data exchange, 
verification of these data, and then reductions. 

December 7. General Secretary Gorbachev an¬ 
nounced at the United Nations a unilateral with¬ 
drawal of 50,000 troops from Eastern Europe, and 
demobiliztion of 500,000 Soviet troops. 

1989 January 14. Twenty-three member nations of 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact produced the Mandate 
for the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces 
in Europe. The mandate set out objectives for the 
CFE Treaty and established negotiating principles. 

January 15. The Vienna CSCE review conference 
ended after more than two years, resulting in the 
Vienna Concluding Document, which set a mandate 
for CSBM talks, specifying that the talks would 
work toward “elaborating and adopting a new set 
of mutually complementary confidence and security 
building measures designed to reduce the risk of 
confrontation in Europe.” 

February 2. After 15 years of negotiations, the 
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks ended 
in Vienna. 

March 9. The Vienna Confidence and Security 
Building Measures negotiations mandated by the 
Vienna Concluding Document began, with 35 states 
participating. 

March 9. Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
(CFE) Treaty negotiations commenced in Vienna 
with 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. 

May 20-25. President George Bush and France’s 
President Francois Mitterrand met at 
Kennebunkport, Maine. President Bush announced 
the acceptance of combat aircraft and helicopters in 
the reductions as proposed by the WTO. He also 
proposed a ceiling of 275,000 personnel stationed 
in Europe by the U.S. and Soviet Union. 

May 29-30. During a NATO summit in Brussels, 
President Bush’s proposal was adopted and subse¬ 
quently presented in Vienna. 

November 9. The Berlin Wall fell. Revolutions in 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria 
followed within four weeks. 

December 2-3. Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met 
at sea off Malta and agreed to speed up arms 
control and economic negotiations. 

1990 January 15-February 22. Non-Soviet WTO states 
negotiated for deeper Soviet cuts and earlier with¬ 
drawals. 

January 16-February 5. The 35 CSCE states held a 
seminar on military doctrine in Vienna. 



347 


Appendix G: Chronology 


January 31. In his State of the Union address, 
President Bush proposed lower levels of Soviet and 
U.S. forces in Europe. The proposal called for 
195,000 personnel for each nation and 30,000 for 
the U.S. in the periphery. 

February 26. Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union 
signed an agreement on withdrawal of Soviet forces. 
The agreement called for the withdrawal by July 
1991 of all 73,500 Soviet troops, along with more 
than 1,200 tanks, 2,500 armored combat vehicles, 
1,200 pieces of artillery, and 80 aircraft. 

March 9. Hungary and the Soviet Union signed an 
agreement on withdrawal of Soviet forces. The 
Soviet Union agreed that by the end of June 1991, it 
would withdraw all its forces, consisting of 50,000 
troops, 860 tanks, 1,500 armored combat vehicles, 
and other equipment from Hungary. 

May 5. The first Two plus Four (foreign ministers 
of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Ger¬ 
man Democratic Republic plus France, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union) 
Meeting on German Unification was held in Bonn. 

May 29. President Bush signed National Security 
Directive 41, which made the Secretary of Defense 
responsible for CFE compliance and directed the 
On-Site Inspection Agency to prepare for CFE 
Treaty implementation. It also directed OSIA to 
prepare for inspection duties under the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, the Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and the 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. 

June 26. The Hungarian National Assembly voted 
to begin negotiations to withdraw from the Warsaw 
Treaty Organization. 

July 6. NATO announced the London Declaration 
on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, which 
called for decreased size of NATO forces as the 
Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Eastern 
Europe, among other measures to draw down from 
the confrontational attitudes of the Cold War. 

July 16. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl 
and Soviet President Gorbachev agreed to a com¬ 
plete Soviet withdrawal from Germany by 1994 
and a ceiling of 370,000 active German military 
personnel. 

September 11. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James 
Baker formally agreed to rescind their earlier 
agreement to limit their own personnel in the 
region, and to resolve the personnel issue during 
CFE 1A negotiations. 

September 12. In Moscow, the Two plus Four 
countries signed the Treaty on the Final Settlement 
with Respect to Germany. The World War II “Big 


Four” gave up their occupation rights in Germany on 
October 3, paving the way for German unification. 

October 1. With German unification drawing near, 
the Soviet Union had 17 divisions stationed in East 
Germany, totaling more than 363,700 troops, 
which had to be withdrawn by 1994. 

October 3. The German Democratic Republic 
ceased to exist, as Germany was unified. 

October 3. President Bush requested that the U.S. 
and Soviet negotiators move from Vienna to New 
York to facilitate completion of the negotiations in 
time for the 19-21 November CSCE Paris Summit. 

October-November. U.S. Secretary of State Baker 
and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze resolved 
most major outstanding CFE issues. CFE negotia¬ 
tors in Vienna resolved most of the remaining 
smaller, technical disputes. Major disagreements 
over verification were resolved, and the “sufficiency 
rule” was established. 

October 13. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze 
sent a letter to Secretary of State Baker listing the 
CFE Treaty-limited equipment that the USSR had 
relocated to east of the Urals. 

November 3. Warsaw Pact countries signed an 
agreement in Budapest that divided Warsaw Pact 
allocations of forces by country as allowed under 
the CFE Treaty. 

November 14. Poland and Germany signed an 
agreement confirming the existing Polish-German 
border. 

November 17. CSBM Vienna Document 1990 was 
completed and signed by the 34 members of the 
CSCE. (German unification had lowered the 
number of CSCE states by one, as the German 
Democratic Republic ceased to exist.) The Vienna 
Document 1990 expanded on the CSBM provisions 
of the 1986 Stockholm Document. 

November 18. The Soviet Union submitted official 
treaty data. Data submitted were significantly out 
of line with data submitted two years earlier—as 
the Soviets’ number of objects of verification was 
reduced from 1,500 to 1,000. 

November 19. At the Paris Summit, the CFE Treaty 
was signed by leaders of 22 states. 

November 21. The Charter of Paris for a New 
Europe was adopted by all 34 members of the 
CSCE. The charter’s goal was to recognize the end 
of the Cold War and to reflect a new spirit of 
cooperation. 

November 26. CFE 1A negotiations formally 
commenced in Vienna. 



348 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


November 29. The first meeting of the Joint Con¬ 
sultative Group (JCG) convened in Vienna. 

December 6. The United States dispatched a team 
of experts to Moscow in an effort to resolve dis¬ 
crepancies in Soviet treaty data. 

1991 February 4-14. The first U.S. CFE course was 
conducted at the Defense Intelligence College in 
Washington, D.C. 

February 14. The Soviet Union submitted updated 
treaty data. The Soviets interpreted equipment 
transferred to coastal defense, naval infantry, 
Strategic Rocket Forces, and civil defense units as 
being not countable as treaty-limited equipment. 

February 15. The United States and other NATO 
nations suspended treaty ratification because of the 
Soviet Union’s unilateral reinterpretation of the 
treaty. 

March 31. The Warsaw Treaty Organization’s 
military organs and structures were dissolved. 

May 14. The U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency 
conducted its first CFE mock inspection, working 
with France’s verification agency, L’Unite Fran^aise 
de Verification. OSIA’s Team Gessert inspected the 
French 3rd Fighter Wing at Nancy-Ochey Airfield 
and, the next day, the French 3rd Tank Battalion. 

June 1. Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander 
Bessmertnykh and U.S. Secretary of State Baker met 
in Lisbon to discuss the final details of the CFE 
Treaty statement concerning Soviet naval infantry 
and coastal defense units. 

June 14. The Soviet government presented to other 
signatory states a “legally binding” statement on 
how it would comply with the terms of the CFE 
Treaty, covering issues such as reassignment of 
treaty-limited equipment (TLE) to coastal defense, 
naval infantry and Strategic Rocket Forces, and 
elimination of TLE east of the Urals. 

June 14. The Secretary of Defense assigned the U.S. 
Commander in Chief Europe (USCINCEUR) as the 
executive agent for CFE, with responsibility for U.S. 
CFE compliance in Europe. 

June 18. The Joint Consultative Group held its first 
Extraordinary Conference at the Hague. During the 
session, the Soviet statements on coastal defense 
and naval infantry and on reductions east of the 
Urals were read and accepted as treaty documents. 

July 1. The Warsaw Treaty Organization was 
dissolved. 

July 9. President Bush submitted the CFE Treaty to 
the U.S. Senate for ratification. 


August 19. An abortive military coup d’etat was 
launched in the Soviet Union. After the coup, the 
Soviet government continued, but very weakly, 
while nationalism grew rapidly in the Soviet 
republics. 

October 18. At the second Extraordinary Confer¬ 
ence of the JCG, held in Vienna, the Soviet Union 
issued a political declaration stating its intention to 
rapidly withdraw weapons based in the Baltics. 

The JCG no longer considered Baltic states to be 
within the CFE area of application. 

December 8. Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus created 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
Within a week, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan also joined the CIS. 

December 25. The Soviet Union dissolved into 15 
independent states, 8 of which had former Soviet 
forces stationed in their territories and fell within 
the CFE Treaty’s area of application. 

December 26. The United States ratified the CFE 
Treaty. 

1992 January 10. The North Atlantic Cooperation 

Council (NACC)—which consisted of the 16 NATO 
nations and the 15 newly independent states of the 
former Soviet Union, along with Hungary, Roma¬ 
nia, Bulgaria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia—as¬ 
sembled a High Level Working Group in Brussels. 
Of the member states, only Kazakstan did not 
attend. The meeting agreed that CFE Treaty obliga¬ 
tions assumed by the former USSR should be fully 
accepted by all newly created CIS states within the 
ATTU. 

January 13. The Joint Consultative Group met to 
discuss how to incorporate CIS republics into the 
CFE Treaty. 

January 30-31. CSCE foreign ministers in Prague 
admitted several new CIS states: Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 

February 10-14. The On-Site Inspection Agency 
conducted its first CFE mock inspections inside the 
territory of the Eastern Group of States. The first 
inspection was held at Siverskiy Air Base and the 
second at Pushkin, both in Russia’s Leningrad 
Military District. 

February 21. The High Level Working Group 
meeting in Brussels agreed on methods for bringing 
the CFE Treaty into force. 

March 4. CSCE participants adopted the Vienna 
Document 1992. The agreement subsumed and 
added to the Vienna Document 1990 and provided 
for expanded membership in the CSCE process and 
greater exchange of information in numerous areas 



349 


Appendix G: Chronology 


of CSBM. With the admission of most of the 
former Soviet states, the CSCE included 48 member 
nations. 

March 24. The CSCE nations signed the Vienna 
Document 1992. 

April 3. The High Level Working Group of the 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council met to discuss 
division of the former Soviet Union’s TLE among 
independent CIS states. 

May 8. The High Level Working Group met again 
to discuss division of the former Soviet Union’s 
TLE. 

May 15. The CIS states met at Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan, and agreed on division of former Soviet 
forces among CIS states. 

June 5. The JCG held its third Extraordinary 
Conference in Oslo, Norway. Twenty-nine coun¬ 
tries signed the Final Document of the Extraordi¬ 
nary Conference of the States Parties to the CFE 
Treaty. The document removed all obstacles to 
ratification of the treaty and modified language of 
the treaty to include all CIS states which were in the 
ATTU, legalizing the entry of the new states into the 
treaty and their acceptance of the obligations of the 
USSR. 

July 1. Ukraine ratified the CFE Treaty. 

July 5. The United States completed its 44th and 
last CFE mock inspection mission before entry into 
force of the treaty. During these 44 missions, OSIA 
inspected 100 separate sites. About half—27 
missions and 50 inspections—involved cooperative 
mock inspections with NATO partners. Six mis¬ 
sions involved participation with Eastern bloc 
nations: Russia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, 
Bulgaria, and Romania. The remainder took place 
at U.S. sites in Europe, giving the host site personnel 
as well as OSIA teams training in the CFE inspec¬ 
tion process. 

July 8. Russia ratified the CFE Treaty. 

July 10. By the time of the Helsinki CSCE Summit, 
three nations—Armenia, Belarus, and Kazakstan— 
had not yet ratified the CFE Treaty. At the fourth 
JCG Extraordinary Conference, held concurrently 
with the CSCE Summit, the CFE Treaty nations 
agreed on provisional entry into force of the treaty, 
which would allow implementation to begin while 
they waited for the remaining three countries to 
ratify the treaty. 

July 10. CFE 1A was signed by 29 states during the 
Helsinki CSCE summit. The agreement limited 
personnel to specific national thresholds and put 
into place an extensive information exchange 
regime. 


July 17. The CFE Treaty provisionally entered into 
force, limiting five major categories of weapons, 
with 29 signatory states. When the remaining 
countries deposited their instruments of ratification 
in October, it was agreed to make full entry into 
force retroactive to July 17. 

July 17. The CFE baseline period began. Canada 
conducted the first NATO inspection in the former 
Soviet Union. 

July 18-20. OSIA’s Team White, led by Lt. Colonel 
Elmer G. “Guy” White, conducted the first U.S. 

CFE baseline inspection at Buy, Russia. 

July 20. The first U.S. liaison officer (LNO) activity 
occurred in England during baseline. 

August 6-8. OSIA conducted the first U.S. reduc¬ 
tion inspection at the Capital Repair Plant at 
Woensdorf, Germany. Russian forces still in the 
former East Germany reduced the equipment. 

August 13-15. In the first Eastern Group of States 
inspection, a Russian team inspected a Canadian 
site in Germany, followed by a sequential inspection 
of U.S. stationed forces at Geibelstadt, Germany, for 
the first U.S. CFE escort mission. 

August 14. The first post-baseline information on 
national equipment holdings was exchanged. 

September 4. U.S. inspection teams were denied 
access to Russian declared sites. A four-month 
dispute ensued. 

September 22. Fifty-four member states of the 
CSCE follow-on conference created the Forum for 
Security Cooperation (FSC) mandate for new 
security negotiations. CFE was replaced as the 
primary tool for conventional arms control confi¬ 
dence and security building measures. Unlike the 
CFE Treaty, all states would participate individually 
and not as alliances or military blocs. 

October 12. Armenia deposited its CFE instru¬ 
ments of ratification in The Hague, leaving only 
two nations to ratify before the treaty could fully 
enter into force. 

October 3-9. Following a German inspection of 
Naro-Fominsk, Russia, in late September, two U.S. 
teams and one French team conducted inspections 
in rapid succession at Naro-Fominsk to test Russian 
assurances that site diagrams would be corrected 
and that inspectors would have full access at de¬ 
clared objects of verification (OOVs). 

October 30. The final two CFE ratification instru¬ 
ments, those of Belarus and Kazakstan, were depos¬ 
ited at The Hague. 




350 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


November 9. The Joint Consultative Group formal¬ 
ized the CFE Treaty’s entry into force with 29 
states, and made entry into force retroactive to the 
July 17 date of provisional entry into force. 

November 14. The CFE baseline period ended. 
During baseline the United States hosted nine 
inspection teams that inspected 23 U.S. declared 
sites, and conducted 33 missions into former WTO 
nations, inspecting 44 Eastern bloc sites. In addi¬ 
tion to the baseline inspections, the United States 
also conducted five reduction inspections. 

November 15. With the baseline period ended, the 
CFE treaty moved into a three-year reduction 
period. 

1993 January. NATO’s Verification Coordinating Com¬ 
mittee (VCC) invited the participation of former 
Warsaw Pact guest inspectors on its teams. Hosting 
guest inspectors from NATO nations had been a 
common practice since the beginning of baseline, 
but this marked the first time NATO had invited 
inspectors from former Eastern bloc nations onto 
their teams. 

April 28. The United States hosted the first guest 
inspector from a former Warsaw Pact nation on one 
of its CFE inspection teams when a Czech inspector 
participated in a U.S inspection in Tazar, Hungary. 

September. Russia’s President Boris Yeltsin sent a 
letter to the United States, Germany, France, and 
the United Kingdom asking that they recognize the 
flanks as a serious problem. 

November 17. The first CFE reduction year ended. 
All signatories met their 25 percent reduction 
liabilities for the first year, with the exceptions of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. 

1994 March 21. Russia asked the JCG to consider 
modifying the CFE Treaty to increase the amount of 
TLE that could be taken out of storage and the 
length of time it could be out of storage. 

March 23. Belarus threatened to cease its CFE 
reductions because of high costs, unless it received 
assistance from other nations. 

March 31. The United States gave $10 million to 
be divided between Belarus and Ukraine to help 
finance their CFE reductions. 

May 15. A U.S. guest inspector took part for the 
first time in an inspection conducted by a former 
Warsaw Pact nation. Major Mark Lieber, USMC, 
served on a Bulgarian inspection in Romania. 

September 19. For the first time, a U.S. CFE inspec¬ 
tion team included a Russian guest inspector. 

OSIA’s Lt. Col. Fred E. Busing led this team on a 
declared site inspection in Oradea, Romania. 


November 13. The CFE Treaty’s second reduction 
year ended. All but two nations had met their 60 
percent reduction goals. 

December 4. At the CSCE Summit in Budapest, the 
52 nations of the CSCE signed the Vienna Docu¬ 
ment 1994, which replaced the Vienna Document 
1992 and expanded on its confidence and security 
building measures. At the same time, the Confer¬ 
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
changed its name to the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 

1995 January 10. The United States agreed that Russian 
forces in Chechnya did not constitute a CFE Treaty 
violation, since flank limits did not come into effect 
until the end of the reduction period in November. 
After that, they would still not be a violation, since 
the treaty allowed temporary deployments. 

February 23. President Alexander Lukashenka 
announced that Belarus would suspend all CFE 
reduction activities because of the cost, which he 
called “economically unjust,” since Belarus did not 
produce the weapons left behind when the Soviet 
Union dissolved but still had responsibility for 
destroying them. Belarus did state, however, that 
reductions could begin again if financing was made 
available. 

May 10. At a Clinton/Yeltsin summit meeting in 
Moscow, the United States told Russia that it would 
not support modification to the CFE Treaty until 
the review conference in May 1996. 

September 12. Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and 
Kazakstan announced that they would not be able 
to meet their reduction liabilities by the end of the 
reduction period. Ukraine said it could meet its 
commitments with the exception of TLE assigned to 
the Black Sea Fleet, which it could not reduce until 
the equipment in the fleet was divided between 
Ukraine and Russia. The other three nations 
blamed economic difficulties. 

October 15. Belarus resumed its reduction of 
treaty-limited equipment, but stated it would not be 
able to meet its remaining reduction liability by the 
end of the reduction period in November. 

November 17. The CFE reduction period ended. 
The treaty nations issued a joint statement identify¬ 
ing the countries that were not in compliance with 
their treaty obligations: Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. Despite some coun¬ 
tries’ failing to fully meet their reduction liabilities, 
the amount of equipment reduced by the CFE 
Treaty constituted the largest negotiated arms 
reduction in history, with over 50,000 pieces of 
equipment destroyed. This equipment included 
19,200 battle tanks, 18,600 armed combat vehicles, 
9,800 pieces of artillery, 2,200 combat aircraft, and 
370 attack helicopters. 



351 


Appendix G: Chronology 


November 17. The residual level validation period 
(RLVP) began. This 120-day “second baseline” 
confirmed the accuracy of national reductions, 
recategorizations, and relocations of equipment 
declared after the reduction period. 

November 25. Russia and Ukraine reached an 
agreement on division of the Black Sea Fleet. 
Ukraine would receive 150 naval installations of the 
fleet in the agreement. 

November 28. The Joint Consultative Group gave 
Belarus an extension until April 26, 1996, to com¬ 
plete its reductions of treaty-limited equipment. 

The United States and Germany agreed to assist 
Belarus in its reduction effort. 

December 31. Russia failed to meet its deadline for 
reducing TLE it had moved east of the Urals prior 
to treaty signature. Russia cited economic difficul¬ 
ties and requested that the JCG extend the deadline 
until 1998. 


1996 March 16. The residual level validation period 

ended. During the 120-day RLVP, NATO nations 
conducted 246 inspections of Eastern bloc nations. 
Of these, the United States led 38 inspections and 
provided guest inspectors to 56 teams led by other 
nations. The Eastern bloc nations inspected NATO 
nations 183 times, with U.S. sites in Europe receiv¬ 
ing 11 inspections. 

April 26. Belarus did not complete its reductions in 
time for the deadline proposed in its November 
1995 plan. 

May 15-31. The 30 treaty nations held the CFE 
Review Conference in Vienna. The Final Document 
of the conference included compromises on the 
flank issue, east of the Urals reductions, and other 
issues. 






































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McNulty, Timothy J. “Baker Urges Delay on Arms Treaty.” Chicago Tribune, February 7, 1991. 

Mendelsohn, Jack. “The CFE Treaty: In Retrospect and Under Review.” Arms Control Today, April 1996, 7-11. 

Mortimer, Edward. “The Soviet Union’s Security Agreements Must be Made Binding on Its Successor States.” 
Financial Times (London), November 27, 1991. 

Oatman, Keith. Major, U.S. Army. “What a Way to Start the New Year!” On-Site Insights, March 1992, 11. 

Pick, Hella. “NATO and Former Warsaw Pact Sign Agreement on Arms Cuts.” The Guardian (London), June 6, 
1992. 

Riding, Alan. “Designing the New Europe: Plenty to Argue About.” New York Times, November 19, 1990, A6. 

Riding, Alan. “The Question That Lingers on in Europe: How Will the Goals be Achieved?” New York Times, 
November 22, 1990, A17. 

Riding, Alan. “U.S.-Soviet Differences Are Said to Threaten Arms-Cut Pact.” New York Times, September 22, 
1990, A6. 



Bibliography 357 


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Saint, Crosbie E., General, U.S. Army. “Changing the Face of USAREUR.” Field Artillery Magazine , August 
1992, 10-15. 

Schmemann, Serge. “Ukraine Uses Summit to Berate Russians and the Commonwealth.” New York Times, 
March 21, 1992, Al, A5. 

Schmitt, Eric. “Arms Pact Allows For Soviet Breakup.” New York Times, November 20, 1991, A3. 

Smith, R. Jeffery. “Soviet Dispute Threatens Arms Pact Approval.” Washington Post, February 8, 1991, A12, 
A16. 

Smith, R. Jeffery. “Soviets Said to be Removing Arms from Europe Before Treaty.” Washington Post, October 5, 
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Smith, R. Jeffery. “U.S. Offers Compromise on Military Planes in Europe.” Washington Post, January 31, 1990, 
A16. 

Smith, R. Jeffery. “U.S., Soviets Disagree on Arms Cuts.” Washington Post, December 17, 1990, Al, A20. 

Smith, R. Jeffery, and Ann Devroy. “Bush Urges Gorbachev to Drop Arms Treaty Claims.” Washington Post, 
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“The Paris Conference: The Thrill of Europe’s Rebirth.” The Economist, November 24, 1990, 49-53. 

“The Peace of Paris.” The Times (London), November 19, 1990. 

White, David. “Political Fixers Confident of Securing CFE Deal.” Financial Times (London), September 27, 
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Whitney, Craig R. “Europeans Agree to Honor Arms Pact by Old Blocs.” New York Times, June 6, 1992, A5. 

Whitney, Craig R. “The Legacy of Helsinki.” New York Times, November 19, 1990, Al, A6. 

Wire service report. “ Sovietskaya Rossiya Acknowledges Shift of Weapons to Avoid Treaty.” Reuters (Moscow), 
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Wise, Michael Z. “Soviets Accept Limits on Arms in Europe.” Washington Post, June 15, 1991, A16, A18. 

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INTERVIEWS 

Bumala, Mark A. Sergeant First Class, U.S. Army, OSIA. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Rhein-Main Air 
Base, Germany, July 13, 1993. 

Chesney, William N., Jr. Master Sergeant, U.S. Army, Plans NCO, OSIA. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. 
Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, July 12, 1993. 

DiMaria, Joseph. Brigadier General, Centro Italiano de Verifica de Armi (CIVA). Interviewed by Joseph P. 
Harahan. Washington, D.C., October 19, 1993. 

Drach, Joseph J. Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Team Chief, OSIA. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Rhein- 
Main Air Base, Germany, December 17, 1993. 

Evans, Mary Margaret. Deputy Director, Conventional Arms Control and Compliance, Office of the Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Washington, D.C., December 8, 1993, and 
February 21, 1996. 



358 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Fiser, Thomas C. Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Team Chief, OSIA. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Rhein- 
Main Air Base, Germany, July 12, 1993. 

Foerster, Schuyler. Colonel, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Representative to the CFE Delegation. Interviewed by Joseph P. 
Harahan. Washington, D.C., May 19, 1994. 

Gallagher, Edward G. Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, OSIA. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Rhein-Main Air 
Base, Germany, December 13, 1993. 

Gessert, David P. Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Team Chief, OSIA. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. 
Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, July 12, 1993. 

Hansen, Lynn. Ambassador, United States CFE Treaty Negotiator. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Ramstein 
Air Base, Germany, December 14, 1993. 

Honcharenko, N. T. General-Major, Chief, Armed Forces Verification Center of Ukraine. Interviewed by Joseph 
P. Harahan. August 1, 1995. 

Janssen, Fred, and Henri Van der Auera. Lieutenant Colonels, L’Unite Beige de Verification. Interviewed by 
Joseph P. Harahan. Brussels, Belgium, January 27, 1994. 

Karcz, Jan. Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Team Chief, OSIA. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Rhein-Main 
Air Base, Germany, December 13, 1993. 

Karstens, Gary E., and Kenneth D. Periman, Sergeants First Class, U.S. Army, OSIA linguists. Interviewed by 
Joseph P. Harahan. Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, December 17, 1993. 

Keitel, Roland, and Bernd Mecke. Lieutenant Colonels, Zentrum fur Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr. 
Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Geilenkirchen, Germany, January 31, 1994. 

Kelley, Lawrence G. Colonel, USMC, Chief of Operations Division, European Operations Command, OSIA. 
Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Washington D.C., May 18, 1994. 

Loquai, Dr. Heinz. Brigadier General, Director, Zentrum fiir Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr. Interviewed 
by Joseph P. Harahan. Geilenkirchen, Germany, January 31, 1994. 

Lukes, Michael R. Chief Warrant Officer 4, U.S. Army, Deputy Team Chief, OSIA. Interviewed by Joseph P. 
Harahan. Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, July 12, 1993. 

Malinowski, Stanislaw. Colonel, Chief Inspector, Polish Verification Center. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. 
Warsaw, Poland, February 3, 1994. 

Medvedev, V. I. General-Lieutenant (Ret.), former Director, Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, Ministry of 
Defense, Russia. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Magna, Utah, August 30, 1994. 

Melomedov, M.Y. Colonel; Deputy Chief; Colonel M. M. Volochko, Chief, International Treaties Division; Lt. 
Colonel I. G. Gerus, Group Leader, CFE Treaty Reduction; and Major G. E. Brusnikov, linguist, National 
Agency for Control and Inspections (NAKI), Belarus. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Minsk, Belarus, 
February 4, 1994. 

Nikulin, Y. I. General-Major, Director, National Agency for Control and Inspections (NAKI), Belarus. 
Interviewed by John C. Kuhn. August 1, 1995. 

Oatman, Keith A. Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Team Chief, OSIA. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Rhein- 
Main Air Base, Germany, July 13, 1993. 

O’Shea, Richard J. Major, USAF, Liaison Officer, European Operations Command, OSIA. Interviewed by Joseph 
P. Harahan. Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, July 12, 1993. 

Partridge, George A. Master Sergeant, U.S. Army, Weapons Specialist, European Operations Command, OSIA. 
Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, July 13, 1993. 



359 


Bibliography 


Rozec, Francois. Colonel, Commandant, L’Unite Fran<;aise de Verification. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. 
Creil, France, February 1, 1994. 

Smith, William R. Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Commander, European Operations Command, OSIA. Interviewed by 
Joseph P. Flarahan. July 12, 1993. 

Steinberg, Joern. Colonel, CFE Treaty Inspection Team Chief, Zentrum fur Verifikationsaufgaben der 
Bundeswehr. Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Geilenkirchen, Germany, January 31, 1994. 

Tsygankov, S. F. General-Major, Deputy Director, Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, Ministry of Defense, Russia. 
Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. Moscow, Russia, February 8, 1994. 

Wierema, C.N.M. Commander, Director, Arms Control Branch, Ministry of Defense, the Netherlands. 
Interviewed by Joseph P. Harahan. The Hague, Netherlands, January 28, 1994. 


U.S. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS 

Bush, George., President of the United States. Organizing to Manage On-Site Inspections Under the CFE Treaty. 
National Security Directive. February 11, 1992. 

Bush, George. President of the United States. Organizing to Manage On-Site Inspections for Arms Control. 
National Security Directive 41. May 29, 1990. 

Bush, George. President of the United States. State of the Union Address. January 31, 1990. Published in the 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1990. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1991. 

Bush, George. President of the United States. Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements and 
the President’s Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements. Prepared by 
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, January 14, 1993. 

Bush, George. President of the United States. The President’s Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with 
Arms Control Agreements. February 23, 1990. 

Cheney, Richard B. Secretary of Defense. “Executive Agent for the Secretary of Defense for the CFE Treaty.” 
Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments. June 14, 1991. 

Crawford, Dorn. Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): A Review and Update of Key Treaty Elements. 
Washington D.C.: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, January 1995. 

Guillory, Kenneth D. Colonel, U.S. Army. Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Where to Next? Unpublished 
report. May 1994. 

Hansen, Lynn M. Adaptation and Innovation: CFE and CFE1A, From Signature to Entry Into Force. 
Unpublished report. December, 1993. 

On-Site Inspection Agency. Public Affairs Office. “Biography of Colonel Frederick E. Grosick, USAF, 
Commander European Operations." News Release, December 1993. 

On-Site Inspection Agency. Public Affairs Office. “Biography of Colonel Lawrence G. Kelley, USMC, Deputy 
Commander and Chief of Operations, European Operations Command." News Release, December 1993. 

Nichol, Jim. Analyst in Foreign Affairs, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. “Conventional 
Forces in Europe Treaty: Russian Attitudes and Implications for U.S. Interests.” Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service, September 15, 1995. 

Parker, Robert W. Major General, U.S. Air Force, Director, OSIA. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Arms 
Control, International Security and Science of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 
Representatives. May 12, 1992. 




360 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


Parker, Robert W. Major General, U.S. Air Force, Director OSIA, Statement Before the House of 

Representatives, Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Arms Control and International Security and Science. 
March 21, 1991. 

Powell, Colin L. General, U.S. Army, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. “CFE Treaty Executive Agent.” 
Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense. April 3, 1991. 

Treaty Between the Twenty-Two Sovereign Nations on the Reduction of Their Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe. Washington, D.C.: On-Site Inspection Agency, November 19, 1990. 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Report to the Congress on the Activities of the On-Site 
Inspection Agency of the Department of Defense. April 1992. 102d Congress. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1992. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Executive Report 101-31: Threshold Test Ban and 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. 101st Congress, 2d session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1990. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Treaty Document 102-8: Message from the President of 
the United States Transmitting the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). 102d 
Congress, 1st session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Treaty Document 103-21: Message from the President 
of the United States Transmitting the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Stockpiling and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. 103d Congress, 1st session. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1993. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Congressional Record. 18038, November 25, 1991. 

United States European Command. “Memorandum of Understanding Between USEUCOM, USLANTCOM, 
and OSIA for Mutual Liaison and Support Operations in Implementation of the CFE Treaty.” 1991. 

U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. Dispatch Supplement: Vienna Document 1990. Vol. 2, 
Supplement 2. Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, May 1991. 

Willford, David M. “A Brief History of the On-Site Inspection Agency,” OSIA Reference Report No. 1. 
Washington, D.C.: On-Site Inspection Agency, 1996. 


FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS 

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Document on Entry into Force of the Treaty on 

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Vienna: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
November 13, 1992. 

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Provisional Application of the Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990. Vienna: Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, July 10, 1992. 

Federal Republic of Germany. Declaration by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on the 
Personnel Strength of the German Armed Forces. Annex to CFE Treaty. November 19, 1990. 

Nedimoglu, Necil. Head of the NATO Verification and Implementation Coordination Section. “NATO’s Role in 
Verification and Compliance Monitoring for the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document,” speech presented 
to the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Verification in All Its Aspects, New York, July 
19, 1994. 



Glossary 


ACDA 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 

ACIU 

Arms Control Implementation Unit 

ACV 

armored combat vehicle 

AIFV 

armored infantry fighting vehicle 

AMC 

Air Mobility Command 

APC 

armored personnel carrier 

ATTU 

Atlantic to the Urals 

BDU 

battle dress uniform 

CAEST 

conventional armaments and equipment subject to the treaty 

CBMs 

confidence-building measures 

CFE Treaty 

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty 

CIS 

Commonwealth of Independent States 

CIVA 

Centro Italiano de Verifica de Armi 

CSBMs 

confidence and security building measures 

CSCE 

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

CWC 

Chemical Weapons Convention 

DLI 

Defense Language Institute 

DoD 

Department of Defense 

DPSS 

designated permanent storage sites 

EIF 

entry into force 

EO 

European Operations 

EU 

European Union 

EUCOM 

European Command 

FAO 

foreign area officer 

FSC 

Forum for Security Cooperation 

GDR 

German Democratic Republic 

GMT 

Greenwich mean time 

GSFG 

Group of Soviet Forces in Germany 

HLTF 

High Level Task Force 

INF Treaty 

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 

INMARSAT 

International Maritime Satellite 

ISS 

Inspection Support Staff 

JACIG 

Joint Arms Control Implementation Group 

JCG 

Joint Consultative Group 

JCS 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

LNO 

liaison officer 

MAC 

Military Airlift Command 

MBFR 

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions 

MD 

Military District 

mm 

millimeter 

NACC 

North Atlantic Cooperation Council 

NAKI 

National Agency for Control and Inspections 

NATO 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NCO 

noncommissioned officer 

NRRC 

Nuclear Risk Reduction Center 

NSC 

National Security Council 



362 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


NSD41 

NTM 

NTT 

OOV 

OSCE 

OSIA 

PACAF 

PNET 

POC 

POE 

POET 

RAF 

RLVP 

SAC 

SHAPE 

SRF 

START 

TAMC 

TLE 

TTBT 

UFV 

USA 

USAF 

USAFA 

USAFE 

USAREUR 

USARI 

USCINCEUR 

USEUCOM 

USLANTCOM 

USMC 

USMLM 

USN 

USNAVEUR 

USSR 

UVB 

VCC 

VICS 

WTO 

ZVBW 


National Security Directive 41 
national technical means 
Nuclear Testing Treaties 
object of verification 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
On-Site Inspection Agency 
Pacific Air Forces 

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty 
point of contact 
point of entry 

Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment 

Royal Air Force 

residual level validation period 

Strategic Air Command 

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 

Strategic Rocket Forces 

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 

Theater Army Materiel Command 

treaty-limited equipment 

Threshold Test Ban Treaty 

L’Unite Fran^aise de Verification 

U.S. Army 

U.S. Air Force 

U.S. Air Force Academy 

U.S. Air Forces in Europe 

U.S. Army Europe 

U.S. Army Russian Institute 

U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe 

U.S. European Command 

U.S. Atlantic Command 

U.S. Marine Corps 

U.S. Military Liaison Mission 

U.S. Navy 

U.S. Navy Europe 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

L’Unite Beige de Verification 

Verification Coordinating Committee 

Verification and Implementation Coordination Section 

Warsaw Treaty Organization 

Zentrum fur Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr 



Index 


A 

Akhromeyev, Marshall, 10 
Allison, Maj. Charles R., USA, 190 
Ambulances, 187, 192, 219-220 
Amen, TSgt. Joseph A., USAF, 113, 114-115 
Angus, TSgt. Paul R., USAF, 101 

Annex on the Format for the Exchange of Information, 28- 
30 

Armenia 

compliance difficulties, 242 
reduction liability, 204, 226 

Armored ambulances versus M-113 APCs, 187, 192, 219- 

220 

Arms Control Policy Coordinating Committee, 157-158 
Azerbaijan 

compliance difficulties, 242, 243 

concerns over Russia’s future security intentions, 251 

reduction liability, 204, 226 

B 

Baker, Secretary of State James A., Ill, 11, 17, 77, 79, 80, 
81, 82 

Barneby, Lt. Col. Stephen A., USA, 190 
Baseline inspections 

armored ambulances versus M-113 APCs, 187, 192, 
219-220 

assignment of states to be inspected, 157 
“backdoor” communications, 171-172 
challenge inspections, 184 
declared site access and, 176-183 
description of activity, 30-31 
first U.S. escort mission, 165-170 
first U.S. inspection, 157-165 
first U.S. liaison mission, 170 
inventory procedure, 164 
multinational teams, 185 
NATO schedule for, 156 
number conducted by United States, 174, 194 
number to be conducted by NATO states, 51-52 
operational issues, 192-194 
projected number of, 51-53 
U.S. active and passive quotas, 156-157 
U.S. baseline escort operations, 185-187 
U.S. baseline reduction inspections, 190-192 
U.S. liaison operations, 188-190 
U.S. operations, 174-176 
U.S. portion of NATO inspections, 52-53 
Belarus 

cost of TLE reductions, 238, 239-241 
declared site inspections, 183, 192, 215-216, 217 
National Agency for Control and Inspection, 141-142 
reduction liability, 226, 258 
Belgium 

L’Unite Beige de Verification, 58, 138-139 


readiness for entry into force, 151-152 
Bessmertnykh, Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander A., 80, 

81, 82 

“Big Hog” database, 121, 188-189 
Bilyeu, Maj. John M., USA, 190 
Black Sea Fleet, 243-245 
Boyd, Sgt. Danny K., USAF, 178 
Bradley, Staff Sergeant Thomas J., USAF, 121 
Bremner, Group Capt. D.A.G., 147 
Brock, Lt. Col. Thomas S., USA, 49, 65 
Bush, President George, 8, 12, 13, 45, 46-47, 53-54 
arms control initiatives, 80-81 
letter to Gorbachev, 81 

remarks to Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, 14-15 

“Report to Congress on Noncompliance with Arms 
Control Agreements,” 183 
signing of CFE Treaty, 74 

submission of CFE Treaty to Senate for ratification, 83 
Busing, Lt. Col. Fred E., USAF, 213, 219 
Buy, Russia 

first U.S. inspection site, 157-165 

c 

CAEST. See Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional 
Armaments and Equipment Subject to the Treaty 
Canada 

Russian baseline inspections of U.S. and Canadian forces 
stationed in Germany, 165-170 
Carraway, Lt. Col. Thomas, USA, 231 
Carter, Capt. David R., USAF, 107, 114 
Certification inspections, 36 
Cetin, Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet, 249 
Challenge inspections, 32-35, 170, 174, 184, 215-217 
Charter of Paris, 13 

“Cheese sheer” or “cookie cutter” compactor, 238 
Chemical Weapons Convention, 3, 45, 123 
Chesney, MSgt. William N., Jr., 172 
Christman, Brig. Gen. Daniel W., USA, 78 
CIS. See Commonwealth of Independent States 
Clinton, President William, 249-250 
Commonwealth of Independent States. See also Russia; 
specific countries by name 
creation of, 85, 227, 234-235 
as state parties for the CFE Treaty, 85-90, 134-135, 

150, 202-204, 235 
Communications 

“backdoor” system for, 127-128, 171-172 
late announcements of inspections, 193 
U.S. liaison teams, 188 

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
admission of CIS as members, 87 
communications system, 158 
confidence-building measures, 4, 6 
Conflict Resolution Center, 14 



364 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


as deadline for agreement on military personnel 
limitations, 17 

Election Monitoring Office, 14 
Helsinki Summit, 90, 91, 151, 155, 229 
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, 4-6 
November 1990 meeting, 13-14 
Secretariat establishment, 14 
September 1983 CSCE Mandate, 6 
Confidence-building measures, 4, 6 
Containers 

definition of, 117 

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. See also On¬ 
site inspections 

American inspection teams, 65-67 
Annex on the Format for the Exchange of Information, 
28-30 

areas of application, 21-25 
baseline inspections, 30-31, 51-53, 155-194 
cadre model for verification agencies, 58-60 
combat aircraft definition, 16-18 
conclusions drawn three years after ratification, 225- 
228 

continuing commitment of states to, 225-226 
data exchange, 28-30, 51-52, 74-83 
declared site access and, 31-32, 33-34, 176-183, 192, 
215-217, 235-237 
description, 1 
early negotiations, 4-13 

entry into force, 66-68, 91, 151-152, 155, 229, 234 
evaluation of, 257-262 
Final Document, 89-90, 246, 251, 256 
final ratification, 90-91 
First Review Conference, 250, 254-257, 258 
flank limits, 246-251 
host states, 37-40 
implementation problems, 234-235 
INF Treaty as precedent, 11 
Inspector/Escort Course, 99-100 
Joint Consultative Group, 15, 36, 78, 83, 84, 89, 133, 
155, 180, 201,226, 227, 256 
“letter of the law” versus “spirit of the law” 
enforcement, 193-194, 220 
liaison officer requirement, 36-40 
Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe, 7 
national verification agencies, 56-60 
nations implementing, 2 
objectives, 228 

obligations and rights, 133-134 
on-site inspections, 31-36 

political and military changes in Europe and, 2-3, 53- 
55, 227, 251-254, 261-262 
Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments 
and Equipment, 19-20, 29, 30, 34, 102, 176, 254- 
255 

Protocol on Inspection, 33-34, 66, 166 
Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, 
28-30 

Protocol on Reduction, 26, 206-207 
provisional acceptance, 90-91, 155 
ratification delay, 67-68 
reductions, 25-28, 199 

residual level validation period, 228-231, 233, 234 


role and mission definition, 46-48 
scope, 18-21 

sensitive or classified programs, 38-40, 176 
signing, 1, 3, 13-15 
stationing states, 37-40 
sufficiency rule, 20-21 
Support Fund, 240 
text and declarations, 15-18 
treaty periods, 30-31 
Treaty Review Conference, 246 
two-meter access rule, 38, 175 
verification agencies, 135-150 
Cooperative Partners plan, 214-215, 218 
CSCE. See Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe 

Czech Republic 

declared site inspection, 216 

D 

Data exchange 

bilateral diplomacy to resolve questions over, 78-82 
collapse of Soviet Union and, 80 
as part of CFE Treaty, 28-30 
Soviet Union-U.S. final agreement on, 82-83 
Soviet Union’s first official data exchange, 51-52 
Soviet Union’s underrepresentation of treaty holdings, 
75-78 

updated treaty data from Soviet Union, 78-79 
U.S. direct appeal to Soviet Union, 81-82 
Databases 

“Big Hog,” 121, 188-189 
VERITY, 215, 227, 254, 260-261 
Davies, Maj. Gen. Joseph T., USA, 194 
Declared site inspections, 31-32, 33-34, 176-183, 192, 
215-217, 234, 235-237. See also specific inspection 
sites by name 

Deconfliction schedule, 61-62, 157, 174 
Defense Language Institute 

Intermediate Russian Course, 106 
deGaulle, President Charles, 6 
Desert Shield 

U.S. troops deployed from Europe for, 54, 258 
U.S. victory, 80 

Destruction and Non-Production of Chemical Weapons, 46 

Detch, John L., Jr., 163 

DiFormato, MSgt. Richard D., USA, 101 

DiMaria, Maj. Gen. (formerly Brig. Gen.) Joseph, 59 

Drach, Lt. Col. Joseph J., Jr., USA, 106, 178 

E 

Eastern states. See also specific countries by name 
East-on-East inspections, 214-215, 218 
Eastern inspectors on NATO nation inspection teams, 
217-218, 227 

reduction inspections, 213-215 
reduction liability, 200-204 

residual level validation period inspections, 228, 231, 
233 

residual levels after reductions, 221-222 
Elliston, Staff Sergeant Kent O., USA, 166, 169-170 
Entry into force, 66-68, 151-152 
Escort missions 

first U.S. mission, 165-170 



Index 365 


responsibilities, 46, 186-187 
standby rotation for, 185-186 
two-meter rule and, 175 
Estonia 

rebellion against Soviet Union, 83-85 
European Operations Command, 53, 55, 62-63, 65, 66 
Eastern Europe mock inspections, 110-120 
expansion, 97-106 
liaison officer role, 97, 121-124 
Memorandum of Understanding, 47-48 
mock inspections, 106-128 
U.S. reductions management, 205-206 

F 

Favia, Sergeant First Class (formerly Staff Sergeant) 

Thomas A., USA, 100 

First Review Conference, 250, 254-257, 258 
Fiser, Lt. Col. (formerly Maj.) Thomas C., USA, 173, 183, 
186-187, 211, 215, 216-217, 218 
Foerster, Col. Schuyler (Sky), USAF, 110, 178 
Fox, TSgt. Ronald S., USAF, 121, 172 
France 

inspection team training, 147 

L’Unite Fran^aise de Verification, 57-58, 108, 137-138 
readiness for entry into force, 152 
French, Alan J., 106, 179 

G 

Gallagher, Ft. Col. Edward G., II, USA, 114, 118, 119 
reduction inspections, 211-213 
Galvin, Gen. John R., USA, 47, 61 
Georgia 

compliance difficulties, 242, 243 
concerns over Russia’s future security intentions, 251 
reduction liability, 226 
Germany. See also Unification of Germany 
inspection team training, 148-149 
mock inspections and, 110-118 
readiness for entry into force, 151 

Russian baseline inspections of U.S. and Canadian forces 
stationed in Germany, 165-170 
TLE reduced, 259-260 
transfer of TLE to other NATO states, 204 
Zentrum fur Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr, 57, 
110-111, 114, 135-137, 172 
Gerus, Lt. Col. I.G., 141 

Gessert, Lt. Col. David P., USAF, 97, 104-105, 108-109, 
181-182, 216 

Giebelstadt Army Air Field, Germany 
baseline inspection, 167, 169-170 
Giles, Col. Roy, 58, 138 
Giscard d’Estaing, President Valery, 6 
Gorbachev, President (formerly General Secretary) Mikhail 
S., 3, 6, 8, 10, 13, 80, 81, 246 
remarks to Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, 15 

Soviet military withdrawal declaration, 9, 12 
Govan, Brig. Gen. Gregory G., 250, 255 
Grachev, Russian Defense Minister Pavel, 244, 248 
Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany 
baseline inspection, 169, 170 
Graham, Thomas, Jr., 250, 255 


Great Britain 

challenge inspections, 170 
inspection team training, 147 

Joint Arms Control Implementation Group, 58, 138, 
172 

Green, Robert G., 158 
Griffiths, RAF Wing Commander, 170 
Grinevsky, Soviet Ambassador Oleg, 10, 11, 13, 77, 82 
Grosick, Col. Frederick E., USAF, 49 
appointment as OSIA Commander, 62 
background, 63 

operational concepts for inspections, 98-99 
Gryshchenko, Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Konstyantyn, 142, 255 

Guillory, Col. Kenneth D., USA, 229-231, 232-234 
Gulf War. See Desert Shield 

H 

Hansen, American Ambassador Lynn M., 12, 13, 75, 80, 
88, 90, 176, 236 
declared site issue, 180 
on U.S. negotiations, 11 
Hare, Staff Sergeant Walter E., 163 
Hartmann, German Ambassador Rudiger, 255 
Helsinki Final Act, 4, 14-15 

Helsinki Process, 56. See also Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe 
Helsinki Summit, 90, 91, 151, 155, 229 
Higgins, Cdr. Edward J., USN, 49-50 
Holum, Ambassador John, 250 
Honcharenko, Gen.-Maj. N.T., 142-144 
Huet, Brig. Gen. Jean-Paul, 57-58 
Hughes, Maj. Griffith S., USA, 111-112 
Hungary 

multinational team inspection, 218 
reduction inspection of Szabadszallas, 212-213 
verification agency, 135 

I 

Ifft, Dr. Edward M., 143 

INF Treaty. See Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 
Ingram, Sergeant First Class Curtis E., USA, 101, 163 
Inspection teams. See also Baseline inspections; On-site 
inspections 

European and Russian teams, 135-146 
generalizations about, 144-145 
training patterns, 146-151. See also Mock inspections 
United States teams, 65-67 

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 3, 45, 49, 134, 
140, 144 

as CFE Treaty precedent, 11 
communications system, 127 
on-site inspections, 56, 134, 140 
Italy 

Centro Italian de Verifica de Armi, 59 
Leghorn Army Depot inspection, 220 
reduction process at Buccino, 209 
transfer of TLE to other NATO states, 204 

J 

Janssen, Lt. Col. Fred, 138, 151-152 

Joint Arms Control Implementation Group, 58, 138 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 





366 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


liaison mission guidance, 121-122 
treaty implementation executive agent designation, 47 
Jubilee, Lt. Col. James, USAF, 217 

K 

Kanter, Arnold, 80 

Karcz, Lt. Col. Jan S., USA, 110, 178, 179, 187, 192, 219- 

220 

Kelley, Col. Lawrence G., USMC, 65, 67, 122, 124, 169, 
171-172, 190, 231 

appointment as OSIA Chief of Operations, 62 
background, 63 

inspection team makeup, 65, 66 
interview, 64 

Leghorn Army Depot, Italy, inspection, 220 
mock inspections, 107, 109, 146-147 
Naro-Fominsk baseline inspection, 182-183 
operational concepts for inspections, 98-99 
qualified inspection team redefinition, 51 
readiness for entry into force, 152 
TLE external markings record, 112 
tri-national inspections and, 111-114, 115, 118 
weapons specialist recruitment, 101 
Kharchenko, Russian Gen. Dmitri, 246, 249 
Kinkel, German Defense Minister Klaus, 241 
Kohl, Chancellor Flelmut, 8, 13 

remarks to Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, 15 

Koptelov, Lt. Col. Oleg Borisovich, 186, 187 
Kravchuk, Ukrainian President Leonid, 88, 244 
Kuenning, Brig. Gen. Thomas E., Jr., USAF, 233 
Kulebyakin, Russian Ambassador Vyacheslav, 248, 250, 
255 

L 

Lacina, Lt. Col. Oldrich, 218 
Lahr, Germany 

baseline inspection, 166-167 
Lajoie, Brig. Gen. Roland, USA, 46, 62, 63, 65 
Latvia 

rebellion against Soviet Union, 83-85 
Lefevers, Lt. Col. William L., USAF, 231 
Lewis, Wilbur, Jr., 126-127 
Liaison missions 

first U.S. mission, 170 
United States operations, 188-190 
Liaison officers, 36-40 

role, 97, 121-124, 188-190 
Lieber, Maj. Marc C., USMC, 213, 218 
Linguist training, 106 
Lithuania 

rebellion against Soviet Union, 83-85 
Loquai, Brig. Gen. Doctor Heinz, 57, 149, 151, 253 
Lukashenko, Belarus President Aleksander R., 240, 241 
Lukes, Chief Warrant Officer 4 Michael R., USA, 104, 108 
L’Unite Beige de Verification, 58, 138-139 
L’Unite Fran^aise de Verification, 57-58, 108, 137-138 

M 

Majoor, Netherlands Ambassador Frank, 250, 255 
Malinowski, Col. Stanislaw, 139-140, 152, 207, 239 
Mamedov, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi, 250- 
251 


Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe, 7 

Medvedev, Gen.-Lt. Vladimir I., 112, 117, 140 

Melat, Kip, 163 

Melomedov, Col. M.Y., 141 

Merkle, Capt. Ellen, USAF, 170 

Miget, French Ambassador Bernard, 255 

Mitterrand, President Francois, 8, 13, 15 

Mock inspections 

container definition, 117 
in Eastern Europe, 110-120 
initial inspections, 106-110 
as key concept in training, 146 
number of, 120 
photography issue, 116-117 
site diagram issue, 119, 120 
tri-national, 111-120 
Moenchengladbach, Germany 
baseline inspection, 187 
Moiseyev, Gen. Mikhail A., 77, 78, 81 
Moldova 

concerns over Russia’s future security intentions, 251 
Morris, Lt. Col. (formerly Maj.) Dee Dodson, USA, 166, 
167,169-170 
Multinational teams 

baseline inspections, 185 
reductions inspections, 217-220, 252-253 
Murray, Lt. Col. Kirk E., USA, 217 

N 

NACC. See North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
NAKI. See National Agency for Control and Inspection 
Naro-Fominsk, Russia 

baseline inspection, 181-183 
National Agency for Control and Inspection, 141-142 
National Security Directive 41, 45 
National verification agencies, 56-60 
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NATO nations. See also specific countries by name 
flank limits, 248-249, 250 
reduction liability, 200 

residual level validation period inspections, 228, 231 
residual levels after reductions, 221-222 
VERITY access, 254 
Nedimoglu, Necil, 253 
Nelson, Lt. Col. Paul H., USA, 49, 65 
Nelson, Sgt. Joseph S., USA, 100 
The Netherlands 

Arms Control Branch, 59, 139 
transfer of TLE to other NATO states, 204 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 85, 87, 88 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. See also NATO 
nations; specific countries by name 
allocation of inspection quotas within each group of 
states, 52-53 
dualism in, 8 

Equipment Transfer Plan, 204-205 

guest inspectors, 185 

Harmonization Plan, 47 

High Level Task Force, 6-7, 17, 61 

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions negotiations, 

4-6 

projected baseline inspections, 51-53 



Index 367 


three-day time block for inspections, 193-194 
total OOVs reduced, 61 
total TLE items reduced, 61 
training course for inspectors, 100 
Verification Coordinating Committee, 52-53, 60-62, 
156-157, 190-192 
Norway 

flank limits, 249 
Novyy, Russia 

baseline inspection, 178-180 
Nowak, Maj. Henry J., USA, 111, 112 
NRRCs. See Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers 
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, 56, 127, 134, 158, 203 
Nuclear Testing Treaties, 45 
Nunn-Lugar funds for TLE reductions, 239-240 

o 

Oatman, Lt. Col. (formerly Maj.) Keith A., USA, 114, 169, 
184, 215-216 

Objects of verification. See also Treaty-limited equipment 
as basis for calculating number of inspections, 12, 13 
inspection and, 34-36 
reduction and, 29-30 

Soviet agreement for challenge inspections of, 82-83 
Soviet Union transfer of, 75, 77 
total NATO items reduced, 61 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 47 
Oleynik, Gen.-Lt. Ivan, 237 

On-Site Inspection Agency. See also Baseline inspections; 
European Operations Command; Inspection teams 
establishment, 3, 56 
expansion of mission, 45, 46 
Memorandum of Understanding, 47-48 
new leadership for, 62-65 
sizing the CFE Treaty mission, 48-53 
On-site inspections. See also Baseline inspections; 
Inspection teams; Verification agencies 
certification inspections, 36 

challenge inspections, 32-35, 170, 174, 184, 215-217 
communications issues, 127-128 
declared site inspection, 31-32, 33-34, 176-183, 192, 
215-217, 234, 235-237 
equipment recognition training, 100-105 
escort operations, 185-187 
escort responsibilities, 46 
initial training, 99-100 
linguist training, 106 
mock inspections, 106-128 
multinational teams, 185, 217-220, 226, 252-253 
number conducted, 226 
operational concepts for, 98-99, 146 
reduction inspections, 35-36 
site diagrams issue, 162, 167, 177-183, 187 
transportation issues, 125-127 
OOVs. See Objects of verification 
Open Skies Treaty, 3, 136 

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 256 
O’Shea, Maj. Richard J., USAF, 114, 121, 122, 123, 189 
Oslo Extraordinary Conference, 90, 202 

P 

Parker, Maj. Gen. Robert W., USAF, 48, 114, 115, 118, 
123, 161, 163, 194 


Parsons, Bill, 99 

Partridge, MSgt. (formerly Sergeant First Class) George A., 
USA, 100 

Patsiorin, Col. Lev Vladimirovich, 166, 167 
Pavlenko, Col. V., 179-180 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, 46 
Pedersen, Lt. Ole T., 182 

Periman, Sergeant First Class Kenneth D., USA, 164 

Perry, U.S. Secretary of Defense William S., 240, 250 

Persian Gulf War. See Desert Shield 

Pestana, Maj. Steven E., USAF, 125 

Pesterfield, Lt. Col. John D., USAF, 191-192 

Petrovskiy, Vladimir, 86 

Photography 

mock inspections and, 116-117 
PNET. See Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty 
Poland 

cost of TLE reductions, 239 
readiness for entry into force, 152 
reduction inspection of Dabrowa Gornicza, 211-212 
reduction of TLE, 207, 208, 210 
verification agency, 135, 139-140 
Powell, Gen. Colin L., USA, 47, 79 
Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments 
and Equipment Subject to the Treaty, 19-20, 29, 30, 
34, 102, 176, 254-255 
Protocol on Inspection, 33-34, 66, 166 
Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, 28- 
30 

Protocol on Reduction, 26, 206-207 
Pushkin, Russia 

mock inspection, 118, 119, 177 

R 

Ratification delay 

Baltic states crisis, 83-85 

Commonwealth of Independent States crisis, 85-90 
data exchange crisis, 74-83 
parallel developments, 67-68 
provisional implementation decision, 90-91 
ratification process, 74 
Reagan, President Ronald W., 3, 45 
Rebholz, Maj. Jon, Jr., USMC, 231 
Reduction methods, 26-28, 206-207, 237-241 
Reduction process, 207, 210-213 
Reductions, 35-36 

calendar reporting periods, 210 

CFE Treaty objectives, 199, 226 

“cheese slicer” or “cookie cutter” compactor, 238 

comparison by group of states, 257 

costs of, 237-241 

declared site and challenge inspections, 215-217 
destruction commitments east of the Ural Mountains, 
245-246 

East-on-East inspections, 214-215, 218 

Eastern inspections, 213-215 

equipment display, 211 

first reduction year, 25-26 

multinational teams, 217-220 

national holdings by alliance, 200 

official notification of, 210-211 

reduction liabilities, 200-206, 226 

reduction methods, 26-28, 206-207, 237-241 






368 


On-Site Inspection Agency 


reduction process, 207, 210-213 
residual levels, 221-222 
right of refusal to reduction inspections, 211 
U.S. baseline reduction inspections, 190-192 
“Report to Congress on Noncompliance with Arms 
Control Agreements,” 183 
Reppert, Col. John C., USA, 61, 65 
Residual level validation period, 228-231, 233-234 
Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany 

as gateway for U.S. inspection teams, 48-49, 62 
training site for inspectors, 100 
Rhine Ordnance Barracks, Germany 
baseline inspection, 187 
RLVP. See Residual level validation period 
Romania 

inspection of Cazarma Centru Oradea, 219 
Rozec, Col. Francois, 58, 137-138, 147-148, 152 
Russia 

baseline inspections of U.S. and Canadian forces 
stationed in Germany, 165-170 
Black Sea Fleet, 243-245 
Chechnya issue, 249-250 
compliance difficulties, 243-245, 258 
declared site access interpretation, 176-183, 192, 235- 
237 

flank limits, 247-248 
inspection team training, 149-150 
mock inspections and, 118-120 
readiness for entry into force, 152 
reduction liability, 226 
TLE reduced, 259 
verification agency, 134, 140-141 
Russian/German/U.S. mock inspections, 111-120 

s 

Saint, Gen. Crosbie E., USA, 48, 54-55 
Schroder, Senior Master Sergeant Clifford A., USAF, 101 
Schwan, Lt. Col. P., 111, 112, 113 
Schweinfurt, Germany 

baseline inspection, 167, 169 
Sensitive or classified programs, 38-40, 176 
Shevardnadze, Foreign Minister Eduard, 10, 17, 77, 78, 79 
Shevtsov, Russian Gen. Leontin, 249 
Shustov, Valery, 87 
Shuya, Russia 

baseline inspection, 177 
Sierra, Staff Sergeant Gilbert, Jr., USA, 101 
Site diagrams 

mock inspections and, 119, 120 
on-site inspections and, 162, 167, 177-183, 187 
Siverskiy Air Base 

mock inspection, 118 
Slepnev, Col. S.N., 140 
Sloss, David, 99 
Slovak Republic 

reduction inspection of Trencin, 213, 214 
Smith, Col. William R., USAF, 143, 191, 192 
Snedeker, Lt. Col. Donald C., USA, 114, 115, 116 
Soviet Union. See also Commonwealth of Independent 
States; Russia 

coastal defense forces, 77, 79-80, 82-83, 89-90, 201, 
203, 217, 245 

collapse of, 68, 84-85, 91, 134, 150, 202, 227, 228, 
234,261 


first official treaty data exchange, 51-52 
flank limits, 247-248 
military withdrawals, 9, 12, 53 

naval infantry forces, 67, 77, 79-80, 81, 82-83, 89-90, 
201, 203, 217, 245 

Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, 56, 127, 134, 203 
number of military personnel deployed in Europe, 37 
reclassification of TLE, 65 
reduction pledges, 201-202, 245-246 
Strategic Rocket Forces, 77, 81, 82-83, 201, 245 
Tashkent accords on allocation of TLE, 88-90 
TLE discrepancies, 75, 78, 81, 82-83 
transfer of TLE to areas east of the Ural Mountains, 52, 
53, 67, 75, 77, 201, 245 
verification agency, 134 
Spangdahlem Air Base 

mock inspection, 115-118 
Sparks, POl David E., USN, 170 
START. See Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
Steinberg, Col. (GS) Joern, 136 
Stockholm Agreement of 1986, 3 
Stockholm Document, 6, 14, 56-57, 140 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, 3, 45, 49, 62, 123 

T 

Tait, Maj. Ronald M., USAF, 216 

Tashkent Agreement, 88-90, 202, 204, 239, 242, 244 

Team Fiser, 215, 216-217, 218 

Team Gessert, 181-182, 185 

Team Jubilee, 217 

Team Tait, 217 

Team Weller, 167, 169-170 

Team White, 157-165 

Tesori, Col. Brenno, 185 

Thatcher, British Prime Minister Margaret H., 8, 13 
Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 3, 46, 49, 62 
TLE. See Treaty-limited equipment 
Towne, TSgt. James L., USAF, 101 
Transportation for inspection teams, 125-127 
Treaty Between the Twenty-Two Sovereign Nations on the 
Reduction of Their Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe, 3 

Treaty-limited equipment. See also Objects of verification; 
Reductions 

accounting for among the successor states, 241-245 
as basis for calculating number of inspections, 12 
cascading of, 204-206 
comparison of national holding, 259 
costs of reductions, 237-241 
external markings record, 112 
inspection and, 34-35, 190-192 
recognition training, 99, 100-105 
reduction methods, 26-28, 206-207 
Soviet discrepancies in number of, 75, 78, 81, 82-83, 
201-204 

Soviet movement of, 52, 53, 67, 75, 77 
Tashkent accords on allocation of, 88-90, 202, 204, 
239, 242, 244 

total decrease after reductions, 222 
total NATO items reduced, 61 
transfer to allied nations, 47, 204-206 
types, 18-19 

Tri-national inspections, 111-120 



Index 


369 


Tsepkalo, Belarus Deputy Foreign Minister Valeriy, 241 
Tsygankov, Gen.-Maj. Sergey Fedorovich, 140-141, 150, 
152, 182 

TTBT. See Threshold Test Ban Treaty 
Turkey 

flank limits, 249-250 
Two-meter access rule, 38, 175 

u 

Ukraine 

Black Sea Fleet, 243-245 

compliance difficulties, 243-245, 258 

concerns over Russia’s future security intentions, 251 

cost of TLE reductions, 237-238 

declared site understanding, 183, 192 

flank limits, 247-248 

reduction liability, 226 

Verification Center of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 
142-144 

Unification of Germany, 8-9, 51, 259-260, 261 
United Kingdom. See Great Britain 
United States 

baseline escort operations, 185-187 
baseline operations, 174-176 
baseline reduction inspections, 190-192 
cascading of equipment, 204-206 
combat readiness concerns, 55 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, 240 
declared site access interpretation, 176-183, 235-237 
declared site inspections during the first reduction year, 
219-220 

first baseline inspection, 157-165 
first escort mission, 165-170 
first liaison mission, 170 

inspection teams, 65-67. See also On-Site Inspection 
Agency 

liaison operations, 188-190 

military withdrawals from Western Europe, 54, 258, 

261 

Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, 127, 158 
number of baseline inspections conducted by, 174, 194 
number of military personnel deployed in Europe, 37 
reduction liability, 204-206 

residual level validation period inspections, 231, 233 
Russian baseline inspections of U.S. and Canadian forces 
stationed in Germany, 165-170 
strict adherence to CFE Treaty provisions, 193-194, 220 
TLE reduced, 259 
Urban, Lt. Col. Klaus, 166, 167 
Urechye, Russia 

challenge inspection, 184 
U.S. Army Russian Institute, 106 
U.S. Atlantic Command 

Memorandum of Understanding, 47-48 
U.S. Embassy 

Arms Control Implementation Unit, 161 
USSR. See Soviet Union 


cadre model of agencies, 58-59, 60, 134, 139, 144 
ratification delay and, 67-68 
separate agencies, 56-58, 59-60, 134, 144 
Verification Center of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 142- 
144 

Verification Coordinating Committee 

allocation of inspection quotas within groups of NATO 
states, 52-53, 156-157 
baseline reduction inspections, 190-192 
Cooperative Partners plan, 214-215, 218, 252-253 
deconfliction schedule, 61-62, 157, 174 
description, 60 
purpose, 61 

selection of specific OOV for inspection, 157 
seminars, 227-228, 253 
VERITY database, 215, 227, 254, 260-261 
Vienna Documents, 3, 14, 52, 58, 127, 136, 137 
Vitse, Georges M., 182 
von Moltke, Gebhardt, 61 

w 

Ward, Staff Sergeant Cecil L., USA, 101 
Warsaw Pact. See Warsaw Treaty Organization 
Warsaw Treaty Organization. See also Eastern states; 
specific countries by name 
collapse of, 8, 228, 254 
dominant role of Soviet Union, 145 
dualism in, 8 
flank limits, 246 
Hungary’s withdrawal from, 9 

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions negotiations, 4- 

6 

signing of CFE Treaty, 74 
Weller, Maj. George P., USAF, 167, 169-170 
White, Lt. Col. Elmer G. (Guy), USA, 111, 157-165, 177, 
187 

Wierema, Navy Cdr. C.N.M., 59, 139 
Wintersteen, Capt. Jeremy, 161-162, 163, 164 
Woolsey, Ambassador R. James, 11, 78, 80, 82, 88 
WTO. See Warsaw Treaty Organization 
Wuensdorf, Germany 

baseline reduction inspection, 191-192 

Y 

Yazov, Defense Minister Marshall Dmitriy, 78 
Yefstaviyev, Gennadiy, 11, 12, 13, 176 
Yeltsin, President Boris, 80, 88, 240-241, 244, 248, 249- 
250 

z 

Zentrum fur Verifikationsaufgaben der Bundeswehr, 57, 
110-111, 114, 135-137, 172 
ZVBW. See Zentrum fur Verifikationsaufgaben der 
Bundeswehr 


V 

Vakar, Gen.-Maj. Viktor K., 141, 239 
Verbruggen, Leo, 61 

Verification agencies. See also Inspection teams; specific 
countries and agencies by name 























































































































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